EU-Russia Relations and the International Society Theory

Tom Hashimoto
Introduction: EU-Russia Relations and the International Society Theory

research articles

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Introduction: EU-Russia Relations and the International Society Theory

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The 2004/07 enlargement brought the European Union (EU) and Russia a step closer to one another in at least geographical terms. Regional actors mapped their already interrelated geopolitical interests via various negotiating frameworks such as the EU-Russia Summit, the G-20 and the United Nations. Nevertheless, due to the quasi-federal nature of the EU, a continuing fear of Russia that is once again on the rise, and the glowing ambition of some Member States, EU-Russia relations are still shaped by the intertwined bi- and multi-lateral relations between individual Member States and Russia. In this process, the European Commission, multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations tackle specific issues vis-a-vis Russia, such as energy security, trade deficit and educational reform, but a wider level-playing field is still a long way from being achieved. The complex mechanisms of dialogue in the EU-Russia discourse are hard to be narrowed down to mere inter-state power politics or liberal institutionalist understanding of EU affairs alone. A broader consensus must be evidenced.

The annual agenda of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (the EU Presidency) is currently shared by Hungary and Poland within the rotation mechanism. Despite the diminished role of the Presidency in a post-Lisbon Union, EU-Russia relations, in particular the issues related to the concept of 'shared neighbourhood', continue to be the primary subjects of much discussion amongst EU institutions. By externalising EU-Russia relations, however, the focus of scholarly debate largely omits the critical internal competition and opposition within Brussels itself. This being said, there has been a trend towards commonality in forming a single European Foreign Policy vis-a-vis Russia since the Central and Eastern European transitions. A shift from Cold War politics to ‘strategic partnership’ is being noted but how founded is this assumption?

In answering this critical question this special issue embeds the discourse on EU-Russia relations in International Society (IS) theory in order to create a level-playing field that has thus far eluded scholarly debates. Unlike World Society, where scholars emphasise the influences of non-state actors, International Society is a theory of states where members share a common set of rules with often an administering body. Hedley Bull stated in his Anarchical Society (1977), that IS, despite its capacity to embrace supranational institutions, remains without a governing organisation. In other words, each member's behaviour is based on its own rationale. Furthermore, we theorise that there exist several ISs at regional level. Russia, for one, shares a different set of common rules with the US than it does with the EU. While our contributors analyse different aspects of IS, there are three unifying features which this special issue emphasises more generally in its contribution to scholarship: (1) members of an IS share the understanding that they are capable of establishing common values, interests and institutions; (2) members of an IS react not only to opportunities and threats, but also prestige and reputation; and (3) all regional ISs are a...
sub-set of the global IS and, therefore, regional ISs are characterised by their members’ relations with the global IS.

Outside of the disciplinary boundary of political science, the theoretical approach of IS coincides with New Institutional Economics (NIE). The NIE scholars generally define an ‘institution’ as a mechanism which produces a set of rules and penalties, both in the broader sense of the terms. For an institution to be efficient\(^1\), its members have to be informed about the rules, and penalties must be credible enough to give incentives to alter a member’s behaviour. In this regard, even abstract concepts, such as the market, can be considered an ‘institution’ since market price or reputation can act as a penalty. In this sense, an IS is also an ‘institution’, whereby each regional and global IS has its own set of rules with a penalty mechanism, primarily understood as loss of reputation and stick in some future negotiations. Likewise, rewards in IS act as incentive-giving mechanisms to comply with the rules of the level-playing field.

From the standpoint of Law and Economics (also Economic Analysis of Law), a normative argument originating from a NIE understanding of IS is that members of an IS can collectively – and perhaps correctly – design the very rules they are governed by, thereby creating incentives for others to achieve socially beneficial common goals. Methodological individualism, i.e. each member of a society focuses on own benefits, does not contradict such collective designing mechanism. To put this into the EU-Russia discourse, it is not too optimistic to hope for achieving mutual agreements among all layers of individual participants. The creation of such a level-playing field depends on rules which are currently shared, mechanisms of incentive-giving, and communication amongst the parties concerned. In this respect IS theory acknowledges path-dependency.

This special issue begins with the paper by Marcin Kaczmarski, which illustrates the complexity of global IS by analysing how regional actors promote their own vision of international order. Within the context of various international crises, EU-Russia relations have faced difficulties in applying a common approach. Thus, a layer of EU-Russia relations as a regional IS interacts with the global IS, while the process of synthesising them may prolong. Such an analysis is linked in with the so-called concept of ‘securitisation’ by the Copenhagen School of international relations, whereby the securitising actors themselves are the audience. In other words, despite each actor’s own vision within the global IS, the decision of regionalised collective action must coincide with some degree of consensus whether it is written or not. This consensus in turn is the core of regional IS.

James Ker-Lindsay examines the way in which political debates over international law shaped EU-Russia regional IS during the Kosovo status process. He focuses on the core differences between two actors rather than their similarities, drawing a marked difference between EU ‘pragmatism’ and Russian ‘constitutionalism’ during this period - although, as is also noted, Russia’s claim to adhere to international law was severely undermined a few months later by its decision to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia. His analysis emphasises that the EU was not simply ‘a victim of external machinations’ during the Kosovo crisis, as has been suggested. Rather, key EU members felt that it was necessary to accept independence, which was been strongly advocated by the United States, despite the serious legal questions over such a move. In doing so, they decided to bypass Russian concerns and circumvent Moscow’s veto power in the UN Security Council. This analysis completes our view of looking at EU-Russia relations as a single regional IS. The analysis has opened a theoretical discussion that regional IS can be thematic, whereby actors freely opt-out from IS institutions. In this sense, it opens the way for further research on EU’s negotiation behaviour vis-à-vis Russia in other international crisis where the opt-outs have

\(^1\) ‘Efficiency’ of institution is also understood as the minimisation of the so-called ‘transaction costs’ and the internalisation of negative externalities. See Coase (1960) and Williamson (1979).
been observed.

Departing from individual case studies, Sandra Fernandes presents an analysis of the European security architecture. She focuses on the gap between the highly institutionalised interactions between Russia and the EU on the one hand, and the lack of ‘political convergence’ on the other. Despite seemingly multilateral approaches by the EU and Russia, Brussels reacts in a peculiar manner even though both actors need to address common security challenges, some of which are discussed in details both by Kaczmarski and Ker-Lindsay. The normative conclusion is, therefore, that the development of the EU-Russia dialogue in the area of security is ‘in the search for collective and legitimate solutions’. The outcome of dialogue highly depends on bi- and multi-lateral levels of interactions in forming the relations. Especially noteworthy in this is the role played by individual states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Estonia during their respective rotating leadership of the EU Presidency. While the Presidency as an EU institution has limited decision-making power in the post-Lisbon EU, it has enormous potential for promoting multilateral political convergence.

In line with the ‘securitisation’ debates, Olga Khrushcheva’s paper raises the question of whether Russia takes advantages of the EU for its lack of solidarity over a common energy policy. She analyses EU-Russia energy relations as a multi-layered dialogue, where a disagreement between an EU Member State with Russia becomes a disagreements within the EU. She implicitly points out that the political dimension in the EU-Russia discourse (negatively) influences the economic dimension of relations, while an effective dialogue should be the other way around. This view is shared by Bozhilova and Hashimoto (2011). The novelty of the analysis lies in the normative view on ‘de-securitisig’ EU-Russia energy supply whereby the Moscow-Brussels dialogue becomes a single channel for coordination. The potential for further research in this field with the aid of methodologies derived from law and economics, such as the game theory, is enormous.

Ekaterina Gorbunova casts a light on EU-Russia relations from a unique point of view: education. If the EU itself is seen as a regional IS, its shared value includes democracy and its common action includes democratisation of neighbouring countries. Without determining which value – European or Russian – is superior to the other, her positive analysis evaluates the EU ‘soft power’ presence in Russia. She characterises the EU effort to promote democratic values through education in Russia not as paternalistic or an exploiting action, but rather as an ‘exporting’ action. In her article, IS theory meets with traditional social constructivism through the EU-Russia discourse. While theoretical applications of such synthesised schools of thought are yet limited to education, it is easy to foresee the practical values of this theory in conjunction with other fields of enquiry, such as foreign direct investment, party politics and ethnic conflicts. A pessimistic stance whereby the EU and Russia do not – or even cannot – share the fundamental values or common regional IS is therefore refuted.

The special issue concludes with an empirical research by Caterina Carta and Stefano Braghiroli. They compose an index to measure ‘friendliness towards Russia’ for each EU Member State, reflecting their political and economic reality. Intuition tells us that energy dependence as well as the long shadow of history would retain the East-West divide in EU-Russia relations. The index, however, illustrates rather a nuanced picture beyond a simple East-West cleavage. From the perspective of IS theory, this is a frequent phenomenon whereby the power balance between regional ISSs, the EU and the former Eastern bloc, modifies the behaviour of political actors located at the centre of the spectrum. Furthermore, the methodological novelty of the study lies in the fact that it focuses on voting behaviours in the European Parliament, rather than on individual Member States’ behaviours in the Council. The authors find that some members of the European Parliament continuously defect from respective Political Groups and vote along a ‘national’
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preference vote. Those are indeed the Member States to be found at the extreme ends of the ‘friendliness index’. The index is likely to have further applications to the field of EU external relations, as well as EU-Turkey relations.

In conclusion, this special issue presents the competing, overlapping and functional nature of regional IS. It is competing as each state simultaneously channels foreign policy objectives towards the global IS through various regional ISs. In some cases, EU-Russia diplomacy functions as a single regional IS, whilst in others, the new Member States of the EU act with one voice as an IS themselves, hence, the idea of overlapping. Such IS is functional as each member promotes their own issues while many share negotiation behaviours or a pattern culture common to others. The EU as it stands in the views of our authors is a competing, overlapping and functional IS (Frey and Eichenberger 1996), and its efficiency, as well as high degree of democracy, can be maintained through flexible membership guaranteed by the opt-out mechanism (Schmidt 2009).

It is important to acknowledge that many contributions to this special issue are based on discussions during the panel on ‘EU-Russia relations through International Society theory’ at the ECPR/SGIR Pan-European Conference at Stockholm in September 2010. Since then, the JCER editorial team led by Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert has been instrumental in making this special issue happen. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for sharing their wisdom. I am further thankful to many colleagues from the UACES annual conference in Angers, France, who inspired me to launch this project.

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References


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Which Rules for the Global Order? The Global Dimension of the Russian-EU Relationship – The Case of International Crises

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Abstract

Both the European Union and Russia have demonstrated aspirations to shape the international order on a global level. The EU has been the most prominent exponent and promoter of a solidarist vision of the International Society (IS), whereas the Russian Federation has belonged to the proponents of a pluralist international order. This article therefore analyses how both actors have attempted to reconcile their respective visions of the IS and what the consequences for the global order have been. It argues that rules and norms have formed the core of the IS and have directly influenced the international order. Three major international crises (Iranian, Middle Eastern and Kosovo) have been chosen as case studies. The selected crises have touch upon crucial rules and norms: the use of force, the scope of non-military coercion, the non-intervention principle, human rights and the inclusion-exclusion issue. The extent of cooperation between Russia and the EU in particular crises has varied. Both actors have been able to overcome some of their differences and reconcile their positions. However, it seems that the differences between Russia and the EU regarding the rules and norms of the IS have been too broad to allow for a common normative base of an emerging global order. Despite general agreement on common interests, the detailed content of norms and rules has remained the source of disputes and has slowed down (or has even made impossible) the practical application of a common approach. Therefore, Russian-EU relations in a global dimension should be expected to prolong the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provide a basis for it.

Keywords

Russia; European Union; International society; International crisis

IN THE EARLY 2000s, CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM REGARDING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN the European Union and Russia dominated, with the notion of ‘strategic partnership’ eagerly used. Nonetheless, the development of the relationship turned out to be far from expected, not to mention the inability of parties to fill the so-called ‘common spaces’ with practical cooperation. The relationship was also filled with serious tensions, such as on the occasion of the Georgian war. However, it has not discouraged politicians and experts, as well as academics, from treating Russia and the EU as natural partners in dealing with global challenges, from regional conflicts to weapons of mass destruction proliferation through climate change. This approach has gained new ground along with the project of ‘Partnership for modernisation’ between Russia and the EU, advocated by President Dmitri Medvedev, and with the issue of co-operation in the sphere of international security governance coming to the fore.

Available at: http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/343/274
One of the challenges of dealing with the Russian-EU relations arises from the fact that they take place within both the European Regional International Society (ERIS) and the global International Society (IS). Within the ERIS, the EU and Russia enjoy different statuses. The EU represents the core of a regional International Society. Russia occupies a liminal position – remaining outside core institutions (the EU and NATO), whilst being a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and asserting a European identity (Stivachtis and Webber 2011: 106). Within the global International Society, Russia and the EU are key and more equal actors. The EU is the most prominent exponent and promoter of a solidarist vision, whereas the Russian Federation belongs to the proponents of a pluralist IS. At the same time, both actors have rejected US unilateralism and the attempts at replacing the global IS with American hegemony (Hurrell 2007). The Russian-EU interaction within the framework of the global International Society has not received as much scholarly attention as their relationship within the European Regional International Society (Aalto 2007, Sakwa 2011, Stivachtis and Webber 2011). Nevertheless, it is of crucial importance for both actors’ participation in global governance, as well as for the shape of a post-unilateral international order.

Of the three building blocks of the International Society concept – common interests and values, common rules and norms, common institutions – it is norms and rules that offer the most promising insight into the Russian-EU relationship within the global IS. Norms and rules that are supported and replicated by its members and respective institutions remain the core of the International Society (Bull 2002). They are the most interpreted and reconstructed element of the IS. At the same time they cannot be separated from power and actual policy behaviour of a particular actor. The relationship between norms and power remains a complex and multidirectional one, with one element taking no precedence over the other (Hurrell 2007). Thus, the agreement on common rules defines the scope of possible cooperation between Russia and the EU within the global IS. It also enables to assess to what extent the Russian-European consensus may serve as a foundation for the emerging global order.

The norms and rules are most openly challenged in the very moments of international crises. They force states to define their attitudes, since the necessary search for consensus in the process of crisis management leads to the reproduction (and reinterpretation) of the constitutional principles of the IS (Clark 2007). As Russia and the EU have strived to participate in the process of crisis management and have put forward their own solutions (especially after the shock of the Iraq war of 2003), selected international crises have been chosen as empirical evidence for the purpose of this article. Three case studies illustrate Russia’s and the EU’s practical approaches to the rules and norms of the global International Society: the Iranian crisis, the Kosovo independence crisis and the Middle Eastern (understood in terms of the Israeli-Arab conflict) crisis. Each of them posed a serious challenge to global governance and, at the same time, none has involved any massive use of force.

The main claim of the article is that the differences between Russia and the EU regarding the rules and norms of the International Society have been too broad to allow for a common normative approach with regard to an emerging global order. The very interpretation of norms and rules has remained the source of disputes and has slowed down, or even blocked, the emergence of such a common approach. Thus, the Russian-EU relationship in a global dimension should be expected to prolong the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provide a normative basis for it.

The article begins with a presentation of the place of Russia and that of the EU within the global International Society against the backdrop of the current state of the IS. The main part analyses Russian and EU approaches towards selected norms and rules of the IS:
regarding the circle of decision-makers (*i.e.* who is entitled to deal with the crisis), referring to the use of force and the use of non-military coercion; concerning the limits of sovereignty and membership within the IS. The final section presents the broader implications of the EU's and Russia's approaches to the norms and rules of the International Society.

**Russia and the EU in the contemporary *global* International Society**

This section aims to present the scholarly debate on the place occupied by Russia and the EU within the contemporary *global* IS. The section begins by presenting current themes in the debate on the post-Cold War IS and follows with the debate on the place of Russia and that of the EU within it.

**The state of the global International Society**

The post-Cold War International Society is distinguished by internal contradictions. On the one hand, the beginning of the 1990s seemed to bring a new consensus with the former Third World joining the Western core and its vision of an IS, albeit to some extent as a result of ‘coercive socialisation’, and more in the economic sphere than with regard to the liberal order as a whole (Hurrell 2007: 211-214). On the other hand, several trends have gone against this new consensus – the ultimately failed ‘American Empire’ project (which would replace a *global* IS with hegemony), the emergence of non-Western centres of power (that challenge solidarism as creating too ‘thick’ an IS) and the *regionalisation* of the IS (happening to the disadvantage of the *global* IS). The tensions between solidarism and pluralism have led to the attempts to reinvent the IS in a restricted shape, comprising (mostly) Western democracies (Clark 2007: 187). The picture gets even more complicated with the inclusion of mechanisms of governance beyond the state (Hurrell 2007: 291-292).

However, despite claims of some radical critics (*e.g.* Dunne 2001), these internal tensions have not made the *global* IS disappear. Although Western march towards solidarism has been blocked by other actors, a simple retreat to pluralism seems impossible, due to such factors as complexity of global governance, identity politics and struggle for recognition, the need for socialized power, global inequality and demands for justice (Hurrell 2007: 292-298). As a result, the international order (understood as *patterns of governance and institutionalisation in world politics* and the ability of a society of states to ‘provide a practically viable and normatively acceptable framework for global political order in an era of globalization’) remains in flux and unfinished (Hurrell 2007: 1-2). As this new international order has to depend to a significant extent upon the type of relations between major powers, Russia’s and the European Union’s ways of engagement with the IS, as well as their bilateral relationship in a global dimension are of crucial importance.

The post-Cold War crises have revealed these unfinished processes of the formation of a new international order and at least some of them may be considered turning points in the evolution of the IS (to name among the most consequential NATO’s war in Kosovo in 1999 or the American war against Iraq of 2003). The crises used in this article as case studies have not involved any massive use of force; however, their influence on the fundamentals of the *global* IS has remained significant.

The Iranian crisis (2003-present) has been triggered by the development of a nuclear program by Tehran and by the concealment of certain activities from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The crisis unfolded in two stages: the first comprised the years 2003-2006, and the second followed immediately and continues until the present. The resumption of the uranium enrichment process by Iran marked the turning point and
the onset of stage two. Formally, Iran has remained a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has declared its actions to be exclusively a way of guaranteeing the right to civilian nuclear power. Practically since 2003 there exists a risk of the use of force against Iran, either by the United States or by Israel.

The Kosovo crisis (2003-2008) has had its roots in the 1999 war, which, led by NATO under the banner of the protection of Albanian residents of the Serbia’s province of Kosovo, did not bring about an ultimate resolution. Kosovo has become a protectorate of Western countries in practice independent from Serbia, although some countries still regard Kosovo as a part of the Serbian state. From 2003 onwards, the UN has attempted to resolve the situation in Kosovo on a permanent basis. However, it has not been until the fiasco of the negotiations between the Serbs and the Albanians (originally kicked off in 2006) that the Kosovo crisis moved to the open phase (Balcer et al. 2008: 19). The main sticking point turned out to be the idea of internationally overseen independence of the province, which was envisioned by the plan proposed by the UN negotiator Matti Ahtisaari. The crisis has been put to an end by the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, supported by majority of Western states.

The notion of Middle Eastern crisis is limited in this article to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which entered a new phase with the second intifada, begun in the year 2000. In 2002, there emerged a new peace initiative known as the Quartet, which included representatives from the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. A so-called ‘Roadmap for Peace’, which envisaged the creation of the Palestinian State was presented on 30 April 2003, but the majority of the proposed ideas intended to normalize the situation fell flat. Other factors accelerating the conflict dynamics included the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections, the 2007 Annapolis Conference, the civil war between Hamas – controlling the Gaza Strip – and Fatah controlling the West Bank and the Israel’s war against Hamas of 2009.

Russia and the EU in the global International Society

The places that Russia and the EU have occupied in the global International Society have reflected the nature of actors, their power and the above-presented current state of the IS. The European Union, although far from being a unitary actor and being rather weak in terms of hard power, has remained at the core of the Western-led solidarist IS. Russia, on its part, has remained at the margins of the global solidarist IS, even despite a resurgence in power since the mid-2000s. At the same time, the influence of both actors on the post-Cold War order has been limited by their inability to match the US predominance.

Russia has been treated as being a part of the European IS¹ and as a representative of one of the ‘competing universalisms’ during the Cold War. Nevertheless, it has not been at the centre of IS studies. Within the post-Cold War IS, Russia has been placed on the margins, presented as striving to ‘adapt’ to the global Western-led institutions of the IS (Buzan 2004: 238) or being in ‘quest’ for the IS (Aalto 2007: 460). Even in the main question of its article on Putin’s project, Browning asks to what extent Russia can be integrated into an IS of shared (i.e. Western) norms, suggesting an adaptive and passive role of Russia within the IS (Browning 2008: 5). Averre points at Russia as undergoing a ‘slow and uneven process of adjustment towards acceptance of common rules’ (Averre 2008). The predominant reason for such assessments seems to be the overall decline of Russia after the end of the Cold

¹ ‘Russia was half way European anyway, and had made it into European international society by the early eighteenth century’ (Buzan and Little 2008: 9).
Concerning Russia’s vision of the IS, it is rooted in history and culture, and can be summed up as ‘statist, traditional and conservative’ (MacFarlane 2003: 206; 2006). Russia perceives the international order through a Westphalian lens, as being pluralist and based on sovereign equality (Stent 2008: 1098), although, at the same time, Moscow has found such a vision increasingly difficult to apply in practice.

The challenge of analysing the EU’s place within the global International Society is double-edged. On the one hand, the EU remains the core of the European Regional International Society, much more advanced in terms of ‘thickness’ than the global IS (Stivachtis and Webber 2011). The EU has also attempted to extend its own model of political development to remaining parts of Europe. On the other hand, the EU is far from being a unitary actor with one identity, since the complex character of the Union includes differences among particular Member States and institutions at the EU level. Bearing this in mind, inter-subjective ‘common denominator’ may still be found, reflected in key documents adopted at the highest level and actions undertaken by the EU (which, if not supported by all members, are at least not blocked by opponents). Notwithstanding the above, the European Union has remained at the core of the global International Society and has advanced an ambitious normative and practical global solidarist agenda, comprising free market economy, human rights, multilateralism, environment, humanitarian intervention and mechanisms of global governance. Despite often serious differences, the EU, along with the US, has been an engine of the post-Cold War transformation of the IS and the centre of debates on its future.

The positions of Russia and the EU towards the rules and norms of the global International Society

This section analyses Russia’s and the EU’s interpretations and applications of particular norms and rules in the framework of dealing with selected international crises. It should be stressed that neither Russia nor the EU has been able to play a primary role in the process of crisis management, as their activities have to be put against the backdrop of American primacy.

The circle of decision-makers within the International Society

The issue of which actors are entitled to, and at the same time responsible for, dealing with international crises, reveals Russia’s and the EU’s approach to the norms and rules referring to the circle of decision-makers within the International Society. Three aspects are to be analysed: the attitudes towards the US predominance and its unilateral approach to crises; the notions of multilateralism (in terms of institutions and actors engaged); and the readiness to pursue unilateral actions in the process of crisis management (which implicitly reveals the understanding of consensus by each actor).

In general, Russia and the EU have preferred a multilateral approach to crisis management and have denounced unilateral actions, rejecting American attempts to establish an hegemonic order (notwithstanding some internal differences within the EU, with, for example, Britain allowing for it). As the European Security Strategy indicates, ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’ (EU 2003: 2). At the declaratory level, Russia and the EU have formally supported the existing secondary institutions of the IS, accepting the primacy of universal mechanisms, especially of the UN Security Council (ESS 2003: 10; Rossiyskaya Federatsiya 2008). However, their practices in crises have revealed certain ambiguities with regard to norms and rules. As particular crises unfolded, new informal bodies were created, with Russia and the EU becoming their active participants and supporters, defending its exclusive position with regard to
‘newcomers’. Besides, when both actors faced a deadlock in the process of crisis management, the temptation to address the challenges unilaterally increased, leading to undertaking actions outside multilateral cooperation.

In each of the analysed crises, Russia and the EU have firmly rejected any US monopoly on providing the solution, striving to establish a multilateral framework for dealing with the crisis. Regarding institutions that should be included, preference for informal seems obvious. In the Iranian case, three multilateral forums have been involved in the process of tackling the crisis: the UNSC, the IAEA and the so-called P-6 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). The latter became a major arena of decision-making, with the UNSC and the IAEA playing important, albeit supportive and sometimes rubber-stamping roles. The European Union itself has been represented at two levels: with France, Germany and the UK being parties to the P-6 and the EU High Representative on CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) serving as a key intermediary between the International Society and the Iranian government. The Kosovo crisis offers additional insight into the Russian and EU interpretations of the rules referring to a decision-making circle. The UNSC remained a formal place of dialogue and, as the only institution, had generally recognised authority to accept a worked-out solution. However, the substantive dialogue was gradually moved towards a smaller circle comprising Russia, the US and the European Union (with the latter remaining deeply divided on the Kosovo issue), thus making the crisis more of a regional, rather than global, issue. The main opposition towards the Kosovo independence was voiced by Russia, which blocked the adoption of UNSC resolutions (as it threatened to veto them, the West decided not to put them up for voting). The Western states employed a variety of forums to convince Russia to Kosovo’s internationally supervised independence: the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, the US, the UK, Italy), followed by the troika (with negotiators on behalf of Russia, the EU and the US). The Middle Eastern Peace Process has revealed similar tendency for Russia and the EU to opt for informal decision-making, with the UN Security Council being treated as a rubber-stamp on decisions taken in the more limited circles. Starting from 2002, Russia and the EU have been parties to the Quartet (which also included the US and the UN).

Regarding the actors which should participate in decision-making processes, Russia and the EU have, in most cases, defended their privileged positions. Russia and the EU have perceived the decision-making circle as closed and exclusive, despite some talks taking place within other multilateral forums, such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the G-20 or G-8. In general, such approach is demonstrated by the protracted debate on UNSC reform, with Russia and France and the UK declaring its support, but in effect blocking any weakening of its position. This stance has been most obviously revealed in the Iranian crisis, during the run-up to the fourth round of sanctions in first half of 2010. Both Russia and the EU rejected the Iran-Turkey-Brazil deal of May 2010 that copied earlier agreement worked out by Russia, France and the US. At the beginning, Russia very cautiously welcomed the deal, warning that it may not fully satisfy the demands of the International Society addressed towards Tehran (Tait 2010), and the day after Moscow supported the Western-proposed fourth set of sanctions (Lederer 2010). The European Union has also not

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2 At the beginning of the process of the regulation of Kosovo status, UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) played a key role, being endorsed by the UNSC. In 2005 the UNSC appointed Matti Ahtisaari as a main negotiator and decided to start direct negotiations between Serbs and Albanians. With the failure of the latter in March 2007, the UNSC was to approve the solution, proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan (see Balcer et al. 2008: 62-63).

3 The agreement in fact repeated the details of the September 2009 agreement, with Iran agreeing to give away its enriched uranium in exchange for fuel for experimental reactor. Russia and France were key participants of the deal. It happened despite the fact that Russia did not oppose Brazil-Turkey initiatives when taken up by both states in the end of April 2010 (and even just before the deal by President Medvedev in his talks with Brazil President).
given up its pressure on Iran, perceiving Tehran’s deal with Ankara and Brasilia as an attempt to delay sanctions.

Despite a declared preference for multilateralism, both Russia and the EU have demonstrated the willingness to act unilaterally. In the Kosovo crisis, when the troika failed in striking the compromise between Serbia and Kosovo at the end of 2007 (Balcer et al. 2008), the West decided to put an end to the crisis by way of recognising Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. When faced with a deadlock in the crisis solution process, the EU was ready to take over responsibility for the crisis solution and to limit the circle of decision-makers. Russia also decided to pursue unilateral action, in the framework of the Middle Eastern crisis. Moscow departed from the common stance adopted by the Quartet and in 2006 decided to establish diplomatic contacts with Hamas. In subsequent years, Russian officials, including the president, visited Hamas leaders and received them in Moscow (Katz 2010; Trenin 2010). Unilateral sanctions against Iran, applied by the EU have demonstrated the limits of multilateralism on the part of the EU. The European Union has prioritised responsibility to prevent WMD proliferation over its commitment to multilateralism, going beyond the agreement within the ‘Six’ (compare Santini 2010). The EU’s stance demonstrates its readiness to complement consensually agreed sanctions with further going steps. Against this backdrop, the opposition towards unilateral Western sanctions imposed on Iran has been a repetitive theme among Russian leadership. In May 2010, when negotiating new sanctions, the Russian Foreign Minister warned against unilateral American sanctions, declaring that, given UNSC sanctions, nations should not face any additional sanctions (VOA News 2010). Denying any extra-territorial character to Western sanctions has been an additional concern for Moscow. Russia has kept on criticising the West after the European Union joined in the unilateral widening of sanctions against Tehran (BBC News 2010). Moscow has stressed the need to maintain the unanimity of the ‘Six’ and the role of consensus in dealing with Iran.

The use of military force

Whether military force should be used as a way of crisis management lies at the heart of every international order. Contrary to the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 or the Georgian crisis of 2008, none of the crises analysed in the article represents a case of actual use of military force. Nonetheless, in each case, the possibility of the use of force both by members of the International Society and by parties to the crisis has been constantly present and remained a source of disagreement. Thus, it is necessary to compare the attitude of Russia and the EU towards norms and rules regulating two issues: to what extent and under which conditions military force may be applied by parties and the IS in a crisis; and to what extent military pressure (i.e. the threat of use of force) may be applied by the IS in a crisis.

The general positions of Russia and the EU seem not too distant from one another. Concerning the use of force by the International Society, both Russia and the EU have rejected the application of military force to solve any of discussed crises. In the Iranian crisis, the US has allowed the use of force⁴, whereas both Russia and the EU rejected even a limited use of force as a way of solving it. Moscow has based its whole approach towards the crisis on a premise that it cannot be solved by force and has to be dealt with using

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⁴ In the case of the Iranian crisis, the use of force could not be excluded, as the US has not wanted to refrain from the military threats, perceiving it as a necessary mean of pressure on Tehran. The probability of the use of force seemed to be at its height twice: in 2003 after the end of the first phase of the Iraq War and in 2007, even despite the talks on the second round of sanctions going on at that time. The risk of the use of force decreased suddenly in December 2007, with the report of US intelligence community claiming Iran withheld its military programme in 2003. However, the possibility of military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure has not disappeared completely.
political-diplomatic means (MID RF 2007). In the third set of sanctions (resolution 1803 of 3 March 2008) Russia managed to push through a paragraph claiming that any further steps will be of peaceful character (Churkin 2008). The need to look for a solution within the framework of dialogue was also stressed in a G-8 resolution in 2009. The European Union adopted a similar stance, rejecting the use of force. The EU’s actual engagement in the crisis has been motivated by the willingness to propose an alternative to the American way of dealing with serious international crises (as demonstrated in Iraq). The EU has not made the non-use of force a crucial issue (as Russia has often done). Nevertheless, throughout the whole period of the crisis, the EU has opposed the use of force. The Middle Eastern crisis has posed a serious challenge for Russia and the EU. Although both actors have not assumed the possibility of the International Society enforcing any solution by military means, the parties to the crisis (especially Israel and Hamas, to a lesser extent the Palestinian Authority) have been ready to use force to push their vision of peace settlement through. Numerous declarations by Russia and the EU have indicated the condemnation of the resort to the use of force by all actors engaged. The most violent episode of the crisis 5 occurred in the years 2008-2009, with the Israel war against the Gaza Strip. Russia condemned the use of force and opted for a withdrawal of Israeli forces as soon as possible, inter alia by supporting the UNSC resolution 1860 (MID RF 2010). The EU took similar steps, among other things condemning the use of force and proposing ceasefires in order to provide humanitarian help (Runner 2008).

In the Kosovo crisis, contrary to the earlier period of 1998-1999, the probability of the use of force by the International Society or parties to the crisis remained low, despite the fact that the crisis touched upon crucial principles of sovereignty and self-governance. Serbia was not ready to defend its position with military force and Russia was not willing to support any resort to military force. The biggest challenge for the EU was the possibility of the eruption of tensions in Kosovo itself on behalf of non-state actors (in 2004 Kosovo Albanians staged violent protests, opting for formal independence). Given the above, the Kosovo independence crisis has not clarified Russia’s or the EU’s approach to the use of force (contrary to the crisis of 1999).

Regarding the use of military pressure as a tool of International Society, the approaches of Russia and the EU have been differentiated. Russia not only objected to the use of force as such, but also rejected the US military pressure on Iran (in the form of force deployment in the Persian Gulf), claiming that such pressure might lead to the actual use of force (Groshkov 2007b). In the run-up to the fourth round of sanctions in early 2010, Russia once again rejected any possibility of the use of force, as well as interrelated threats, declaring any statements referring to the use of force unacceptable (Itar-TASS 2010). The EU, to some extent, has refrained from criticising US military pressure, thus indirectly tolerating the threat of the use of force. In the Middle Eastern crisis, none of the parties has been ready to debate possible military action that could enforce a solution and, as a result, has not referred to it. Similarly, in the case of the Kosovo independence crisis, neither Russia nor the EU considered the need to put military pressure on the parties of the crisis.

Coercion: political and economic pressure

As the use of non-military coercion (understood in terms of political and economic pressure, and mostly reflected in the form of sanctions) is much more common in the process of crisis management than the use of force, it is necessary to analyse the approach of Russia and that of the EU to the norms and rules regulating this sphere of the International Society. Two key issues stand out with regard to the non-military coercion applied by the IS: the purpose of coercion (i.e. whether is it a way to punish a member of

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5 Israel’s war against Lebanon in 2006 is not included, as it goes beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
the IS or an incentive to make it obey the rules) and the scope of coercion (i.e. how far the IS may go in applying pressures and sanctions). It should be noted that both Russia and the EU have been rather sceptical towards coercion as such, proposing to solve crises with the help of positive incentives and of more cooperation (compare EU 2003, 2008; Rossiyskaya Federatsiya 2008). Nevertheless, in the course of the Iranian, Middle Eastern and Kosovo crises, both actors have resorted to coercive measures in order to impose a solution on the parties.

The approach of particular actors to the purpose and justification of coercion indirectly indicates how far the competences of the International Society may reach in the process of crisis management and what role the IS should adopt.

Russia’s general approach is highly sceptical towards the use of coercion by the International Society as a way of punishing its members. This approach has been most clearly revealed in the Iranian crisis. As the Russian Foreign Minister put it, when deciding about support for sanctions, Moscow had assessed the character and reality of an Iranian threat (Lavrov 2006). Russia has insisted that any sanctions must be proportionate to the threat for non-proliferation regime. Such an approach means that Russia has rejected sanctions as a way of making Tehran less assertive in its foreign policy (Groshkov 2006a). During the run-up towards a second round of sanctions, the secretary of the Russian Security Council at the time, Igor Ivanov, explicitly stated that sanctions could not be used for other purposes than guaranteeing non-proliferation and could not serve as a way of interfering in domestic affairs (Newsru.com 2007). When commenting on the third resolution, Russian foreign minister Lavrov repeated that any actions within the UNSC were directed at supporting the IAEA in its efforts to clarify the Iranian nuclear programme, should correspond to Iran’s behaviour and keep open the possibility for talks with Iran (Lavrov 2008). Russia justified its support for this resolution, claiming that it was a political signal towards Iran, making cooperation with the IS necessary (Churkin 2008). Therefore, in summing up, for Moscow, pressure has been the way of bringing a party back to the negotiating table, rather than punishing it for its past incompliance with demands of the IS (MID RF 2007; Strokan’ 2006).

The European Union’s stance towards the purpose of coercion has been more nuanced. In the first phase of the Iranian crisis (till 2006), the EU chose a conciliatory path. The EU leading states (the UK, France and Germany) attempted to limit the playing field for the crisis to the IAEA, opposing the handing over of the Iranian dossier to the UNSC (Moussavian 2008; Rynning 2008). Throughout the crisis, the EU has pursued a double track-approach, attempting to balance coercive measures towards Iran with offers of cooperation. The EU has offered long-term engagement, including cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy, hydrocarbon energy cooperation, political dialogue, support for Iran’s integration with international economy and technology cooperation (UNSC 2007; Santini 2010: 471). The EU only referred to the Iranian nuclear programme, without mentioning any other aspects of Iran’s domestic or foreign policy. A similar preference for non-coercive measures was demonstrated by the EU during the Kosovo crisis. When attempting to convince Serbia to agree to the Ahtisaari Plan, the EU suggested an offer of prospective membership for Belgrade.

The content of norms and rules related to the scope of acceptable non-military coercion is another challenge for the members of the International Society. The EU has been ready to go much further with political-economic pressure than Russia. The European position is revealed in the ESS, which perceives a broad array of ways to tackle WMD proliferation: ‘Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. […] Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be
needed in the post conflict phase’ (EU 2003: 8). The EU points out that states that reject principles of International Society ‘should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union’ (EU 2003: 10), but this document does not elaborate on how much coercion the EU is ready to accept. Russia opposed such types of sanctions that, according to Moscow, would push Tehran too much and face it with an ultimatum, thus becoming counterproductive (Lavrov 2006).

In the first phase of the Iranian crisis (2003-2006) both Russia and the EU aspired to limit this coercion. Both actors opposed handing over the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, preferring to keep it within the IAEA framework, which resulted in a lower profile and less pressure respectively. Russia supported EU efforts during that period to convince Iran to back down and make some concessions with regard to its nuclear programme. The positions of Russia and the EU, and their respective attitudes towards the rules of coercion, began to differ after handing over the issue to the UNSC in mid-2006 (which was the result of Iran’s resuming the nuclear enrichment process).

Russia’s posture towards the scope of pressure can be characterised as a general unwillingness towards applying sanctions and a preference for limited pressure. Russia has made it clear that diplomatic dialogue should be preferred over political pressure (with the example of Putin’s visit to Tehran in October 2007). Moscow has opted for a compromised effect, which would result from Iranian consent, rather than overt pressure (for example, by preventing the mention of Iran in the NPT Review Conference final document in 2005 and by proposing enriching fuel for Iran on Russian territory). Although, overall, Russia has supported four sets of sanctions against Iran (1737 in December 2006, 1747 in March 2007, 1803 in March 2008 and 1929 in June 2010), in each case Moscow has prolonged the process and has managed to water down Western-proposed content. The Iranian defiance of UNSC demands has not changed Russia’s approach significantly. Russia has insisted that any sanctions should be limited to the framework of the non-proliferation regime and should not include political pressure (which has implied reluctance towards sanctions on banks or the energy sector). As Deputy Minister Ryabkov put it, ‘[w]e find the term “paralyzing sanctions” completely unacceptable. Sanctions should follow the aim of strengthening the regime of nuclear nonproliferation’ (Nowak and Lederer 2010).

By offering tangible incentives, the EU has simultaneously declared its readiness to go further with sanctions: ‘the EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure’ (EU 2008: 7). The European Union has been more eager to support far-reaching ways of coercion. In the face of continuing Iran’s defiance, the EU employed tougher rhetoric and called for stronger sanctions (although finally it has not managed to push through all of its proposals). The measures that have constantly been supported by the European states included *inter alia* broad spectrum of ban on trade with Iran and measures against investments in Iranian energy complex. The EU’s position evolved over time and has been influenced by the conviction that up-to-date measures are too limited and in a too narrow way target the Iranian nuclear programme, which is why the EU proposed broadened sanctions: ‘If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows’ (EU 2008: 7).

Another illustration of the EU’s distance towards applying coercive measures is provided by the Middle Eastern crisis. Although the EU has been unwilling to put significant political and economic pressure on Israeli and Palestinian side, it has nevertheless attempted to enforce at least some basic principles of the solution of the crisis. The EU agreed to restrict trade of goods produced in the Occupied Territories, although did not put economic sanctions on Israel (Yacobi and Newman 2008: 187-189).

Given the need for compromise, the sanctions adopted by the UNSC reveal the scope of coercion that is acceptable to both Russia and the EU. The content of sanctions evolved
along with the continuing Iranian defiance of the demands of the IS. For example, the first set of sanctions was to be withdrawn in the case of Iran’s compliance with the demands of the IAEA within the 60 day-deadline. Russia also successfully insisted that entry bans for the persons connected with the Iranian nuclear programme should be excluded, claiming it would make dialogue more difficult. Yet, it is possible to point out the basic norms and rules of coercion that have been agreed among the members of the global IS. Firstly, they have been related to the Iranian nuclear programme, including the embargo on export and import of items, materials and equipment that could be used in the programme. These provisions of the UNSC resolutions have not raised any serious disputes between Russia and the EU (UNSC 2006). Secondly, the sanctions have been related to the individuals working on the Iranian programme. The EU insisted on the inclusion of a travel ban for them, whereas Russia only suggested vigilance, which found its way in the final versions of the UNSC resolutions in 2006 and 2007. Only the 2008 resolution introduced a ban for selected individuals, the list of which was broadened by the 2010 resolution. The third component of the sanctions has comprised the freezing of the financial assets of individuals and entities related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Whereas the norm itself has not been controversial, the scope of its application has been the subject of disputes (UNSC 2006). Subsequent resolutions broadened the lists of individuals and entities being the object of the sanctions. Fourthly, Iran has been faced with an embargo on Iranian arms export (UNSC 2007). However, the issue of arms import by Iran has been much more controversial. Whereas particular resolutions called upon states to exercise vigilance with regard to the sale and transfer of weapons to Iran (UNSC 2007), it has only been the fourth round of sanctions (UNSC 2010) that introduced such an embargo. Russia’s objection (next to China’s) towards too broad a scope of sanctions has been the main reason for such a late introduction of the ban. The fifth element of sanctions has comprised trade and financial issues. Here, it has also been due to Russia’s unwillingness to directly punish Iran that initial sanctions called only for restraint on the part of UN members when entering new commitments (UNSC 2007). The scope of these sanctions has been broadened only in the 2010 resolution, including the ban on Iranian commercial activities in uranium mining, production and the use of nuclear materials and technologies, as well as a ban on the provision of financial services for entities suspected of contributing to proliferation activities (UNSC 2010). The sixth part of the sanctions included the inspections of cargoes of selected Iranian companies that could have been involved in proliferation activities (UNSC 2008, later broadened to all cargoes in UNSC 2010). The EU had proposed such measures during earlier negotiations over sanctions, but they had not gained Moscow’s support.

**The limits of sovereignty and membership within the International Society**

The scope of state sovereignty has been one of the most disputable issues within the post-Cold War International Society. The domination of solidarism implied the changing notion of sovereignty, adapted to broader cooperation among IS members. The issue of sovereignty has coalesced with the problem of membership. The West has aspired to set a new ‘civilisation standard’ and exclude states that do not fulfil Western-defined criteria of governance and ‘responsible’ behaviour in the international arena, branding them as ‘pariahs’ or ‘rogues’ (Hurrell 2007: 67). Thus the membership, and belonging rights, would become conditional. Although Russia and the EU have on the surface supported the universal character of the global IS, the practices of both actors have revealed different attitudes. The EU has been ready to limit sovereignty and introduce at least some extent of conditionality, whereas Russia, on its part, has perceived the IS as a hierarchical one, composed mainly of great powers, in which small states have a limited say.
Each of the crises referred to different aspects of the sovereignty-membership nexus. The norms and rules concerning state sovereignty have been the subject of a large controversy during the Kosovo crisis, with the challenge for the *global IS* being how to reconcile the principles of national self-determination, state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU itself has been deeply divided on the issue of whether Kosovo should be granted independence. Nevertheless, it not only recognised Kosovo, but offered significant financial aid and sent the EULEX mission, which in effect replaced the UN mission. The European Union perceived the legal situation around Kosovo as lagging behind the international reality on the ground and opted for the primacy of the norm of national self-determination. The EU definitely managed to reconcile its internal disputes in December 2007, supporting the end of talks and concluding that the only way to defuse the crisis was to implement the Ahtisaari plan and grant Kosovo independence under the supervision of the international community (d’Aspremont 2007). In practice, it meant that, despite internal tensions and disputes, the EU decided to opt for the principle of national self-determination, treating it in this particular case as superior over sovereignty or territorial integrity.

To the contrary, Russia’s position was clear-cut. Engaging in the Kosovo crisis, Moscow gave priority to the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian approach was based on the UNSC resolution 1244 of 1999, which, ending NATO’s war against Serbia, treated Kosovo as a part of the latter. Russia regularly emphasised the need for bilateral talks between Belgrade and Pristina, and as a consequence, objected to the proposal of the solution presented by Martti Ahtisaari. In Moscow’s opinion, the ending of the Kosovo-Serbian negotiations without results and the subsequent submission of the Ahtisaari Plan to the Security Council in 2007 had been ‘premature’. The symbolic strengthening of Russia’s position came in *The Review of Russian Foreign Policy*, published by the MFA at the end of March 2007. It argued against the acceptance of Kosovo independence, declaring that ‘the creation of independent Kosovo threatens the European stability’ (MID RF 2007: 33-34). Throughout the crisis, Russia has attempted to make the West (or at least the EU) change its mind by threatening to use its veto right in the UNSC - in the end, none of the resolutions proposed by the West was put up for voting, due to Russia’s objections. Moscow perceived the need to continue dialogue until a compromise and without any deadlines, and saw the UNSC approval as necessary for any solution to be internationally valid. Russia’s intent was to prevent the implementation of any solution which would encroach on the territorial integrity of Serbia.

Beside the dispute on the hierarchy of norms referring to sovereignty and self-determination, Russia and the EU have differed with regard to the consequences of the Kosovo crisis. Moscow has stressed that the preference given to the principle of national self-determination has universal character, which could be applied to other similar cases. The EU has defended the particular and specific character of the Kosovo crisis, implying the situational character of the hierarchy of norms. EU representatives claimed that Kosovo had been an exceptional case and as such had not constituted a precedent for the *global IS*.

In the case of the Iranian crisis, Russia has spoken and acted against any exclusion, claiming that all states should have the same security guarantees under the NPT regime and access to technologies. When debating the first round of sanctions in late 2006, Moscow’s representatives stressed the need for keeping ‘all channels of communication with Iran’ open and rejected the projects of the resolutions that, in their opinion, failed to do so (Groshkov 2006b). The opposition towards labelling Iran as being part of an ‘axis of evil’ has also remained an important component of this policy (MID RF 2007). One of Moscow’s arguments was that any drastic pressure may cause a harmful response from Iran, for example in the form of a withdrawal from the NPT (Blinov 2006b). The EU has
taken a much more nuanced approach. It has not supported the US position, which would throw Iran out of the International Society. Nevertheless, it has still perceived the Iranian regime as untrustworthy, semi-authoritarian and prone to human rights violations and pointed at the need of the state to regain international confidence (Santini 2010: 470-471).

The Middle Eastern crisis has not been such a clear-cut case for Russia and the EU. Whilst they have treated the Palestinian National Authority as an *in spe* member of the IS and have declared their support for a Palestinian state, differences occurred with regard to the Hamas issue. Having won a popular parliamentary election in the Palestinian Autonomy in 2006, Hamas has not been recognised as a legitimate player by the outside powers. The West, and subsequently, the Quartet (comprising the UN, the US, the EU and Russia) has kept on perceiving Hamas as a terrorist organisation. However, in a rather surprising move, Russia has decided to strengthen its bargaining position. Moscow has abandoned the hitherto united front and has invited the leadership of Hamas in March 2006, which has been followed by the establishment of regular diplomatic contacts with it. Interpreting Russia’s behaviour in terms of rules of IS borders reveals Moscow’s unwillingness to stay behind Western powers in drawing the borders of the IS and deciding whom to include or exclude. The EU has been caught between the tough US posture, rejecting any contacts with Hamas, the need to support the Quartet’s unanimity and Russia. However, despite some doubts regarding an at least partial recognition of Hamas, the EU has not decided to support the broadening of IS borders, perceiving Hamas’ terrorist activities as a crucial obstacle.

**Conclusion: prospects for Russian-EU cooperation within the global International Society**

Russia and the EU have been among most active and most important actors in the presented cases of international crises. Both have aspired to leave their mark on the process of crisis management and crisis solution. The analysis of the norms and rules of the International Society that they have supported and applied allows us to assess the extent to which Russia and the EU are able to cooperate in global security governance. It also allows for the assessment of the potential of both actors and their relationship to serve as the building blocks of an emerging post-unilateral order.

The cases presented in the article have revealed both the closeness of the Russian and EU positions and the difficulties to overcome. Russia and the EU have answered the question of who has the right to deal with crises in a similar way. While accepting multilateralism and the primacy of the UNSC in dealing with crises, both actors have nevertheless recognised the privileged role of informal ‘great power clubs’, such as the P-6 or the Quartet. At the same time, despite a declared commitment to multilateralism, neither Russia nor the EU has been interested in widening the circle of global decision-makers and both have protected their exclusive position. The main difference between Russia and the EU with regard to the rules on the circle of decision-makers boils down to the point of under which conditions a unilateral solution may be pursued, as both players applied such one-sided measures.

Both Russia and the EU have rejected the use of force as a way of solving international crises, either by the International Society or the parties to the crisis, and have been far from ready to apply military force themselves. Nevertheless, the EU has been less critical towards the threat of the use of force as a way of coercing participants in a crisis to change their positions.

The differences between Russia and the EU have been quite obvious with regard to the non-military coercion and political pressure that could be put on members defying the
International Society demands. In general, both actors have been quite reluctant towards the use of coercion, perceiving it as a means of last resort and demonstrating a preference for positive incentives. However, when it has come to the application of political and economic pressure, Russia and the EU have differed. The EU has been ready to go much further with coercive measures, whereas Russia has attempted to limit the political and economic pressure put on particular IS members. Although with time the Russian position has evolved, and Moscow has moved closer to the original EU position, accepting coercion of a broader scope, the EU itself has also gradually changed its policy, accepting the need for tougher sanctions. This lack of coherence has resulted in the EU’s unilateral political and economic pressure, contested by Russia.

With regard to the issue of sovereignty and membership of the International Society, the positions of Russia and the EU have been hard to reconcile. Russia has understood the notion of sovereignty in traditional terms, whereas the EU has been ready to apply ‘conditionality tests’ for full membership of the IS and has not perceived sovereignty as absolute.

As the norms and rules promoted by Russia and the EU in particular crises demonstrate, the extent of cooperation between Russia and the EU has varied. Both actors have been able to overcome some of their differences and reconcile their normative positions. However, it seems that the differences between Russia and the EU, regarding the rules and norms of the IS, have been too broad to allow them to promote a coherent vision of the international order. The detailed content of norms and rules has remained the source of dispute and has slowed down (or even made impossible) the practical application of both actors’ visions. As Russia has been able to block some sanctions, it has been Moscow that defined the upper limits of the intrusiveness of norms and rules. However, later on, the EU has attempted to restore its voice by putting unilateral sanctions. Until now, the Russian-EU relationship in a global dimension has prolonged the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provided a basis for it. On that basis, it seems doubtful that the Russian-EU relationship could serve as a normative ‘building block’ of a future global order.

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References


Between “Pragmatism” and “Constitutionalism”: EU-Russian Dynamics and Differences during the Kosovo Status Process

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Abstract

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 has been widely regarded as a failure for international diplomacy in general, and for the European Union (EU) in particular. The narrative that has emerged suggests that, rather than taking charge of the situation, the EU was instead a “victim” of external machinations led by Washington and Moscow. This article challenges this view. It argues that, during the status process, it became clear that in the case of Kosovo there was a tension between the constraints imposed by international law on acts of secession and the requirements for stability on the ground. While Russia insisted on the former, albeit for a range of reasons that went beyond upholding international law, the United States placed emphasis on the latter. For their part, the key members of the EU eventually decided that, after having tried to win Moscow over to their position, they too had to ensure regional security; even if this meant circumventing the United Nations and the Security Council and challenging long-standing legal norms and principles concerning the territorial integrity of states.

Keywords

Kosovo; Russia; European Union; United States; United Nations

WHEN KOSOVO UNILATERALLY DECLARED INDEPENDENCE IN 2008, IT WAS WIDELY SEEN to represent a failure of international diplomacy. As one leading observer noted, the end result of two years of status talks was a “mess” (Jackson 2007). For many Western observers, the ultimate responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement rested squarely on Moscow (MacShane 2007; Harris 2007; The Economist 2007; Joseph 2007; Bugajski and Joseph 2007). It was, or so they argued, Russia’s decision to veto a Security Council resolution authorising Kosovo’s independence that prevented Kosovo from gaining international legitimacy as a fully sovereign and independent state. Within the European Union (EU), opinions differed. Many argued that the burden of blame lay equally with Moscow and Washington. As one noted regional analyst has observed, “the international significance of a debacle that reflects poorly on all participants is […] very clear: Russia and the United States have combined to humiliate the European Union” (Glenny 2007). 1 Few

1 As one EU official put it, “Russia has simply decided to stop short of doing anything that would lead to real pressure on Serbia to strike a deal […] At the same time, Washington’s long-standing pledge to recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence has always been in the back of the Kosovars’ minds” (Financial Times 2007b). This was echoed by Massimo D’Alema, the Italian Foreign Affairs minister. As he explained, Russia and the United States had fed the intransigence of the two sides by taking positions that often appeared to be stronger than those expressed by the parties themselves (New York Times 2007b).
observers, however, took the view that the United States was largely responsible. One
such voice was Alberto Navarro, the Spanish Minister for Europe. Speaking soon after the
declaration of independence, he made little effort to hide his feelings over what had
happened: “I’m really frustrated that the future of Kosovo has been decided in Washington
and to some extent in Moscow, and not in Europe” (BBC News 2008b).

This article examines the United Nations (UN)-sponsored status process and the events
leading up to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. It will seek to show that,
while Russia’s position was almost certainly driven by a strong degree of self-interest and
may possibly have had malign motives, there can be little doubt that its position was in
fact in accordance with traditional thinking on the right of secession under international
law. So much so that, under other circumstances, there would have been little difference
between Moscow’s position and that of the EU. In contrast, as will be shown, the United
States adopted an approach that circumvented standing principles of international law.
Seeking to extricate itself from a situation that had the potential to lead to a new conflict in
the Western Balkans – this time aimed at international administrators and peacekeepers –
it supported Kosovo’s independence, even though this was opposed by Belgrade and was
being undertaken without the endorsement of the UN Security Council. Therefore, in the
international debate between the legal “constitutionalists” and the political “pragmatists”
(The Independent 2007), Russia claimed to be the champion of the former position, whilst
the United States led the latter camp.

As for the view that the EU was the victim of external machinations, it will be shown that
this picture is rather too simplistic. Yes, it was caught between the two positions. However,
several key states, such as Britain and France fully agreed with, and actively supported, the
US position. As they saw it, any further delay in deciding the status of Kosovo as an
independent state could be disastrous. However, many others, while not openly siding
with Russia, were distinctly uneasy about the dangers of going against established
international principles concerning secession and bypassing the UN Security Council. To
this end, several efforts were made by senior EU leaders in the spring and summer of 2007
to try to persuade Moscow to accept Kosovo’s statehood – thereby gaining the necessary
Security Council resolution to ensure European unity. The problem was that these
tries to gain Moscow’s support offered little by way of reasonable rationale or a
suitable quid pro quo.

Eventually, therefore, the EU simply gave up and focused on forging its own unity in the
face of growing US determination to “solve” Kosovo, with or without European support. When
faced with a choice between Russia’s demand for a strict adherence to international
law (albeit done for its own purposes), which ran the risk of prolonging an increasingly
unstable and dangerous situation in Kosovo, and Washington’s overwhelmingly political
approach to the situation, which would ease tension in Kosovo, but would pose a distinct
challenge to prevailing international approaches towards secession, most EU leaders –
often extremely reluctantly – decided that they had no alternative but to follow the US
lead.

The right of secession in international law

Perhaps not unsurprisingly, states tend to have an innate aversion to acts of secession
(Fierstein 2008). Indeed, the principle of the territorial integrity of states is a central tenet of
international politics. As one eminent international jurist has put it:

[the truth is that international law upholds the territorial integrity of a State. One of
the fundamental principles of contemporary international law is that of respect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This principle entails an obligation
to respect the definition, delineation and territorial integrity of an existing State. According to the principle, a State exercises sovereignty within and over its territorial domain. The principle of respect for territorial integrity is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments (Koroma 2010 para. 21).

To this extent, a high threshold has been created for entities seeking recognition as independent and sovereign states. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which codified the essential characteristics of statehood, an entity claiming to be a state must fulfil three necessary and minimally sufficient conditions. In the first instance, it must have a defined territory. Secondly, it must have a settled population. Thirdly, it must have some sort of effective administration. However, while the Montevideo Convention sets down the key features of statehood, and thus provides a basic – but non-binding – framework for deciding whether a territory or entity should be recognised as a state, other factors play an important role in the process of recognition. Notably, the process by which a state emerges has also become extremely important. As Fabry notes, 'since the 1950s, the determining factor in admission of new members into the society of states has been whether an entity has a prior right to independence, rather than whether it is independent' (Fabry 2010: 12). For instance, territories that may meet the criteria of a state but have been created through acts of aggression are widely considered to be illegitimate, even if not always in practice viewed as illegal. Other factors also play an important role in shaping the decision of a state of whether or not to recognise an entity as a state. In the modern era, and especially since the end of the Second World War, perhaps the most powerful of these is the injunction against recognising states that have come about through unilateral acts of secession from an established and recognised state.

Of course, entities claiming statehood usually emphasise the right of self-determination. However, despite the fact that the principle is explicitly recognised within the UN Charter, and has since then been elucidated in international treaties and agreements – such as the Helsinki Final Act, which has played a seminal part in shaping peace and security in Europe (1975), the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Anti-Colonial Declaration (1960), or the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) – its application has in fact been very limited. Since the end of the Second World War, the notion of self-determination resulting in the creation of new states has been viewed as a right applicable to cases of European decolonisation (Koskenniemi 1994: 241), or else to areas otherwise recognised as being under military occupation. Even then, the principle has been narrowly defined as to be applicable only at the point of decolonisation or military withdrawal. A new state created by an act of decolonisation is, from the very moment of its creation, subject to the very rights of protection that apply to other sovereign states. By contrast, in non-colonial settings, the principle of self-determination has been regarded as subordinate to the principle of territorial integrity. In these cases, self-determination has come to be more generally seen as a right to self-administration and self-governance within an existing state, a right of internal self-determination (Archibugi 2003), rather than a right to create a new state. As Crawford (1997) has stated,

[j]in international practice there is no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or territory, whether or not that population constitutes one or more “peoples” in the ordinary sense of the word. In international law, self-determination for peoples or groups within an independent state is achieved by participation in the political system of the state, on the basis of respect for its territorial integrity.

2 For an analysis of these conditions, see Crawford (2006). At the same time, the Convention included a further qualification that suggested that an entity wishing to claim statehood must be capable of interacting with other states. However, this is not generally considered to be a requirement under international law (Keating 2008).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia did not fundamentally alter the way in which the international community approached the question of secession. In the case of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Socialist Republics were all considered to have an inherent right to statehood as recognised by Russia, the most important of the component states, which also sought independence from the Soviet Union (Saideman 1995). This meant that the three Baltic republics, the three states of the Caucasus and the five Central Asian republics were all recognised as sovereign states alongside Belarus and Ukraine. Yugoslavia proved to be a more difficult example as Serbia, the key republic in the Yugoslav federation, sought to keep the federation united, or at least to ensure that the Serbs living in the other republics retained a link to Serbia (Pavlowitch 68-69). However, the underlying principles guiding recognition nevertheless remained similar. A committee of jurists led by Robert Badinter, the president of the French Constitutional Court, examined the issue and decided that the six republics recognised under the 1974 Yugoslavia constitution – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia – all had a right to independence. This right did not, however, extend to the national minorities as such – in other words the Serbs, Croats and others as distinct peoples. Nor did it extend to the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which, under the 1974 Constitution, were accorded many of the rights of the six republics, but did not have a notional right of secession. In this sense, and again, sovereignty was seen to be vested in units within the state that were, even notionally, accorded a right to express a sovereign identity under the terms of the constitution of the state they were seceding from.

Thus the end of the Cold War, while apparently creating challenges to notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity, in actual fact served to reinforce the traditional views on secession. Although there have been increasing calls for the right to self-determination leading to independence to be extended, this has not been accepted by national governments. They continue to remain wedded to traditional respect for the territorial integrity of states – and only break from it under very exceptional circumstances. As Berg (2009: 222) put it, “in short, current legal and normative doctrine forbids de jure recognition to those territorial units whose political leadership has been successfully resisted by metropolitan central authorities”.

Even the emergence of new thinking on the limits of state sovereignty – encapsulated within the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – has so far failed to alter entrenched views on the territorial integrity of states. Despite the fact that some advocate a new norm of remedial secession in cases of gross human rights abuses, this has yet to gain any traction in international law. Certainly, when the matter of Kosovo’s declaration of independence came before the International Court of Justice, and which decided to avoid the underlying question of the right of secession, the judges also decided to avoid the

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3 Belarus and Ukraine were rather interesting inasmuch as they had formally been members of the UN prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, and so did not have to apply for membership as such. Instead, they simply informed the UN of a name change. However, this did not mean that they were formally recognised as states by the international community, nor did they have their own diplomatic missions to other states.

4 See Pellet (1992) for a discussion of the work of the Commission.

5 As Crawford (1997: 114) has noted, states are still reluctant to recognise new states formed outside of the colonial experience: “[t]his practice has not changed since 1989, despite the emergence during that period of 22 new states. On the contrary, the practice has been powerfully reinforced”.

6 As the majority opinion stated, “[i]n the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State […] Accordingly, the Court does not consider that it is necessary to address such issues as whether or not the declaration has led to the creation of a State or the status of the acts
issue of remedial secession – despite the call by one of their number to address this very question (Simma 2010). In the meantime, a number of scholars who have studied the issue have concluded that, under current international law, there would seem to be no clear right to remedial secession, even if, in practice, it is gaining some relevance (Summers 2010). Moreover, the argument that such a process can be undertaken years after the human rights abuses have ended, and where there is no longer a threat to the community, is questionable (Vidmar 2010). Indeed, even those who support Kosovo’s independence appear to argue that remedial secession is not really an applicable approach in this context – instead arguing that a notion of “earned sovereignty”, whereby the conditions laid down by the Montevideo Convention are met, would be more applicable (Boulton and Visoka 2010: 20-21). Moreover, even from a practical perspective, there appear to be grave doubts about trying to establish a clear norm of remedial secession. As will be seen, the degree to which the countries that supported Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence insisted that it was a wholly sui generis case - which therefore cannot be viewed as a precedent -, highlights the extent to which they do not want the case of Kosovo to become established as a model for secession – remedial or otherwise – for other separatist entities. All other things being equal, unilateral secession appears to remain unacceptable under international law and according to the standing norms of international politics.

Kosovo, 1999-2008

In 1999, following a number of attempts to end the fighting between Serb forces and separatist Albanian guerrillas, NATO launched an air campaign to end the ethnic conflict in Kosovo. Seventy-eight days later, the Serbian Government under Slobodan Milosevic capitulated. Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was placed under UN administration pending a final agreement on the province’s status. Five years later, despite attempts to introduce democratic reforms (the “Standards before Status” policy), it was clear that the decision on the future of Kosovo could not be delayed much longer. Serious riots, in March 2004, highlighted the growing frustration amongst the majority Kosovo Albanians, who were by now openly calling for full independence and unless they were given some sort of blueprint for independence there was a real danger that international presence could become a target of violence (King and Mason 2006: 191). The following year, the UN Secretary-General commissioned a study into the situation from Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat. In his report, Eide noted that the situation on the ground was far from ideal, but that there was little to be gained by holding off the status process any longer. As he explained, whatever the outcome of talks between Belgrade and Pristina, it was time for the European Union to be given a greater role in determining the future of Kosovo, as part of the wider process of regional integration (UN Security Council Document 2005a).

As Boulton and Visoka (2010: 20) note in their analysis of the arguments presented by states supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence, ‘only three other countries explicitly noted human rights abuses, suggesting that this is not that dominant international consideration.’

These were set out as follows: (1) the existence of effective, representative and functioning democratic institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4) sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy; (6) fair enforcement of property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8) transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate.

As two prominent observers noted, “Violence had once again advanced the independence agenda as nothing else in the previous five years had” (King and Mason 2006: 191).
In October 2005, the Security Council authorised the start of formal status talks between the Serbian Government and the Kosovo Albanian leadership (UN Security Council Document 2005b; 2005c). Shortly afterwards, the Contact Group – a body made up of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States – laid down a fundamental set of principles to be followed during the discussions. First and foremost, they agreed that there could not be a return to the situation that existed prior to 1999. Kosovo could never return to direct rule by Belgrade. Likewise, Kosovo could not be partitioned, nor could it unite with any other state (Contact Group 2005). To oversee this process, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the UN, appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland and an experienced negotiator, to serve as his special envoy (UN Security Council Document 2005d). Within weeks, he had established his office in Vienna and travelled to the region to meet with the parties. Moreover, despite the fact that it was meant to be a process of negotiation between the two sides, he had also decided that independence was the only possible outcome – a decision he communicated to the Contact Group as well as to the Serbian Government. Meanwhile, at a meeting in January 2006, the Contact Group decided that in addition to their previous principles, any solution must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo (Contact Group 2006). This served to confirm, at least in Ahtisaari’s view, that independence was indeed the inevitable end result of the process, and he lobbied the members of the Contact Group to convey this message to Belgrade.

In February 2006, face-to-face talks between the two sides got underway. Given that the status had already been decided, Ahtisaari decided to focus on the structure of the state. The talks therefore focused on local governance and community rights (Weller 2008). However, little progress was made. The Kosovo Albanians insisted that there could be no negotiations over independence as the final outcome of the process (Associated Press 2006a). At the same time, Belgrade was adamant that it would only be willing to accept some form of extensive autonomy for the province (Ahtisaari 2005). With this in mind, the UN team decided to focus more openly on the status question and convened a high-level meeting between the political leaders in July. As expected, this did little to break the deadlock (Associated Press 2006b). With little goodwill between the sides, and little hope of reaching an agreement, the Contact Group authorised Ahtisaari to prepare a status proposal (UNOSEK 2006).

Meanwhile, the Serbian Government, in an attempt to secure its position, passed a new constitution affirming Kosovo’s place as an integral part of the Serb state. This new constitution was confirmed in a national referendum in October 2006, which in turn paved the way for general elections in January 2007. As a result, Ahtisaari was forced to delay unveiling his proposals to the two sides until the start of February. Notably, the 54-page document laid out in precise details the structure of a state, but made no specific reference to sovereignty or statehood. Nevertheless, recognising that this was a blueprint for independence, Pristina warmly welcomed the proposals. For its part, Belgrade insisted that it would contest any provisions challenging Serbian sovereignty over the province (Reuters 2007a; Makfax 2007; Associated Press 2007a). However, it was given little opportunity to do so. Although two rounds of technical discussions took place in Vienna, and concluded with a high level summit between the leaders of the two sides, Ahtisaari’s

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11 Martti Ahtisaari, conversation with the author, September 2008.
12 Albert Rohan [Ahtisaari’s deputy], comments to the author, October 2007.
13 Specifically, he stated that, “the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s authority in 1989, and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is not a viable option” (Ahtisaari n.d.).
14 In the days that followed, Çeku also defended the plan provisions for the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities (Southeast European Times 2007). But evidently not wanting to appear to keen to accept all the proposed terms while further talks were on the agenda, over the next few days he expressed his concern that elements of the proposals were too restrictive (Reuters 2007b).
team was adamant that any changes to the proposal could only be minor (B92 2007b). It therefore came as little surprise when the UN envoy announced at the end of the meeting that hopes for a negotiated solution had come to an end, and that compromise between the two sides was impossible (Reuters 2007c; B92 2007a).

Shortly afterwards, at the start of March 2007 Ahtisaari presented his finalised package to the UN Secretary-General, who forwarded it on to the Security Council (UN Security Council Document 2007a). As expected, the UN Envoy had indeed proposed a form of supervised independence for Kosovo. Despite support for the proposals by London, Washington, Paris and Berlin, and the hope that a UN resolution could be relatively quickly passed endorsing the plan for statehood, it soon became clear that there was a greater degree of concern about the proposals within the Security Council than had been expected. In addition to Russia, which led the criticisms of the Ahtisaari plan on the grounds that it had not secured the support of Belgrade and Pristina (Associated Press 2007b), many other members of the Council appeared to have serious reservations about the idea of sanctioning statehood for Kosovo against the wishes of the Serbian Government. To this end, the Council accepted a Russian proposal for a fact-finding mission to Brussels, Serbian and Kosovo (Associated Press 2007c; Associated Press 2007d; Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty 2007; United Press International 2007a). This provided the fifteen permanent representatives had a chance to learn at first hand about the situation in the province and the proposals that had been put forward (UN Security Council Document 2007b).

Meanwhile, the United States was becoming increasingly clear in its intentions. During a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, in Washington, Nicholas Burns, the US Undersecretary of State, who was taking the lead on Kosovo, insisted that the White House would, “support a declaration of independence by the people of Kosovo” (Associated Press 2007e), and that the US Administration had told Russian officials that independence was “inevitable” (Burns 2007). Perhaps most importantly, Secretary of State, announced that the United States would even be prepared to recognise Kosovo without a UN Security Council resolution (US Department of State 2007).

Soon afterwards, in mid-May, the United States and Germany presented a draft resolution to the Security Council proposing that Kosovo be awarded supervised independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari proposals. Russia immediately objected on the grounds that it would not accept an imposed solution. Direct talks between Presidents Bush and Putin on the issue during the G8 summit in Germany failed to bridge the differences. In late July, it was announced that efforts to try to pass a resolution had been shelved for the meantime. Instead, it had been agreed that a further period of talks would be held between the two sides. This would be overseen by a Troika of leading diplomats from Russia, the United States and the European Union. However, right from the start, there were no real expectations that the two sides would be willing to reach an agreement. Any incentive on the part of the Kosovo Albanians to compromise had effectively ended when President Bush announced, during a trip to Tirana, that the United States supported independence. Nevertheless, the Troika explored a range of potential options, including forms of autonomy (Serbia presented a number of ideas, including suggestions modelled on Hong Kong’s relationship with China and on the Åland Islands in Finland) and partition (Government of Serbia 2007)15. Efforts by Wolfgang Ischinger, the EU representative on the Troika, to introduce some form of status neutral model, which was essentially based on the relationship between East and West Germany during the Cold War, and which would focus

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15 It was pointed out that the Åland Islands, a group of islands with 27,000 inhabitants, were a Swedish-speaking autonomous province of Finland that had not only been demilitarised, and its inhabitants exempt from conscription in Finland, but also been granted the right to its own flag, raise taxes and customs, issue its own postage stamps, administer its own police force, and retain full language and cultural rights.
on establishing working relations between Kosovo and Serbia, was also rejected by both sides. For the Kosovo Albanians it fell short of full independence, whereas the Serbian government viewed it as independence by another name.

Under these circumstances it came as little surprise when after the last round of discussions, held in Austria on 26–28 November, the Troika was forced to concede defeat. Delivering their report to the UN Secretary-General on 7 December 2007 (UN Security Council Document 2007c), the Troika announced that their four month effort to broker an agreement, which had resulted in six face-to-face meetings between the two sides, had failed to deliver a breakthrough. As they noted, the two sides had failed to bridge their differences over the fundamental notion of sovereignty. As expected, a Security Council meeting held on 19 December to discuss the report failed to produce a last-minute compromise. After two years of effort, hopes of reaching a negotiated agreement were now over.

**Apparent international acceptance for independence**

In large part, the “mess” that was created was a result of misperceptions and misunderstandings. At the start of the process, most observers felt that independence was the logical outcome and the prevailing view was that all the members of the Contact Group were willing to endorse Kosovo’s statehood. Certainly, this path was favoured by the United States. As far back as 1999, it was clear that there were many within the US administration who strongly favoured an independent Kosovo. However, while support for independence was deeply ingrained within certain State Department circles, this does not completely explain the situation. Necessity also drove the decision. In the first instance, this necessity was driven by the need to end the US military commitment in the Western Balkans. With ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, US decision makers needed to reduce their military commitments in other locations as much as, and as soon as, possible. Tied to this was the danger that, unless resolved quickly, Kosovo could again descend into violence. As the frustrations of the Kosovo Albanians grew, the danger that they could vent their anger at international forces and administrators grew substantially. If this were to turn to open conflict, this could create a potentially troubling and embarrassing situation. How would it be possible to explain to a domestic audience at home that the people who had been “liberated” by the NATO were now turning on those same liberators? It was far easier to be able to declare victory and depart. However, given that the Kosovo Albanians would resist any attempt to reintegrate Kosovo back into Serbia, even under a high degree of autonomy, the only feasible exit strategy became independence. As a result, from a very early stage in the process US officials made it clear to their EU counterparts that the United States was intent on recognising independence. Europe could either agree, or live with the consequences.\(^\text{16}\)

Amongst the four EU members within the Group, Britain and France were equally certain that the only possible outcome of the process would be some sort of independence. Indeed, the French Government was the first to state this to Belgrade, in December 2005 (TV Pink 2005). Following on from this, a senior British official – John Sawers, the Political Director of the Foreign Office – became the first to state it openly, in February 2006 (Reuters 2006a). For their part, the German and Italian Governments were rather more circumspect about the situation. While Berlin also saw the logic of independence it was rather more careful in how it expressed its view. For example, the German Ambassador in Serbia sought to distance his government from the British comments. Independence was not a foregone conclusion (Tanjug 2006b). As for the Italian Government, it had

\(^{16}\) Diplomat from an EU member state, comments to the author, 2007.
traditionally had the strongest relations of the four with Belgrade and appeared to want to maintain a diplomatic silence over the outcome of the process.

While the United States, Britain and France were explicit regarding its intentions towards Kosovo, the Russian government appeared to be sending out rather more equivocal signals as to its own position. Nevertheless, the general expectation prior to the start of the status talks was that, while the Russian government might have misgivings about granting independence to Kosovo, it would soon drop its objections (Bugajski and Joseph 2007). While this view may appear with the benefit of hindsight to be naïve or misguided, it appeared to many observers to be perfectly justified at the time. After all, at the very start of the status process, Moscow had agreed with the other five members of the Contact Group on a joint statement noting that any settlement must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo – a note that Ahtisaari took to mean support for independence, which was the only acceptable solution in the view of the Kosovo Albanians. Similarly, it must be remembered that the Russian Government also agreed to allow Ahtisaari to draw up a status proposal, even though Russian officials must have known full well what his eventual suggestions would entail given that Ahtisaari had, from the very outset of the process, made it more than clear to the Contact Group that he saw independence as the only possible outcome of the process. Therefore, just as the United States had come out strongly in support of independence, the Russian government appeared to be quietly signalling its acceptance of that independence. Under these circumstances, it appeared likely that the status process would be a relatively straightforward process.

**Understanding Russia’s position**

The problem for European decision makers was that they had in fact misread Russia’s position from the outset. Upon closer examination, it was wrong to assume that Russia would simply endorse the case for independence. For a start, at every stage in the process, Moscow insisted that any settlement must be acceptable to both sides. Russia would certainly be willing to accept independence – but only if Belgrade did.17 Secondly, it was absolutely insistent that the talks should not be subject to specific timetables. Likewise, while the UN Envoy was authorised to draw up proposals as a basis for a settlement, Ahtisaari was never given carte blanche to present a comprehensive plan – let alone present a proposal that he would then insist was not open to significant amendment. To this extent, it can in fact be argued that, at best, Western decision makers misunderstood the Russian position (Abramowitz 2008). At worst, they deliberately chose to ignore the warning signs. Indeed, even after Putin’s tough warning over Kosovo in early 2007, there still appeared to be a general belief that Russia would not block the process. Certainly, no efforts were made to plan for the possibility that Moscow was serious about its position (Holbrooke 2007).

This failure to judge Russia’s intentions on Kosovo appears to be the result of several factors. First of all, there appears to have been a degree of anti-Russian prejudice at play. Indeed, it was telling that many observers fell back on typical stereotypes to explain Moscow’s behaviour. For example, some commentators put Moscow’s decision to adopt a tough approach on Kosovo down to its wish to stand up to the West and reassert itself on the world stage (The Washington Post 2006; Abramowitz 2008). To be sure, under Vladimir Putin, Russia sought to reassert its regional and international authority and the discussions over Kosovo took place against a backdrop of growing tensions between Russia and the West. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the US approach towards Kosovo was also criticised by many liberal pro-Western Russians. For example, in an article

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17 As several senior ministers pointed out at various points in the process, Russia would not be more Serbian than the Serbs (New York Times 2007a; The Independent 2008).
published in the Russian press, Mikhail Gorbachev called Kosovo a “dangerous precedent” that would be capable of “detonating” conflicts elsewhere in the world. And like many other Russians, he was also scathing of the decision by the EU and NATO to pursue a settlement outside of the UN Security Council. As he stated,

[t]his is an unprecedented step, without foundation in political, never mind moral terms [...] For the first time in history, two organizations are trying to assume responsibility for the future of a country – Serbia – which is not a member of either of them [...] By destroying the international law and replacing it with poorly disguised tyranny, the proponents of this approach have certainly miscalculated the outcome of their actions (United Press International 2007b).

Another argument was that Moscow may also have been trying to exact some sort of revenge on the United States and NATO for the events of 1999 (Council on Foreign Relations 2008; Traynor 2007; Reuters 2008). Again, this could be true. 1999 was certainly a humiliation. But it may have been less about extracting revenge than about letting those countries that had created the problem find their own solution to the quagmire they had made for themselves. Having been sidelined in 1999, Moscow may well have believed that it was now under no obligation to provide political cover for NATO as it now sought to extricate itself from the political and legal mess it had created (International Crisis Group 2007).

While such explanations may well have played a part in Russia’s thinking, Moscow’s behaviour can perhaps be better explained by other factors. First of all, the US and EU decision makers failed to consider the impact of Kosovo on Russian public opinion and the ways in which this shaped Moscow’s reaction. The Russian Government also harboured concerns about the impact of allowing Kosovo to be granted independence. In the first instance, there was the issue of Slavic solidarity. Many in Russia felt a natural affinity with the Serbs and resented the way in which they had been treated in 1999. But this was in fact a rather secondary concern. Far more importantly, the question of Kosovo touched on the key question of the South Caucasus. If Moscow accepted US demands for Kosovo’s independence, there would be an expectation that it would be able to secure independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the necessary quid pro quo. It was simply not possible for the public to accept that Russia should confirm Kosovo’s statehood without payback. For some reason, this was never taken seriously – even though US officials, even at the highest level, were warned about the depth of Russian public sentiment on the Kosovo issue.18

Secondly, and crucially, there was a general underestimation of the seriousness with which Kosovo was held in Russian domestic circles as a matter of international law. Western policy makers failed to appreciate the fact that Russia harboured serious and legitimate concerns about the consequences of recognising an independent Kosovo against the will of the Serbian Government. For a start, such a move would be unprecedented in modern international affairs. Having been recognised as Serbian territory under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and as shown at the start of this article, any attempt to end Belgrade’s rule over the territory without Serbian consent would necessarily undermine international law. As one senior British diplomat noted, many in the West did not understand that when it comes to matters of international law, and the authority of the UN, Moscow is not in fact a rogue actor. If anything, it is an arch-conservative.19 Certainly, on the question of Kosovo’s statehood, Russia’s views were far closer to the prevailing

18 For example, meeting with representatives from a number of Russian NGOs during a visit to Moscow in May 2007, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, was explicitly warned not to underestimate the depth of Russian feelings on Kosovo (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007a).
19 Retired senior British diplomat, comments to the author, November 2006.
international opinion on the legality of the matter than those of the United States (The Independent 2007).

The European Union’s position

Within weeks of the unveiling of the finalised version of the Ahtisaari proposals, the depth of division within the European Union was obvious. This was first highlighted at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Bremen, at the end of March 2007, which failed to produce a joint position on the proposals (EU Observer 2007). The problem was that, under normal circumstances, one would have expected the European Union as a whole to have taken the same position as Russia. After all, in other comparable situations of ethnic conflict where one group had sought to declare independence – such as Cyprus, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestra – it had adhered to the prevailing norms on secession and had strongly favoured reconciliation within existing borders. Indeed, the seriousness of this principle is rather confirmed by the fact that European (and US) officials have repeatedly sought to portray Kosovo as a “unique case” precisely in order to ensure that its effects are not felt elsewhere. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that even in the case of Kosovo, for several years after 1999 many European officials – including diplomats in Britain, the strongest EU supporter of independence – still wished to pursue some sort of autonomy arrangement for the province, rather than statehood (Ker-Lindsay 2009).

By the time the status talks started, however, autonomy within Serbia was already no longer a feasible option – if, indeed, it really ever had been.20 To try to deny Kosovo statehood at this stage would have almost certainly led to catastrophic circumstances. Even by the end of 2006, UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) was facing growing opposition and threats of violence (UN News Service 2006; South East European Times 2006)21. They wanted independence. As one former senior UN official put it, “Initially, [Kosovo Albanians] had welcomed UNMIK as a replacement for Serb rule, and as what seemed like a steeping stone to that independence. With no progress on status, however, many Kosovo Albanians began to see UNMIK as an obstacle instead” (Harland 2010). Moreover, if the situation continued for much longer it would be more than likely that the Kosovo Albanians would simply decide to declare independence unilaterally – a repeated threat by Kosovo Albanian leaders (Adnkronos International 2006). Once this happened, any attempt by UNMIK to continue administering Kosovo would be all but impossible. Indeed, its authority was already declining precipitously.

The problem was that if the Kosovo Albanians did decide to pursue independence unilaterally, Kosovo would be almost wholly incapable of governing itself. After all, earlier attempts to introduce democratic standards prior to status talks had failed despite the presence of such a large UN mission. More to the point, there was a distinct possibility that the minorities in Kosovo, particularly the Serbian community, would be put in grave danger without formal outside supervision. In view of this, the only way in which to avert this catastrophe was for the European Union to take over some of the functions of governance and try to succeed where UNMIK had failed so badly. However, it was obvious that this would only be possible if the Kosovo Albanian population saw this new mission as being there by the consent of their own authorities. In other words, with the population agitating for the end of international administration, the only way in which the European

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20 As one leading Kosovo Albanian political figure stated, the Kosovo Albanian leadership always saw NATO’s intervention in 1999 as a prelude for independence. “[T]hey understood that Serbia cannot just get out, and the process of independence for Kosovo cannot be initiated without the presence of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. A Western protectorate, and later independence through a referendum, is the national strategy of the Albanians of Kosovo” (Shala 2000: 187).

21 At the same time, the Albanian National Army (ANA), which the UN termed a terrorist group, was increasing its activities in the west of Kosovo (Reuters 2006b).
Union could hope to control the situation was by agreeing to Kosovo’s independence, and then putting in place a mission with the explicit consent of the government of Kosovo.

Thus the European Union found itself with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, if it chose to take the side of Washington, and bypass the Security Council altogether, it would clearly raise serious concerns about international law. On the other hand, if it chose to align with Russia it risked destabilising the situation on the ground, which could lead to a rebellion against the UN and NATO and leave a dangerous vacuum in the Western Balkans. For some countries, it was an easy choice to make. Throughout the discussions, Britain and France were firmly supportive of Washington’s position. They too believed that there was no alternative to independence – even if that meant supporting a declaration of independence that was made without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. As one EU official later explained, “The cake has been baked because the Americans have promised Kosovo independence. And if Washington recognizes Kosovo and European nations do not follow, it will be a disaster” (International Herald Tribune 2008).

In contrast, a number of smaller states were adamantly opposed to any move to recognise Kosovo unless sanctioned by the UN Security Council. These included Spain, as well as a number of smaller states that feared the precedent of endorsing a unilateral act of secession that appeared to violate international law. Importantly, between the two camps lay a third group of states that tended towards the constitutionalist position, but could be swayed by pragmatists if it could be shown that all attempts to reach a consensual position between the two sides, or gain Security Council endorsement, had failed. The most important member of this group was Germany. Although Berlin had voiced support for the Ahtisaari proposals, it was nevertheless worried about the legality of recognising Kosovo’s independence without the explicit authorisation of the UN.22

The depth of the problem facing the European Union was highlighted during the Brussels leg of the UN fact finding mission, in April 2007. Meeting with EU officials, the ambassadors were told that a united European position on the question of independence would require a Security Council resolution (UN Security Council Document 2007; Associated Press 2007f). As Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, who had also served as a UN Special Representative in Kosovo, noted, the question of Kosovo’s status was as one of the most difficult problems ever encountered by the EU (Associated Press 2007g). Another put it more succinctly, EU policy on Kosovo was a “chaotic mess”23.

EU-Russian engagement

Realising that the hopes of an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina were minimal, and fearing the divisions that would emerge within its own ranks if a Security Council resolution was not passed endorsing independence, senior EU leaders, rather than try to engage with the sides, instead attempted to secure Russian support for the Ahtisaari proposals for independence. For example, as early as February 2007, when the proposals had only just been unveiled, the EU sought to allay Russian concerns that a status decision on Kosovo might set a precedent elsewhere. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU commissioner for external affairs, tried to reassure Moscow that any decision on Kosovo would not have a wider effect on Russia’s autonomous regions (Interfax 2007a; The Washington Times 2007). It was evidently not enough. Speaking days later, at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin issued a sharp rebuke to the West over a number of issues, including Kosovo. Arguing that it was in the interests of the US and the EU that international law was upheld, he insisted that a settlement must be reached between the sides and openly

22 Wolfgang Ischinger [the EU representative on the Troika], interview with the author, December 2008.
criticised Washington for attempting to impose a Kosovo settlement against Belgrade’s wishes, arguing that this would set a precedent for conflicts elsewhere. In a particularly notable turn of phrase, he argued that no one had the right to play “Lord God” and make decisions for other nations (Interfax 2007b).

Thereafter, a number of further efforts were made to persuade Moscow to change its mind. It refused each time. For example, pressure was put on Moscow at an extremely acrimonious meeting in the southern Russian town of Samara, in May 2007. In response, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, warned against trying to impose a solution from outside; arguing that anyone who believed that Kosovo could be solved by the EU, the US and Russia was obviously burdened by “colonial instincts”. He also reiterated that if Kosovo were to become independent it would inevitably become a precedent, regardless of whether or not anyone wanted it to be one (BBC News 2007; B92 2007c). Thereafter, another attempt to win Russian support, during a tense meeting of G8 foreign ministers in Potsdam, a week prior to the G8 summit, also failed. When Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German Foreign Minister, appealed to Russia to give up its objection to Kosovo’s independence, Lavrov again refused, asking why other, longer-standing issues, such as the Western Sahara and Palestine, were not being dealt with first (International Herald Tribune 2007; Reuters 2007d).

The strength of Russian feeling on the issue was further emphasised to European leaders when Putin travelled to Austria and Luxembourg and delivered a further warning against any moves to grant Kosovo statehood (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007b). He also reiterated his opposition to imposed independence at the G8 summit meeting, where Kosovo was discussed over lunch. It was at this point that the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, switched tack and tried to win Moscow over. However, it was done in a ham-fisted manner. Calling upon Russia to accept the “unavoidable prospect” of independence, he proposed that a resolution be delayed for six months to allow for further talks to take place. If, after that, no agreement had been reached, the Ahtisaari plan would be implemented. With no chance that the Kosovo Albanians would support anything but independence, especially given such strong US support, this initiative was little more than an attempt to placate Moscow with what would obviously be little more than a façade of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. While the call for new talks was certainly welcome, Moscow was unwilling to accept that independence would be the inevitable outcome of the process. Speaking at the end of the summit, Putin again stressed that no final decision on the status of Kosovo without Serbia’s agreement and warned that attempting to do so would set a precedent (Austrian Associated Press 2007; Reuters 2007e; Reuters 2007f; Agence France-Presse 2007a; Financial Times 2007a).

On balance, therefore, it was hardly surprising that these efforts met with little success. The comment that Kosovo would have no effect on Russian regions was a particularly ham-fisted effort. By even raising the issue of the regions, it rather suggested that the EU considered that there were potential cases of secession that could appeal to the Kosovo precedent. Likewise, the use of the sui generis argument was problematic and showed just how little the EU was able to grasp the delicacy of the situation in Russia. Had Russia decided to accept this line of argument, it would be read as caving in to US and EU demands on Kosovo without securing anything at all in return on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while at the same time severely undermining Moscow’s claim to being a champion of international law and state sovereignty. Indeed, this line of argumentation may in fact have served to make matters worse inasmuch as it effectively ensured that it would close the door to Russia to extend the same principle to the South Caucasus.
Thereafter, by August 2007, when the Troika started its work, it appeared as if the European Union simply gave up trying to persuade Moscow to change its position. While the decision to form the Troika may have appeared to be a genuine attempt to reach a compromise between the sides, it was undermined by the obvious intention of the US to recognise Kosovo regardless – as evidenced by Bush’s comments in Albania. It was therefore doomed before it began. However, it did serve another, equally important purpose inasmuch as it was also designed to win over the group of states that saw the pragmatic argument for independence, but were concerned about the legal issues. It was designed to achieve European unity as much as to try to find a solution between Belgrade and Pristina.24 By showing that any agreement between the sides was utterly impossible, and that Russia was simply obstructing independent, the hope was that this would persuade them to accept Kosovo’s statehood without explicit UN Security Council authorisation. In this regard, the Troika mission provided the cover necessary to this middle group of states to make a political decision, despite concerns over the legality of this decision. On this score, the Troika was successful. As was noted, at the start of the summer, the EU had been hopelessly divided. By the end of the process, most of the EU states that had harboured earlier reservations, most importantly Germany, had been persuaded that there was no other choice but to support independence (B92 2007d; Agence France-Presse 2007b)25. By now, Russia’s position had become all but irrelevant in amongst the EU states on the Contact Group.

Conclusion

In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Within days it had been recognised by the United States and a number of the larger members of the European Union. In the months that followed, many others followed suit. However, five EU members – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – have steadfastly refused to recognise Kosovo; as have Russia, China and the large majority of UN members. According to the standard narrative that has emerged in EU circles, the unilateral declaration of independence was widely viewed as a major defeat for European diplomacy. Having been recognised as the key actor shaping the future of the Western Balkans, the Union had singularly failed to provide leadership on the issue and fell victim to Russian and American machinations. However, while there has been a tendency to apportion blame equally to Washington and Moscow for this state of affairs, on closer examination a more complex picture emerges.

Certainly, a large degree of responsibility lies with the United States. As several senior US officials stated on the eve of the declaration of independence, “While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo’s independence, a number of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington’s inflexibility and insistence” (Bolton, Eagleburger and Rodman 2008). Partly out of ideology and partly out of necessity, the United States saw no alternative to independence,26 and pursued this option. But it is wrong to believe that

25 As officials explained, while this decision might not be strictly according to the letter of Resolution 1244, it would nevertheless be taken in the spirit of the resolution, which envisaged an eventual decision on Kosovo’s status. This was later explicitly elucidated in the document placing an EU mission in Kosovo, which stated that, “Acting to implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more compatible with the intentions of 1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome in a situation where everyone agrees that the status quo is unsustainable” (BBC News 2008a).
26 A case can be constructed that there was in fact an alternative. Leaving aside the obvious desire of certain key officials to support an independent Kosovo and in doing so punish Serbia, the necessity argument is open to challenge. For a start, there was already a realisation in international circles that Kosovo would increasingly become a European issue in the future. The European Union was already taking the lead role in the NATO KFOR mission. It was also poised to take over many of the UNMIK administrative responsibilities. To this extent,
Europe was simply an innocent bystander caught up in a resurgent Cold War, as some have suggested. From the very start, a number of key actors openly sided with the United States on the question of independence. Indeed, Britain and France took a far more forthright position far earlier than Washington. In other words, the failure to achieve European unity over the question of Kosovo was not as a result of the agenda having been hijacked by Washington, but by the fact that several EU members had also taken a position in favour of independence without having sought to engage in a full and open debate on the issue with their European partners. Of course, the argument can be made that this debate was felt to be unnecessary at the start of the status process, when there appeared to be an international consensus in favour of independence. However, as was shown, there was never any solid evidence to support the view that Russia was in fact willing to acquiesce on the question of statehood.

By the time the extent and depth of Russia’s opposition to independence without Serbia’s permission was understood, it was too late to change course. Washington was openly set on statehood and had publicly made it clear that it would recognise Kosovo even without UN support. At this point, EU leaders sought to try to persuade Moscow – rather than Washington – to change its mind, even though the Russian position on the question of mutually agreed secession was far closer to what would usually have been expected to be the EU position. However, little incentive was offered to Moscow to change its mind. EU leaders appeared to have no understanding of the dynamics at play within Russia, and showed little desire to acknowledge Russia’s concerns about the wider effects of the Kosovo precedent. Relatively quickly, therefore, the key EU states appeared to abandon efforts to try to reach a compromise, instead focusing their efforts on providing the degree of political cover needed to secure the support of the middle group of EU states that could be persuaded to support Kosovo’s independence without Security Council authorisation. Viewed retrospectively, this does in fact appear to be the main purpose of the much-vaunted Troika process.

In view of these circumstances, the Russian position certainly does not seem to be as obstructive and malicious regarding Kosovo as some observers have argued subsequently. As has been shown, it was the United States, acting with the support of key EU states, which eventually forced the EU to abandon constitutionalism – and not Russia. In fact, Russia was always far more in line with prevailing international norms regarding secession. (Importantly, this argument has not been undermined by the International Court of Justice’s opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, delivered in July 2010. Although it argues that a declaration as a mere statement is not contrary to international law, the judges deliberately and clearly insisted that their majority opinion did not judge whether the act of secession was in fact legal (International Court of Justice 2010)27.) Indeed, had it not been the case that the United States and key EU members

US engagement with Kosovo was already declining significantly. To be sure, the Kosovo Albanians wanted independence. However, there are good reasons to argue that had the United States stood firm and made it clear that this was not an option, at least at this stage, and that any attempt to press ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence, or destabilise the situation, would be met with united international condemnation it is likely that the Kosovo Albanians could have been persuade to take a more moderate approach and discuss other options, such as full autonomy. It would not have been easy, but had US officials taken a firm line, the situation may well have been manageable. But they did not. Instead, they chose to adopt a position that they knew was, at best, highly controversial in terms of international law and sought to force the EU to follow suit.

27 As the judges stated, in paragraph 52, “In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State […] Accordingly, the Court does not consider that it is necessary to
pushed too hard for independence, and forced most of the rest of the European Union to take sides so openly, it is highly likely that the EU as a whole would have continued to look for some sort of solution that fell short of full independence, as has originally been hoped in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO campaign. Instead, when it was clear that this was unacceptable to Kosovo Albanians and would almost certainly lead to violence against international officials, the majority of EU members were left having to try to support the rather specious argument that Kosovo represented a “unique case” in international politics – an argument that carried very little weight on the wider international stage – in order to create the conditions whereby it could try to stabilise the situation after the unilateral declaration of independence.

Of course, it would be wrong to argue that Russia bore no responsibility for the situation that arose. Like the United States, its position was driven by more than a little self-interest. Had the west been willing to do a deal that linked Kosovo’s fate with that of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it seems more than likely that Russia’s seemingly principled stance would have disappeared quickly. Be that as it may, it can be clearly shown that the EU’s disunity was not the result of Russia’s “constitutionalism”. If anything, the EU was instead a “victim” of the “pragmatism” of the United States and several of its own members. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Moscow’s claim to the higher moral and legal ground were wholly undermined by its subsequent decision to recognise the unilateral declarations by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the fact remains that throughout the period under examination in this piece, Moscow’s position was far more in line with the international legal norms than the line taken by the United States. Had it not been for the dire situation on the ground, a situation that had the potential to directly affect key EU members as well as the United States, it is highly likely that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence would have found little support in EU circles given that it so clearly went against long standing international legal principles and norms.

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address such issues as whether or not the declaration has led to the creation of a State or the status of the acts of recognition in order to answer the question put by the General”.

But even here, the Russian Government continued to take a legalistic approach – albeit with a twist. In justifying its decision to recognise the two territories, Moscow adopted the very Anglo-Saxon concept of legal precedent. As Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian President, stated during a press conference with President Sarkozy: “You were right in asking if the Ossetians and Abkhazians can and want to live within Georgia. This is a question for them to ask of themselves and it is they who will give their own clear answer. It is not for Russia or any other country to answer this question for them. This is something that must take place in strict accordance with international law. Though, over these last years international law has given us numerous very complicated cases of peoples exercising their right to self-determination and the emergence of new states on the map. Just look at the example of Kosovo” (The Kremlin 2008).

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European Security through EU-Russian Relations: Towards a New Multilateral Order?

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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and Russia have managed to create an original framework for institutionalised cooperation despite asymmetric characteristics. Yet, the way these two main security actors interact has an impact on the (non)-resolution of security issues in Europe, ranging from “frozen conflicts” to the discussion of the security architecture. Since the second mandate of President Putin, the relation has been characterised by two paradoxical features. On the one hand, the methodology and the domains of cooperation have reached a high degree of achievement. On the other hand, the political quality of the relationship has deteriorated and it is not able to achieve the desired “strategic partnership” that should be based on a common set of values and principles. This article aims to define multilateralism as a paradigm applicable to EU-Russian relations. It examines their relationship in the security and defence realm and the Union’s reactions to a new security approach by Russia since the 2008 Medvedev proposal. The article questions how the EU-Russian political dialogue impacts on multilateralism in the security field. The conclusion considers EU-Russian relations as a peculiar multilateral playground addressing common security challenges, which still needs to be developed further in order to be instrumental in the search for collective and legitimate solutions.

Keywords
European Union; Russia; European security architecture; multilateralism

By and large, it is necessary to analyse the “family affairs” in Europe, and reassess a lot of things, though not in terms of the euphoria and triumphalism of the early 90s, but on the basis of sober analysis of the real consequences of what has occurred in the past twenty years (Lavrov 2010).

These words of Russia’s Foreign Minister are a reminder of the renewed Russian desire to reshape security relations and institutions in Europe. This idea was launched by President Dmitry Medvedev in June 2008 and is recurrent in the serious and polarising security-related disputes over the US project to extend missile shields in Europe, Kosovo’s independence and the EU/NATO-accession aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation have developed a unique institutional framework of cooperation, based on the 1997 cooperation agreement and the creation of “four common spaces” of cooperation in
2003. Nonetheless, despite the approximation experienced between the two biggest European neighbours, growing dissatisfaction has emerged from both sides. The contribution of Russian experts to the report of the “Group of Valdai” is illustrative of this state-of-play. The report criticises both parties for the stagnation of the relationship and calls urgently for a ‘Union of Europe’ (Karaganov et al. 2010).

Additionally, the 2008 Russian–Georgian war has created a more difficult environment for relations with the Kremlin. As far as relations between the EU and Russia are concerned, significant changes have occurred. After a ‘reflection period’ from September to October 2008, the agenda for cooperation has refocused on core interests, such as trade and energy. Parallel to this, a new agenda on security is taking shape. Globally, despite a comprehensive cooperative dialogue, producing concrete results mainly on economic matters and trade, the political outcomes have not been satisfying for either partner. This is particularly noticeable in the ‘common space of external security’², or more broadly in the political difficulty of achieving a renewed partnership.

This article aims to understand the current state-of-play of security relations in Europe and how multilateralism impacts on them, taking into account two main elements. On the one side, there are new Russian pressures on security arrangements in Europe, namely the Medvedev proposal for a new security pact in the context, created by the August 2008 war. On the other hand, the EU is an important counterpart for Russia and is a security player as well. Cooperation has, in fact, emerged between the EU and Russia but there is still a controversy in interpreting the added value of this cooperation in the systemic context of global politics and as a problem-solving tool for specific issues.

The fact that there are opposite views about EU-Russian relations are also a motivation for their study. Some consider that the relationship has produced little in dealing with European and global issues and, in contrast, others value the outcomes of EU-Russian relations. For instance, Emerson (2005) tends to produce a critical assessment of the capacity of EU-Russia relation to deliver tangible solutions, as opposed to Grant and Barysh (2003). There is, therefore, a need to evaluate the current stalemates in the European security dialogue and the possibilities for developing dialogues into a problem-solving tool.

The present work assesses the impact of multilateralism (a form of cooperation and institution) in framing the European order in the light of EU-Russian relations. In the first section, the phenomenon of ‘multilateral cooperation’ is analysed and applied to the case of EU-Russian relations. This form of interaction remains complex and poorly defined in the literature and the relationship between the Union and Russia are presented here as a case-study for multilateralism. The article endorses Petiteville’s broad definition of multilateralism for the study of its current forms:

The production by States, international organisations and NGOs of norms and rules that aim at establishing a cooperative international order governing international interdependencies (2009: 13).

Secondly, the author addresses the specific area of security cooperation between the two actors in order to analyse a specific practice of the theoretical framework presented in the

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¹ The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is the legal basis for EU–Russian relations. A new framework of cooperation was established at the St. Petersburg summit in 2003. Since then, Brussels and Moscow have cooperated in four areas (the so-called ‘common spaces’): a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a common space of cooperation in the field of external security; and a common space on research, education and culture.

² See footnote 1.

³ Author’s translation.
first section. The state-of-play of EU-Russian relations in this domain is taken as an element to assess the capacity of the relationship to address security concerns and solutions. The Medvedev proposal for a new security treaty for Europe is also considered in the sense that this initiative relates to the need to reshape the security order. Finally, the conclusion draws on the limited EU reactions to the Medvedev proposal and on the poor prospects for EU-Russian relations to advance collective and legitimate solutions for European security, despite the originality of their multilateral interactions.

Multilateralism as a paradigm

In this section the author aims to explore the multilateral feature of EU-Russian relations, as opposed to mere bilateral relations. The European Union and Russia have developed a unique and institutionalised framework of cooperation, based on the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) since 1997. Despite the fact that EU Member States retain core sovereign prerogatives in external affairs and defence issues, as opposed to EU supranational prerogatives in other domains such as trade (Kurpas et al. 2007), this article argues that the relations between Brussels and Moscow are embedded in a core multilateral scheme. This characteristic does not dismiss the fact that bilateral interactions do happen and influence the relationship. The argument developed below is that bilateral relations are not disconnected from the overall multilateral playground. Two elements are analysed in order to understand multilateralism and EU-Russian relations. On the one hand, an overview of the concept of ‘multilateralism’ highlights the theoretical and empirical limitations of the study of this phenomenon. On the other hand, this particular form of interaction is applied to the case of EU-Russian relations, namely taking into consideration the analysis of the EU as a global actor.

The concept of ‘multilateralism’

At the beginning of the 1990s, Ruggie stressed that the lacunas in the research about multilateralism lay in the lack of studies about the form that international institutions can assume and about the effects on their world role (1992: 597). The phenomenon has an important place in post-Cold War studies but the complex nature of its forms and efficacy has not yet created a unified theoretical proposal. In 1992, Ruggie already noticed that multilateralism was a spread and studied institutional phenomenon but that its features were often blurred by institutionalism (1992: 567). In EU-Russian relations, it can even be approached as the less usual of one of its three historical forms: the one which aims at solving cooperative problems when conflicting interests are at stake (1992: 582). The other two are the management of coordination problems (in that case, states want the same result for all and result is less important as such) and Property Rights of the states (1992: 597).

Multilateralism is broader than international organisations. Thus, one may underline Ruggie’s advise about the fact that there is no explanation in theoretic literature about contemporary multilateralism because of its adaptability (1992: 594 and 597). Petiteville (2009) also addresses the multiplicity and evolution of ‘multilateralism’ as an unavoidable fact of contemporary International Relations (IR) in specific organisations and areas. The theoretical and empirical importance of the study of multilateralism in the selected context (EU-Russia relation) is, furthermore, supported. Ruggie is also puzzled by a global

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4 There is a broad literature on EU-Russian relations. See for instance Antonenko and Pinnick 2005; Delcour 2005; Emerson 2006; Kefferpütz 2008; Makarychev 2008) Nikolov 2009; Nygren 2009; Trenin 2002.
movement through the twentieth century: the fact that multilateralism materialised in formal organisations.\(^5\)

Taking into account the existing analysis of institutions and cooperation\(^6\), it is considered here that multilateralism is a specific shape of institution and also a form of reciprocity\(^7\). As an organising form of IR, it has gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War and with the integration of the world economy. Multilateralism is a specific way of gathering international actors to support cooperation, non-discrimination principals, diffuse reciprocity (positive sum games) and generalised institutional structures (Caporaso 1992; Ruggie 1993). Indivisibility is also another principle. For instance, in collective security agreements, peace is indivisible and states must assume compromises towards all members (e.g. Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty).

Institutionalist approaches also state that institutions form preferences and that they influence choices. In contrast, individualist approaches consider that states and their interests are the independent centres of cooperation. This would reduce multilateralism to a simple strategic interaction. Institutionalism presents itself as a moderation of neorealism and not as its refutation: states and interests matter but they are located in a context in which there are norms, rules and believes (institutions).

The ‘problem of cooperation’ is not representable primarily as a game of strategic interaction, although this dimension of interstate behaviour surely exists. The emphasis shifts from strategic interaction with given (and fixed) utilities to a model of debate, communication, persuasion, argument, and discursive legitimation (Caporaso 1992: 626).

\(^5\) Morgan raises a similar question about developments in post-Cold War: ‘it is hard to see why great powers have now responded to the long peace in one way, enhanced cooperation, rather than the other – stable nuclear deterrence amid serious political cooperation. […] Leading governments reacted to the astonishing developments of 1989-1991 by declaring their readiness to undertake unprecedented adventures in multilateralism to enhance regional (European) and global security’ (1993: 328 and 333).

\(^6\) The concept of ‘cooperation’ is an element of both realist and liberal theories of International Relations but it has a different importance and explaining value. The liberal conception of IR lays mainly on ‘institutional liberalism’, which develops the following assumption: institutions are a key to promote peace. The main disagreement between realism and institutionalism is about the significant effect of institutions on perspectives of international stability, in an anarchical environment. Other general theories offer different perspectives. These approaches proposed, since the 80’s, contesting views based on a critic of modernity and positivism. Critical theory, post-modernism, gender theory or constructivism put the emphasis on the fact that all knowledge arises from a specific historical and political base. They are considered radical theories because they aim at changing the world rather than interpreting it (Battistella 2003: 235-298). Taking into consideration the debate between these two different IR approaches, institutions are defined here broadly as the rules which stipulate the way each state should cooperate or compete with others (Mearsheimer 1998: 333). The theory of international regimes provides a more detailed classification (Krasner 1983).

\(^7\) In IR, due to the great number of actors (players) involved, the cooperative games are, by essence, positive sum games. Nonetheless, there is another factor which interferes in this: the way each actor sees the game. As Dougherty and Platzgraff underline, there is often a player who sees the game as zero sum (2003: 724). The issue of how each actor perceives the results of interactions raises another difficulty for cooperation because one may consider absolute or relative gains. If the player considers absolute gains, cooperation is easier because he is not worried with the other’s gains (distribution of the benefits among all the participants) but only with his own share with no comparison. Realist thinkers have also underlined this constraint on cooperation by identifying that anarchy makes the states worry with relative gains (Waltz 2002: 148). One of the main contributions of Axelrod consists in having evidenced the effect of iterated games in establishing reciprocity, namely among states (Axelrod 1984; Wu and Axelrod 1995). The perspective of future encounters with the same player is an incentive to both cooperate and reciprocate strategies since it may be repeated in forthcoming situations. Globally, reciprocity in iterated games diminishes the fear of cheating of the actors, which is the biggest obstacle to cooperation (solution to the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’). Consequently, reciprocity is able to promote stability in a direct (between states) or indirect (multilateral agreements) way.
Institutionalism is then interesting in the analysis of multilateralism because it is a component of it. Additionally, this approach implies a critical cross-fertilisation of the theories of IR and an historic perspective. In fact, the contingency of the institutional models and their results (Caporaso 1992: 628) is a pertinent characteristic for the post-Cold War period (systemic changes and nature of the actors). Nonetheless, this article argues that a more specific approach to multilateralism is still necessary because it is a particular form of institutionalised cooperation often drowned in a theory of international institutions or, more generally, of cooperation. Thus, the study of EU-Russian relations through multilateral cooperation is an analytical challenge that needs to be explored.

The phenomenon of ‘multilateral cooperation’ remains complex and insufficiently defined in the literature. The current dynamics that shape the global order highlight the core tension between several forms of external action, mainly between unilateralism and multilateralism. Devin synthesises the definition of these terms and how they relate to each other, as follow.

In the usual sense, multilateralism is a method for coordinating behaviour among three or more actors. It differs from both bilateralism that concerns actions defined between two parties only and unilateralism by which one party alone defines the elements of its conduct. But this nominal approach is not sufficient. The noun (multilateralism) adds another dimension to a simple particular mode of cooperation (multilateral). Multilateralism (as bilateralism or unilateralism) is also a policy and, as such, is a series of actions led by some general principles and pursuing the achievement of certain goals. Technique and politics are not always equal: if the multilateral nature of international negotiations is ancient, multilateralism is more recent (2006: 21 and 26).

In this context, EU-Russian relations can be viewed as an answer to the complex nature of the international scene. They would represent a kind of reciprocal strategy to cope with globalisation and complexity. Kessler underlines that new centres of power have been created or reinforced in the globalised world and in the complex multilateral system. She gives examples ranging from the EU to the G8. The aim of the participating states is to coordinate policies and eventually common norms (1999: 482-483).

Taking into account the above mentioned tension between multilateral and bilateral options for global actors, and the aim of understanding EU-Russian relations, the question of how multilateralism is a feature of this relationship is raised. The issue of how bilateralism interplays within is not developed in this article although the author acknowledges the pertinence of this element. In fact, the EU outputs are informed by the Member States that retain sovereignty in certain domains, in addition to the EU level that creates a balance based on the power of EU institutions. The Russian Federation is a more traditional state actor that does not share decisional power as it is the case in the complex and unique EU political system. In the case of EU-Russian relations, available theoretical debates do not answer sufficiently critical questions such as the following. Why does the advanced framework of cooperation produce such limited outputs, namely at the political level and in the security agenda? How does Russia deal with the Union as compared to its relations with Member States separately? On which issues and in which conditions do these actors interact multilaterally? Is there a synergy between the different levels of interaction? These questions are wider research questions that fall outside the scope of this paper. The author aims here at identifying multilateral characteristics and the impact of this form of cooperation, and institution, in framing the European security order.

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8 The literature about EU functioning and external policies is abundant. See for instance Jorgensen et al. 2007; Kurpas 2007; Magnette 2008; Petiteville 2006; Rosamond 2000.
Additionally, the Union is a *sui generis* actor that needs to be conceptualised as an international actor. As it will be demonstrated below, the Union conveys practices of multilateralism. Nonetheless, as above mentioned, bilateral relations between the EU Member States and third actors occur in parallel with EU relations with these third parties, namely EU-Russian relations. On some issues and in specific contexts, actors favour the national level to pursue foreign policy goals. In differentiated cases, EU Member States and Russia are cooperating and competing depending on how national and bilateral positions and actions influence EU-Russian relations as such. This influence might reinforce or weaken the multilateral agenda and EU policies towards Russia. On the one hand, it depends on whether national preferences are convergent with the EU agenda. On the other hand, it depends on the EU possibility to act at the Union level as opposed to individual Member States actions. Russian preferences to deal with Brussels or with the Member States capitals to advance its interests are also influential in shaping relations with the Union. Energy relations are illustrative of this interplay between the bilateral and multilateral level. The fact that the EU has no integrated policy on energy yet puts a break on its management of the issue at the multilateral level, as opposed to bilateral relations of Member States with Moscow (Delcour 2009). In the second part of this article, the author shall evidence how security relations are poorly dealt at the multilateral level.

Weiss (2006) underlines that ‘effective multilateralism’ is ‘the core thought of the European approach to international relations’. It constitutes a principle that considers the Charter of the United Nations the guiding reference for international relations. In external policies, the Union has used the principle of conditionality to deal with its neighbourhood (and with the enlargement process) (Raik 2011). This principle implies the convergence of third parties with the EU set of norms and values. One of the most visible strains in EU-Russian relations is related to this characteristic of the EU as a foreign policy actor: the sharing of common values and principles, which are supposed to be the basis of the partnership. In 2003, the *Wider Europe* concept and the *European Security Strategy* clarified the external goals of the EU (European Commission 2003; Council of the European Union 2003). Brussels wants to create prosperity and security on its borders, which highlighted the importance of the relation with Russia. The objectives stated by the EU, in its *sui generis* foreign policy (Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)), are also based on norms observance because they advocate an international order based on multilateralism ('effective multilateralism') and International Law, as embodied by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The normative goals of the external action of the EU have, then, been further clarified in these two documents. The 2003 *Strategy* has been under revision and the French presidency of the EU issued a first preparatory outcome in 2008. Concerning the enhancement of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Union shall act ‘in the service of effective multilateralism and peace’ and CSDP is ‘compliant with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the United Nations Security Council (…)’ (Council of the European Union 2008b: 11 and 15). These external policy aims are also convergent with the goals of the institutionalised dialogue with Russia, stated in all the documents produced in the relation.

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9 The cases of bilateral trade disputes between Member States and Moscow evidence this interplay between the bilateral and multilateral levels (Roth 2009).

10 The analysis of bilateral relations and how they interfere with the EU-Russian agenda are not part of this research. The aim of the paper is to highlight multilateral interactions as such.

11 We underline in particular the Chapters 1, 5 and 7 of the Charter (United Nations 1945).

12 The official documents produced in the context of EU-Russian relations are available at the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS), available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm. The issue of norms convergence between the two actors has produced abundant literature such as Nygren 2009; Makarychev 2008; Tocci 2008.
An influential effort to conceptualise the EU as an international actor has been shaped by Manners (2002). He developed the idea that the Union might be a ‘normative power’. He aimed at ‘thinking beyond traditional conceptions of the EU’s international role and towards the idea of the EU’s international role being primarily normative, not civilian or military’ (Manners 2001). He considers that:

The EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system (2002: 252).

Laïdi (2008; 2010) has also been studying the issue of norm, and the rejection of the use of force to impose norms by the EU. He attempts to classify the Union as a ‘Risk Averse Power’. This kind of power insists on the ‘indivisibility of systemic risks between actors’ and is determined to diminish the ‘risky behaviours’ of other actors by integrating ‘their actions within a normative framework that would constrain them and make them more predictable’ (2010: 2). The feasibility of such a normative commitment for the EU as a global actor and the various understandings of the concept will not be discussed here. Rather it addresses the effects of this assumption on its relationship with Russia, namely how the Union has been able to apply, or not, the core systemic principles that it has endorsed in this context. It is argued here that the principled relationship that the Union wants with Russia has proven to be difficult to achieve in the interaction with Russia, namely in the security domain (see section two of this paper).13

In an attempt to analyse change in IR, Grevi characterises the contemporary world as being ‘interpolar’. His analysis underlines the fact that balances of power are highly evolutionary and dynamic, with a loss of dominant position by Washington on a global scale. He relates two basic trends: the multipolarisation of the balance of power and the deepening of interdependence. The management of this dual long-term ‘great transition’ requires, essentially, cooperation in the form of multilateral arrangements (Grevi 2009: 7 and 31-38). In his analysis, power is measured as the capacity to strengthening multilateral structures, able to bringing about an ‘interpolar world’. In his view, the EU has the profile to do so. The EU is a unique global actor and its complexity conditions its relation with Moscow. Particularly, if one attends Caporaso’s question: ‘[w]hat is the relationship between the number of actors involved in a potential multilateral scheme and the costs of transacting?’ and its answer: transaction costs increase with the number of actors [these costs include: ‘[t]he costs of identifying the relevant others, of discovering their preferences and strategies, and of devising policies that are capable of discriminating among defectors and cooperators’ (1992: 609)], then, the EU simultaneously facilitates multilateral cooperation, but it also complexifies it because of its complex and unique structures, functioning and policies.

How multilateralism applies to EU-Russian relations

The EU is a *sui generis* international organisation which conveys the practice of multilateral methods in its interactions with third parties. This characteristic is based on two core elements. Firstly, the external policy of the Union endorses values and principles that are deposited, namely, in the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945). In this context, the Union seeks the promotion of ‘effective multilateralism’. The goal of the

13 For an analysis of the EU commitment to the concept, see Wouters et al. 2010.
14 Globally, the use of conditionality and the insistence on normative convergence has been producing increasingly a ‘boomerang effect’ on the Union because Russia has been reacting negatively (Fernandes 2008a).
EU is to improve global governance and support, on the one hand, the UN system, and on the other hand, the EU values (European Commission 2003b). The Union recognises the importance of multilateralism for its policies that have external dimensions in other documents, such as the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003). Secondly, one might argue that the EU is itself a unique international organisation whose relations with Russia cannot be considered simply as bilateral relations as it is the case for relations between two states, for instance. The EU pursues a regional process of integration since 1951 that has no precedent in history. Today, the Union has no foreign policy as such, in the sense that it is a sui generis global actor (Cameron 2007). In fact, there are areas of community competence and others depend on intergovernmental decision-making. This is a complex framework which involves several EU institutions (the Commission, the Council, the Presidency, the High Representative), Member States and other international organisations.

The EU foreign policy is composed by, on the one hand, economic and commercial policies and, on the other hand, a security and defence content. Globally, the EU has developed and implemented a CFSP since 1992 and a CSDP since 1999 (former ESDP). Although the general definition of multilateralism considers that, ‘[m]ultilateralism is three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (more or less) institutionalised cooperation, with rules that apply (more or less) equally to all’ (Aspinwall 2010), this analysis underlines that multilateralism is still defined in multiple manners. The first findings of the Mercury consortium, that studies Multilateralism and the EU in the Contemporary Global Order, also point to the fact that multilateralism is still defined in different ways, particularly in different regions of the world ‘but common to all are the importance of rules, institutionalised cooperation and inclusiveness’. The study also considers that the EU has still to develop a ‘coherent doctrine of multilateralism’, although it has been consistent in the promotion of principles to seek multilateral solutions (Mercury 2010: 2). Thus, the EU uniqueness, understood as a process of integration, creates, on the one hand, its own internal experience of multilateralism and, on the other hand, multilateral interactions with third actors. It may be argued, then, that EU-Russian relations have a multilateral feature.

The way third actors view and interact with the peculiarities of the Union is also important to shape the nature and the quality of the multilateral cooperation that is produced. Baranovsky (2002) evidences that there is a Russian tendency to consider the EU under the political angle and that Moscow views the Union through multiple perspectives. He explains four paradigms in Russian views: the EU as a model, as a partner, as a possible accession, as a mean to achieve results. According to the author, the second view is the most developed and it mixes political and economic motivations, whereas the third paradigm is the most demanding for Russia because it would imply exigent conditions to be an EU candidate country. Nikonov (2004) clarifies some core reasons that explain the Russian lack of interest for an eventual accession to the Union. He explains that Russia ‘is too big and too Russian’, even in a long term perspective. This affirmation refers to the geopolitical and cultural features of the Federation. Additionally, the EU is very rigid in terms of regulation and it is not a homogeneous entity. As a consequence, bilateral relations with Member States are often preferred. Finally, he underlines that there are other possible models to create a free trade area with the Union. Nonetheless, this article highlights that both the Union and Russia advocate multilateralism, at the discourse level,

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15 Petiteville (2006) analyses the foreign policy if the EU in its multiple aspects, namely how the common trade policy of the Union contributes to the shape of EU’s external dimension.

16 The information about the research conducted by the Mercury consortium is available at the Mercury website: http://www.mercury-fp7.net/index.php?id=10072&no_cache=1 (accessed April 2010).

17 Abbott and Snidal consider also the Union as a different case in the context of their study of international organisations. The state that ‘[a]lthough we discuss certain of its operations, we deliberately de-emphasize the EU because some would regard it as an exceptional case of institutionalization’ (1992: 4).
as a desirable tool to address global politics and, particularly, global security (Council General Secretariat 2003; Putin 2007).

Additionally, the EU specifically binds its relationship with Moscow to the provisions that both parties endorsed in other multilateral organisations or conventions. EU-Russian relations are then informed by multilateralism coming from the systemic or global scale. Among the most important reference points, the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe are core depositories of principles and values. The role of the OSCE in the European security architecture has been discussed recurrently, despite the prominence that NATO has gained in the reshaping of the post-Cold War order. Although the Helsinki statement recognises official principles such as peace, consultation and the respect for human rights (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975), they will not be interpreted in the same way. The divergences about the commitments assumed in Helsinki, and later, have in fact been enduring. Klimov (2008) considers that it is time to organise a major international conference on the issue of security and take into account the new facts of the 21st century. He underlines that Helsinki occurred a long time ago and that it is not valid any more. Contrarily, the view of the Union is that the principles of Helsinki are valid. An official of the European Parliament Secretariat\(^{18}\) underlines that ‘the Helsinki Act is not obsolete because the values are more important than the signatories of the time’. Additionally, the participation of Russia in several multilateral forums, such as the Council of Europe, has been based on its interest to achieve international legitimisation (Massias 2007:103-119). Moscow wants recognition of its specificities and not a convergence on perceived imposed standards.

**Multilateralism in practice: EU-Russian security and defence dialogue**

This section explores the significance of the Medvedev proposal for a new security treaty for EU-Russian relations and for the emergence of a multilateral form of dealing with security issues in Europe. Firstly, the article analyses the security and defence dialogue between Brussels and Moscow, under the ‘Third Common Space of Cooperation’, in order to assess the modest role that this domain of cooperation has played in the European order. In fact, one might argue that the achievements of this dialogue are a key to understand how both actors may contribute to a multilateral approach to European security. Secondly, the impact of the Medvedev proposal is analysed as such.

**The Third Common Space of Cooperation**

Since 1999, both the Union and Russia have acknowledged major internal and external changes. Moscow has recovered from the 1990s political and economic chaos, whereas Brussels has concretised its CFSP/CSDP and launched a renewed policy framework towards its neighbourhood, namely in the post-Soviet/ post-Warsaw Pact space (the Russian ‘near abroad’\(^{19}\)). Nonetheless, the two actors have not experienced the expected approximation, namely at the normative level and in cooperative solutions to solve ‘frozen conflicts’. The Kremlin seems to have been looking for the maintenance of an enhanced role, in a Europe which is more and more defined by the EU (enlargements and neighbourhood policy) (Oldberg 2010). Problems of compatibility have arisen, namely because of different interpretations of sovereignty and integration. The Russian approach of sovereignty through territorial control has unique features in Russian foreign policy,

\(^{18}\) Interview conducted at the European Parliament, on 24 September 2008.

\(^{19}\) The near abroad corresponds to the fourteen Newly Independent States which integrated the USSR. This zone of vital interest, or at least sphere of influence, is fundamental to the Russian perception of threats. The Russian *near abroad* (*blizhnye zarubezhnye*) is attributed to Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs under Yeltsin (Tinguy 2008, 57-59; Safire, 1994).

After the presidency of Yeltsin (1991-1999), the Putin leadership marked a new era for Russia that also introduced changes in the relationship with Brussels, leading it to a crossroads. In fact, the state of play concerning the acceptance of the consequences of the end of the Cold War, during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, has been challenged. Until then, the Russian Federation accepted a status quo, determined by its weaker position in the regional and global balance of power. This explained partly its approximation to Europe, mainly in economic and commercial areas but also, later, in the security and defence sector. The EU, Russia and their relations have changed during this timeframe. This has been particularly visible from the Russian side. Since the second mandate of president Putin (2004-2008), the relation has been characterised by two paradoxical features. On the one hand, the methodology and the domains of cooperation have reached a high degree of achievements. On the other hand, the political quality of the relation has deteriorated and it is not able to achieve a real strategic partnership. The above mentioned image of a crossroad is pertinent to define the relationship since then. It is so because the ten years period of the PCA has come to an end in 2007, the consequences of the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU are impacting on its approaches, the EU is deepening its role as a global and a regional actor and the Russian foreign policy has become more assertive.

A feature of EU-Russian relations is the fact that the ‘low politics’ agenda (economics and trade) has been more developed than the ‘high politics’ agenda (security and conflicts) (Fernandes 2008b). The first common declaration in the security field was issued in 2000. It included concrete measures and common objectives for peace and security. At the operational level, cooperation in crisis management was established as a field for further development, as well as regular consultations at the expert level. Both Brussels and Moscow considered the evolution of these practical aspects related to the evolution of the European integration process in this domain (EU-Russia Summit, 2000). This enhancement of the political dialogue towards a security dimension has brought two modest results: a Russian participation in a CSDP mission and improved channels of communication. The first CSDP mission in which Moscow contributed is actually the EUFOR Chad/RCA, after the signing of an agreement in late 2008 (Council of the European Union 2008), below mentioned. Russia was also the first non-EU country to have regular meetings with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), created in 2001 after the Nice Treaty signature. This represents an additional institutional channel in the framework of cooperation and in the security dimension of the political dialogue.

Under the St. Petersburg third common space of external security and the 2005 Road Map to concretise this area of cooperation, five priorities are identified. The five priority areas are: ‘Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene; fight against terrorism; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament; co-operation in crisis management; co-operation in the field of civil protection’ (European Commission 2005). One of them, cooperation in crisis management, is directly connected to CSDP. The other four are mainly dealt with through CFSP. The political and security dialogue with Moscow, through the CFSP, has intensified even if the ‘common neighbourhood’ is clearly a difficult area of cooperation, as the current crisis in Georgia further highlights. The concrete

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20 Some analysts, such as Nadia Arbatova (2008), have a sharper view on the situation. She affirms that the turning-point has been surpassed in 2007 and that the EU and Russia took a different way. She wonders if they will meet again.

21 The relation with NATO has also led to an institutional framework of cooperation, based on the Founding Act (1997).
achievements in CSDP-Russia cooperation have materialised, so far, in four main aspects: missions, orientation courses, expert talks and virtual exercises.

The EUFOR Chad/RCA military mission is unique in the context of EU-Russian relations because, for the first time, Russia has contributed to the operational deployment of a CSDP mission. This operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic was designed as a ‘bridge operation’, for a one year period, to be substituted by the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). In March 2009, MINURCAT has taken over the authority of the EU operation. The UN deployed their mission since 2007. On November 5, 2008, Solana and the Russian ambassador to the EU signed an agreement on the Russian participation in the operation (Council of the European Union 2008). Previously, in May, the EU Military Committee analysed positively the offer of a contribution from Russia and, in October, the Council endorsed the agreement that had been negotiated with Moscow (Council of the European Union 2008f; 2008g). The negotiations started in March and were concluded in early November, followed by the Russian deployment on November 24-26. Besides Russia, only two other third states (Croatia and Albania) contributed to the mission.

In the Chad/CAR case, Russia demonstrated a change of attitude. The country did not overcome questions of principle but it did contribute fundamentally to the mission. Considering the huge distances to be covered in the region of eastern Chad and the north-east of CAR and the EU lack of airlift, the Russian four helicopters and 120 supporting personnel were needed. The balance of the Russian participation is considered positive. The full Russian operation was achieved by January 2009. The mission seems to have triggered the Russian will to follow what the Union does in its missions. Additionally, the long process in the Russian Duma to ratify the EU-Russian agreement for the Chad/CAR mission has also provoked a will to simplify the procedures. In fact, the agreement was ratified after the mission ended, in the autumn of 2009. The parties agreed about the fact that an exchange of letters would be sufficient in the future.

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon since December 2009 could be an opportunity to improve the EU-Russia security dialogue. Namely, the troika PSC meetings with Russia (discuss CFSP issues only) have neither delivered enough concrete results, nor cooperation in the scope of CSDP. Russia is not satisfied with the arrangements proposed by the EU to all third states in general. There has been also a need for a package of technical agreements to clarify how classified information can be protected, namely in Russia, that was finally signed in June 2010. It comprises all the areas of cooperation and is especially significant for crisis management and projects requiring access to classified material (Council of the European Union 2010). More positively, non-proliferation is an area of cooperation offering prospects for closer interaction between the EU and Russia. This area is an important element of the security dialogue that can contribute to an improved political convergence between the two parties and impact on the willingness to cooperate further. One of the priorities of the third common space is ‘non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament’ (Council of the European Union 2005). This goal is pursued using the G8

22 There are EU red lines on CSDP that are twofold: preserve EU decision-making autonomy and the conditions for Russian participation in EU crisis management operations (defined by the arrangements of the Seville European Council). On the one hand, the Kremlin wants to be involved in the decision making process on an equal footing with Brussels. On the other hand, the EU considers Russian participation at the same level as the participation of other third states, based on the framework of the Seville Council conclusions (Council of the European Union 2002). Globally, Moscow wants more influence and integration compared to what the Europeans are willing to concede.

23 The data concerning the deployment and the Russian participation in the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission have been retrieved, namely, from the author interviews at Directorate-General 8 and 9 of the Council Secretariat, on November 11, 2008, November 26, 2008, December 12, 2008, and March 3, 2010.

The deepening of CFSP/CSDP is regularly pointed out as a precondition for the EU to be an empowered global actor and a stability provider. This perspective is part of a debate about the nature and the impact of EU power (McCormick 2007). Nonetheless, besides any considerations about the Union capacities in these domains, understanding the growing difficulties in creating political convergence is crucial to interpret the poor EU-Russian military cooperation. Furthermore, there is today a complex ‘basket’ of security issues which relate to each other and undermine cooperation on ‘frozen’ conflicts and weaken the legal bases for solutions. For instance, there has been a growing need to further discuss, in a collective manner, the consequences of a defence missile system and its implications for the future of the CSDP and relations with Russia. Although Member States retain sovereignty on the issue and they are allowed to engage in bilateral moves with Washington, the Bush administration policies provoked unease in Brussels. The specificities of the integration process require at least consultation, not to mention the growing appeal of European internal solidarity, especially with respect to Russia. Although the CSDP does not cover missile defence, Javier Solana stated that ‘the treaties in force allocated sovereignty over this issue to the Member States, but this must be compatible with [the] EU’s general interest in security’ (Euractiv 2007). CSDP is influential in defining the EU’s role as a global actor in the medium and long term. In the common space of EU-Russian cooperation on external security, the two main aspects are crisis management and non-proliferation. Ryabkov identified a divergence of views only on a few issues, concerning separatist entities (Ryabkov 2008).

The fact that Brussels has experienced serious difficulties in producing a unified stance towards Russia has had a serious impact in advancing the security multilateral agenda. The difficult search for unity has reached a severe moment in 2008, in the context of the Russian-Georgian war. In the aftermath of this war, the EU went through an internal crisis concerning the attitude to adopt towards Moscow that involved Member States, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The Union sensed that ‘[l]a crise en Géorgie place la relation entre l’UE et la Russie à la croisée des chemins’ (Conseil de l’Union européenne, 2008, p. 4). There are different national perspectives in the EU on Russia and there is no consensual method to deal with Moscow. Some Member States wish to reconsider cooperation with Russia on the basis of Russia’s non-normative behaviour, while others favour a more pragmatic approach (Leonard and Popescu, 2007).

Immediately after the Georgian war, the EU stance has been concretised in three main events: the Extraordinary Council of 1 September, the Review of EU-Russia relations (Conseil de l’Union européenne, 2008; European Commission, 2008), and the EU-Russia Nice summit of November (Présidence de la République, 2008). The review is the first exercise of this type conducted by the EU where a frank and open wording highlights the problems putting a brake on the relationship. It is a direct reaction to the need to redefine attitudes towards Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis. It was meant to address two important issues: to send a public message to Moscow stating the principle of Georgian territorial integrity, and to support the resumption of negotiations with Moscow for a new cooperation agreement to substitute the obsolete PCA. In fact, the EU core interests regarding Russia are stated and the aim was to consider ‘the complex web of overlapping and shared interests in the EU-Russia relationship, and to make a sober assessment of where the EU’s own interests now lie’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 2). The political impact of this document was influential in prioritising EU-Russia cooperation because of EU interests, even if principles were still defended by Brussels in the letter.

Ryabkov was director of the Department of European Cooperation of the Russian Federation’s ministry of foreign affairs. At the time of writing, he is the deputy foreign minister.
The balance of EU institutional positions, on how to deal with Russia after the August war, has been summed up by the chair of the European Parliament Delegation to the European Union-Russia PCC. In an internal meeting of October 2008, she acknowledged that ‘no business as usual’ could be undertaken with Moscow because the situation was exceptional, while dialogue was to be maintained (Oomen-Ruijten, 2008). Nonetheless, it was visible that a fuzzy situation existed in the Union at the time about how to cooperate with Russia. The officials and the institutions were looking for the determination of a position in the making. For instance, the Chair directly asked the Commission and the Council if their working groups were meeting and if the work was blocked until November 15 (the day of the Nice EU-Russia summit).

The author considers that the importance attributed to the 2008 EU review of its relations with Russia is linked to the ‘emotional’ moment of EU-Russian relations provoked by the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. This moment is particularly illustrated by the conclusions of the extraordinary Council on 1 September 2008 (Conseil de l’Union européenne, 2008). The 2008 recommendations reveal the high degree of tension in EU-Russian relations through a screening of all the conflicting issues among the parties. The text is interesting namely because it refers the main legal instruments that are not being implemented by Russia and because it reveals the internal EU tensions. The EU ability to accommodate Russia as a bloc during the French presidency seems to have been only episodic. It also irritated some Member States as for instance during the Nice summit, in November 2008, when President Sarkozy announced an OSCE meeting to discuss the Medvedev proposal and criticised the US missile defence project (see below).

According to Trenin (2008), the Caucasus reveals a multiple failure for which three actors are responsible: Russia, the United Stated and the EU. Moscow has maintained the conflicts ‘frozen’ during too much time. Washington has failed to prevent an attempt by the Georgian president to take the separatists regions by force. Brussels is considered to have failed in a minor proportion and that it should act ‘more boldly’ in this part of Europe and become a united player. His reading of the rationales of Russian actions is linked to the United States and not the issue of values observance in EU-Russian relations. He does not consider that the Russians engaged in conflict against EU principles and values because there are internal forces in the country that desire peaceful relations with the neighbours. His reading is geopolitical instead. He considers that the conflict evidenced a conflict between United States hegemony and Russian great power ambitions and that the ‘redlines’ of the Kremlin have been surpassed. The Russian limits are the United States political and military presence in the post-soviet space, namely NATO enlargement towards Ukraine and Georgia.

The return to the status quo situation prior to the conflict has not been an option since the conflict. The loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia seems improbable in the foreseeable future, despite the presence of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) since October 2008. One of the main tasks for the EU Member States is to face the need to find the right balance between condemning/sanctioning Russia versus cooperating in the light of major interdependencies and the weight of Moscow in global issues (energy, Iran, missile defence and other security issues). The political framework of cooperation, namely the Third Common Space of Cooperation, is the multilateral tool available in the context of EU-Russian relations.

*The Medvedev security proposal: Towards new multilateral arrangements?*

One of the most important issues that the Union had to face in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis was the fact that the Russian foreign policy became much more self-assertive, in continuity with Putin’s aim of ‘recreating the greatness of Russia’ (Kanet 2009:
The Medvedev proposal for a new security pact in Europe has emerged in this renewed context. In fact, a new debate appears to be entering into EU-Russia relations. It existed before but it has not been tackled directly so far. The discussion of the European security architecture and the need to redefine is prone to impact on the relation. This is due to several factors, namely the recent EU developments in CFSP/CSDP, Russian transformation during Putin’s mandates, Russian views on the EU as a security actor and the August 2008 war. It is a complex issue since it implies a discussion of the role of NATO, the US, the Council of Europe and, the OSCE. To analyse the ongoing debate provoked by recent Russian security discourses, two elements have to be balanced: Russian discourses and the Kremlin capacity to deliver in accordance to them.

The Medvedev proposal is vague and sometimes inconsistent. For instance, Article 10 foresees that all the international organisations and states of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area shall become parties of the new security treaty. Globally, the proposal to include all these actors raises serious issues on the functioning of such an alliance and it ignores the political differences among them. For instance, as far as NATO is concerned, the signature of this treaty would be incompatible with its own article 5 (mutual defence) because article 7 and 8 of the Medvedev proposal state the principle of mutual defence as well. Thus, NATO member states would assume this principle for the whole area. From the EU side, nobody sees a consistent Russian plan. Nonetheless, discourses need to be interpreted under the scrutiny of the Russian ability to deliver the desired outcomes. This section assesses this capacity in the security field and how the Union has been dealing with this new agenda.

The issue of how to read Russia and, as a consequence, how to deal with it, is a recurrent in Western concerns. This question has gained a renewed importance since 2006, because of the Russian reassertion of power, which can be seen in the energy disputes but also in the ability of the Kremlin to oppose undesired developments, such as NATO enlargement, and more vigorously in the August 2008 war. There is a disagreement on how to interpret Russian power. In this context, EU Member States (and NATO allies) have demonstrated a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards the Medvedev proposal to reshape the existing security architecture into a new European Security Pact. This idea was launched by the Russian President in 2008 during a visit to Germany (President of Russia 2008b). It has been promoted later by Foreign Minister Lavrov in the sense of reshaping security relations and institutions in Europe (Lavrov 2009).

Concomitantly, new Russian doctrines have been made official. In fact the Russian national security strategy to 2020 was approved in May 2009 (Zysk 2009), replacing the 2000 text. Additionally, in December 2009, the draft Russian military doctrine indicated a more assertive use of military means to defend Russia’s interests and strategy (Russia Today 2009). In mid-2008, a Presidential decree clarified the signs of change which have been visible previously concerning the new Russian foreign policy. The new concept of foreign policy states the objectives of the Federation, such as the capacity to impact on the global agenda (President of Russia 2008). Finally, a draft ‘European Security Strategy’ was sent by Medvedev in November 2009 to European foreign leaders (President of Russia 2009). The May 2008 Medvedev’s speech in Berlin called for the creation of a new European security pact, but without any specification of modus operandi. The consequences of these doctrinal moves are still difficult to assess but they are a key to interpret what is at stake for Moscow and, consequently, for Europe.

In real terms, three interrelated security issues have been addressed and opposed by Russia, with some success: missile defence in Europe, NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, and the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty. They are dealt with in different forums, at bilateral and multilateral levels. The existing security architecture makes it difficult to discuss missile defence outside the bilateral US-Russian dialogue.
Actually, there are several security dialogues which do not necessarily overlap. For instance, the EU lacks competences, under Title V of the Treaty on the European Union, to discuss hard security matters. Member States are, then, able to pursue national aims in bilateral talks with third states. NATO enlargement is a more divisive topic among Member States as compared to the US plan to extend missile defence in Europe, which has led to a delay in offering Membership Action Plans to the candidates.

Concerning conventional armaments, there is a shared concern about the Russian suspension from the CFE, since December 2007. As a result, the EU Member States have been supporting missile defence in the NATO context, have been cautious with enlargement, and have been worried by the CFE issue. One can translate these positions as mixed messages towards Moscow, in a balance of negative and positive decisions on the Kremlin stances on the three disputes. The European responses, so far, highlight that, contrary to what happened in the 1990’s, these long lasting and recurring disagreements are now to be dealt taking into account a real Russian capacity of influence. The presence of Medvedev in the last NATO summit had a high symbolic impact, qualified as a ‘fresh start’ or a ‘reset’ (Blitz and Spiegel 2010). The Russian President agreed on the idea of a missile system to which it could contribute. Nonetheless, operational matters and the issue of sharing sensitive information cast a serious shadow on the political euphoria that the Lisbon summit created.

The bottom line of the disagreement on security issues lies in a deep incompatibility of views, besides the flaws within the proposed Russian concept of security architecture. On the one hand, the Kremlin does not recognise the legitimacy of the existence of NATO in the post-Cold War world. On the other hand, the Allies do not even question NATO raison d’être. The former Secretary-General embodied this fact when he acknowledged that he is willing to engage in a dialogue on Medvedev proposal but that he considers the existing security architecture as being ‘satisfactory’ and ‘balanced’ (Scheffer 2009). The EU has not been answering the 1990s Russian will for core thinking about transatlantic relations and European security. On the contrary, Brussels has invested much more in economic cooperation with Russia, while the US-Russian relationship has focused on security. In fact, since the 1990s, Russian foreign policy was largely pro-European, based on the existence of a ‘European ideal’. This trend lasted until the beginning of the first mandate of President Vladimir Putin. Moscow considered that there was a trade-off between the EU and NATO, at least in a long term perspective. NATO still represents a challenge to Russian interests, despite the modus vivendi experienced (the NATO-Russia Council, for instance). It is then possible to interpret the Russian reluctant acceptance of the first two NATO enlargements (1999 and 2004) as the provisional agreement on a status quo explained by its weaker position in the balance of power. The Bucharest Summit, in April 2008, demonstrated that the status quo had evolved, resulting in the delay of further enlargements towards Ukraine and Georgia. The Moscow opposition was one of the causes which informed, for instance, German and French caution in this move.

It might be too early to foresee how the discussion of the European security architecture, and the need to redefine it, will impact on the Moscow – Brussels relation, and vice-versa. It is a complex issue since it implies a discussion of the role of several international organisations. The Union has not responded to it yet, at least in a consistent manner, which may be explained by internal disagreements: a passive ‘wait-and-see’ posture (namely the period that consisted in waiting for Obama’s turn) versus active (present an EU offer). The EU still needs to be taken more seriously by Russia on security affairs, and how the US shadow impacts on it. Today, there is a window of opportunity for the EU to have a

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25 The issue of missile defence has been surpassed politically during the last NATO summit in Lisbon last November. The allies agreed to cooperate on the system. Russia has also lifted its recurrent opposition during this summit (Blitz and Spiegel 2010).
greater and defining role in this forthcoming debate on security, which Russia would most likely welcome. Although the Medvedev proposal is considered one of the ‘big things’ in the current EU-Russian agenda, EU officials acknowledge that there is no novelty in the substance and that the issue that is of matter is the process in which the debate will be conducted. The issue was expected to be handled at the OSCE. In fact, the Corfu process was launched on 28 June 2009 (OSCE 2009). A Council official considers that it places the debate in another phase that is less general, such as merely brainstorming. Eight different areas are specified and Member States are pushing forward proposals. Despite the fact that it may be considered a minor change, it is an evolution. The official also underlines that the main issue is about the coordination of the EU 27 Member States that are a majority in the OSCE.

Some EU Member States have tried to engage more consistently, at the EU level, with the Kremlin on the security agenda in the context of improved relations with Russia since 2009. The most visible proposal might be the German-Russian initiative of June 2010 in order to launch an ‘EU-Russia Political and Security Committee’ that would permit to achieve joint decisions. The idea was resumed in the trilateral Deauville meeting that gathered France, Germany and Russia in October 2010 (the fifth meeting of the kind). Security issues were high in the agenda of this encounter, namely because of the need to prepare for the Russian rapprochement with NATO during its summit in the following month (Zuvela 2010). After the German-Russian move, the French president advocated a fuzzy ‘economic security union’ between the Union and Moscow. Nonetheless, as much as Sarkozy’s idea has been seen as a mere statement to trigger re-approximation with Moscow, the German initiative is difficult to materialise if one considers the sensitive issue of EU decision-making autonomy in CSDP (above mentioned). As far as the Medvedev proposal is concerned, the lack of interest for the Russian ‘European Security Treaty’ seems to be further confirmed by the French and German positions in Deauville. Whereas a German official considered that it was ‘more important to have closer EU-Russia cooperation’, a French official declared that ‘the Russian idea for a new security framework was ‘no longer really the subject” (Hall and Peel 2010). On the Russian side, despite official discourses pointing to the continued interest in advancing the Medvedev proposal, the author considers that the Russian goal is not to get the proposed treaty ratified as such, but rather push for new pan-European security arrangements that would give Russia an improved role. A high rank official of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) declared that the substance of the European Security Treaty was to ask the question whether Russia is ‘inside or outside the Atlantic community’ and that it served the purpose to launch the discussion. Practicalities need now to be discussed. On the EU side, the most cautious voices see the Russian move as an attempt to veto security-related decisions in the EU (and NATO). Nonetheless, even these sceptical voices acknowledge that ‘Russia should nonetheless be consulted on all major security issues’ (Onyszkiewicz 2010).

Conclusion: The need to reshape the European security order multilaterally

This article has aimed at contributing to a better understanding of multilateralism, namely by analysing the case of EU-Russian relations in the security and defence field. As a domain of social sciences, international relations theories do not offer a unique explanation of the multilateral phenomena despite the need to grasp the complexity of the empirical world. The growing significance of institutionalised and multilateral cooperation since the 1990’s has not yet provided a unified theoretical approach to the phenomenon. Taking into

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26 Interviews conducted at the Council of the European Union, on 27 April 2009 and 1 March 2010.
27 Interview conducted at the Council of the European Union, on 1 March 2010.
28 This declaration has been collected by the author during an informal meeting on 9 September 2010.
consideration the features of ‘multilateralism’, the present analysis has characterised EU-Russian relations as being a specific and unique form of multilateralism.

This argument lays mainly on the characteristics of the paradigm and on the nature of the Union as an international actor. In fact, the EU creates its own experience of multilateralism, internally and externally. Externally, the EU might be viewed as a normative actor that conveys multilateralism as a desirable tool to achieve its goals. In their relations, the Union and Russia assume several values and principles that should guide their cooperation. These values and principles have not been defined for this specific relation but are inspired from other multilateral fora instead. The United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE are the core depositaries of these guiding provisions that are assumed as such, in the letter, in the overall cooperation between Brussels and Moscow.

The literature of the beginning of the 1990s enhanced the specificity of multilateralism but also the difficulty in defining it in a unique manner (meaning and concrete form). Multilateralism is an institution but it can refer to an organisation or an activity (Caporaso 1992: 603). Our objective was to characterise the kind of multilateralism created by EU-Russian relations and how it affects the approaches of the two players, in particular to security challenges in Europe. Cooperation under the Third Common Space of Cooperation has proven to be modest but evolving towards a greater common engagement of both players. Nonetheless, the security dialogue does not comprise ‘hard’ security issues. Additionally, both political divergences and the limited agenda of EU-Russian security dialogue have impeded Brussels and Moscow to engage in the areas of their ‘common’ neighbourhood and in the definition of new security architecture.

This article has also analysed the relation that the Union developed with the Russian Federation in the defence realm. The cooperation with Moscow has been characterised by a decade of unfulfilled promises in the security and defence fields. The security dialogue was launched more systematically into the EU-Russian agenda in 2000 and, in 2003, it has been organised under a ‘common space for external security’. Nonetheless, this is one of the less advanced areas of cooperation between the two actors as compared to the overall framework of cooperation.

The major consequence of the Medvedev proposal has been the fact that the security agenda has gained more visibility. The impact of this development on improving political convergence between Brussels and Moscow has still to be foreseen. Nonetheless, a resurgent Russia introduces the need for the EU to devise a new and consistent model of multilateral cooperation with Moscow that comprises security, while pursuing the management of real interdependencies. The Medvedev ‘proposal’ for a new security pact in Europe needs to be interpreted in the context of Russian re-assertiveness that has materialised in a better position to impose its most-favourable terms (Georgia, missile defence, NATO enlargement).

The Union has not demonstrated willingness to address these Russian evolutions, as the poor reactions to the Medvedev proposal have shown. The proposal voices recurrent Russian dissatisfaction with the European security architecture that need to be accommodated in light of the Russian renewed capacity to deliver beyond mere rhetoric. This need arises besides any interpretation of the legitimacy of foreign policy actions. The Union has developed a political and security dialogue with Moscow that has a potential to shape multilaterally this accommodation, provided that sufficient political will and unity emerges from the Union as a whole.

The ‘reflection period’ that the Union undertook towards Moscow after the Georgian war in 2008 has shown that the EU unity promoted by the French presidency has been
sporadic and that the cleavage between Member States on how to deal with Russia is enduring. Despite the Union presence in Georgia through the EUMM and the increased visibility of security in EU-Russian relations, the growing dissatisfaction of Brussels with Russian developments is expressed directly, namely in the 2008 review of EU-Russian relations conducted by the Commission. Nonetheless, although the banner of ‘no business as usual’ has been endorsed as an EU stance in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis, the focus rapidly returned to trade goals. This fact has also been visible in the EU avoidance of the issue raised by Medvedev for a new security treaty in Europe and more globally, security arrangements in Europe. Nonetheless, multilateralism implies reciprocity that ought to be achieved in all the dimensions of EU-Russia dialogue if better deliverables are to be achieved, namely to overcome growing competition at the expense of cooperation.

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The Creation of an Energy Security Society as a Way to Decrease Securitization Levels between the European Union and Russia in Energy Trade

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Abstract

The energy trade between the European Union and Russia is securitized due to a combination of factors. First, there are securitizing agents within the European Union. Second, the domestic consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control, the Gazprom monopoly on transportation networks linking Central Asian gas with European markets and the state imposed-limits on foreign direct investment may also raise concerns in the European Union. Finally, Russia is also securitizing the energy sphere by claiming that the EU is trying to impose its values on Russia (for example through the Energy Charter Treaty), which contradicts Russian interests. This article combines securitization theory and the English School of thought and argues that the creation of an Energy Security Society could help de-securitize energy trade between the European Union and Russia.

Keywords

EU-Russian energy dialogue; Energy security; Common energy policy; NABUCCO; South Stream

THIS ARTICLE COMBINES SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF thought and argues that the creation of the Energy Security Society could help to de-securitize energy trade between the European Union and Russia. The central concept of the English School is ‘international society’, which is ‘established by dialogue and common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognizes their common interest in maintaining these arrangements’ (Buzan 2004: 9). Each society has specific characteristics which differ from one society to another. The societies of states are not formed by natural reasons or from necessity (for example, alliance in case of threat to security), but because the members of the society share the same norms and values (Brown 2001). The European Union could be regarded as a good example of an international society: it is a group of states which share an understanding of political and economic principles and which have developed a set of norms to protect and regulate these principles through a network of intergovernmental institutions.

However, in terms of regional energy security the integrity of the European Union as the ‘international society’ is challenged by ‘close security interdependence’ (Buzan et al. 2003: 43) between individual member states and the energy producers (including Russia)

situated outside EU borders, which means that their interests are not protected by the shared rules and institutions of the European Union. Moreover, there is no comprehensive international agreement that would regulate energy trade between Russia and the EU, since trade is still regulated by the power politics of the international system. As a result, the high levels of dependence on Russian supplies, the negative history of supply interruptions and Russian ambitions to regain the status of a regional power, facilitate the securitization of energy trade, which makes it very difficult to develop mutually beneficial energy dialogue. In order to overcome these difficulties, the European international society should be expanded to include Russia. If Russian interests would be considered, Moscow would not have to promote them on a bilateral level.

Structurally, the article is divided into three sections: the first is devoted to the analysis of the reasons for the securitization process; the second demonstrates the negative consequences of securitization, using the example of two competing pipelines (the South Stream and NABUCCO); and the third section proposes the steps that could lead towards the creation of an Energy Security Society.

The securitization of energy trade between the European Union and Russia

In order to understand how such an Energy Security Society could be constructed, it is important to begin with an analysis of the existing problem of securitization and its consequences. It is difficult to argue that energy trade between Russia and the European Union could be described as a purely economic issue. Uninterrupted energy supplies are crucially important for the industrial development of the member states of the European Union, which makes energy security an important part of national security for the EU members. Energy relations with Russia have specific problems contributing to the securitization process. The high levels of interdependence in energy trade are one of the main pre-conditions for the securitization of energy trade between the EU and Russia. According to European Commission data, Russia supplies Europe with 34 per cent of oil imports and 40.8 per cent of natural gas. In both cases Russia is the biggest importer of fossil fuels to the European Union. Some experts expect this share to grow significantly in the very near future. For instance, D. Finon and C. Locatelli write that the share of Russian gas imports could reach 50 per cent by 2020 (Finon et al. 2008: 424). But this high level of dependence on Russian energy supplies is not the only reason for securitization of energy trade.

Karin M. Fierke defines securitization as the extreme point of politicization (Fierke 2007: 111). The Copenhagen School explains the securitization process as the construction of a threat to the security of a state or a group of states (McDonald 2008: 69). The authors of the book Security: A New Framework for Analysis have stated that ‘any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (state does not deal with it) through politicized (the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). In the case of EU–Russian energy trade, the high level of dependence on Russian energy supplies is the main pre-condition of securitization. But high dependence per se does not justify the securitization process. The individual actors (some of the member-states and Russia) are presenting the energy trade as an issue of security for different reasons, which could be divided as follows: the actual concerns about energy security caused by previous supply interruptions; the domestic political dynamics in Russia; and the lack of trust between the European Union and Russia.
Securitization of energy trade within the European Union

The former EU Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, once said that ‘[t]he incoherence of European policy towards Russia over much of the last decade has been, frankly, alarming. No other country reveals our differences as does Russia’ (Mandelson 2008). The different attitudes towards Russia within the European Union due to different levels of dependence on Russia and the different histories with Russia also contribute to the securitization process. When talking about the high level of dependence of the European Union on Russian energy sources, it is important to remember that not all member states are equally dependent on Russia in this sense. There are seven member states who are 100 per cent dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies and another six dependent on around 50 per cent. However, overall Russia provides only around 40 per cent of overall EU energy consumption (Leal-Arcas 2009: 351). Andreas Goldthau divided European consumers into two groups on the basis of their dependence levels on Russian energy supplies. The first is ‘old’ Europe, which is less dependent on Russia and imports less than half to no energy resources from Russia (Germany is the biggest consumer in this group with a 46 per cent import share); the second group is made up of the so-called ‘new’ European states, which are almost 100 per cent dependent on Russian supplies, for instance, the Baltic Republics or Poland and the Czech Republic, who import around two-thirds of their supplies from Russia (Goldthau 2008: 687). The second group includes some states that have a difficult history of relations with Russia, which sometimes contributes to the securitization process.

Historical Connotations of the Securitization process within the European Union

Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams write that it is easier to present an issue as a threat ‘where history of hostile sentiments exist’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). For instance, Poland often argues that the Kremlin tries to regain the status of a Great Power using the so called ‘energy weapon’. This vision of Russia is caused by high levels of dependence by the majority of the new member states on Russian energy supplies and by the experience of energy cutoffs exercised by Russia since the early 1990s. Even though for a long time Russia was considered to be a reliable supplier of energy resources and the question of energy dependence on Russia was not that crucial for the European Union, the situation changed after a number of transit rows with the transit states (Ukraine and Belarus) in 2006, 2007 and 2009. The energy shortfalls due to price disagreements demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU due to its high levels of dependence on energy imports. However, for some of the new member states energy cutoffs have not been something completely new. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had already faced energy supply interruptions during the winter of 1992 to 1993. Russia explained these cutoffs as being the result of the refusal of these countries to pay world prices for energy supplies in hard currency. However, some researchers (for instance Keith Smith) argue that the real reason for the cutoffs was a Russian attempt to prevent policy change in the Baltic States (Smith 2004: v).

In order to protect their own energy security, Poland and the Baltic States are promoting quite defensive energy policies toward Russia. For instance, in 2007 Warsaw vetoed the negotiations on the new Partnership and Cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia because Moscow refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and to sign the Transit Protocol (Morozov 2008: 141). This example demonstrates how some of the new member states try to bring energy trade to the political and security agenda of the European Union. The Baltic States and Poland have historically formed negative perceptions of Moscow and tend to view Russia as a threat to their national security, including energy trade. However, occasionally the attempts of these states to securitize energy trade with Russia are caused not by objective reasons or even by a difficult history of relations with Russia, but by the desire to achieve their own national interests.
Securitization as a way to get personal benefits

Sometimes some of the players escalate the securitization process in order to prioritize specific issues and reach some personal goals. The Copenhagen School defines securitization as ‘the negotiation of security act between the securitizer and the audience’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Ole Waever suggested that security is a speech act. The issue becomes one of security, not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat, because only an extraordinary situation may require extraordinary measures (Collins 2007:61). Sometimes individual member states are covering their own interests with the idea of collective energy security needs. This idea can be illustrated using the example of the Nord Stream pipeline project,¹ which was described by Poland as the new pact of Molotov-Ribbentrop (Gilbert 2009: 131). Polish criticism was based on such reasons as questions of environmental security in the Baltic Sea, the lack of control from the transit states over the energy flow, which can increase the risk of energy cuts from Russia, and potential complications to the development of common energy policy within the EU, amongst others (Gilbert 2009). However, some of the experts are quite sceptical of the real reasons for Polish negativity towards the Nord Stream pipeline. For instance, Dr. Fraser Cameron believes that in reality Warsaw did not want Russia to prioritize the Nord Stream over the traditional overland pipeline, which was supposed to go through Polish territory, and consequently to lose the fees from the transit of Russian gas through the Polish territory.

The section above demonstrates that there is a lack of solidarity within the EU with regards to the development of relations with Russia. This inconsistency of energy policy towards Russia allows the separate member states to escalate the securitization process either due to historically formed problems in relations with Moscow, or in order to gain specific benefits out of the securitization of energy trade. However, it is difficult to say that Russia is completely innocent in this sense. In the context of energy trade between Russia and the European Union, Moscow is also a securitizing agent. Due to the complexity of the domestic political and economic situation, the Kremlin also puts a special emphasis on energy security issues.

Russia as the securitizing agent

During the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia went through the process of decentralization of political power: the prestige of the government within and outside Russia had been undermined; the level of quality of life in Russia declined (32 per cent began to live on incomes below the poverty threshold) and the unemployment rate increased (in the 1990s, 14 million people lost their jobs) (Shevtsova 2007: 27-28). The difficult situation within the country was associated with the unpopular political and economic reforms of Yeltsin’s government. When Putin came into power in the early 2000s he promised to stabilize the domestic economic and political situation as well as to return the status of a great power to Russia in the international arena. Putin considered energy resources to be one of the main advantages of the Russian Federation that could be used to achieve the aims mentioned above. For these reasons, energy policy was a priority for the Russian government as it could guarantee political security. Political security is defined by Buzan as, ‘relatively stable institutionalization of authority’ (Buzan 1998: 143). Vladimir Putin saw the revenues from energy sales as a way to ensure economic and political stability within Russia, which in his understanding required the consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control.

¹ The Nord Stream (NS) pipeline goes under the Baltic Sea. The NS aims to connect Russia and Germany by bypassing transit states. The NS is expected to have an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meters.
The consolidation of the energy sector under the control of the Russian government as the securitizing factor

In Russia there is a close connection between political power and the energy sector. For instance, 51 per cent of the largest gas producing company (Gazprom) belongs to the state. Gazprom is not only Russia’s largest producer of natural gas, but also the owner of the world’s biggest gas pipelines network, which connects Europe with Central Asian and Caspian States. The monopoly of Gazprom for trade and transportation of Russian gas is secured by Russian legislation. In July 2006 State Duma of the Russian Federation passed the law on gas export, which gives Gazprom the undivided rights for the export of gas. For this reason, Gazprom’s export policy is sometimes interpreted ‘in the larger context of Russian foreign policy’ (Finon et al. 2008: 426), which is aimed at limiting the ability of the European Union to diversify gas supplies by importing natural gas from Central Asia and the Caspian region (Ibid).

Another problematic topic in relations between Russia and the European Union is the guarantees of the security of foreign direct investment in Russia. Putin’s administration was orientated towards ‘establishing a dominant role of the Russian state in key sectors, including the scrutiny of foreign firms in these sectors’ (Crane et al. 2010: 117). The energy sector is one of the key strategic industries in Russia. According to the Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors (approved in May 2008) any foreign investment into this industry has to be authorized by Russian authorities, which usually takes a lot of time. Russian legislation often requires joint ownership of shares in companies and projects involved in the development of the energy sector (Crane et al. 2010: 117-118). Moreover, foreign investors have to compete with state subsidized enterprises. As a result only large companies such as Shell or BP are able to invest in the Russian energy sector. Considering the desire of Russian companies to invest in the energy sectors of some of the European states (at the moment Gazprom owns equity stakes in Finland, Germany, Greece, Poland, Hungary etc.) (Liuhto et al. 2003: 139), Brussels is concerned that the growing share on the European market of state controlled companies such as Gazprom may give the Russian state the leverage to achieve political goals. The situation became even more complicated when Russia denounced its participation in the Energy Charter Treaty in 2009.

The tensions around the Energy Charter Treaty as a securitizing factor

The idea of developing an international treaty on energy trade first appeared in the European Council in 1990. The treaty was intended to serve as a political and legal foundation for cooperation in the energy sector. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed in 1994 and is a legally binding multilateral agreement (Haghighi 2007: 188). The Energy Charter Treaty is based on five main elements (ECT 1994): the protection of foreign investment on the basis of national or the most favoured nation treatment and protection from non-commercial risks; the energy materials, products and energy-related equipment trade on the basis of the WTO regulations; the provision for reliable cross-border transit of energy products; the resolution of conflicts between participating states, or between investors and host states; and the promotion of energy efficiency in order to minimize the negative environmental consequences. Russia signed the treaty but never ratified it. Moreover, in 2009 the Russian government denounced its intention to participate in the Energy Charter Treaty.

The main point of contradiction in the Energy Charter Treaty was the transit protocol, which obliges signatory states to provide access to their transport routes (ECT 1994). Russia did not want to lose control over the pipeline network which connects Central Asian gas with the European market. Russian leaders argued that the Energy Charter Treaty focused only on the interests of the energy consumers, and it was not beneficial for
energy producers and transit states to participate in it. Moreover, the Energy Charter Treaty proved itself to be invalid during the energy crises mentioned earlier. For instance, the Ukraine signed and ratified the Energy Charter Treaty and transit protocol, but it did not prevent Ukrainian officials from stealing gas destined for Europe. The Russian decision to denounce its participation in the Energy Charter Treaty was criticized by the European Union. Finon and Locatelli write that this decision by the Russian state demonstrates that ‘Russia had moved towards a model of traditional power, deployed diplomacy backed by force to reassert its influence in its “near abroad”, and was determined to use its energy resources to exert geopolitical influence’ (Finon et al. 2008: 425). In order to understand the complexity of Russia’s decision, it is important to differentiate the meaning of the Energy Charter Treaty for the European Union and for Russia.

**The Energy Charter Treaty as a mechanism of external governance and its perception by Russia**

In order to explain the European understanding of the purposes of the Energy Charter Treaty, this article uses the concept of external governance proposed by Sandra Lavenex. She writes that when the achievement of internal goals of the EU requires the participation of the third party countries then Brussels may decide to take external action which may ‘bind third party countries to the fulfillment of these internal policy goals’ (Lavenex 2004: 681). This external action may involve the promotion of European values and rules outside of EU borders, such as external governance. There are different models of this governance, for example hierarchical, network and market. Hierarchical governance is based on ‘the vertical relationship between the “rulers” and the “ruled” when influence is exerted in asymmetric manner’ (Lavenex 2009: 797). In network mode actors are formally equal (Lavenex 2009: 798), and in market mode ‘outcomes are the result of competition between formally autonomous actors’ (Lavenex 2009: 799). For the European Union the Energy Charter Treaty was supposed to be the mechanism of external governance, such as the promotion of market rules in the energy sector. The European Union intended to assist the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries in adaptation of principles and standards of a market economy as well as achieving modernization of the energy sector in order to ‘progressively become full, important and equal players in the European Union’s internal gas and electricity markets’ (Lavenex 2004: 693).

The current Russian government has a different perception of the Energy Charter Treaty. In Russia the Treaty is associated with the period of political weakness when Russia was supposed to accept the rules of the game imposed from the outside, which did not take into consideration Russian interests and needs. At the same time, the current government presents Russia as the stronger player, which would never agree to the provisions of the Energy Charter or any other international agreement that would contradict Russian interests (Rahr 2008: 316-317). For ‘new’ Russia it is a question of prestige and recognition. It is part of Russian political security to be recognized as an equal partner rather than an inferior actor forced to follow somebody else’s rules. Using the language of the Copenhagen School of thought, the importance to be recognized as a strong actor is a question of political–societal security, for instance the justified reason for securitization (Buzan et al. 1998: 141-145).

To sum up, the securitization of energy trade between Russia and the European Union is a complex process caused by different factors, starting from high levels of dependence and negative history of supply networks to the personal motives of individual securitizing agents. Vladimir Putin and his government have put energy security on the top of the Russian security agenda because of the importance of the energy sector for the development of the Russian economy, which in turn is supposed to guarantee the popularity and support of the current regime. At the same time, Russia is trying to regain
the status of a great power internationally and uses the energy supply as a way of ‘playing with the muscles’, by denouncement of participation in the Energy Charter Treaty, the Kremlin wants to demonstrate that the ‘new’ Russia is a strong actor that is not going to agree to unfavorable conditions. At the same time, some of the EU member states are contributing to the securitization process by covering their interests under the needs of European energy security. As a result, the politicized context of the energy trade complicates the fulfillment of mutually beneficial projects due to the unnecessary security considerations. The example of two competing pipeline projects (the South Stream and NABUCCO) can illustrate this point.

The consequences of energy trade securitization: the examples of NABUCCO and the South Stream Pipeline Projects

The competition of two pipeline projects, the South Stream and NABUCCO, demonstrates the negative consequences of the securitization of energy trade. Due to the high levels of securitization it seems to be difficult for the European Union to prioritize these projects in terms of their potential contribution to supply diversification. By concentrating on the threat of further increase of the Russian share in the European energy market, some of the critics of the South Stream project are overlooking the benefits of the project for European energy security. Before moving on to the analysis of the competition of these two pipelines it is important to describe both projects briefly.

The NABUCCO project

The idea of a 3300 km long pipeline construction which would connect European customers with gas fields in Iran was first proposed by the Austrian company OMV in the late 1990s. NABUCCO would transport gas from the Caspian region via Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The construction should begin in 2011 and finish in 2014. NABUCCO will cost around 5 billion Euros and have a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year (Nanay 2010: 126).

The main problem with this project is the uncertainty about the possible suppliers. Azerbaijan is only able to provide 10 to 12 bcm per year, which is insufficient (Nanay 2010: 126). According to the original plan, the rest of the gas was supposed to come from Iran, but considering the current intense situation around Iran this is not likely. At the moment investors consider Central Asian states to be potential suppliers (Simonov 2007: 203). This may also include Iraq or Egypt (Socor 2008: 1). This uncertainty creates the risk that there could be no gas to pump through the pipeline. Moreover, the recent announcement made by Baku that Azerbaijan has delayed the beginning of the Shah-Deniz gas field development at the Caspian Sea until 2016 instead of 2014 creates additional concerns about the gas supplies for the NABUCCO project (New Europe 2010).

The South Stream Project

Looking at the Russian project, the South Stream pipeline planned to go under the Black Sea to supply Russian gas to Bulgaria and further to Italy and Austria. At the moment, seven states apart from Russia are involved in the South Stream pipeline project: Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia and Austria. In the next couple of months Gazprom is planning to finish negotiations with France about the French power group EDF’s participation in the project (Filatova 2010). The South Stream is more expensive than NABUCCO, with an estimated cost of around 10 billion Euros. However, it is important to mention that the total cost of NABUCCO depends on the potential suppliers. At the
moment it is difficult to say who will provide the rest of the gas apart from Azerbaijan, but the construction of one or several additional pipelines to connect new suppliers with Europe would definitely increase the cost of NABUCCO.

The competition between the two projects is a complex game. Russia is being blamed for high-levels of governmental interference in the South Stream project. The pipeline is often represented by Vladimir Putin, who is using the lack of solidarity to sign bilateral agreements with countries along the planned NABUCCO route (Socor 2008: 1). Recently Putin visited several EU member states, including Italy and Austria. The majority of his visits are related to discussions about the South Stream project. In this sense the level of governmental interference is higher than compared to NABUCCO. In official interviews Vladimir Putin emphasises that Russia is not threatened by NABUCCO and is not going to sabotage the competing project. However, this is not totally true. The pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe, bypassing Russian territory, does indeed interfere with Russian interests because it would reduce its share of the European energy market. But it is important not to exaggerate the potential threat to Russia from NABUCCO. At the moment it is still not clear who will produce the rest of the gas required. To start construction without signing any contracts with energy producers is a risky and expensive enterprise (Simonov 2007: 203).

Moreover, it is important to answer the question of whether the competition between South Stream and NABUCCO actually threatens European Energy Security. Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary (the states involved in both projects) argue that there is no conflict between these projects, since both pipelines will contribute to supply diversification. It is argued that these two projects have two different aims. NABUCCO is aimed to connect Azerbaijan and Central Asian gas with Europe, bypassing Russia. At the same time, the South Stream and Nord Stream intend to reduce dependence on the transit states. 95 per cent of Russian gas supplies transit through the territory of at least one country before reaching consumers in Europe. This creates transit risks for both Russia and Europe (Spanjer 2007: 2891). The transit rows with Ukraine in 2006, 2008 and 2009 resulted in gas cutoffs to EU customers. The South Stream would help to avoid such disruptions of supplies in the future.

To sum it up, the example of two competing pipeline projects demonstrates the negative consequences of securitization of energy trade. The context of confrontation and unclear vision of the EU on which project is more important for energy security gives Russia an opportunity to use bilateral relations to promote its interests. Connecting the securitization theory with the ideas of the English school of thought, it is possible to say that the securitization of energy trade between Russia and the European Union became possible because Russia and all the EU member states are operating by the rules of the international system. Considering that Russia denounced its participation in the Energy Charter Treaty, there is no international legal framework that would be able to regulate the energy trade between the two sides. As a result power politics are dominating the energy relations between Russia and the European Union. In this sense the creation of an Energy Security Society may help to overcome the difficulties created by the securitization process.

**An Energy Security Society: definition and implementation**

Pami Aalto proposed the following definition of an Energy Security Society as’ a group of states that have established common rules and institutions for the conduct of their mutual energy relations with a firm interest in maintaining these arrangements’ (Aalto 2010: 161). This society shares three main principles, namely markets and competition, security of supplies and sustainability. Ideally this society should include not only energy consumers,
but also energy producers and the transit states (Ibid). This section focuses on the steps which should be taken in order to construct an Energy Security Society. In order to connect the idea of the potential positive impact of an Energy Security Society for de-securitization of energy trade, these steps are linked to the securitization problems listed in the first part of the article.

**De-securitization within the European Union**

As was mentioned above, one of the major difficulties in relation to Russia within the European Union is the different perspectives of different member states on the development of energy policy towards Russia. The lack of solidarity within the European Union contributes both to the securitization process and allows Russia to secure deals on a bilateral level which are not always beneficial for the European Union as a whole. For these reasons, the development of a Common Energy Policy would be the first step towards the development of an Energy Security Society, because this would mean the existence of common values and interests shared and accepted by all the member states – the essential factors for the creation of an international society according to the leading theorists of the English School (Little 2000; Bellamy 2005; Buzan 2004). If the European states would overcome the contradictions in the field of energy security, develop common principles and priorities in external energy relations and delegate the authority over energy trade to the EU institutions, it would, without doubt, benefit the energy security of the European Union. If the EU is able to ‘speak with a single voice’ it would be extremely difficult for either Russia or any other third party to undermine common EU interests by securing deals on a bilateral level with individual member states (see the example of competition of the NABUCCO and South Stream pipeline projects). However, the Common Energy Policy per se would not sort out all the problems that exist in EU-Russian energy trade. The specifics of the Russian domestic political situation should be taken into consideration. If a common energy policy would focus only on the security of supplies, it would fail to harmonize relations with Russia in the same way as the Energy Charter Treaty. The Kremlin would consider this policy to be another way to impose European rules without taking into consideration Russian interests, and the example of the Third Energy Package could illustrate this point.

**The defensive nature of the Third Energy Package**

European officials are already working on formulating common principles of a European energy policy. At the moment the Common Energy Policy aims to achieve the following: ‘A European Energy Policy will firmly commit the European Union to a low consumption economy based on more secure, more competitive and more sustainable energy. Priority energy objectives involve ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market in energy, security of strategic supply, concrete reductions in greenhouse gas emissions caused by the production or consumption of energy and the EU's ability to speak with a single voice on the international stage’ (European Commission 2007). To put it simply, the EU is aiming to unify the internal market and acknowledges the importance of diversification of supplies by developing renewable energy sources. This communication also demonstrates the intention of the EU to coordinate relations with the energy producers. These provisions are known as the Third Energy Package, which is supposed to ensure the energy security of the European Union. However, at the moment it is difficult to say that the new provisions would improve relations with Russia. The Third Energy Package requires energy producers to liberalize access to oil and gas transportation networks and to allow third parties to get access to pipelines. Russia opposes these requirements for the same reasons the Kremlin refused to sign the Transit Protocol, as Russia does not want the third parties to have access to its transportation networks. Russia
already tries to find a way to be exempt from the non-beneficial provisions of new European energy market regulations, and most probably the Kremlin would continue to secure its interests on a bilateral level. For instance, according to the representative of German Ministry of Economics Russia already reached an agreement with Germany that within German territory different branches of Gazprom would be responsible for the sale and transportation of Russian gas. This indicates that Russia would continue to secure deals on a bilateral level.

The vision of Russia as a threat to energy security pushes EU member states to develop a common energy policy to restrain Russian ambitions to control Europe via energy sales. However, the defensive nature of a common energy policy would not help to overcome the difficulties in the energy trade between the two partners. The development of the Common Energy Policy would definitely be a step towards the construction of a European Energy Security Society. However, the lesson of the failure of the Energy Charter Treaty demonstrates that an Energy Security Society with the focus on the security of supplies would not be able to resolve the problems in energy relations between the EU and Russia. The defensive nature of the international society would leave Russia outside of its borders and the relations between Russia and the EU would still be regulated by the power politics of the international system. Ideally, to avoid this, the European Union needs to develop some of the aspects the Third Energy Package further and to indicate its intentions to move from a hierarchical mode of external governance to a network one.

A network model of external governance as a way to include Russia in an Energy Security Society

It was mentioned earlier how it is important for Russia to be accepted as an equal partner, both in order to de-securitize the relations with Russia and at the same time to include it into an Energy Security Society. Coming back to the discussion of different modes of external governance, the European Union should demonstrate the shift towards network governance, where ‘actors have equal rights and that no party can bind the other party to a measure without the latter’s consent’ (Lavenex 2009: 797). Little writes about ‘the endless debates that take place in the international arena as statesmen try to reach agreement about the nature of the problems they are confronting. But any agreement achieved necessarily involves language and often the creation of new language’ (Little 2000: 396). Coming back to our discussion, it is important for EU and Russian officials to adapt ‘their language’, or in other words to find compromise in order to create an Energy Security Society. For instance, Pami Aalto suggests that Brussels needs to ease the requirement for market liberalization in Russia and to accept the Gazprom monopoly on the Russian energy market (Aalto 2010: 177).

Of course, Russia needs to compromise as well to reduce the levels of securitization in its energy relations with the EU. The way to go would be to open the energy sector for foreign investors. This would allow Russia to solve some of the problems both internally and in the energy trade. First of all, to keep the high volumes of supplies Russia needs to invest a lot in the development of new oil and gas fields and the construction of new pipelines. It is almost impossible to support such a demanding sector without private investors. If Russia would let foreign investors participate in some of the projects it would be able to get essential money to increase the productivity of the energy sector and improve its image in the European Union. It is important for Russia to keep its share of the European market or even to increase it. For this to be possible, Russia should be viewed as a reliable and close ally in the EU. However, at the moment the situation is the opposite, since Russia is perceived as a potential threat to energy security in a number of EU member states. This results in the development of various projects of supply diversification. If European customers could be involved in the development of new
energy fields in Russia or pipeline projects it would help to rebuild trust between Russia and the European Union. Recently, Russian experts have begun to realize this. For instance, Konstantin Simonov said that Russia would invite more foreign investors in future (Simonov 2010). Finally, it is important to develop a coherent international legal framework, which would protect the interests of both energy consumers and energy producers.

An international agreement as the last step towards an Energy Security Society

The relations between Russia and the European Union are so complicated because the majority of the problems are addressed on a bilateral level. The mechanisms of regulation of trade between the EU as a whole are either non-existent or very weak. In the 1990s, the Energy Charter Treaty was supposed to be such a mechanism. The main elements of the Energy Charter Treaty included the main principles of the Energy Security Society formulated by Pami Aalto, namely free market, energy sustainability and security of supplies. Hypothetically, the Energy Charter Treaty was supposed to ensure energy security for energy producers and the transit states, as well as for energy consumers. The reason why the Energy Charter Treaty failed to regulate relations between Russia and the EU is that the treaty was developed to protect the interests and values of energy consumers. The role of Russia as an energy producer was to guarantee this security. At the same time, the security of demand was overlooked. As a result the treaty not only failed to facilitate cooperation, but became another point of contradiction. The Energy Charter Treaty proved to be ineffective in regulating the energy trade between Russia and the European Union because it was imposing the norms and values beneficial for the energy security of the European Union.

However, the development of an international agreement, which would regulate energy trade among all the sides involved, is extremely important. It could be considered as the final step in the creation of an Energy Security Society, which would guarantee the protection of interests of both energy producers and energy consumers. In 2009 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed the incentive to develop a new treaty beneficial for the EU, Russia and the transit states (Lo 2009). However, Brussels does not support the idea of the development of a new treaty. The representative of DG Energy in the European Commission said that, ‘More than fifty states signed the Treaty and for this reason it would be more rational to upgrade the Energy Charter Treaty rather than to develop the entirely new treaty’ (DG Energy 2011). This position is shared by the majority of the EU member states. For instance, the representative of the Ministry of Economics of Germany said, ‘that Germany supports the initiative of the European Commission to continue cooperation with Russia on the Energy Charter Treaty’ (German Ministry of Economics 2011). In case the European Union does not want to develop a new agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty needs to be amended to accommodate the interests of Russia. Moreover, the development of EU–Russian energy dialogue created in 2000 could contribute to further strengthening of the Energy Security Society. Some experts argue that the progress of this dialogue is rather limited and ‘the member states rather than the EU still play the dominant role vis-à-vis Russia’(Finon et al. 2008: 427) However, the European Commission gives positive feedback on the recent development of the dialogue and expresses hope for future improvement of its effectiveness (DG Energy 2011). The amendments to the Energy Charter Treaty and the further development of EU-Russia energy dialogue would create legal and institutional grounds of Energy Security Society.
Conclusion

When looking at the energy trade between Russia and the European Union from the perspective of the English School, the European Union could be described as an international society uniting a group of states with a shared identity and understanding of norms, rules and values, as well as a system of supra-national institutions (Buzan 2001: 475). The society does not exist in isolation from the rest of the world and has to communicate with the units outside of its borders. And these relations with third party countries are still going to be regulated by the rules of the power politics of the international system. The case of energy trade with Russia is even more complicated due to the securitization process initiated by some individual member states as well as by Russia itself.

This article divided the factors contributing to the securitization process into three main groups. First, there are securitizing agents within the European Union. Different member states have different reasons to present Russian energy policy as an existential threat. For the Baltic states, these reasons may be based on previous experience of energy cutoffs by Russia and negative consequences of these cutoffs. Second, the domestic consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control, the Gazprom monopoly on transportation networks linking Central Asian gas with European markets and the state imposed limits on foreign direct investment may also raise concerns in the European Union with regards to the possibility that the Kremlin will use energy supplies as a political weapon (Goldthau 2008: 686). This gives the EU a reason to take exceptional measures for supply diversification. Finally, Russia is also securitizing the energy sphere by claiming that the EU is trying to impose its values on Russia (for example through the Energy Charter Treaty), which contradicts Russian interests.

The negative consequences of these securitizing factors could be demonstrated by the example of the competition between the South Stream and NABUCCO pipelines. These two projects should not be considered as competing because they have different aims. According to Gazprom’s representative the South Stream project would help the EU to reduce transit related risks of Russian supplies, and NABUCCO would bring new producers on the European market (Gazprom 2010). However, at the moment some of the actors within the EU present the South Stream as a threat to supply diversification. In order to harmonize the situation, this article supports the idea of creation of an Energy Security Society, which was proposed by Pami Aalto. In order for the Energy Security Society to help the de-securitization of energy trade it should consider the factors which caused securitization. This could be achieved by following these steps. First, the development of a Common Energy Policy would help the EU to overcome the internal differences in attitude towards Russia and to prevent any possibility of manipulation of security threats as a way to prioritize national interests over the interests of the European Union as a whole. At the same time the Common Energy Policy should not be defensive in its nature. Ideally, the Common Energy Policy should consider the issues of extreme importance for the energy producers (such as transportation networks for Russia) to exclude the possibility of the third party countries securing bilateral deals with individual member states. Second, the article suggests that if Russia invites more foreign investors into its energy sector it may help to restore trust in Russia as an energy producer and reduce the levels of securitization. Third, in order to protect the interests of energy producers and energy consumers, the Energy Charter Treaty needs to be amended in such a way that the rules are not going to be exported from the European Union in a hierarchical fashion, but would be mutually developed by equal partners (Lavenex 2009: 798).

The combination of these steps would help to minimize the factors contributing to the securitization process and move towards the creation of an Energy Security Society, where
the trade between Russia and the European Union would be based on shared norms and values.

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Interviews

(1) Cameron, F., Director of EU-Russia Centre, interviewed on 16 February 2011 in Brussels.

(2) Representative of the DG Energy, European Commission, interviewed on 15 February 2011.

(3) Gazprom representative, interviewed on 7 April 2010 in Moscow.

(4) Simonov, K., Director General of National Energy Security Fund, interviewed on 8 April 2010 in Moscow.

(5) Representative of the German Ministry of Economy, interviewed on 20 May 2011.

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References


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EU-Russia Educational Cooperation as a Democracy Promotion Mechanism

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Abstract
The idea of understanding and assessing the EU’s role in promoting democratic values in the neighbourhood has acquired a central place in the EU’s external relations discourse. At the same time, in the literature on democratisation, education is conventionally considered one of the key prerequisites of successful democratic transition and consolidation. Still, a rich body of democracy promotion literature and Europeanisation studies never discuss education as a possible mechanism of democratic socialisation. The article aims to fill this gap by bringing together these two different scholarly traditions and by looking at EU-Russia educational cooperation as a mechanism to promote democratic values. The following propositions are advanced on the basis of the analysis: (1) democracy promotion is both implicitly and explicitly present in the EU-Russia educational policy discourse; (2) the level of education is a valid predictor of more democratic attitudes in Russia and, hence, should be considered a strong factor of a country’s democratisation.

Keywords
EU-Russia relations; Democracy promotion; Education policy

THE IDEA OF UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)’S ROLE IN promoting democratic values in the neighbourhood has recently received a rising amount of academic attention (Emerson et al. 2005; Youngs 2008, 2009; Saari 2009a), as it has acquired a central place in the EU’s external relations discourse. Scholars have identified different governance mechanisms used by the EU to promote democracy, including conditionality, such as external incentives, and socialisation, such as social learning models (Noutcheva 2010). An intensification of the EU-Russia cooperation in the sphere of education in the last two decades can be seen as a reflection of the EU’s growing concern about the promotion of democratic culture, and using education as a priority socialisation mechanism. A large amount of resources is annually spent by the EU on education support programmes in Russia, with the explicit goal of fostering a European democratic system of values. According to the EU-Russia Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects, which was approved on 10 May 2005, one of the main objectives of EU-Russia cooperation in this field is ‘to strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights’. At the same time, in the

literature on democratisation, namely in its traditional structuralist perspective, education is conventionally considered one of the key prerequisites of successful democratic transition and consolidation (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Barro 1999; Glaeser et al. 2007). The general research hypothesis states that the higher the education level of a nation’s population, the better the chances for democracy. Through education, citizens enrich their human capital and are socialised into civic attitudes and democratic values.

Still, the EU’s efforts in using education as a ‘soft power’ instrument for exporting democratic ideas to Russia and constructing an EU-Russia partnership built on shared principles and values have not been discussed yet. The article fills this gap by raising this new research question and offering a multidisciplinary framework to answer it. Specifically, the article traces the development of EU-Russia educational cooperation from 1990 until 2010 and analyses it from a democracy promotion point of view. Then, it formulates and preliminarily tests a series of research hypotheses related to the democratisation function of education in Russia. The intention is to introduce the concept of the EU’s educational policy as a democracy promotion mechanism and to analyse its validity in relation to the Russian context.

Methodology

By integrating two different areas of academic research, namely scholarly work on Europeanisation and democracy promotion, as well as transition and democratisation studies, the article draws on rich bodies of literature to explore the democracy promotion function of EU-Russia educational cooperation. First, using IR social constructivism theories, the article analyses the dynamics of EU-Russia educational cooperation in the post-Soviet period with a view to reveal democracy promotion objectives and mechanisms. By proving the hypothesis that democracy promotion objectives are explicitly and/or implicitly present in EU-Russia educational policy discourse, it is shown that the proposal of regarding educational cooperation as a democracy promotion attempt is theoretically valid. Secondly, building on structuralist political science theories of democratisation and democratic transition, the article analyses the democratisation function of education in Russia by testing a set of research hypotheses of the correlation between the level of education of Russian citizens and their democratic values and attitudes. By proving them, the empirical validity of looking at education as a democracy promotion mechanism is demonstrated.

Democracy promotion and democratisation theories

The EU as a democracy promoter

The importance of EU-Russia relations based on a comprehensive bilateral strategy has already become an academic and political commonplace. The EU-Russia common interests lie in the spheres of economy, energy, common neighbourhood, environmental protection, justice and home affairs, security, as well as in the fields of research, education and culture.

The key liberal democratic principles, namely rule of law, political pluralism, protection of human rights and so on, are encoded in the EU’s treaties and constitute the normative basis for the EU internal and external policy. ‘In its external action the Union thus wants to be seen as an essentially normative power […] and rely on “softer” means for influence and persuasion’ (Haukkala 2005: 2).

In recent years, the comparative analysis of the EU promotion efforts has become subject of several book-length studies (Kelley 2004a; Pridham 2005; Emerson et al. 2005; Youngs 2008). From a conceptual point of view, the role of the EU as a promoter of democratic norms and principles has been addressed in the framework of the IR social constructivist (Finnemore 1993, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Rise, Popp and Sikkink 1999; Kelley 2004a, 2004b; Checkel 2005) and sociological institutionalist (McNeely 1995; Mundy 2008) traditions, as well as in the Europeanisation literature (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Whilst admitting the existence of two main mechanisms through which the EU channels its influence – conditionality and socialisation – the first group of scholars has been mostly concentrated on exploring socialisation functions of international organisations, including the EU, while the Europeanisation strand, in turn, focuses mainly on political conditionality as a key mechanism of democracy promotion and democratisation.

In the framework of social constructivism, international relations are seen as ‘embedded in an institutional and cultural environment – an international community. In this context, international socialisation is an institutionalised policy, carried out by international organisations, to transmit the constitutive normative rules of the international community to individual states’ (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 17). The socialisation agency acts as a role model and persuades the target states (members or partners) to adopt the rules and norms using various socialisation strategies, such as reinforcement by reward, by punishment or by support (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). The target states, in turn, also pursue one of the strategies – strategic calculation, role playing or normative suasion – which lead to one of the socialisation outcomes: adoption of new roles or changes in values and interests (Checkel 2005).

A similar idea was developed in the framework of the sociological institutionalism arguing that national education policy and practices are influenced by overall world-level principles, ideas and imperatives usually defined and promoted by international organisations (Meyer et al. 1997; McNeely 1995; Mundy 2008; Pfister 2010).

In pursuing political conditionality, ‘the EU sets the adoption of democratic rules and practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfil in order to receive reward such as financial assistance, some kind of contractual association or – ultimately – membership’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 5). Usually, adopting liberal political norms means quite significant domestic costs. Hence, high external rewards are needed to balance these costs and effectively realize democracy promotion policy. The most general conditionality hypothesis assumes that ‘the level of democracy in the neighbouring countries of the EU increases with the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 6).

**Education as a social requisite for democracy**

When speaking about democratic transitions, at least two major perspectives can be identified: the structuralist and the actor perspective (Edvardsen 1997). The former tradition (which is of primary interest for the aims of this article) sees the establishment of democracy largely as a result of a series of favourable external and internal factors, while the latter emphasises autonomy of political actors and processes (see e.g. Linz 1973; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

In the framework of the structuralist approach, starting from the 1950s, a great variety of economic, political, social and cultural factors were identified as determinants of a series of waves of democratisation, including:
• socioeconomic development (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Diamond 1992; Przeworski et al. 2000; Fish and Choudhry 2007);
• political culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; Dahl 1971; Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993; Diamond 1993; Alexander 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2003);
• religious tradition (Huntington 1993, 1996; Inglehart and Norris 2004; Marsh 2005; Papkov 2007);
• social cleavages and fractionalisation (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1977; Przeworski et al. 2000; Alesina et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006);
• international linkages and diffusion (Diamond 1992; Levitsky and Way 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007), and others.

As far as education is concerned, scholars have long attempted to identify and measure the relationship and interdependence between education and democracy. The view that educational systems perform an important socio-political role contributing to citizens’ socialisation was proposed by John Dewey (1916) and later developed in the framework of the functionalist theory of education, originated from the works of Emile Durkheim (1956). In his article *Education, its Nature and Role* Durkheim asserts, that ‘every society […] has a system of education which is imposed on individuals”, and sets itself a certain “human ideal’ (‘a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states’), which is the crux of education. Hence, ‘education consists of a methodical socialisation of the young generation’. Through education, the individual is turned into a social and political actor.

At the same time, starting with classical works of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) the role of education – especially, higher education – as a requisite for democracy was emphasized: ‘If we cannot say that a “high” level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world’ (Lipset 1959).

Later, the theories linking education with support for democratic values and democratisation received a good deal of theoretical and empirical cross-country support (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959: 80; Kamens 1988; Dahl 1992; Barro 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Glaeser et al. 2007; Spilimbergo 2009) proving that education is crucial for appearance of a democratic regime and its stability.

Several potential causal mechanisms could be identified. Education broadens the men’s outlook, enabling them to understand the need for liberal norms and increasing their capacity to make rational electoral choices (Lipset 1959). Individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed and socialized into accepting officially promoted democratic values (Gibson et al. 1992). Moreover, education leads to higher participation in a whole range of social activities, including politics, as schooling involves learning about the virtues of civic participation. By socialisation and improving of interpersonal skills (i.e. human capital) education facilitates civic involvement and development of social capital (Glaeser et al. 2007). Finally, education may also inherently instil or reinforce liberal values already developed by the individual (Gibson et al. 1992). It should be stressed that in spite of addressing the issues of socialisation function of education, the majority of scholars were actually dealing with the ‘quantity’ of education (by measuring such indicators of education as level of educational attainment, average years of schooling, or number of students who studied abroad etc.), and not with the ‘quality’, the content of education (e.g. democratic values, political indoctrination or technical knowledge).4

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4 One of rare exceptions is the work of Glaeser et al. (2006) where the authors make an attempt to construct (using tools of mathematical modelling) a theoretical model of regime stability based on the core assumption
The development of EU-Russia educational cooperation and the aims of democracy promotion

One of the major features of Europeanisation is the fact that it produces externalities to neighbouring countries. It was impossible for Russia to remain indifferent to the European integration process as the eastern borders of Europe moved closer. At the same time, Perestroika, the end of the USSR, and the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation⁵ marked a new era in the EU-Russia relations and boosted the EU-Russia cooperation. As a successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the already existing framework of the cooperation with the EU (mainly constituted by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in November 1990),⁶ and through the 1990s Russia itself actively sought the membership of the Council of Europe and advocated for a close ‘strategic partnership’ with the European Union (Haukkala 2005).

The EU-Russia cooperation policy in the sphere of education and research was developed through the implementation of a series of bilateral arrangements and policy instruments and began with the adaption of the first EU-Russia Cooperation Programme and the opening of the EC Delegation in Moscow in 1991 (see Table 1).

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Table 1: EU-Russia educational cooperation in 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/date</th>
<th>Russia-EU milestones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The Delegation of the European Commission to Russia was opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>EU-Russia Cooperation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 1991</td>
<td>Regulation Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery in the USSR – the TACIS programme (the second phase followed on 19 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1994</td>
<td>The first TEMPUS programme for 1990-1993 was launched in July 1990. Russia joined in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the second phase on the 29 April 1994. The third phase followed on the 19 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1994</td>
<td>The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June 1999</td>
<td>EU’s Common Strategy on Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 October 1999</td>
<td>Agreement on Cooperation on Science and Technology between the European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and the Government of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 June 2000</td>
<td>Russia’s Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 February 2004</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relations with Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April 2004</td>
<td>Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>Inauguration of the Tempus Programme Russian office in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 2005</td>
<td>Road Maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces, including the Common Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 October 2006</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Federation and the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 2008</td>
<td>First meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Research in Ljubljana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Start of the negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2010</td>
<td>New Partnership for Modernisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own compilation on the basis of various sources.

On 15 July 1991 the Council adopted the Regulation Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and Recovery in the USSR (the second one followed on 19 July 1993). The aim was ambitious: ‘to promote, support and sustain the process of transformation to market economies and democratic societies in the New Independent States’ and to develop ‘the local skills and know-how required for the acceleration of the economic reform process in the NIS [New Independent States] through the provision of advice, know-how and practical experience necessary for the effective functioning and management of a market-based economy and related democratic institutional structures’.

Though the incentives were respectively high – the amount of Community funding for the implementation of the TACIS programme was €400 million for the financial year 1991 for

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all former USSR countries, €450 million for 1992 and €510 million including humanitarian aid for 1993 (see Table 2) – the TACIS programme was built not only on clear principles of political conditionality, but there were already strong socialisation mechanisms implied. From the first year the programme was targeted not only at financial assistance to several sectors of economy identified as priority ones (e.g. energy, transport, financial services and food distribution in 1991), but also at human resources development aimed at fostering of competences and skills required in new economic and social conditions, as well as on purely training and educational programmes. In 1992, the human resources development constituted 21.4 per cent of the overall amount of financial assistance.

The TACIS programme, which acted as a main financial framework for implementation of the EU-Russia Cooperation Programme in 1994 to 2006, expired at the end of 2006. From 1 January 2007 it has been replaced by a new regulation for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI Regulation – No. 1638/2006, 24 October 2006), but a large number of TACIS projects will still be ongoing until 2013.11

Table 2: Allocation of TACIS funds for Russia, 1991-2006 (Euro, million)

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TACIS-Russia</td>
<td>212.0</td>
<td>111.0</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>161.2</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>139.7</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>298.0</td>
<td>2,060.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional programmes</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>131.5</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>155.8</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>128.5</td>
<td>129.5</td>
<td>235.6</td>
<td>471.4</td>
<td>2,400.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For all countries</td>
<td>396.6</td>
<td>418.9</td>
<td>472.2</td>
<td>469.7</td>
<td>511.2</td>
<td>536.0</td>
<td>481.8</td>
<td>507.2</td>
<td>427.7</td>
<td>453.6</td>
<td>428.2</td>
<td>456.5</td>
<td>396.5</td>
<td>530.6</td>
<td>1,079.4</td>
<td>7,567.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Meanwhile, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), valid for ten years, was signed on 24 June 1994 and entered into force in December 1997 (which replaced the 1996 Interim Agreement). The PCA provided the institutional framework for the EU-Russia relations in supporting the reform process in Russia, strengthening political and economic freedoms and starting a regular dialogue on political issues, based on the assumption of shared values. Again, the main objectives were clearly demonstrating the EU’s will to promote mutually recognizable principles of liberal democracy in Russia, namely ‘to strengthen political and economic freedoms, to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy, to provide a basis for economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation founded on the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support’, and so on, with an ultimate goal of ‘gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe […] [and] establishment of a free trade area between the Community and Russia.12

11 It is worth noting that the results of the EU’s audit of the projects, supported in Russia, sometimes are far from being positive. According to the Special Report No 2/2006 of the Court of Auditors concerning the performance of projects financed under TACIS in the Russian Federation – Council Conclusions, “the efficiency of the use of TACIS funds in the Russian Federation has been low… the objectives were not met in a number of the audited projects and... projects were deemed sustainable in only a few cases… Given the size and duration of the programme, the audit results can only be seen as disappointing.”

In turn, the conclusions of TEMPUS impact studies are generally positive: see, e.g. Mid-Term Evaluation of Tempus in Russia – Assessing the contribution of Tempus to the Bologna process in Russia, Final report, February 2008: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/eval/russia_en.pdf.

On the incentives level, though, the implementation of PCA was assured through continuous support in the framework of the TACIS programme, where from 1999 the amount of financial support significantly decreased. According to the Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) classification of the EU political conditionality incentives, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements represent political conditionality with minor economic and financial incentives, on the one hand, and with low credibility of threats to withhold them in case of political non-compliance, on the other.

Article 63 of the PCA was specifically focused on the cooperation in education and training with the aim of raising the level of general education and professional qualifications through a number of instruments, including updating higher education and training systems in Russia; the training of public and private sector executives and senior civil servants in priority areas to be determined; cooperation between universities, cooperation between universities and firms; mobility for teachers, graduates, young scientists and researchers, administrators and young people; promoting teaching in the field of European Studies within the appropriate institutions; training of journalists, etc.

According to the PCA, it was advisable that such cooperation was institutionalised through Russia’s participation in a new Community’s TEMPUS programme. The first round of the new Community TEMPUS programme (Trans European cooperation scheme for higher education) for 1990-1993,13 financed through TACIS mechanism, was launched to respond to the modernization needs of the higher education sector in Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The second phase followed in 1994: TEMPUS II was adopted by the European Council for a period of four years and broadened the list of partner countries to include Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus with an overall objective to contribute to the creation of a higher education area between the European Union and the Neighbourhood.14 The decision on the TEMPUS III and TEMPUS IV was taken in 1999 and in 2008, respectively (the fourth phase being finances through the ENPI mechanism) giving the opportunity to Russia to enjoy so far the total amount of support of nearly €170 million (see Table 3).

Table 3: Allocation of TEMPUS funds for Russia, 1991-2006 (Euro, million)

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific allocation for Russia</strong></td>
<td>69,5</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td></td>
<td>167,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENPI regional funds</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the whole, the launch of the TEMPUS programme had a crucial significance not only for the EU-Russia education cooperation, but for the development of the EU educational policy at large. Though not stressing directly the goal of democracy promotion, the

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programme could be seen as one of the major socialisation mechanisms aimed at ‘reciprocal development of human resources’, ‘mutual understanding between peoples and cultures of the EU and the Partner Countries’, and hence, fostering European, namely democratic, norms and values.

The turn of the 21st century brought new challenges and possibilities for the development for the EU-Russia cooperation and resulted in a series of bilateral agreements. Since 2000 EU-Russia summits start to be held twice a year on a regular basis. The high point was the Saint-Petersburg summit of May 2003, when the EU (then with 15 members) recognised that Russia, while not eligible for membership, had a European dimension and granted it the status of a market economy, a vital step to membership of the World Trade Organisation. An EU-Russia permanent partnership council was set up, giving Moscow a say in European affairs where its interests were concerned.

At the same time education and training became central to the new EU economic, social and environment strategy 2010, defined at the European summit in Lisbon in March 2000 in preparation for the EU enlargement, and thus marked a new era of major changes in Community cooperation in education and training, both in terms of policy and grassroots programmes (Pepin 2006).

EU enlargement brought the European Union and Russia closer together and further strengthened the rationale for a close and effective strategic partnership, based on shared values and common interests, and giving a new shift to educational cooperation. This fundamental policy was confirmed in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia (9 February 2004) and the Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations (27 April 2004), and followed by the adoption of a single package of Road Maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces at the Moscow Summit in May 2005: Common Economic Space; Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; Common Space of External Security; and Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects.

The EU-Russia Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects (10 May 2005) represented a significantly new phase in the EU-Russia educational dialogue. The Road Map was clearly combining explicit goals of intensifying cooperation in the sphere of research, education and culture – to ‘intensify links and exchanges in the fields of education, youth and culture and promote the identification and adoption of best practices’ – with explicit and implicit political goals of promoting democratic values – to ‘capitalize on the strong EU and Russian intellectual heritage and knowledge capital to promote economic growth involving civil society of the EU and Russia and strengthening of competitiveness of economies in the EU and Russia’.16

Specifically, this should be reached by implication of a series of instruments and activities, including provision of the Russian participation in the European Community education programmes like TEMPUS, Erasmus Mundus, and Youth; promoting youth exchanges between the EU and Russia; promoting cooperation between youth organisations and youth leaders from the EU and Russia; exchange of information, expertise, and best practices through joint seminars and workshops between the EU and the Russian Federation; investigating means of promoting studies and training in Russia in the field of European Union law, EU economy, EU general and interdisciplinary studies, etc.

The culture section of the document more openly appealed for desired democratisation of Russia stating as the key objective ‘to strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity as a basis of vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines’.

A deeper analysis of the TEMPUS and the Education Road Map programme documents helps to identify at least two crucial democracy promotion / socialisation instruments. The first one concerns academic exchanges. Indeed, on the one hand, democracy promotion is predominantly societal and bottom-up, but on the other – international (Levitsky and Way 2005). Here, the potential of education for contributing to transnational exchange plays a crucial role. The effects of these interactions are diverse, but undoubtedly cultural and academic exchanges increase the level of education as a social requisite of democracy or constitute a channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favour democratisation ‘[…] the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with (other) democratic countries in its international environment’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 9).

Although there is no available data on the amount of mobility carried out within EU-supported projects in Russia, the positive dynamics of the overall outgoing mobility of Russian students (especially, for European destinations) is a good indicator of increasing transnational linkages of Russian students with their European colleagues, assuming that Community programmes provide by far the largest and longest-living support for cooperation between Russian and European universities.

**Figure 1:** Outgoing international mobility of Russian students, 2000-2008

![Outgoing international mobility of Russian students, 2000-2008](source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, various years, author’s own compilation.)
Another instrument is promotion of the EU Studies in Russia. It was with the launch of TEMPUS programme when ES started to enter Russian universities. The first major project was the creation of a postgraduate ES department at Saint-Petersburg State University, the first of its kind in Russia, in 1994. The number of ES departments continued to grow under the framework of TEMPUS I and II, and by the time the TEMPUS III programme was implemented, ES had become a priority area in higher education reforms. The numbers speak for themselves: since 1994 twenty EU-Russia educational projects devoted directly to studying Europe were put in place.

In the framework of the Road Map, the European Studies Institute (Eurocollege) in Moscow was opened in 2006 as a result of a joint EU-Russia initiative and was supported by Russia and the EC through a €12 million grant, paid on a parity basis from 2006 to 2013. Moreover, under the recently launched pilot project call of the Erasmus Mundus programme, the European Parliament made available 960,000 EUR to provide scholarships for university graduates from European Neighbourhood countries and Russia to follow courses in the European Union leading to a Master Degree in European Studies. Additionally, a series of EU Information Centres have been set up by the European Commission at Russian universities with the aim to promote research and teaching on European integration and to provide general information about EU policies.\(^\text{17}\)

Table 4 presents a summary of the amount of financial support and intensity of the EU-Russia academic exchanges for all key EU educational programmes with Russian participation (except for the TACIS and TEMPUS programmes discussed earlier).

\(^{17}\) See the list of the centres and the contact information here: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/more_info/eu_information_centres/eu_info_centres_russia/index_en.htm.
Table 4: EU education support to Russia, and intensity of academic exchanges, 2004-2010, various programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Education Programmes</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erasmus Mundus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External Cooperation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Window (Action 2)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support, € thousand</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>7930</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects supported</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 consortium, 12 unis, 310 mobility flows</td>
<td>3 consortia, 34 unis, 730 mobility flows</td>
<td>2 consortia, 17 unis, 486 mobility flows</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action 1, Masters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courses and Joint</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctorates</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Projects supported</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 EMMCs(^{18}), 1 EMJD(^{19}), 3 universities</td>
<td>2 EMMCs, 1 EMJD, 3 universities</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action 1, Individual</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>scholarships</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility flows</td>
<td>9 students, 3 academics</td>
<td>31 students, 9 academics</td>
<td>36 students, 13 academics</td>
<td>50 students, 16 academics</td>
<td>81 students, 19 academics</td>
<td>65 students, 22 academics</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action 4, Enhancing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>attractiveness projects</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects supported</td>
<td>1 project, 6 universities</td>
<td>1 project, 2 universities</td>
<td>1 project, 2 universities</td>
<td>1 project, 4 universities</td>
<td>4 universities, 4 projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Monnet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support, € thousand</td>
<td>12,00</td>
<td>28,28</td>
<td>18,00</td>
<td>13,87</td>
<td>65,35</td>
<td>75,00</td>
<td>19,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects supported</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth in Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Projects supported</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,600 participants, 320 projects</td>
<td>1,000 participants, 220 projects</td>
<td>600 participants, 100 projects</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation on the basis of various sources, mostly from the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) web-site http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/index_en.php.\(^{20}\)

Meanwhile, in the period of 2007-2008 several key EU-Russia documents were adopted, including the EU Country Strategy Paper on Russia (2007-2013), the ENPI National Indicative Programme for Russian Federation (2007-2010), and a so desired by the Russian part Agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union playing an important role in the EU´s democracy promotion efforts by facilitating international movement and exchange of persons participating in scientific, cultural and artistic activities, pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers, journalists, etc.\(^{21}\)

\(^{18}\) Erasmus Mundus Masters Courses.
\(^{19}\) Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorates.
\(^{20}\) The author would like to especially thank Ms. Claire Morel, the Deputy Head of the Unit C4 – International cooperation, Directorate C – Lifelong Learning: Higher Education and International Affairs, European Commission - Directorate General for Education and Culture, Ms. Sarah Moffat from the EACEA - Tempus & Bilateral Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, and Mr. Nicola Scaramuzzo from the EU-Russia Cooperation Section of the Delegation of the European Union to Russia for their cooperation and the information provided.
In June 2008, as a result of the 21st EU-Russia Summit in Khanty-Mansiisk, the negotiations on a New EU-Russia Agreement started, and on 1 July 2010 the EU and Russia launched a new Partnership for Modernisation.

At the same time, structural and curricula reforms in Russian universities were marked by a clear strategy of European integration, including joining the Bologna Declaration on the European space for higher education on September 19, 2003 and the adoption of a series of legal and strategic measures to assist those changes, such as the approval of the National modernization project ‘Education’ (which started in 2005); the implementation of Russia’s transition process to the two-level Bachelor-Master system (25 October 2007); and the elaboration of the next generation of Federal state standards of higher professional education (started in 2007), allowing more academic autonomy to universities, introducing course curricula based on compulsory and elective modules and a credit system as a measure of workload substituting academic hours, and so on.

All these inputs contributed to the fact that throughout the 2000s, EU-Russia cooperation in the field of education and research flourished reaching its peak in 2008. The year of 2008 was expected to bring the positive momentum into the relations between Russia and the European Union by starting negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement. However, the reality turned out to be different from expectations, and by 2009 the situation started to deteriorate. According to Haukkala, ‘none of the Union’s strategic objectives have been met: Russia has not become democratic and the basis of its current stability is debatable… What is more, Russia is increasingly belligerent towards the Union’s normative agenda in the so-called “Common Neighbourhood” – and it is beginning to challenge the applicability of EU principles as the cornerstones of a wider international order’ (2009: 1757). This EU disaffection resulted in significant cuts of financial education and research assistance to Russia, not to speak the deterioration of EU-Russia relations in general (see Table 5).22

Table 5: Tempus projects with participation of Russian partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Number of projects in Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 – 1993</td>
<td>TEMPUS I</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 – 1999</td>
<td>TEMPUS II</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 – 2006</td>
<td>TEMPUS III</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>… 1st call</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>… 2nd call</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>… 3rd call</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, when analyzing the development of the EU-Russia educational cooperation, it is important to take into consideration that for Russia (in contrast to Ukraine, for instance) the EU is only one relevant player in a multipolar world system. This is reflected in an intensification of political dialogue within other international and regional organizations, (e.g. G8/G20, CIS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRIC etc.) and is translated into an increasing number of cooperation initiatives in education and research with respective regions.
Education as a factor of democratisation

The previous section presented an analysis of the development of the EU-Russian education cooperation between 1990 and 2010 using theoretical and methodological framework of the IR social constructivist and institutionalist approaches, and the Europeanisation literature. Though the amount of financial incentives provided by the EU to Russia has been reduced, Russia enjoys quite favourable conditions of benefiting from the EU resources and programmes in the sphere of education, mainly through implementation of the Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects, and participating in several of the Community’s largest educational programmes like TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundus. Still, most scholars agree on the apparent failure on the part of the European Union in promoting democracy in Russia (Saari 2009b; Haukkala 2009).

This section will turn to domestic conditions of democratisation in Russia by briefly describing the current state of democracy in the country and then testing a series of research hypotheses related to the democratisation function of education, like the relationship between education and the level of democratic attitudes, for example.

The state of democracy in Russia

Analysis of the current situation shows that democratisation objectives in Russia have not still been met: the country ranks low on all the major democracy scales and, two decades on from transition, is some way from being a truly democratic society (Gerrits 2010; Haukkala 2009). When discussing the process in Russia, the scholars now are moving from the category of ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002) to using the notions of ‘new’ / ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Gerrits 2010), and ‘autocracy’ (Hassner 2008; Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010). There is common agreement about the authoritarian tendencies in Russia’s polity, which are combined with some democratic elements (like free elections, or political pluralism) serving not the establishment of a democratic regime, but performing a declaratory or, in other words, a ‘facade’, ‘virtual’, ‘imitation’ role (Hassner 2008), or a legitimizing function (Gerrits 2010) – Levitsky and Way (2002) called this type a ‘competitive authoritarian regime’.

The Freedom in the World survey, conducted by the Freedom House, provides an annual evaluation of the progress and decline of freedom in 194 countries and 14 select related and disputed territories. The survey measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Countries and territories are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Then each country and territory is assigned a broad category status of ‘Free’ (for countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5), ‘Partly Free’ (3.0 to 5.0), or ‘Not Free’ (5.5 to 7.0). Freedom House also assigns upward or downward ‘trend arrows’ to certain countries and territories which saw general significant positive or negative trends (Puddington 2010).

Russia ranks low on the Freedom in the World 2010 democracy scale: ‘6’ for Political Rights score, and ‘5’ for Civil Liberties score and is considered as being ‘Not Free’. According to the report, ‘Russia received a downward trend arrow due to electoral abuses, declining religious freedom, greater state controls over the presentation of history, and the repeated use of political terror against victims including human rights activists and journalists’ (Freedom in the World 2010). Moreover, in 2009 only 24 per cent (47) of all countries, and 28 per cent (8 countries) of the Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union region – all representing the former Soviet Union republics – were considered ‘Not Free’.
The situation appears to be even more worrying if we consider the 2002 results for Russia, when it was considered ‘Partly Free’ and received rights ‘5’ score both for Political Rights and Civil Liberties indicators. This means that instead of continuing its democratisation process started in the 1990s, the country is characterized by a democratic degradation.

The Economist Index of Democracy 2008 corroborates the Freedom House findings, concluding that the ‘authoritarian trends in Russia have continued [...] Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today’s Russia has been called a “managed” (or “state managed”) democracy’ (Kekic 2008: 2, 10). In 2008 Russia was placed into the ‘Hybrid regimes’ group and ranked 107th (of 167 countries). Moreover, between 2006 and 2008 Russia recorded the third biggest democracy decline worldwide (Kekic 2008).

Just to compare, Table 6 also presents results for the most democratic European countries – namely, Sweden, Iceland and the Netherlands (the latter two have the highest level of political culture) – and the least democratic EU members – Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the scores for the most authoritarian regime of North Korea. Russia seems to be as far even from the less democratic European countries as it is close to the world’s most authoritarian one.

**Table 6: Economist Index of Democracy 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
<th>I Electoral process</th>
<th>II Functioning of government</th>
<th>III Political participation</th>
<th>IV Political culture</th>
<th>V Civil liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9,88</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>9,38</td>
<td>10,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9,65</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>9,64</td>
<td>8,89</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>9,71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9,53</td>
<td>9,58</td>
<td>8,93</td>
<td>9,44</td>
<td>10,00</td>
<td>9,71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7,06</td>
<td>9,58</td>
<td>6,07</td>
<td>6,11</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>8,53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7,02</td>
<td>9,17</td>
<td>5,36</td>
<td>6,11</td>
<td>5,63</td>
<td>8,82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4,48</td>
<td>5,25</td>
<td>2,86</td>
<td>5,56</td>
<td>3,75</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0,86</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>2,50</td>
<td>0,56</td>
<td>1,25</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Kekic 2008.*

The 2010 Bertelsmann Political Transformation Index measures a country’s progress towards democracy through two main indexes: the Status Index and the Management Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). The Status Index for Russia is considered as ‘limited’ (5,7 out of 10, rank 65 of 128) and includes score for Democracy and Market Economy; the Management Index is 3,14 out of 100 (rank 107 of 128), which is considered to be ‘weak’.

Moreover, the 2003-2010 dynamics of the Bertelsmann index for Russia clearly demonstrates the deceleration of institutional transformations in the 2000s.
Table 7: Bertelsmann Political Transformation Index for Russia, 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status Index (0-10 scale)</th>
<th>Management Index (0-10 scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,0 (rank 41)</td>
<td>5,5 (rank 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy (0-5 scale)</td>
<td>Market Economy (0-5 scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,7 (rank 65)</td>
<td>3,14 (rank 107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>Market Economy (0-10 scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,25</td>
<td>6,14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the 2010 Russia’s country report, ‘[i]n terms of the country’s democratic transformation, no material progress was achieved during the period under study. To consolidate its power, the political elite that surrounds Putin routinely employs measures that conflict with democratic standards […] It is clear that the political leadership that surrounds Putin and Medvedev does not consider a qualitative enhancement of the process of democratic transformation one of the government’s key tasks’, (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 2-3).

**Education as human capital**

Though expert and scientific assessments of the state of democracy in Russia could be extremely negative, it is necessary to have a closer look at its citizens, shared democratic values and attitudes towards democracy, as democracy is not just a top-down political action, but is ‘built from within societies’ (Beetham et al. 2002). Starting with the starting with the classical modernisation theory of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), the level of education of country’s citizens is widely considered as a determinant of the level of human capital and, hence, a prerequisite for the country’s successful democratic transition. According to our hypothesis, education is one of the key mechanisms of democratic socialisation and nurturing of democratic values and civic competences in the citizens.
Figure 2: Level of education in Russia – the highest level attained, 1995-2006

![Figure 2](image)


Even though the level of primary and secondary education enrolment in Russia has been declining since 1995, the higher education enrolment rate, as well as the percentage of citizens with higher education, has risen (see Figure 2 and Table 8).

Table 8: Level of educational enrolment in Russia, 2000-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment in primary education</th>
<th>Enrolment in secondary education</th>
<th>Enrolment in tertiary education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 (people)</td>
<td>6 138 300</td>
<td>14 138 847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (people)</td>
<td>4 968 710</td>
<td>8 415 648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of the whole population</td>
<td>4,2%</td>
<td>9,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,5%</td>
<td>5,9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By level of education Russia falls into one cluster with such countries as Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and Japan (Kosova 2009). Although the average number of years spent by Russian students in educational institutions is somewhat lower than in the most developed countries, however, by the share of graduates who received a higher education certificate, Russia is among five leading countries (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: The level of education in Russia and in the world

Source: Kosova 2009.

This is a crucial (though, preliminary) conclusion showing that the ‘Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis’ of direct positive correlation between the level of education in the country and the state of democracy in it could also work for Russia and proving the validity of our main research question concerning the role of external educational policy in country’s democratisation.

The context is amplified by a significant decrease in prestige of Russian education in comparison with the best examples in the world. Though one-third of the Russian population thinks that the quality of Russian higher education today corresponds to the world standards (28 per cent), 41 per cent are convinced that it is lower than world standards (though in 2001 this indicator equalled to 35 per cent, see Table 9). People with higher education are those who are more critical towards the quality of Russian education and those whose opinion changed most dramatically: if in 2001 29 per cent of this category thought that the quality Russian education was below the world standard, in 2007 they already constituted half of the group (50 per cent).

---

23 For example, John Dewey in 1916 in Democracy and Education suggested caution in making optimistic prospects of democratic developments in Russia based on the great expansion of education.
Table 9: In your opinion, Russian education, in general, is higher or lower the world level?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Aug.01</th>
<th>May.05</th>
<th>Jan.07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher than the world level</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponds to the world level</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than the world level</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Quality of the higher education in Russia”, “Public opinion” Foundation, 21 January 2007.

We can further suppose that it is not only the ‘quantity’, for example the level of education enrolment or education attainment, that effects successful democratic transitions, but also the ‘quality’ of education, such as the norms and values nurtured in students, that matters. To investigate this, the article will analyse the democratic public attitudes in Russia and try to identify whether the more educated part of population is more democratically oriented.

Education and democratic attitudes

Following Almond and Verba, most scholars agree that ‘the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process upon the political culture’ (Almond and Verba 1963, 498). In the case of Russia, the population’s approval of democracy per se as voiced in representative polls is moderate to high, depending on the wording of the question. According to the ‘Levada Analytical Center’ data of December 2009, half of the population (57 per cent) thinks that Russia needs democracy (see Table 10), but just 39 per cent recognize that democratic development is Russia’s reality nowadays, and 13 per cent believe that the country is approaching dictatorship (see Table 11).

Table 10: Do you think that Russia needs democracy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Jun.05</th>
<th>Dec.06</th>
<th>Dec.07</th>
<th>Jun.08</th>
<th>Dec.09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “What is Democracy and does Russia Need it?”, Levada Analytical Center, 21 January 2010.

24 It is not a surprising fact since it is confirmed by other Russian and international empirical studies (see e.g. New Russia Barometer – Rose et al., 2006). Though, according to Gerrits (2010: 40-41), “the research findings are not all consistent. While the New Russia Barometer concludes that throughout the 1990s and 2000s two-thirds of the respondents rejected dictatorship, and only one-third supported it; Diamond concludes on the basis of other polls that in most of the European republics of the former Soviet Union, Russia included, only minorities say no to ‘all authoritarian options’” (See Diamond and Plattner 2008).
Table 11: In which direction, in your opinion, is developing political life nowadays in Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Oct.05</th>
<th>Oct.06</th>
<th>Oct.10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of democracy</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of previous Soviet order</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of dictatorship, authoritarian regime</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise of disorder, anarchy</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Democratic freedoms and Russian politics”, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

Though 23 per cent of the Russian population think that Russia needs a European or American style of democracy, 30 per cent of the respondents consider Western democracy and Western culture ‘not applicable’ for Russia, and 12 per cent perceive them as a ‘dangerous and destroying’ (see Table 12).

Table 12: What kind of democracy needs Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Jun.05</th>
<th>Dec.06</th>
<th>Dec.07</th>
<th>Jun.08</th>
<th>Dec.09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like in development countries in Europe, America</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like it was in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely specific, corresponding to national traditions and specificity of Russia</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia does not need democracy</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Democratic freedoms and Russian politics”, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

The vast majority of the Russian population has no strong opinion on the idea of democracy. This implies a sort of silent consent to democratic norms, but represents no principal opposition to undemocratic norms (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). 43 per cent of the Russian population believe that Russia needs an absolutely specific kind of democracy, corresponding to national traditions and specificity of Russia (43 per cent), which they associate primarily with economic development (39 per cent), various freedoms, for example, freedom of speech, media, religion (38 per cent), as well as stability and order in
the country (37 per cent), and not with such crucial democratic principles as democratic elections or human rights.25

Gibson et al. (1992: 333-334) argued that ‘perhaps the key cultural enemy of democracy in the Soviet union is the desire for order’. It seems that two decades so far the situation has not changed significantly. For 42 per cent of Russian citizens democracy cannot exist without order, and 59 per cent of the population would prefer maintaining order in Russia even at the cost of violations of some democratic principles and limitations of personal freedoms (see Table 13).

**Table 13:** What, in your opinion, is more important for Russia: order or democracy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Sep.96</th>
<th>Apr.00</th>
<th>Dec.05</th>
<th>Dec.09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Order, even at the cost of violations of some democratic principles and limitations of personal freedoms</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, even if following democratic principles can give freedom to destroying and criminal groups</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: “Democratic freedoms and Russian politics”, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.*

As it was supposed, the population in Russia nowadays is also characterized by a very low level of political interest and participation: 64 per cent of citizens are not interested in politics and 64 per cent do not think of participating in political life, even at their city’s level.26 This attitude is closely connected with the situation of factual absence of alternative decisions in all spheres of life, which results in absence of trust towards government and public authorities, and a very specific perception of ‘freedom’. The majority of the Russian citizens (84 per cent) are aware of their inability to influence any political decisions and processes (see Table 14). More than half of the population (52 per cent) think that the majority of social movements and initiatives in the Russian society nowadays appear as a result of the initiative of the government authorities or other political parties, who are in the opposition to the current power.27

---

25 “Democratic freedoms and Russian politics”, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.
26 *Idem.*
27 *Idem.*
Table 14: In your opinion, are you able to influence political processes in Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>Jun.08</th>
<th>Jun.10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely, yes</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most probably, yes</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most probably, not</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely, not</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Democratic freedoms and Russian politics”, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

But does this negative picture change if we analyse the most highly educated part of Russian society? Preliminary analysis of the correlation between several democratic attitudes, namely interest in politics, political participation, assessment of the importance of democracy and satisfaction with democracy, confirms that the level of education is a positive indicator of democratic perceptions and attitudes. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2003), political participation and self-expression are among the core values constituting a specific democratic type of a political culture, such as “more deeply rooted orientations of tolerance, trust and participation which can guarantee the presence of effective democracy present at the societal level” (Inglehart and Welzel 2003: 69). Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, the higher the education level of a citizen is, the higher is his interest in politics. Or, in other words, people with higher education are more often interested in politics than citizens with education below tertiary level.

Figure 4: Correlation between interest in politics and educational level


28 The level of educational attainment was grouped into two categories: (1) below tertiary level, and (2) university and upper-level tertiary education. The first reason is that the vast majority of EU-Russia educational cooperation programmes are targeted at higher education. Secondly, the difference in democratic values of people with non-university and university education is statistically higher than between people of other educational levels (primary and secondary, or secondary and university).
Similarly, people with university education will more probably show a higher level of political participation and, for example, join political organisations than people with lower levels of education (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5:** Correlation between political participation (joining political organisations) and educational level

![Graph showing correlation between political participation and educational level]

*Source: “General political activity”, Foundation “Public Opinion” (FOM), 13 April 2006.*

Although one can argue that support for democracy *per se* cannot be considered to be a valid predictor of democracy as at this point of history a favourable opinion of democracy is extremely widespread, this is not actually the case of Russia. But though the overall level of public assessment of the importance of democracy is not as high as in developed democratic countries (61 per cent), the level of citizens’ education is positively associated with their opinion about the importance of democracy. For more educated Russian citizens democratic regime is more significant, than for less educated individuals (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Correlation between the assessment of the importance of democracy and the educational level

![Graph showing correlation between education level and assessment of democracy importance]


The image of democracy also depends upon individual’s level of education. If we compare positive and negative associations that Russian citizens have with the notion of democracy, the tendency of people with higher education to perceive democracy in a positive way is significantly higher that of those who was not socialized in the university (see Tables 15 and 16).

Table 15: Associations with the notion of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive associations</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Negative associations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just system of governance with participation of all citizens on equal basis</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Idle talk, demagogy</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantees of respect by the government of civil rights and liberties</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>This is a state regime for “normal countries”, not for us</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility to criticize authorities of all levels</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Chaos, disorder, anarchy</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of power and public accountability of authorities</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>System of governance that proved its inefficiency in Russia</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free competition of political parties for electorate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Absence of a “firm hand” in governance, dispersed responsibility</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Relation of positive to negative associations with the notion of democracy

| In general | 1,5 |
| Education |   |
| Higher    | 1,6 |
| Secondary, college | 1,3 |
| Below secondary | 1,0 |


Finally, the most educated part of Russian population is also the most realistic with regard to the country’s democratisation successes and drawbacks. People with higher education are more likely to assess the current situation as a ‘lack of democracy’ than citizens with lower educational levels (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Correlation between satisfaction with democracy and educational level


These facts demonstrating that the higher level of education (and its content) is positively associated with civic participation and democratic attitudes provide additional support for the hypothesis concerning the role of education (especially, higher education) as a prerequisite for democracy in Russia. Education can directly increase these attitudes by developing necessary democratic competences and values and providing relevant information and experience, as well as implicitly reinforce them, since those with higher levels of education are more likely to have higher human and social capital and, hence,
demonstrate higher levels of social trust and satisfaction with life (other crucial cultural prerequisites of democracy).

Concluding remarks

By bringing together two different scholarly traditions, namely the literature on democracy promotion and that on democratisation, the article has developed a new perspective for understanding the EU democratic promotion activities and the role of education (and educational policy) in the democratisation of Russia. It has also contributed to the understanding of the EU’s educational policy as a democracy promotion mechanism. Democratic norms and values constitute the core of the EU’s politics and the fabric of a modern society. By tracing the history of EU-Russia educational cooperation, the primacy of values on the EU’s normative agenda is stressed, and education is shown as one of the EU’s key socialisation mechanisms for promoting and fostering democracy in Russia. At the same time, the article has demonstrated that, in the current ambiguous socio-political situation in Russia, the level of education is a valid predictor of more democratic public attitudes, and hence, should be considered a strong factor in the democratisation of a country. Given the current status of the EU-Russia relations, the widening of the so-called ‘values gap’ (Haukkala 2005) and the necessity of a real strategic partnership based on common interests and shared values (Larionova 2007), it is exactly in the educational domain that the EU could exercise its ‘soft’ normative power and influence the development of Russia through the democratic socialisation of its citizens.

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References


29 See Ian Manners’ conceptualisation of the EU as a “Normative Power Europe” (Manners 2002).


Measuring Russia’s Snag on the Fabric of the EU’s International Society: The Impact of the East-West Cleavage upon the Cohesion amongst the EU Member States vis-à-vis Russia

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**Abstract**

This article explores Russia’s impact upon the cohesion of the European Union International Society (EUIS). The analysis proceeds from a systematic categorisation of Member States’ positions towards Russia, using an “index of friendliness towards Russia” based on various indicators. This index allows us to analyse the relative positions of Member States towards the Eastern neighbour and to order them along an ideal continuum which goes from “normative adamant” to “normative docile”. By taking a broad perspective of the different national attitudes, this article offers an innovative approach to the key question of EU-Russian relations. Existing cleavages and social differences among the members bear an important divisive effect on the development of the EUIS. The present analysis explores adherence to norms deriving from the widely accepted institutions of sovereignty and the market. While there is no doubt that these institutions boast complete devotion on behalf of EU Member States (MSs), translation into both common language and action proves to be hindered by social differences among members. The difference among the preferences of Member States towards Russia is then compared to the preferences expressed by the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the 6th legislature. The analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviours towards Russia explores whether there is a coincidence between the positions of the MSs and those of the MEPs, as representatives of the EU’s societies.

**Keywords**

International Society; Member States; EU-Russia relations

RELATIONSHIPS WITH RUSSIA PROVE TO BE PARTICULARLY PRONE TO INCREASE breaches into the European Union (EU)’s cohesion and ability to act. Despite the hope that

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the East-West cleavage no longer constituted a source of divisions in the Post-Cold War Europe (Browning 2003), relevant differences in confronting the Eastern colossus still originate from this cleavage of the past (Attina 1998: 221). From this perspective, the distinction between Old and New EU as stemming from the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 still explains the difficulty that the EU meets in consolidating common norms vis-à-vis Russia. On the one hand, “Old Europe” – to varying degrees of intensity – sees in the long Russian transition the opportunity to spread stability through economic integration, in including its immediate neighbourhood the normative heritage of its Society. On the other, “New Europe” considers Russia as a threat to regional security and urges the EU to assume a severe stance. The EU’s Member States therefore oscillate between Liberal Institutionalist and Neo-Realist temptations in dealing with Russia. In so doing, the Member States at times hold ambitions for integrating Russia into a larger pan-European International Society, but at times showing concerns for their interests and security. It could be argued that difficulty to reach a common positions towards Russia is symptomatic of different interpretations of “what ought to be done” vis-à-vis Russia.

This article starts by asking if it is possible to identify social differences among the Member States (MSs) which systematically infringe the consolidation of EU’s “common interests and common values” vis-à-vis Russia, and to what extent this affects the functioning of the EU institutions when Russia is at stake. The benchmark of “self-identification” with the EU’s International Society looks closely at those differences which define the MS’ own identities. In light of the original character of the European Union International Society (EUIS), reference to normative foundations and common interests here focuses on the core values emphasised in the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on the European Union, TEU), rather than on MS’ respect of the core primary and secondary institutions at the international level.1

It is argued here that an analysis of consistent divisions and social cleavages among the members of a given International Society constitutes an important, though neglected, element in the study of International Societies. This importance descends from two reasons. First, separation and divisions contribute as much as commonalities to the definition of the normative foundation of a given International Society. In other words, it is the dialectic between patterns of division and co-operation which shapes the normative foundations of an International Society. Second, the mix between divisive and shared elements defines the scope for action of that Society.

Self-identification, therefore, does not mean that social differences among members of a Society fade away. Social differences among the members of a Society consistently show that agreement on the normative weave of an International Society alone is not a sufficient requisite for action. The dialectics between commonalities and differences is also reflected in a constitutive feature of the EU process of integration, that is, its inherent multidimensionality (Caporaso 1996).

Related to this, four central assumptions emerge. In the first place, main social differences among Member States contribute to both the definition and interpretation of common norms. This reveals a process of differential self-identification (Aalto 2007: 469) with the foundations of a given system. Second, social differences can determine the margins of action of a given system as well as institutional paralysis. Third, they contribute in a central way at predicting the behaviour of members of a given Society. Finally, they highlight the possible reverberation of those cleavages at the polity level.

This article offers an analysis of MS’ positions towards Russia as influenced by the strength of economic flows, energy dependence, preferences for projects of regional security,

1 For an extensive discussion on primary and secondary institutions, see Buzan 2004: 161-204.
existence of disputes and projects of energy supply. On this basis, an “index of friendliness towards Russia” was built. The index allows us to order Member States into a “normative” continuum: from the “normative adamant” to “normative docile”. In building the index, attention was paid to the complexity of measures of economic relations and dependence over Russian energy supplies, in hypothesising a bi-directionality of their causal effects, whereas Old MSs consider the strength of economic ties with Russia as a relative asset, New MSs still consider it as an absolute form of dependence, which threatens their overall stability. The analysis performed is based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. This mixed approach is particularly evident in the process of definition of our index of friendliness towards Russia, where qualitatively retrieved dimensions go hand in hand with hard data addressing each county’s trade and imports with Russia. Given the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation this strategy seemed to maximise the advantages of both analytical approaches. At the same time it appears to guarantee a wider and more consistent array of indicators which depict the dynamics addressed more accurately.

Second, the article aims to compare the result of the analysis of the members of the EUIS with the positions of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviours towards Russia explores whether there is a coincidence between the positions of the MSs and those of the MEPs, as representatives of the EU’s societies. Accordingly, the article compares the position of MSs with those of the MEPs, as expressed in a sample of 18 roll call votes, issued from December 2004 to July 2008. This additional analytical step aims at evaluating to what extent MS’ individual attitudes towards Russia emerged in the first part of the analysis has the potential to affect the way the EU decision-making process works. Or, to put it another way, to what extent MS’ preferences cross the borders of national politics and embrace a transnational dimension, thereby mutually blending one another in increasingly forging the EU’s strategy towards Russia. In particular, the European Parliament represents a perfect laboratory to conduct this test. As the only directly elected EU institution it allows us to see if, and to what extent, national preferences relate to ideology in the eyes of the legislators when such a sensitive issue is at stake.

Consequently, Section two introduces the main literature and advances the theoretical ground of this work. Section three presents a relation between the norms as expressed in the TEU, diverse perceptions and social differences among the MSs, and the derivative deadlocks which can impinge over the reach of a common action. This taxonomy is further related to the variables employed in our analysis and their operationalisation. This section also presents the variables adopted in the construction of the index and the methodology employed for the analysis of the MS’ positions. Section four presents the “index of friendliness towards Russia”. Section five explains the methodology employed for the analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour and will present the main results of the analysis. The final part of this work develops some general conclusions.

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2 All the votes included have been held during the 6th EP legislature, according to a time-line defined by the time period delimited by the dimensions which compose our index of friendliness towards Russia is based. Given the MEPs’ turnout between one parliament and the other we could not include also the current EP. On the other hand the inclusion of the sole 7th EP would have been severely harmed and made virtually impossible by the very limited number of votes concerning Russia held so far (3 RCVs).
Literature review: values and interests, commonalities and differences within an International Society

An International Society can be defined as the product of a group of states, which have “established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Bull and Watson 1984: 1). Born in the European region as the cradle of the values of modern International Society (Watson 1982: 95; Bull and Watson 1984), the seeds of an International Society sprang into life from a perceived sense of the unity of Latin Christendom (Mattingly 1955: 16) and developed throughout the late Dark Ages around “three converging currents of tradition: ecclesiastical, feudal, and imperial, or, if one prefers, Christian, German, and Roman, embodied in canon law, customary law, and civil law” (Mattingly 1955: 19). Basic international societal institutions, such as the balance of power and diplomacy, have been progressively accepted by non-European states, on the basis of either adherence or forced assimilation to this collection of rules and practices; by means of incorporation (Watson 1966), legal reception (Watson 1978), legal borrowing (Roberson 2009) and so forth.

Scholars belonging to the English School’s (ES) tradition usually refer to the concept of International Society (IS) by highlighting both common interests and values. Common values and interests bond the Member States (MSs) of a given IS to “a set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977: 13). Bull’s crucial reference to commonalities is exemplificative of the awareness that shared interests and normative values constitute the precondition to the establishment and consolidation of a given IS. According to Bull, the existence of a trait d’union in values and interests among members of a Society needs to be complemented with their consciousness of the relevance of existing ties. This awareness, coupled with the normative character of common rules, is ultimately what conceptually distinguishes a system from a society of states. At large, the English School tradition does not deny the relevance of interests in the consolidation of an IS. But in contrast to Realist perspectives, states do not co-operate merely on the basis of security related interest and strategic calculations, but decide to tie themselves up with others on the ground of a collective identity (Andersson 2010: 49). Therefore, as for security communities, belonging to a given International Society does not imply that “interest-based behaviour by states will end, that material factors will cease to shape interstate practices, and that security dilemmas will end. Nor [...] that security communities transcend the mutual dependence between regional orderly security arrangements and stable economic transactions” (Adler 1997: 255). Being bonded to an International Society rather means that, as with neoliberal institutionalism, instrumental judgements “can be accompanied by judgements about prevailing expectations and normative considerations affecting the validity and solidity of international agreements” (Smith 1996: 10). As in any international system, one of the goals of any International Society is the one of preserving security and independence of the members (Wight 1978: 96, quoted in Diez and Whitman 2002: 54). But, in difference to an international system, members are bonded together by a common set of values, and tied up by a more or less thick set of rules and institutions.

Even within an International Society, therefore, “contradictions within a set of values [...] are the everyday stuff” (Buzan 2004: 250). Therefore, differences in interpretations, values and interests need to be taken into account in the study of a given Society. Attina goes further in revealing a central gap in Bull’s theoretical approach, where “he disregards social
variables as relevant determinants of state actions and system characteristics”, and in so doing he overstates “factors inducing community and peaceful coexistence rather than separation and division” (Attina 1998: 210). He applied the traditionally domestic conceptual tool of cleavages (Lipset and Rockan 1967; Rokkan 1970) to the IS and individuates three social cleavages cutting across the global International Society: the North-South (economic), the Centre-Periphery (cultural) and the most recent East-West cleavage (1998: 221). These cleavages intervene massively in shaping both the feasibility of an agreement and the range of activities pursued by the international society. They impact the policy-cycle from the introduction of a given point in the agenda to the conduct of negotiation, from the timing to the results of the overall cycle.

On the one hand, cleavages separate states into groups which are differently exposed and sensitive to the issues of the system; on the other, social cleavages result in aggregations which strongly influence political alignments and governmental coalitions in multilateral negotiation for giving formal solution to global issues (Attina 1998: 219).

These considerations highlight two sets of consequences related to the norms shared within a given society and to the creation of closer ties among selected members of a given society. On the one hand, norms shared are formulated in vague and flexible terms, to the extent that they can be considered as a “standard of civilisation” (Samhat 1997: 352). On the other, the territorial scope of an International Society is inherently “unbundled” (Ruggie 1993: 165) and its borders are fuzzy, and time- and context-sensitive. The next section will explore the way in which these conceptual categories have been applied to the analysis of the EU and the wider European order.

**The EU: an International Society like no one? Inter-subjective understanding, social differences and their effect into the EUIS normative weave**

The European Union (EU) constitutes a particularly thick International Society insofar, in a highly advanced process of “integration by law” (Kohler-Koch 2009: 110), Member States agreed upon a grid of principles, from human rights to social form of market liberalism (Diez and Whitman 2002: 53) and accepted to bond themselves to the EU International Society (EUIS) set of rules and institutions. In this understanding, within the overall International System, the EU can be conceived as a “specific sub-system […] in which the societal element is stronger than elsewhere” (Diez and Whitman 2002: 48).

In the analysis of the EU/EUIS two conceptual dimensions of Society overlap: the institutional dimension, which defines the geographical political space of the EU as a system of governance (Friis and Murphy 1999); and the societal dimension, that is, the quality of interstate relations, both in terms of thickness of normative ties and consonance of fundamental interests.

In the first place, the consolidation of an International Society, formal institutions represent a crucial tool for embedding Members into *norm-sharing* and patterns of cooperation, whereas institutions provide for “persistent sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989: 3). As was noted, English School scholars often disregarded the importance of formal institutions in the strengthening of a society of states. In a global environment in which the quasi totality of states share the same basic practices and principles of relation (such as diplomacy, sovereignty, or the balance of power), the existence of thick institutional structures can be considered as a further indicator to depict the strength of ties among a

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4 For a review on this point, see Simmons and Martin 2006: 197.
group of states, whereas the thicker is the institutional dimension, the stronger is the societal element among states.

In the second place, criteria for inclusion in the EU, and as an extension to the EUIS, repose on constitutive normative elements, such as self-identification (Diez and Whitman 2002) endorsed through membership. The EU’s bedrocks are codified within the treaties, whereas acceptance of basic norms, together with the entirety of the *acquis communautaire*, constitutes a precondition for membership. This guarantees, even if within limits, that a common understanding of vague norms (such as adherence to a social form of market economy or territorial sovereignty of states) exists among members. Two primary norms are recognised as constitutive of the EU: supremacy of the Member States in the process of *norm-building*; and centrality of agreed values in shaping external conduct. In the first place, the basis of the EUIS’ capability to act descends from Member States’ conferral of delegated competencies “to attain objectives they have in common” (art. 1, TEU). Secondly, in light of their high catalyst power (art. 2, TEU), agreed norms are placed at the core of the EUIS’ quintessence, which also shapes the EUIS’ main principle “to advance in a wider world” (art. 21.1, TEU).  

Self-identification with the EUIS normative ground is, therefore, both a precondition for membership and a central instance of the EU’s normative ethos as an international actor.

Although of central symbolic importance, the sharing of common norms is only one possible reason underlying the strategy of enlargement, whereas other sets of considerations converge in the decision to expand the borders of an institutional community of states. Schimmelfennig posits that the normative argument progressively constituted a powerful strategic lens to re-interpret Europe’s contemporary history. This strategic attitude characterised the position of Central and Eastern European Countries in order to strengthen their claim for accession (Schimmelfennig 2001: 55). The frequent metaphor of a return – whether to “Europe”, to “democracy”, to “capitalism” or to “history” – in the rhetoric surrounding the Eastern enlargement sheds light on the normative, rather than geographical, marker of Europe as a category.

While EU enlargement has often been regarded as a powerful, albeit limited and improper, tools of foreign policy, the possibility of recurring to the rhetoric of common values has today nearly extinguished its potential, as “the heterogeneity of the membership”, and “the costs of centralized decisions are likely to rise where more and more persons of differing tastes participate” (Sandler *et al.* 1978: 69, quoted in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 511).

In light of both the institutional and societal dimension, therefore, EU’s membership defines the geographical political space of the EU as a system of governance in a given

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5 The EU/EUIS is told to projects its values beyond its borders through its presence (Allen and Smith 1990; Manners 2002; Waever 2002), its external policies (Barbe and Johansson-Nogues 2008; Kelley 2006; Rynning 2003; Schimmelfennig 2008; Tocci 2007) and through interactions with third party states and international organisations (Boerzel and Risse 2004; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Manners 2008).

6 In difference to institutions as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that were born “enlarged” to the communist side of Europe (Pourchot 2011: 179), enlargement in the EU context is “is a key political process both for the organization itself and the international relations of Europe in general” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 500). In this understanding, enlargement is defined as “a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 504). In a EU/EUIS understanding, enlargement embodies central institutional and societal consequences, which, together with the geographical and political borders of the EUIS, shape the inter-subjective understanding of common norms.

7 See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002.

8 Whereas: “today’s Europe is to be found where its democratic, liberal and humanist values and practices succeed in shutting the door on the nightmare of authoritarian regimes, command economies, and disregard for human rights and fundamental values” (Melescanu 1993, quoted in Fierke 1999: 38).
point in time, but it does not explain three central and constitutive elements of that Society: the in-group differential self-identification (Aalto 2007: 469), the existence of a shared inter-subjective understanding of basic norms among the members (Kratochwil 1988; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986) and the evolving relation between the EU and a changing broader European order (Smith 1996: 7).

In the first place, within the EU, differential patterns of integration occur due to a variable geometry on the ground of stronger ties in interests and/or values among selected Member States (Smith 1996: 8). Even within the EUIS, therefore, the development of the European political space can be explained in terms of a “Europe of Olympic rings”, “in which the different yet interdependent regions/rings of Europe (Northern–Baltic Europe, the Mediterranean, Central Europe, etc) become simply nodes in a wider framework” (Medvedev 2000 and Joeniemi 2000, quoted in Browning 2003: 50). The strength of common interests and the identification with the values and principles of the overall International Society admits, therefore, several degrees of intensity, as constitutive values are purposely conceived and elaborated in flexible and rather vague terms (Aalto 2007: 467).

In relation to the second point, Kratochwil adds two important specifications to unravel the nature of adherence to rules and norms and their relation to behaviour. First, norms cannot be seen in a causal relation with behaviour in term of rights and obligations, but rather as factors able to “guide”, “inspire”, “rationalise”, “justify”, “express mutual expectations” or simply “be ignored” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 767). Second, “no single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm” and its existence; therefore it is the inter-subjective reaction to a violation that defines what a violation itself is (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 767). In this perspective, any international relationship seldom relies on authoritative interpretation: “it follows that interpretations of acts by the actors are an irreducible part of their collective existence” (Kratochwil 1988: 276). Norms, therefore, have a “communicative, rather than merely referential functions” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 769). In this sense, norms produced by an International Society and embedded in formal institutions are intrinsically based on both “a subjective and inter-subjective understandings” (Navari 2009: 1), on the basis of individual elaboration on behalf of states and constant processes of re-elaborations in the interstate/inter-institutional context. As follows, this flexibility and vagueness signals the plural existence of the same norm, whereas norms are flexibly adapted both to different interpretations and to different interests and geopolitical considerations of the members of an International Society. Crucially, recognising the plural existence of norms indicates that an IS’ normative weave can survive flexible interpretations.

In the third place, the development of the EUIS does not occur in geographical isolation, but is significantly shaped and reshaped through interactions with the outside world, especially with its neighbours, such as the Eurasian continent.

Eminently, Smith draws upon the analytical distinction among four types of boundaries which define the relation between the EU and the surrounding European order, the geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural (1996). The geopolitical boundary encompasses a security dimension and implicitly demarcates a zone of order and stability from an area of disorder (the wider European environment). The second dimension embodies the institutional and legal elements which underpin membership to the EU. In this perspective, in the post-Cold War era, a close alignment came to verify between the geopolitical and legal/institutional borders in Europe (Smith 1996: 15). The transactional type of border adds up extra-regulatory layers to trade issues, while the cultural border constructs a “difference between the assumed culture of the insider and the outsiders” (Smith 1996: 17). Consequentially, borders between the EUIS and the overall European order, in this context, reflect a politics of inclusion and exclusion, “that implies a
disjunction between an entity (here the EU) and its environment (the European order)” (Smith 1996: 13).

With reference to the wider European Regional International Society, therefore, chalking out the borders of Europe has always been a context- and time-related exercise rather than a territorial or geographical one (Neumann 1996). In the eye of some observers, the borders of the European International Society seem to go from Western Europe to Russia and the most parts of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). This Society is characterised by the support for the institutions of sovereignty, diplomacy, the market, equality of people and human rights, nationalism in the form of self-determination, popular sovereignty and democracy (Aalto 2007: 467-89).

In a recent article, Georgeta Pourchot (2011) applied to the overall European Regional International Society (ERIS) the concepts of pluralism and solidarism (Bull 1966: 52). Bull explained pluralism by depicting the tendency of states “of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of enforcement of the law”; whereas solidarity, “was a twentieth century tendency for real or potential solidarity in international society that enabled enforcement against lawbreakers” (Bull 1966: 52, quoted in Pourchot 2011: 192). Pourchot joins Buzan’s claim for a more flexible conceptualisation on how pluralist and solidarist elements are balanced in an International Society where pluralism and solidarism represent the two extremes of a continuum which depicts the ‘thinness’ or ‘thickness’ of a given International Society (Buzan 2001: 484, quoted in Pourchot, 2011: 192). Pourchot concludes that the ERIS is a thin society, of which Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) represents a significant instant (2011: 193). Along the same lines, Diez and Whitman posit that the EU constitutes a thick Regional International Society that exists within a much broader but thinner European International Society.

An analysis of the place of Russia in the wider ERIS has been neglected (Aalto 2007). The normative undertone of the word Europe aptly applied, often in negative terms, to the biggest Eastern neighbour on the Eastern border. The Russian Federation has often been defined as “non-European” (Neumann 1998: 406, quoted in Schimmelfennig 2001: 69) or, at best, as “neither a part of nor apart from the West” (Kaempf 2010: 318). In her valuable review on discourses of Otherness in European collective identity building, Michelle Pace refers to the division of Europe into West and East as “a fundamental characteristic of modern times” (2002: 189), with Russia as a symbolic epicentre. Throughout Europe’s turbulent history, Russia has been often labelled as a material competitor threatening the European living space (Carta 2008: 488). The historical evolution of Russia proved that westernisation and modernisation are two processes which do not necessarily go hand in hand (Gray 1995: 167) to the extent that the turbulent and premature entry of Russia in modern history made Russia and the West constitutively “incompatible”, as if they belong to “different stages of civilisation” (Carr 1956: 362). The image of Russia as a “non-European” country in normative terms constitutes largely but not exclusively a heritage of the Cold War, whereas the Soviet Union was defined “in Europe but not of Europe” on the ground of some “master dichotomies civilised/barbarian and European/Asian and […] a number of others such as free/unfree, market/plan, West/East, defensive/offensive, etc.” (Neumann 1996: 7). Therefore, the demarcation between “accepted Europeans” and a Russia in perennial transition to Europeanness (Neumann 1996) has been defined in terms of a modern form of differentiation, that entails “the construction of [European collective identity’s] outside as inherently different and as a threat to its identity” (Rumelili 2004: 28).

As noted previously, the fall of the Iron Curtain “ushered in a belief that territorial and psychological borders could be transcended and eroded and that ‘Europe’ could be reconstructed in much more open and diverse ways. One result of such optimism has been the instigation of numerous region-building projects across the East-West divide, the
aim being to eradicate that divide in favour of a new commonness” (Browning 2003: 45). In the next sections an analytical framework is proposed to see whether the East-West divide still constitutes a prism to analyse the evolution of the EU International Society and its relation with Russia. Therefore, it will focus attention on those differences among EU Member States which threaten the consolidation of a common approach towards Russia. The after-effects of the East-West cleavage still prove to be powerful explanatory tools for detecting patterns of behaviour in the European and EUIS. Social differences stemming from the East-West cleavage still inform Member States’ positions towards Russia. They also impact over the EU’s international actorness insofar as they limit the feasibility of a possible action. In parallel, differences between the Member States appear to be more composite due to the complex interactions among Member States’ evolving interests and normative beliefs. This might also contribute to explain why the EU’s final decisions on the issue tend to reflect an intrinsic median position, regardless from the gravity of the Russian challenge.

The EUIS and the Russian Federation: exploring social differences among the EUIS members

The analysis presented here builds upon six main elements: the East-West cleavage weighted by religion, the strength of economic flows, energy dependence, preferences for projects of regional security, existence of disputes and preferences in projects of energy supply. This provisional list is by no means exhaustive of compelling social differences. Yet, this list constitutes a valid inventory of divisive elements.

Table 1 puts some norms stated in the Treaty of Lisbon in context; diverse perceptions and social differences among the Member States, and the derivative deadlocks which can impinge over the assumption of a common action. The table further introduces the variables adopted in the analysis. As it appears, there is no doubt that members of the EUIS do not diverge from such norms as national security, independence and integrity or safeguard of fundamental interests. These manifestations of the institutions of sovereignty and the market (Buzan 2004: 187) are widely shared among the EUIS members and in the whole International System.

The basis for deadlock in common action on behalf of the EUIS, therefore, descends from different interpretations of these norms and from different security and economic considerations among the members. This urges upon the need to identify highly divisive elements among the members of the EUIS. In this direction, the heritage of the past is still a heavy stigma for New Member States. The East-West cleavage does not recall merely geopolitical considerations, but marks the nexus between geographical and historical identity and perceptions of the outside world. The recent experience of satellisation of the former Soviet Union impacts negatively on CEE Member States’ visions of Russia, also in light of the “systematic policy of coercive bilateralism” (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 11) allegedly pursued by Russia. Following on from this, it is hypothesised that the East-West divide impacts the normative considerations of the EUIS members to a great extent. In the quantitative analysis here, it further substantiates the East-West dimension by taking into account the percentage of orthodox population in the Member States (see Appendix 3 for the ratio of orthodox population within the Member States). Religion traditionally played a rather relevant role in Member States’ identification with Russia. Many recent political developments, such as the formal/informal pattern of alliances in the Yugoslav wars, reflect the strong appeal of this historical linkage both among the public and at elite level.

If we analyse figures of energy dependence (see Appendix 2) and commercial shares (see Appendix 3) Member States’ different stake in relation to Russia becomes striking. In light of structural differences, many New Member States still perceive the absolute dependence
on the exchanges with Russia as a form of “dominance”, while Old MSs perceive the possibility to entertain solid economic relations with Russia as an important relative asset. Accordingly, our index was built in taking into account the intrinsic “bi-directionality” of these two measures.

New Member States tend to be much more reliant, if not totally dependent, on Russian trade. This seems to be the case for many EU’s Member States that confine with Russia. Baltic Member States score the highest rate of commercial exchanges with Russia. Eastern and Northern Member States (with the notable exception of Denmark) also score a very high rate of commercial exchanges. In relative terms, Old Member States present lower figures. This is also the case of those Member States that Russia considers as “strategic partners”, notably, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

The same can be said about dependence over natural gas supplies. We can distinguish between those that rely completely or nearly completely on Russian sources (such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) and those that do not draw at all on them (such as, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg and the UK). Belgium and the Netherlands score a comparatively low level of reliance on Russian sources, while the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia draw more significantly on Russian sources. Germany, Poland and Italy score relatively high level of dependence which, nonetheless, accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total gas imported. France and Romania also have a comparatively low rate of dependence. These figures contradict the commonsensical parlance according to which some big Member States are those that are submitted the most to the blackmail of a possible Russian cut in supply.

Attitudes towards Russia are likely to be worsened by the presence of significant disputes, whether territorial, diplomatic, commercial or of other kind. Particularly, Member States from CEE have been dramatically affected by Russian aggressiveness. In this respect, the Baltic states represent an epicentre of turmoil. The ongoing crisis between Estonia, Latvia and Russia over the issue of Russian minorities and the territorial disputes affecting the Lithuanian-Russian relationship over the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad all represent a serious cause for concern. Severe diplomatic disputes have been experienced also by some Old Member States, notably, in the case of UK.

In energy related matters, the EU collectively tried to elaborate alternative natural gas supply options to substantially differentiate natural gas supplies. The Nabucco natural gas pipeline represents an ambitious attempt in this direction. The Nabucco would have transported natural gas from the Caspian region and from the Middle East through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria and then further to the West European markets. Russia was opposed to the Nabucco project, and launched the South Stream project in 2007. The project, which has been seen as strongly rivalling Nabucco, planned to pump Russian gas to Europe, under the Black Sea, via Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia and Italy, with branches crossing Hungary and Austria. This proved to have had a tremendous divisive effect over the European support to the Nabucco project. In a short space of time, Gazprom, on behalf of the Russian government, proved to be able to reach an agreement over seals pipeline for the Southern Stream gas pipeline with Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. It can therefore be argued that the norm of “safeguarding fundamental interests” hold different meanings for different Member States.

Another potentially divisive issue is the accession of Georgia and Ukraine in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), a proposal that met the strong opposition of Russia. Many Member States, notably some of the “big” ones, such as Italy, France, Germany and Spain, but also, the Netherlands and Belgium, proved to be particularly keen not to hurt Russia’s sensitivity on this issue. During the NATO Summit in Bucharest, held in April 2008, the
accession had been delayed, in contrast to the will of the US in light of “Russia’s legitimate security concerns”. On the contrary, New Member States chorally recognised the need to build a security belt around Russia.

Table 1: A presentation of the variables included in the analysis in light of common norms and different perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms stated by the treaties</th>
<th>Diverse perceptions and social differences</th>
<th>Derivative deadlocks</th>
<th>Variables included in the analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeguarding national security</td>
<td>The presence of disputes in some EUIS render them more incline than other members to assume a sever stance towards Russia</td>
<td>Inability to set an adequate policy response</td>
<td>Presence of relevant disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy variable based on track record disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, independence and integrity (21.2)</td>
<td>Russia is accused to threaten territorial integrity of its neighbours. Member states do not share the same strategy on how to deal with territorial security in Europe.</td>
<td>Different voting behaviours of MSs both in the EU and NATO summits.</td>
<td>NATO’s enlargement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three scale variable, dividing those that favoured the accession of new candidates in NATO (0); those who preferred to counter or postpone their accession (1); and those EU members who are not NATO members, who did not express any particular position (0,5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental structures (4.2) and cultural diversity</td>
<td>New MSs tend to have a more negative approach towards Russia than older MSs. Common religious roots contribute to favour better relations for Old MSs and to a lesser extent for New MSs.</td>
<td>Cut across the policy spectrum</td>
<td>East/West weighted by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Four scale variable developed as follows: Western orthodox (1), Western non orthodox, Eastern orthodox and Eastern non orthodox (0).[^9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard of its fundamental interests (21.2(a))</td>
<td>Projects of energy independence depict different strategies in the pursuit of the EU’s fundamental interests.</td>
<td>Incapability to pursue independent projects in matters of energy independence.</td>
<td>Support for energy independence from Russian supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three scale basis variable ranging from 0 (support for Nabucco pipelines or opposition to the Northern Stream) to 1 (support for either the Southern Stream or the Northern Stream). A modality, ranging 0.5, takes into account those MSs that do not rely on Russian sources, thus, do not adopt any clear positions on this regard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^9]: In our case, it fits completely to this divided as Cyprus and Malta were excluded by the analysis due to the lack of data.
### Measuring Russia’s Snag on the Fabric of the EU’s International Society

#### Safeguard of its fundamental interests (21.2(a))

| The strength of economic relations affects differently EU’s MSs: it is positively related to a more friendly attitude for Old MSs, and is negatively related to a positive attitude for New MSs. | Inability to use instrument of economic coercion to sanction violations or export norms. | **Strength economic relationships**

The strength of economic ties has been measured as the share of trade with Russia weighted by the share of overall extra-EU commercial trade. Four scale variable, ranging from 0 (maximum of exchanges with Russia on behalf of a New Member State) to 1 (maximum of exchanges with Russia on behalf of an Old Member State).

| The level of energy dependence affects differently the MSs. We can distinguish between those who rely completely on Russian sources and those who do not draw at all on them. | Stalemate and inability to present a common stance toward Russia | **Level of energy dependence**

Measured as the share of energy imported by Russia and the overall gas imported. 4 scale variable: ranging from 0 (maximum of reliance on Russian gas on behalf of a New MSs) to 1 (maximum of reliance on Russian gas on behalf of an Old MSs).

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### The state of the art of the relations with Russia: a threat to the EUIS?

In order to systematically depict Member States’ attitudes, an index of friendliness toward Russia was built based on the variables described above. The index proves to be reliable, scoring a Cronbach’s Alpha of .683. The analysis depicted two main dimensions. These two dimensions cumulatively explain the differences in Member States’ positions for a total of 59.6 per cent.

The index has been developed according to the following formula:

\[
\text{IndexRus} = \left( \frac{\text{ind}1 + \text{ind}2 + \ldots + \text{ind}n}{n} \right)
\]

where \(\text{ind}n\) represents the score of each Member State on a given indicator of closeness towards Russia (ranging from 0 to 1) and \(n\) represents the number of indicators included. The final measure (IndRus) orders MS’ attitudes from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the lowest and 1 the highest rate of normative proneness towards Russia (see Table 2). In other words, the final measure represents each MS’ average score, calculated on the basis of the six indicators included in the index (see Table 1). All the six dimensions are operationalised according to a scale ranging from 0 to 1, therefore all weight the same in the definition of the final score, and no normative assessment has been conducted in order to develop an artificial – and possibly fallacious – ranking. On the basis of Member States’ score four categories where developed: “normative adamants” (ranging from 0 to 0.25), “normative intransigent” (from 0.26 to 0.50), “normative malleable” (from 0.51 to 0.75) and the “normative docile” (from 0.76 to 1).
Table 2: An index of friendliness towards Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Normative Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>normative adamants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>normative intransigents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>normative malleable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>normative docile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results seem to validate the hypothesis that the East-West divide concurs consistently in explaining differences in Member States’ behaviours. The hypothesis of a bi-directional relation of measures of commercial exchanges and energy dependence seems also to be largely validated. Hence, MS’ position along the index appears to reliably portray the current state of the EU’s Member States-Russian relations.
The normative adamants

According to the results here, the most adamant Member States towards Russia come from CEE. This group of countries – composed homogeneously by Eastern Member States – has been labelled as “normative adamants”. In spite of the fact that Schimmelfennig reports the CEECs’ claim for a “return to Europe” (2000) following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, homogeneity seems still far to come in this respect. Thus, the East-West divide proves to be a powerful analytical prism. With the possible exception of Slovakia, all the countries in the group have been hit by Moscow’s unilateral coercive politics. Overall, security concerns upset this group of countries, which tends to assume Atlanticist positions when dealing with their security strategy.

As highly predictable, the Baltic States, namely Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, score the maximum level of intransigence towards Russia. The question related to the treatment of the Russian minorities in the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, can be regarded as a main source of conflict between these states and Russia, exacerbated in the cases of Estonia and Lithuania by other disputes. Compared to the other Baltic neighbours, Latvian government recently attempted to improve its bilateral ties with Moscow.10 Poland and Czech Republic can be regarded as holding similarly inflexible attitudes towards Russia. Like Lithuania, Poland has actively promoted a harder line towards Moscow at the EU level. The two countries experienced serious unilateral commercial blockages on behalf of Moscow. The antimissile shield stands at the core of the diplomatic stalemate between Moscow, Warsaw and Prague. Slovakia seems to hold a comparatively softer approach towards Russia, as reflected by its borderline position in the category. It did not register any particular conflict with Russia and tended to have a more acquiescent attitude in dealing with the Russian dossier (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 38).

The normative intransigents

The group of the “normative intransigents” contains an interesting group of countries. On the one side, appear four CEE countries, which progressively “unfroze” their relationships with Russia. On the other, four Western European countries come into sight, characterised by a low level of economic exchanges and total energy independence from Russia.

The UK is the more hostile country among the biggest Old Member States. Its commercial exchanges rate with Moscow as one of the lowest among the Member States. Moreover, it is totally independent from Russian natural gas resources. In this regard, London marks its “insularity” vis-à-vis the other big Member States, in confirming the special character and autonomy of its foreign policy. Several diplomatic accidents and vocal criticisms marked the British position towards Moscow, such as the Zakaev extradition case in 2003 and the assassination of Litvinenko in 2006. Moreover, the UK did not spare its severe criticism in denouncing Russian violations of human rights.

Sweden scores a relatively high rate of commercial exchanges, as is the case of Bulgaria, but total independence over Russian natural gas resources, a condition that makes it closer to those of the UK and Portugal. Stockholm’s reaction to Northern Streamline Project has been lukewarm and marked by concerns over the ecological feasibility of the project. Although Sweden is not a member of NATO the recent turmoil in Abkhazia and South Ossetia urged several cabinet members in Sweden, as well as in Finland, to speed up

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discussions on their membership in the Alliance.\textsuperscript{11} This is coupled with Swedish tendency to raise its criticisms about the evolution of Russian politics. Within the group, Portugal seems to be a Member State which has a lesser interest in the Russian dossier as it does not have significant commercial exchanges and draws entirely upon different natural gas sources. This position is coupled with its indifference over the Nabucco/Southern Streamline quarrel. As their Eastern neighbours, Bulgaria and Romania are tied to Russia by nearly total natural gas dependence and by strong commercial rates, while Slovenia, even if consistently dependent over Russian energy supplies, proves to be far less dependent over commercial rates. These CEE states, compared to their Eastern neighbours, seem to have undertaken a more positive path in their relationship with Russia. In particular, in the case of Bulgaria, this seems related to the strategic weight of the South Streamline Project.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The normative malleable}

This category represents the most heterogeneous group in the index presented here. This may be due to different reasons. Among others, it represents the modal category of the index. Thus, this specific measure of central tendency might be more subject to internal inconsistency.

Analogously to Bulgaria, Hungary was also included in the Southern Streamline Project. In March 2009, the Hungarian energy company MOL and Russia’s energy giant Gazprom signed an agreement to build the Hungarian section of the South Stream gas pipeline. Hungary’s rate of energy dependence is high, as well as rates of commercial exchanges. Since the signing of the Treaty on 6 December 1991, inter-state relations between Russia and Hungary are told to be of “a new type based on the equality of the parties, mutual interests and benefits, free of ideology”.\textsuperscript{13} Following on from this, Hungarians seem to be orientated to pushing their “business interests above political goals” (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 2). The most outstanding outlier in the group is Denmark. Denmark does not have particularly strong commercial ties with Russia and score a total independence from Russian natural gas supplies. However, Denmark can be regarded as the first MS that had experienced severe bilateral disputes since Putin’s Presidency (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 46). States such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg can be considered as small Member States, with a weak foreign policy agenda and with a lower stake in relation to Russia. This group of states scores a very low level of commercial rates with Russia and presents a low reliance on Russian natural gas sources. With the exception of the Netherlands, they have generally not been involved in disputes with Russia. These Member States favoured the postponement of the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO. Traditionally, these states tend to assume a rigid stance in human rights matters, though the leverage of the Eastern giant may bring them about assuming an acquiescent behaviour.\textsuperscript{14}

\footnotesize


\textsuperscript{12} Bulgaria proved its will to strengthen relations with Moscow. Bulgaria, which was initially included in the Nabucco project, did not hesitate to change its position, by assuming actively a more acquiescent position towards Russia, by signing agreements for the realization of the Southern Streamline.


\textsuperscript{14} Benelux and Ireland do not assume the same stance towards Russia. The Netherlands and Ireland are told to assume a colder posture, while Luxembourg and Belgium a more friendly one, due to criticisms and occasional disputes in the case of the former, and of higher economic stake in the case of the latter (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 36-43).
Within the group, France, Spain and Germany can be regarded as important foreign policy players with a precise strategy vis-à-vis Moscow. Spain stands in a slightly different position from France and Germany. It is completely independent from Russian natural gas supplies and does not regard Russia as a relevant asset for its international trade balance. Even if Spain did not take part to the Nabucco/Southern Streamline quarrel, it often voiced the claim for a major EU’s energy independence. It can be supposed that the need to maintain good relations with Russia brings it about being more acquiescent. Like Germany, Spain advocated the postponement of the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, in order not to irritate Moscow.

The activism of the EU French Presidency in the Russian-Georgian crisis proves the importance that France has historically attached to its relations with Moscow. France does not enjoy comparatively relevant commercial exchanges with Russia, and its rate of dependence on Russian natural gas sources is lower than the European average. In spite of this, France took a pro-Southern Streamline position in the European pipelines “dispute” and often boasted its preferential channels of communication with Moscow. The reciprocal relevance is more political than economic and is grounded on the partners’ will to increase their international leverage. Recently, Russia and France assumed similar positions at the international level, notably in the case of Iraq. France voiced clearly and firmly not to favour Georgia and Ukraine’s Atlanticist ambitions in overtly diverging with the approach of the US.

Among the big members, Germany is the one that scores the highest rates of commercial exchanges and natural gas dependence. Germany is the Western Member State with the strongest economic ties with Russia. Its Ostpolitik tradition has brought it about having a balanced and often acquiescent position towards Russia. Angela Merkel adopted a colder posture than her predecessor, in nonetheless recognising the importance of the dialogue with Russia in all issues. Angela Merkel, therefore, emphasised the importance “to talk to rather than against” each other, also in delicate questions, such as the antimissile shield and the enlargement of NATO. Italy scores a relatively high rate of economic exchanges, and relies consistently on Russian natural gas supplies. Even with a different emphasis, all Italian governments, regardless of their political colour, tended to stress the importance of economic ties with Russia. Italy proved to be particularly active in contrasting the Nabucco Pipelines Project. On several occasions, Berlusconi emphasised the friendly character of his relationship with Putin. Italy proved to be a loyal ally for Russia, even if its loyalty in certain cases resulted obscured by its solid Atlanticist commitment. This was the case for the antimissile shield issue when, even if in an unclear way, Italy supported the US’ position. In this regard, its position towards Russia may suffer from its medium foreign policy leverage (Santoro 1991).

Austria scores a comparatively low rate of economic exchanges with Russia, but has a consistent energy dependence on the Eastern giant. As mentioned above, it signed agreements for inclusion in the Southern Streamline Pipelines. It is not involved in any direct dispute with Russia and tends to maintain overall good relations with Moscow. Even with a low leverage, Austria proved on several occasions its keenness to defend Russian interests within the EU (Leonard and Popescu 2007: 37). The last Member State in our group, Finland, proves to be remarkably careful to keep good relations with Moscow. It enjoys a comparatively high rate of commercial exchanges and a total dependence on Russian energy supplies. The leverage of Finn-Russian relations improved to the extent of approximating the replacement of Germany as Russia’s biggest trading partner, also on the basis of the fact that “a quarter of all Russian imports transit through Finland” (Leonard

Historically, Finland has tried to have good-neighbourly relations with Russia, and to be able to pursue its own soft security agenda, in order to maintain a peaceful path in its relations with Russia.\footnote{Finland launched the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) in 1997, which later has been included on the agenda of the Luxembourg Summit and became an official EU policy. In this regard, in spite of its small dimension, Finland proved its ability to pursuing actively its goals, in order to influence the EU’s agenda, even if the ability to influence further implementation of its goals is far beyond its scope of action (Arter 2000: 695).}

**The normative docile**

The last ideal-type, Greece\footnote{On the specificity of Greece’s foreign policy in this regard, see Pace 2004: 227-38.}, embodies a state which only scores 0.89 on the scale. As mentioned, Greece boasts solid cultural, historical and even religious ties with Russia. Its rate of energy dependence proves to be high, even if rates of commercial exchanges are not among the highest. Greece concluded agreements on energy supply with Russia and proved to oppose staunchly the Nabucco Pipeline Project. Greece has never faced diplomatic or commercial harassment by Russia, and has been rewarded by being included in the Southern Streamline trajectory. The low leverage of Greece \textit{vis-à-vis} other EU’s Member States presumably dimensions its ability to threaten the EU’s cohesion. Notwithstanding, Greece proved to be a solid ally for Russia.

From this insight in the index, the first preliminary conclusions can be drawn. The more New Member States are dependent on Russia, the more they adopt a critical attitude. The CEE Member States that boast a major independence or are undertaking agreements with Russia on future pipelines, tend to have a relatively milder position. Those Old MSs that hold a comparatively low dependence over Russian energetic supplies and commercial exchanges tend to assume a colder posture. Whether this posture is translated into open criticisms presumably depends also on the leverage of their foreign policy and on the stake of their relation with Russia. Proceeding along this continuum, we find those Old Member States that have a comparatively high dependence over Russian supplies and strong economic ties, which, thus, assume the most acquiescent attitude towards Russia.

**Measuring MEPs’ sensitiveness to national preferences towards Russia**

The analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour highlights whether MEPs’ positions mirror the same cleavages emerged from the analysis of the MSs. Exploring whether cleavages affecting the Member States are also reverberated at the EP level offers an interesting contribution to our analysis. If it is assumed that social variables included in the index presented here are representative of an enduring cleavage, it can be argued that – when a nationally-sensitive issue is at stake – there might be coincidence along national lines between the MSs and their respective MEPs. This analysis also seems particularly relevant, considering that many scholars tend to claim an increasing normalisation of the EP, thereby abandoning the temptation of following national positions (Hix 2001; Kreppel and Hix 2003).

The votes included in the analysis were held between December 2004 and July 2008.\footnote{The minutes of the votes are available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/pv.do?language=EN.} In order to assess MEPs’ sensitiveness to national preferences, that is, the weight of MS’ preferences in an ideologically-oriented transnational environment, in the empirical analysis it is considered that only the cases characterised by opposite majorities of MEPs at national delegation and group level. Therefore, only those votes marked by conflicting
positions between national party and European leadership are included\textsuperscript{19}, assuming the national leadership to issue clear voting instructions to the affiliated MEPs, possibly reflecting MS’ “hopes and fears” towards Russia. This further step seems to guarantee both the “national saliency” of the votes included and a clearer identification of the voting preferences of the European parliamentary group (EPG) and the affiliated national party delegation (NPD).

Two different measures were developed. The first one used to calculate and compare the levels of nationally-conformist defections at national delegation\textsuperscript{20} level is called absolute defection rate (ADR). ADR represents the average proportion of nationally-oriented votes for each national delegation of MEPs.\textsuperscript{21} In order to compare the share of nationally-conformist votes among the 25 national delegations the relative defection rate (RDR) has been developed. RDR can be obtained by dividing the ADR of each national delegation by the EP average ratio of nationally-oriented defections. The RDR value will be higher than one if a single delegation defects more than the EP average share of nationally-oriented defections and will be lower than one if it does not. The main advantage of using RDR is to relatively assess the differences in the levels of defection among the delegations, thereby making them statistically comparable.

\textit{An analysis of the RCV concerning Russia: national or ideological orientations?}

This analysis tested the impact of the cleavages identified at the Member States’ level, both in terms of polarisation and in terms of intensity. Therefore, it is hypothesised that, even under different circumstances, both the most fervent supporters and opponents of Russia are likely to feel uncomfortable with the final outcome of the vote, given the generally assumed median nature of the parliamentary compromise based generally on oversized coalitions of mainstream parties\textsuperscript{22} (Kreppel 2004). As a consequence, stronger nationally-oriented pressures might be expected on the MEPs originating from those EUIS national contexts in which the impact of the cleavages is stronger. In this case, those characterised by above-the-average levels of opposition or support towards Russia (i.e. normative adamants or normative docile), which are more likely to be dissatisfied with the agreed, generally mild, position.

This section will test the proposed hypothesis by comparing MEPs’ defection rates in the 18 votes with their stance towards Russia (Member States’ index score), thereby looking at the persistence of the cleavages identified in the previous sections as a consequence of different perceptions and understanding of the norms by the EUIS Member States.

The first part of this section will look at the ADR values displayed by the 25 national delegations analysed, while in the second part we will comparatively assess the existence of a relationship between Member states’ degree of friendliness towards Russia and the voting behaviour of their MEPs.

\textsuperscript{19} The analysis specifically refers to those cases in which the modal vote of the majority of the European group differs from the modal vote of the majority of its affiliated national party delegation.

\textsuperscript{20} In this paper, the term National party delegation (NPD) refers to a group of MEPs elected under the label of the same national party, whereas the term National delegation (ND) includes all the MEPs of a Member state, regardless of their partisan affiliation at national and EP level. The NPD operates with the framework of an intra-group dimension, while the latter cross cuts the ideological divisions.

\textsuperscript{21} The ADR has been built through a multiple-step data refinement process. First, the modal voting option of each EPG and of each affiliated NPD has been identified for every single RCV included in the analysis. Second, the share of nationally-oriented votes has been identified for each NPD. Third, the measure for the 25 national delegations has been calculated by combining together the results of the NPDs belonging to the same Member State.

\textsuperscript{22} In the 6\textsuperscript{th} EP, a winning majority involved 86.1 per cent the EPP-ED, 86.8 per cent ALDE, and 81.2 per cent PES (source: votewatch.eu).
Figure 1 summarises the results of the first analytical step. If we look at MS’ ADR values – when Russia is at stake - a high level of variance among the 25 can be appreciated, which can be hypothesised as an indicator of the strength of the social and cultural cleavages. The average level of defections at EP level equals 6.04 per cent. By far, the Czech MEPs represent those who tend defect more often from their respective parliamentary group on the Russian dossier (18.80 per cent), followed by the Latvian (15.30 per cent), by the Estonian (14.30 per cent), and by the Polish MEPs (14.10 per cent). On the other hand, the Bulgarian MEPs emerge as the most conformist as they defect only 0.3 per cent of the times. Similarly, two other delegations present an ADR value below two per cent, namely the Austrian and the Spanish ones. In line with the initial prepositions presented here, all “normative adamants” emerge as the least conformist. The exceptional nature of the Russian dossier is confirmed by an additional discrepancy which emerges when comparing MS’ ADR including all the votes held between 2004 and 2009 and ADR values calculated on the basis of the votes on Russia. Czech ADR is three per cent higher when Russia is at stake, Latvia’s score is five per cent higher, Estonia’s is ten per cent higher, and Poland’s is four per cent higher.

The Scandinavian countries appear also keener to defect. Sweden, Finland and Denmark’s ADR score relatively higher than those of other Western MSs. It can be assumed that, given their geopolitical proximity, relations with Russia are perceived as a matter of greater national concern (i.e. higher intensity of the cleavage). Beyond the four CEE delegations and the Scandinavian group, the ADR value of most of the national delegations (18 out of 25) tends to score lower than ten per cent. It is worth noting that all the EU heavy-weights fall in the low-defecting side and that their mainstream national party delegations are therefore likely to be part of a winning majority, in the light of their ability to affect the pre-legislative policy-shaping processes at EPG level.

In the most conformist national delegations the MEPs do not seem to disagree frequently from their respective groups. Given the relevance of the Russian dossier it can be confidently assumed that national parties do care, but that they simply tend to agree most of the times with the policy position sponsored by the head of the group. Consistently, Faas maintains that “if national parties become involved in the process of voting in the EP […] MEPs from national delegations are likely to defect in cases of conflict. In these cases, the [European] party group leadership cannot do anything but accept it” (2003: 847).
In the light of previous discussion, it can be supposed that national delegations tend to defect more in the policy-areas considered as matters of primary national concern; a dimension that – keeping the ideological characterisation of the delegation constant – varies according to the existence, intensity, and polarization of a given cleavage.

**Figure 2: Relationship between MEPs’ relative defection rate and MS’ index score**

Figure 2 summarises the results of the second analysis performed. National delegations’ RDR scores allow statistically consistent inter-delegation comparisons. In the horizontal dimension of the figure, MS’ position along the anti/pro-Russia continuum, as defined by this index, are located. The vertical dimension reflects national delegations’ voting behaviour (RDR score). The point of convergence of the two measures defines MS’ position on the bi-dimensional space.

Three national clusters clearly emerge from the observation of the plot, which seem consistent with the hypothesised link between Member States’ positions as the result of social and cultural cleavages at EUIS level and representatives’ voting behaviour. On the left upper side of the bi-dimensional space a group composed by our four “normative adamant” CEE countries characterised by both the lowest levels of warmness towards Russia and the highest level of defections in the EP can be identified. The high RDR scores yielded by these countries indicate national leaderships’ uneasiness with the voting positions adopted by the respective EPGs, supposedly perceived as too moderate. These findings confirm that not only the foreign policies of the four “normative adamant” CEE
countries depict Russia as a “normative other” (Carta 2008; Kaempf 2010) – as emerged from the index – but also their MEPs tend to reflect this intransigent approach.

Not all the “normative adamant” seem to completely fit the hypothesised pattern. Although Lithuania and Slovakia emerge as integral part of the anti-Russian front, their dramatically low score in the index (0 and 0.25) is rather matched with a relatively low level of defection rate at EP level (respectively, 7.6 per cent and 6.3 per cent).

In the specific case of Lithuania this seems to be primarily determined by specific inter-parliamentary factors and by the political distribution of the Lithuanian MEPs: the majority of the Lithuanian parliamentarians (7 out of 13) belong to the Labour party (Lithuanian: Darbo Partija), whose leader is the Russian-born millionaire Viktor Uspaskich. In the mid-1990s, Uspaskich quickly gained tremendous success in his business empire that now includes – among others – the importation of natural gas from Gazprom, in addition to flourishing enterprises in the food production and animal fodder industries. These factors seem to explain the more moderate (and mainstream) stance towards Russia of most of the Lithuanian MEPs. This state of things is likely to change following the debacle of the Labour party in the 2009 EP elections and the victory of the centre-right Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, more critical towards Moscow.

On the other hand, the more moderate behaviour of the Slovak delegation might well be explained by its borderline position within the anti-Russian group. Slovakia presents the highest score in the index among the hardliners (0.25). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Slovakia (unlike all the other members of the group) did not experience any relevant diplomatic or commercial conflict with Russia.

In the central-lower section of the figure a cluster of countries characterised by the lowest degree of defection and a more balanced and median position in the anti-/pro-Russia continuum can be identified. This cluster embraces by large the countries belonging to the two median groups defined by our index: the “normative intransigent” and the “normative malleable”. The Member States in this cluster are characterised by a low RDR score. Four of the EU’s heavyweights fall in this second cluster; in other words the majority of their MEPs seem to adopt a more pro-Russia stance. Three of them Spain, France and Germany perfectly fit the hypothesised pattern (milder stance towards Russia and low RDR). In contrast, the UK seems to emerge as an exception as its relations with Russia are generally marked by a more conflicting stance (UK scores 0.48 in the index) even if the RDR of the British MEPs (0.38) appears in line with the average of the cluster. This result seems, therefore, to denote either an imperfect link between British elites’ concerns and MEPs’ voting behaviour or a more pragmatic approach adopted by the British delegation when it comes to the vote in the plenary. In the second scenario, although generally more critical towards Moscow, a majority of the British delegation prefers to chose “voice”, rather than “exit”, thereby supporting the median-mainstream position and avoiding the risk of isolation.

In general the presence of all the major EU MSs in the least defecting group seems to confirm the possibility of significant policy-shaping power in the pre-legislative phase of the intra-group bargaining. It is worth noting that the “mainstream” position adopted by the EP is more likely to be “median” rather than “extreme” (openly, anti- or pro-Russia) as it

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24 For further details on the 2009 EP elections in Lithuania see Braghiroli 2010.
25 Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark represent relevant exceptions as their defections on the Russian dossier appear to be more frequent than the average of the group. Significantly, we discovered that both Denmark and Sweden (the latter included among the “vigilant critics”) are marked by a more critical approach towards Moscow, especially in those votes related to human rights.
must involve most of the MSs in this median cluster (characterised by a moderate stance towards Moscow) to get a majority in the Parliament. On the other hand, as French, German, Spanish and British MEPs (along with the Italians), constitute more than half of the membership of the three major mainstream parties, those national delegations are necessary to get a winning majority and therefore have to be part of it.

Among the most conformist cases several CEE countries are identified whose foreign policy seems to be characterised by a more cautious approach towards Russia such as Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and the small Benelux states, characterised by weaker foreign policy agenda and lower stake in relation to Russia.

A final cluster can be identified in the left side of the figure including the “normative docile”, namely Greece, along with Finland and Italy (the only Russia’s strategic partner in the group). According to the index here, these appear characterised by an evident pro-Russia stance at EU level (i.e. the impact of the cleavages appears strong and positively oriented). The levels of nationally-oriented defections appear higher than that displayed by the median-mainstream group, but lower than that of the anti-Russia hawks. The RDR score of the three delegations equals respectively 1.31; 1.45, and 1.25, moderately above the average level of defection.

This is possibly due to the fact that the agreed compromise appears to the elites of the three Member States more acceptable than to the anti-Russia hawks, although not totally appropriate. For this reason they appear on average more likely to defect in comparison to the second cluster, but most of their MEPs are part of a winning majority more often than those of the anti-Russian pole. From this perspective, when it comes to Russia, both MS’ preferences and MEPs’ voting behaviour seem to confirm that, albeit common norms do exist, these norms are subject to different and, at time conflicting, individual interpretations (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986)

The cubic fit line in the plot tells the same story described above. If we move from opposition to normative proneness towards Russia in the horizontal dimension of the bi-dimensional figure, we assess a gradual decrease in the national delegations’ defection rate whose lowest level is touched by the states sponsoring a median position towards Russia. It can be confidently assumed that those national delegations feel sufficiently comfortable with the stance of their respective EPG and this reduces their need to defect. When the pro-Russia pole of the horizontal continuum is approached, a new (even if more moderate) increase is registered in national delegations’ defection rate, signalling growing concern with the agreed policy position at EP level. In this respect, the impact of the cleavages seems stronger at the antipodal extremes.

**Conclusion: condemned to be divided?**

This article posited that the EU is an IS, grounded on common interests and values. Commonalities among the EUIS’ members have been laid down and locked up in an unprecedented way into a highly sophisticated institutional and legal system. This system assigns to the Member States the centrality to decide which basic norms are to be considered constitutive of the EUIS. Once agreed upon, these norms are told to forge external action.

Instead of focusing the attention on those elements which touch upon commonalities it highlighted highly troubling factors of the EUIS’ relations with Russia. These factors seem to originate massively from a cleavage that in the past affected the IS on a global scale: the

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26 The trajectory of the change is plotted as a cubic fit line with 95 per cent individual confidence intervals.
East-West cleavage. Both psychological and material elements, coupled with the persistence of intrusive policies on behalf of Russia contribute to the resilience of the East-West divide.

The analysis here explored adherence to norms which derive from the widely accepted institutions of sovereignty and the market. While there is no doubt that these institutions boast complete devotion on behalf of EUIS’ members, translation into both common language and action proves to be hindered by social differences among members. This difference massively reveals the differential meanings that these norms assume in dealing with the Russian dossier.

The strong normative vocabulary that the Member States have in common, therefore, does not prevent the EUIS to sail across troubled waters when it is time to act. Norms matters, but their translation into action reposes on conditions consistently determined by social differences among members. The same norm is dissected by relevant social factors, which, consistently, explain the interpretation of “what ought to be done”.

In building this index, the complexity of economic measures is depicted by hypothesising a bi-directionality of their causal effects. The strength of commercial figures or dependence over Russian natural gas supplies seems to mean different things for the Old and New MSs. This affects their preferences and behaviours in a different way. Therefore, intense exchanges with Russia means in practice different things for Old and New Member States.

This is confirmed by the Member States’ different attitudes towards preferences over projects of regional stability. In general, New Member States tend to adopt a more rigid stance, while Old MSs tend to be more acquiescent. This does not prevent Old Member States to assume a more intransigent posture towards these issues.

By combining indicators of economic flows, energy dependence, preferences for projects of regional security, existence of disputes and projects of energy supply, four ideal-typical reactions to Russia are found: the “normative adamants”, the “normative intransigents”, the “normative malleable” and the “normative docile”. Above all for the “adamants”, a rigid interpretation of norms descends by their troubled history of subjugation from Russia. Both “normative adamants” and “normative docile” will generally tend to be the most discontent of the final outcome of the EU’s decisional process. The two median ideal-types comprise a more heterogeneous group of MSs, which is arguably driven by different kinds of rationale.

As our four ideal-types show, Old and New Member States, however, do not constitute homogeneous blocks. On the contrary, our results show a more nuanced picture. Among the “intransigents”, two major approaches can be depicted. On the one hand, there are Member States, mostly coming from the Old Member States that are less tied to Russia. These Member States may be more incline to assume a rigid stance. On the other, there are New Member States that undertake a softer approach compared to the neighbours, due, for instance, to the strategic importance of projects of energy supply.

Analogously, among the “malleable”, there are those Member States that have a major interest in keeping good relations with Russia. They will be inclined to pursue friendly policies at the EU levels, even if this does not necessary prevent them to raise their voice. On the other, there are Member States that do not have a major commercial or energetic stake in relation to Russia. These, mostly small, Member States may tend to follow the median outcome of the EU’s policy making towards Russia.
This article has focussed on factors which stem from the East-West cleavage. Yet, the methodology here could apply to detect other relevant differences. An indicator to depict Member States’ attitudes towards human rights violations, to our advice, might expand the scope of this analysis. This analysis also proves to be a solid basis to explore normative clusters within the Council. The analysis, indeed, focused on members of the EUIS, rather than on the EUIS itself. This analysis can, therefore, be expanded and related to the process of norm- and policy-making within the EUIS.

As predicted, looking at the voting dynamics in the EP allowed us to roughly assess MS’ relative weight in what can be seen as the gradual definition of an EU strategy towards Russia. What emerges is that the MSs located in the media categories of the index of friendliness have in general more chances to successfully see their preferences mirrored in the EU agenda. In particular, the analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour seems to confirm two relevant elements. The cleavages which affect the Member States also trouble the MEPs. Consistently, several national delegations emerge as more likely to defect than others. In the case of the national delegations belonging to the two antipodal categories (“normative adamants” and the “normative docile”), MEPs are more likely to vote “nationally”, that is, to defect from their respective EPG.

These differences have emerged in the process of crossing national delegations’ respective RDR and Member States’ index score in the bi-dimensional scatter plot. The analysis of the results revealed the existence of three clusters marked by distinctive behavioural styles. The first cluster, mainly consisting of the “normative adamants”, is characterised by low levels of warmness towards Russia and by high levels of defections at EP level. The delegations belonging to the second cluster (comprising the two median categories of the index) seem rather characterised by a milder stance towards Russia and by the lowest levels of parliamentary defections. The third cluster, consisting of Russia’s best friends, is marked by a relevant increase in the RDR score, nonetheless lower than that displayed by the first group. These results bring us to an interesting consideration. Assuming that national delegations’ RDR increases if they feel uncomfortable with their respective EPGs’ position, it seems that EP median position leans towards the pro-Russia pole, given the higher level of discontent among the anti-Russian cohorts.

In conclusion, the analysis of cleavages and social differences seems to be a promising stream of study in order to depict living dynamics of a given International Society. In the case of the EUIS, divisive elements seem to be highly predicting factors of the margin of ability to translate common norms into action.

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References


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Appendices

Appendix 1: Member states with relevant orthodox penetration

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<th>Other Christians</th>
<th>Other religions / Non believers</th>
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Appendix 2: Dependence on Russian natural gas supplies

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Note: The figures are expressed in billion cubic meters; if not explicitly stated otherwise data refer to 2008; asterisk (*) denotes countries whose data refer to 2005.


Appendix 3: Russian share in the extra EU overall trade balance

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Export towards Russia</th>
<th>Import from Russia</th>
<th>Total Import/Export</th>
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Book Review

Oksana Bukiy (2010)

*Russian Gas Policy and the EU’s Energy Security*

Saarbrücken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing

Tomas Maltby
*University of Manchester*

In light of major gas supply disruptions of Russian gas imports to Europe in 2006 and 2009, and the subsequent rise of energy security to a become a more general security priority for the EU, this addition to the literature on EU-Russia energy relations is an extended (80 page-long) policy paper, based on data to early 2009. Arguing that a more depoliticised and economically rational energy relationship between the EU and Russia would be of benefit to both, mutually dependent, partners, the work analyses the key factors that influence the Russian energy security strategy, including a focus on the 2003 Russian energy security strategy. In exploring the actions of the Russian state, and the state controlled Gazprom (who have a monopoly on gas exports) this work highlights and explains the acute need for investment in the economically derived energy strategies, evaluating alliances with transit states, gas suppliers in the Former Soviet Union, and also analyses the Russian gas industry infrastructure and lack of investment that is a possible threat to supply security in the long term. The work then looks at the obstacles for closer cooperation between Russia and the EU, and plans by both sides to increase security of demand and security of supply respectively.

This is a useful collation of data to 2008, with an attempt to balance EU interests in the field of energy with those of Russia, a useful and explicit rejoinder to the overpoliticisation of EU-Russia energy relations, and increase in the perception of Russia as a problematic partner, with repercussions for EU energy and broader security. The work demonstrates the importance for both parties of the energy trade relationship – whilst recent work has often highlighted, in the aftermath of the 2006 gas supply disruptions – the vulnerability of the EU in this relationship, Russia is also dependent on the EU. Though lacking in depth, this extended essay provides a useful additional accompaniment to a field that includes important and authoritative work by Youngs in2009 (Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge) and Aalto’s 2008 edited publication (The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue); focusing on an attempt to examine both EU energy security policy towards Russia, and vice versa.

The author provides a useful perspective and background and explanation of factors that influence Russian energy strategy, that includes, but also moves to a more nuanced explanation than a simple Russian coercion to achieve geopolitical objectives through the state dominated monopoly of Gazprom by focusing on the economic / market principle
motivations for gas price rises of neighbouring (FSU) states, and the supply disruptions that have resulted after thirty years of reliable energy relations between the EU and Russia.

Whilst the author notes the importance of the problem of mutual suspicion that exists along with the mutual dependency of the EU and Russia in energy relations; this is exacerbated by the diversity of interests of the plethora of actors within the EU. Commission DGs have objectives that are rarely coherent, and the same is true for actors with competency for national and energy security in Russia. The Russian data is heavily reliant on the 2003 Energy Security Strategy to 2030, and this could have been supplemented by additional Russian government reports (and in an update, the 2009 National Security Strategy). The work could have been further strengthened with additional reference to primary Russian and EU documents, to provide a more nuanced analysis of the interests and actions of relevant parties, as insufficient use is made throughout of the extensive collection of primary documents available from the EU. For EU gas imports (on which this work focuses) a 2003 source is used, that claims that 70% of EU gas imports came from Russia in 2000, though other Eurostat sources put this figure at closer to 40% in 2000 (and 32% in 2008 rather than the 50% by 2010 cited here). This is an important discrepancy, though the EU trend for increasing gas imports leaves Russia as a major player in gas consumption, cancelling out the decreasing market share for Russia of gas imports. Another oversight relates to the second Yamal-Europe pipeline to bring additional Russian gas to Europe through Poland, and the failure to note that this was cancelled in 2007 and the initiative has not been restarted.

This book analyses the state of the energy market, though despite being published in 2010, this work would benefit from an update to include important developments at the end of the decade, including: Progress on Nord Stream and the Southern gas Corridor; The effects of the Commission’s 2008 Energy security focused ‘Second Strategic Energy Review’; developments as a result of the Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 (2009); the implications of the withdrawal of Russia from the market rules based Energy Charter Treaty (2009), and the EU’s third energy package (2009), and Energy 2020 strategy (2010). With reference to the utility for research is the occasional lack of full bibliographic detail for primary sources (newspaper articles and additional materials), the lack of an index, and other issues that editorial oversight would have helped to ameliorate. Though not an essential or unique contribution to the literature, this piece provides a useful summary and analysis of existing secondary literature, and limited primary data that could be further enhanced by far wider reference to primary sources and recent developments in the field of EU-Russia energy security. In focussing on the motivations and preferences of both the EU and Russia, the work effectively highlights the importance of existing and future interdependency in energy trade, and the necessity of moving towards a less politicised relationship that incorporates a mutually acceptable legal framework for energy trade that recognises the economic and security concerns of Russia, the EU and individual member states. Russia has withdrawn from the Energy Charter Treaty, and the current challenge for the EU and Russia is to reach such an agreement that be included in the broader New Framework Agreement between the two parties.

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Book Review

Hiski Haukkala (2010)

*The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-sovereignty in International Relations*

London: Routledge

Anna Visvizi

*DEREE – The American College of Greece*

Although the EU-Russia relationship seems to have entered a new phase framed by the Partnership for Modernisation, the nature of this relationship remains puzzling. The monograph by Hiski Haukkala, focusing on the interrelationship between ideas, power and institutions underpinning the EU-Russia relationship, constitutes in this context a timely contribution to the topic. The author of the publication makes an effort to examine the nature of this relationship in a methodologically most challenging manner consistent with developing a theoretical framework and applying it to a policy-analytical approach. The objective of the book is to examine “Why, despite the initial promise and enthusiasm, has the actual process of EU-Russia interaction proved to be so problematic and failed to meet the parties’ expectations?” (p 3).

The monograph consists of ten chapters. Following an introduction (Chapter 1), the next three chapters set the meta-theoretical foundation, the theoretical framework and the method of the ensuing discussion. Chapters five through nine engage with the evolution of the EU-Russia relationship by thoroughly examining the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the Second Chechen War, the Four Common Spaces, and the Northern Dimension (ND) of EU policies. Conclusion follows.

The strength of the book consists in its theoretical contribution (Chapters 2 and 3). IR-theorizing is a challenging domain where contributions to well-established arguments are not easily accepted requiring a very carefully selected set of arguments to grant them a niche among the discipline’s paradigms. Haukkala’s critical introduction to the possibility of, as he terms it, theoretical complementarity in IR lays the meta-theoretical justification for the ensuing theoretical move in which (liberal) institutionalist theorizing and thin Wendtian constructivism are nested into the English School framework. In other words, the English School emphasis on the primary institutions is complemented with a theory that deals with procedural institutions, i.e. with liberal institutionalism. As a result of this marriage, the normative component is brought to the fore, and the role of culture in shaping the worldviews of the actors involved is acknowledged. The discussion on meta-theory will be particularly interesting to anybody who dwells on the question of the disciplining boundaries of the discipline of IR, and has an inclination toward critical (scientific) realism. Well written and to the point, Chapter 2 with an obvious ease and grace communicates the not-so-easy matters of the philosophy of science.
The major theoretical move in Chapter 3 consists of the introduction of post-sovereign international institution, a concept meant to capture the essence of the EU-Russia relationship (p 23). Haukkala stresses that the EU-Russia interaction displays a number of characteristics that set it apart from more traditional forms of international cooperation/integration in which the limitation to sovereignty tends to be symmetrical, and material interests prevail over the normative clout. In this sense, in contrast to internal ‘pooling of sovereignty’, “in its external policies the EU has a more variegated logic whereby it advocates a host of sovereignty-challenging practices while seeking to preserve its own sovereign prerogatives in full” (p 24). Haukkala's point converges with what many analysts used to say about, for instance, the failed Barcelona Process whereby the notion of asymmetry, the employment of the Union’s economic clout, and insistence on the universal applicability of Union's internal mode of governance, have been identified, next to political reasons, as the major causes of failure. In a way, therefore, Haukkala opens up a very neat path for empirical and theoretical engagement, possibly with a comparativist twist.

Retroduction remains the central tenet of Chapter 4 devoted to the method the study. Retroduction allows combining different methods in a single work with a view to constructing hypothetical models that in a cyclical way probe into the why-, how- and what-questions. Haukkala employs the frame analysis to uncover what the potential differences concerning commonality between the EU and Russia are, and the case study method to examine how the diverging worldviews that both actors hold affect the actual logic of their interaction, and thus why it is has been institutionalized in a particular way. Very clear, enriched with useful tables and figures, this short chapter suggests a way to meaningfully navigate four case studies presented in the following chapters.

The objective behind the examination of the negotiation process leading to the signing of the PCA (Chapter 5) is to set the baseline against which the following more specific cases are discussed. Although a number of studies sought to examine the early stages of the evolution of the EU-Russia relationship, Haukkala’s argument adds a fresh touch to the discussion by locating the subject-matter in the broader geopolitical context of the 90s as well as by including in the discussion arguments voiced by Russian scholars and diplomats.

The following chapter (Chapter 6) examines the strategy documents that the EU and Russia have adopted on each other over the period 1995-2000. The purpose of this exercise is to reflect on the worldviews, Russian and the EU-ones respectively, that these documents embody. As the author concludes, clear differences concerning the normative foundation of their institutionalized relationship exist, thus suggesting a fairly low level of commonality between Russia and the EU. It is also emphasized that whereas the EU aims at using post-sovereign methods to transform Russia in line with European values and models, Russia implements a hybrid approach to PCA. Accordingly, although the transformative logic of the relationship is embraced, the notions of sovereignty and global actorness (as well as reluctance toward joining the European community of values) balance it up in the approach followed by Russia.

Chapter 7 focuses on the first phase of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000), a period that according to Haukkala exemplifies plainly the lack of commonality between the EU and Russia. The discussion in this chapter starts with a concise yet comprehensive account of the causes of the Second Chechen War, and continues with a discussion on the EU’s reactions to Russia’s intervention in the Chechen Republic. By so doing, Haukkala observes that Russia’s military intervention in Chechnya was justified by a traditional reading of Russia’s sovereignty. For the EU, by contrast, the conflict was predominantly about the infringement of liberal values, namely human rights, the EU sought to emulate on Russia following the end of the cold war. Although, sanctions against Russia were adopted by the
EU, it was the Russian reading of the conflict that prevailed, in a path-dependent way casting shadow on the nature of the EU-Russia institution.

The erosion of the value component in the EU-Russia relationship is quite visible also in the case of the Four Common Spaces. Chapter 8 suggests that as the EU-Russia relationship unfolds, the Russian framing of the relationship becomes dominant (p 129). Haukkala demonstrates that although the EU enjoyed clear leverage in terms of market power, and it was Russia that requested improved market access etc., Russia’s insistence on equality and respect for sovereignty has actually diluted the post-sovereign principles originally codified in the PCA in 1994. For instance, “the explicit reference to the EU as a source of norms and standards has been removed and largely replaced with vague references to wider international rules and standards” (p 151). Instead, Russian documents have emerged as officially recognized benchmarks, thus breaking the normative monopoly of the EU, and indicating a shift in the logic underpinning the EU-Russia relationship.

The notion of the evolving logic behind the EU-Russia interaction returns in Chapter 9 that focuses on the ND of the EU policies. A brief but detailed introduction to the origins and the evolution of the ND, along with a subsequent discussion, reveal that “most of the original, and largely post-sovereign, objectives of the policy have remained unrealized” (p 165). As Haukkala concludes, once again by waving its sovereignty banner, Russia was able to resist the EU’s agenda, and essentially ignore the policy. Overall, “the snapshot we have gained from frame-analysing the new ND documents is no longer that of a post-sovereign international institution at all, but one of traditional inter-governmental cooperation, a radical change in the logic of interaction indeed” (p 166), possibly bearing consequences for the future outlook of the EU-Russia relationship.

One final remark: by introducing the concept of post-sovereign international institution, Haukkala places the EU’s attempts at spreading its norms and values internationally in a quite unusual context. By highlighting that this approach tends to lead to asymmetric nature of the relationships forged, and relies on unidirectional expectations concerning normative convergence between the parties concerned, Haukkala implicitly questions the normative component in the normative power Europe argument, and paves the way for some very interesting theoretical and empirical questions. This propensity to trigger new questions, rather than foreclose them, constitutes one of the greatest strengths of the monograph discussed here. As such it will be of particular interest to researchers and academics focusing in their work on EU-Russia relations, external relations of the EU, on IR theorizing, as well as on questions of norms and values and their diffusion in international context.

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Book Review

Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams (2010)

*Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus: The European Union, Russia and Turkey*

Basingstoke: Palgrave

Fotis Mavromatidis

One of the most debated issues of European Union (EU) is the European energy security. Particularly, the Union’s strategy to ensure energy security through the diversification of sources has drawn the interest of scholars and policy-makers, who tend to show special attention to the role of Russia and Turkey in this strategy. Russia is the biggest supplier of gas and oil to Europe and it has been suspected of using energy for political means, while Turkey is the main energy bridge between Europe and non-Russian sources, which uses its geopolitical role for promoting its candidacy to the Union. All these elements are linked, outlined and analysed in the book by Tekin and Williams. In fact, as it is becoming clear in the introduction, the book aims to analyse the EU’s efforts to ensure the security of energy supply in connection with the EU-Turkish relations and the progress of the latter towards EU membership.

To do so, the book is divided into three parts that correspond to three core objectives outlined by the authors. The first part (Chapters two and three) describes the instruments and types of power that EU uses for implementing its energy policy and provides the framework for the analysis. The second part (Chapters four to six) explores in detail the interdependence between EU and Russia and the complexity of the regional energy relations. The analysis covers all the aspects of energy security, including the environmental challenges of Europe and external actors such as Africa and China. The last part (Chapters seven and eight) covers the Turkish role in the European Energy Policy in a connection with Turkey’s accession progress towards EU membership. The book is well written and structured. Each chapter starts with an introductory paragraph and then in a deductive manner it covers the whole topic in discussion. In that way the narration of the argument is easy followed and provides the space for extracting meaningful conclusions.

However, this very structure depicts a main weakness of the book. Some parts of the narrative are over-detailed and look too descriptive. In addition, some parts of the narrative are repeating among chapters, for example on pp. 52-63 and pp. 171-172, and this gives the impression that it is written by different contributors. To this one could add the ‘marginalisation’ of Turkey’s role and candidacy in the last two chapters, which prevents a more coherent and in depth analysis of these issues.
The treatment of the Turkish candidacy to the EU is another shortcoming of the manuscript. The analysis of that subject tends to reflect the official Turkish view, which put the blame for the slow progress of the accession negotiations, to the attitude of certain EU member states, notably France and Cyprus. Indicative is the position that ‘[a] total of 18 chapters of the EU acquis are closed for negotiations due to various EU and national vetoes, including those by France and the Republic of Cyprus’ (p. 178). However, the authors avoid to illustrate the Turkish responsibilities for the fate of the negotiations and to explain why some member states are having this attitude. For example, on p. 169 Cyprus receives the blame for the veto on energy chapter without reference to the paradox of the Turkish diplomacy that seeks to join the single market without recognising one of constituent markets! Despite these limitations, there is an accurate projection of Turkish role as a key geopolitical actor for the energy security of Europe, with well targeted recommendations for the proper use of the energy card by the Turkish diplomacy.

The weaknesses are balanced by accurate and thorough analysis of the field. Both authors are experts on the field and this is evident from the presentation of the topic and from the analysis and the policy recommendations that they are providing. For instance, on p. 14, they perfectly pointed the lack of coherence of EU policy and the tendency of key players such as Germany and France, for bilateral actions. Perhaps the best aspect of the narrative is the conception of the Gas Wars between Europe and other actors through the angle of market competition, which seeks to better reflect the situation, away from the neo-realist exaggerations that are the case in the relative literature. The following quote is characteristic:

‘our concept is not meant to connote that producing, transit and consuming states are poised to engage in military struggle over gas or the terms of its delivery...it implies that many energy-centric international tensions have arisen in large part from strong resistance to attempts to acquire ownership and operational control of different segments of the value chain that are located outside the initiating firm’s home jurisdictions’ (p. 97).

Hence, the authors manage to include in the analysis the role of the European companies in the implementation and promotion of the energy projects such as the Nabucco pipeline. In addition, the authors are connecting the European Energy Policy with environmental aspects, which are having crucial role for understanding the policy making in regards to energy and which are often neglected by the relative literature. Moreover, the analysis of Gazprom tactics in distance from Kremlin’s political considerations is added to the description of the geopolitics of energy from a more economic perspective. A final positive element is the existence of theory. There are few books in this field that are using theoretical interpretations and particularly non neo-realist approaches, for analysing the geopolitics of energy. In fact, the authors, by presenting liberal and realist approaches, with clear preference on the former, are capturing the real dimension of the European Energy Policy.

To sum up, it is a book that could be used by scholars and students who are interested on the field of EU energy security and to be a reference point for further research and debate.
In a time where everybody talks about the current situation and is trying to find some answers and even solutions in past similar situations, the volume edited by Stefan Gänzle, Guido Müntel and Evgeny Vinokurov with the title *Adapting to European Integration? Kaliningrad, Russia and the European Union* tries to find a new way to look at possible future developments in Europe. This book, that is better defined as a collection of good and very well documented articles, themselves an indispensable part, wants to be an analysis of a phenomenon that we expect to find only inside the boundaries of the European Union and the states that want to become part of it: Europeanization. In order for this intention to become a reality, the authors choose to study the singular case of oblast Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad, also known in the past as the city of Koningsberg and a part of East Prussia, is a small territory, part of the Russian Federation as an exclave, because it is not within the boundaries of Russia, but it is situated more than 500 km from it, having as neighbours Lithuania and Poland. From this situation the authors see the region of Kaliningrad as an enclave of the European Union even if it is not part of the Union, but Poland and Lithuania are.

The situation of this particular and singular region in Europe in this position is not simple and easy to understand and the authors of this interesting book have tried to describe and analyse it from a different perspective, making use of a vast methodology based on a main question and analysing some particular and well selected case studies. The main questions of the book and the central themes are: how do EU-Russia relations ‘feed back’ into Kaliningrad’s domestic arena? Is Kaliningrad becoming ‘Europeanised’ –at least to some extent? In particular, do EU standards and norms impact on the exclave and in what ways? As we can deduct from this interrogatives, the issue analysed in this book is not simple and not of little interest for the future of Europe.

The concept of Europeanization especially vis-à-vis third countries is studied and reviewed with the help of Kaliningrad’s situation and development of the relations between the European Union and its biggest neighbour: the Russian Federation. The framework conditions are analysed from three different perspectives: A. as a set of exogenous variables that are paramount and that are referring to forms, content and the conduct of interaction between the European and Russian partners; B. as a number of endogenous...
variables: the domestic constrains imposed by post-Soviet transformation and the relations with the federal centre; and C. as an exclave-related factors: region’s economic dependency on neighbouring countries, its social identity that is relevant for the development and externally-induced changes. But, in any case, the authors have not examined the Europeanization impact on Russia in general. The oblast of Kaliningrad is just a test case, and from its analyses the authors came out with a sum of insights and explanations that can be of help for the Europeanization process in the future and for the European Union policies outside its frontiers.

First of all, it was necessary to give some space for the Kaliningrad background. Generally, the people do not know this region and its particular characteristics, and only few of us, the direct involved in the process, have an idea of what importance it has in the European context. Therefore, the author’s explanations and the impartiality with which these are given are welcome. Further more, the ‘double peripherality’ of the oblast is well described and explained in the first chapters of the book. The region’s enclave and exclave status derives from the fact that the Kaliningrad has been peculiar in its geo-political situation. We can discover when we go deeper in the subject of the book, the cross-regional comparison that appears like a must in this particular situation.

The methodological framework reveals us that the chapters of this volume are divided in three parts, each part having a scientific motivation for the whole book. This volume offers a new approach and additional insights: a thorough analysis of the region’s institutional structures, actors’ interaction and decision making and the resulting policy-output within the selected fields; it draws conclusions on the general situation and the character of institutional structures and decision making process; a specific and detailed enquiry into the conduct of foreign partners and the implementation of projects; the overlap and linkages between the domestic developments and international context. All of these have there crucial importance. The influence of external factors on regional governance is the analytical lens of ‘Europeanization’ research, in the opinion of the authors.

The assumption in the beginning of the book is that the Europeanization processes are the result of processes of integration in Europe, but in this particular case it is not relevant and neither true. In this situation occur some innovations in the analysing of the issue: sub-national units of third countries have not yet been studied independently from their national context, so this is the first analysis of adaptation in a (part of) post-communist transitional country that has not acceded to the EU nor is preparing for accession. In this intent, the authors seek to answer these questions and to this peculiar situation by analysing and comparing several policy areas (economic policy, higher education, environmental policy, social policy, public health policy, integrated border management and economic policy) of the Kaliningrad region with the institutional structures, processes of decision-making (politics) as well as policy-outputs (policy) therein. In the second and third part of this volume this work is well documented and clearly synthesised.

The Europeanization ‘à la carte’ or ‘selected adaptation’ as the authors call this phenomenon, demonstrated that over time the European Union has got tired of exerting influence on Russia through bargaining about conditions and rewards and through the promotion of a strategy of persuasion and limited conditionality.

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Ludovico Grandi  
University of Bologna

One of the most controversial aspects of the EU integration process, and the relations between the European Union and Russia, is represented today by the creation and implementation of the European energy market. Alexander Gusev's analysis tackles very effectively the main issues on top of EU-Russia energy dialogue, underlining all factors behind the stop-and-go process taking place between Brussels and Moscow. The well defined structure of the study helps understanding the reasoning process behind the research, built on three chapters plus the conclusion, with every chapter followed by three sub-chapters. The first chapter addresses the argument of EU energy security, with a deeper analysis of the process that should lead to a better definition of EU energy policy, particularly after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The second chapter deals with the legal, institutional and conceptual bases for the EU-Russia energy cooperation, taking in consideration a comparative approach to the energy strategies of these two actors, together with its developments in the last three years. The last chapter analyses present problems and prospects for the EU-Russia cooperation in the energy sphere, with a particular reference to the common interests in infrastructural projects, the question of energy efficiency and the often discussed Third Liberalization Package and Energy Charter Treaty. In the conclusion the author, after stating that EU and Russia's long term energy strategies are mutually compatible, considers the pros and cons of the respective models of cooperation on the energy sector, affirming that the European model, thanks to its drive towards liberalization (which sets a wider legal base for cooperation and enhanced commercial competition on a multilateral level) is more effective.

The opening of the introduction quotes a sentence from the ex-German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, stating that "[t]wo countries, dependent on each other economically, will not be at enmity. It means that the economical cooperation serves the creation of peace". The author, as his analysis proceeds, repeatedly emphasises the concept of interdependency, which is the result of a bilateral dynamic, where on one side EU is constantly growing dependant on Russian gas, and on the other Russia have substantial difficulties in finding alternative costumers for his resources. He correctly arguments that, thanks to this mutual dependency, both actors are deemed to cooperate and to formulate a compromise satisfactory enough to meet respective interests, and even more correctly underlines the necessity (despite all difficulties) of de-politicizing these issue. Nevertheless, major problems persist and are evidenced in the stalemates occurred since the very
beginning of negotiations regarding the revisions introduced by the Energy Charter Treaty and its internationalization in 1994. The author looks at these problems as the natural outcome of different energy concepts. But while his analysis is very lucid in outlining most of them, at the same time he doesn’t give the same importance to others. When for example he correctly stresses the natural tendency towards monopolies when describing Russian energy markets, which is by the way one of the points of frictions in EU-Russia negotiations, particularly for the terms of transit infrastructures (this is also true for some European firms like Eni), he doesn’t mention a structural problem quite typical of all oil/gas exporter countries, the so called “Dutch disease”. Although cautious analysts argue Russia is not affected by this phenomenon (Oomes 2007), others like Marshall I. Goldman (2010) outline a “Russian disease” that has taken the country to a point in which its GDP count for more than 30 per cent on energy (and 65 per cent of exports). For this reason, I would have liked to see a sub-chapter dedicated to the political decisions made in the 1990’s and in the past decade (see the Yukos affaire or the controversies in the Sakhalin project between many others) and the lack of substantial re-distributions of incomes coming from this sector, resulted in a de facto vertical structure of Russian extraction and distribution chains. The importance of this point is behind Russian resistances in possible EU supply diversifications routes that could harm its considerable yearly growth.

In the final part of his analysis, the author interprets the flow of acquisitions in European downstream facilities as a reaction to uncertainties coming out from the market reforms taking place in the Old Continent for what concerns volumes and prices terms in future contracts. This argument, clearly articulated, goes again in the same direction of the above described dynamic of substantial resistances from the Russian side to deal with the perspective of loosing shares in EU markets (and is concretely confirmed by the controversial reactions towards the so called “Gazprom clause”). One of the remarkable results of the arguments outlined in Gusev’s work is probably that, by underlining Russia’s reliance on the EU for gas (particularly) and oil consumption and on foreign investments, he manages to balance European fears of being over dependant on Russia’s energetic resources. Although this has become a reality from several decades onwards, the European public should never forget that on the other side of the table the situation present strong and parallel concerns, even if they are expressed in different terms. In the final part of the conclusions, Gusev states that both the EU and Russia need to reboot their respective energy approach towards each other, since the EU has failed in introducing western values inside Russia in the 1990’s, when it was considerably weaker, and Russia has failed (by reinforcing its state monopoly) in attracting those investments that it vitally needs in order to explore new gas fields. Obtaining an effective compromise which could overcome differences and strengthen common grounds can only result from constant dialogue and new energy treaties, since it’s clear that interests are stronger than resistances. The need for de-politicization has never been felt so strongly, although it is still not clear on what ground it can be reached as long as political actions are so strongly linked to economical and strategic interests on both sides.

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Book Review

Karen Henderson and Carol Weaver, eds (2010)

*The Black Sea Region and EU Policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agendas*

Farnham: Ashgate

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Andreas Müllerleile

*Loughborough University*

The Black Sea region is probably one of the most interesting and, at the same time, under-researched regions in the EU neighbourhood. The volume *The Black Sea Region and EU Policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agendas* edited by Karen Henderson and Carol Weaver provides an excellent overview of current research regarding the main problems in the region and the role of the EU.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the EU policy in the Black Sea region with contributions by Marek Chichoki, Lucia Najšlová, Kataryna Wolzuk. It includes a critical discussion on the various EU policies in the wider Black sea region such as the European Neighbourhood policy, the Black Sea Strategy and the Eastern Partnership. The three chapters examine the evolution of the EU’s approaches towards the region, pointing towards the problems of developing various policies and strategies, instead of a coherent EU policy. Both, the diverging interests of the Member States and the responses of the Black Sea countries are analysed and the instruments used in implementing the policies are critically assessed.

The second part looks into issues of security and conflict resolution, especially by analysing the relation between the EU’s policies in the region and the interests and security dilemmas of the other big powers in the area, for example Russia, that seeks to preserve its influence in the region or the USA, that wants to expand its involvement through NATO enlargement. Carol Weavers tries to assess to what extent the tensions among these players have had a negative effect on the implementation and effectiveness of EU policies in the Black Sea region. The following two chapters, written respectively by Dennis Sammut and Syuzanna Vasilyan, focus on the conflicts in the South Caucasus, looking into the EU’s approach to the region and the EU “cacophonous” security policy. However, by focusing on “civilian” rather than “military” security, the EU approach differs from that of other actors such as US, Turkey and Russia, whose perception of security is tightly linked to defence and energy.

The last part of the volume analyses issues of regionalisation and energy. The first chapter by Tunç Aybak explores the emerging strategic partnership between Russia and Turkey, the two largest states in the wider Black Sea area, and, at the same time, an often forgotten relationship within EU dominated discourses. Mukhtar Hajzada analyses the dynamics of the regionalisation process, which currently appears to be characterized by competition...
rather than cooperation. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is analysed as a potentially important regional player, as it is the only organization whose membership includes all the states in the area; furthermore, the need for a redefinition of its role in the context of EU's Eastern enlargement is examined, as the membership of the two organisations is increasingly overlapping. The last chapter by Slawomir Raszewski looks specifically into the energy sector, focusing on the EU's external energy policy in the wider Black Sea region, which is arguably the most developed EU policy in the region.

The book focuses on a region that is often neglected by politicians as well as academics. The EU is portrayed as a confused latecomer in the region, which generally constitutes a fruitful research agenda for EU scholars. Thus, the book is a much needed contribution to the literature on the Black Sea region and gives a solid overview of the EU external policies and the problems within the region. Especially the complexity of foreign policy challenges regarding security and energy are well laid out, although a more in-depth discussion of EU-Russia relations or a chapter dealing with the Russian perspective would have been a helpful addition to the volume.

However, it would be too easy to criticise the book purely on issues regarding thematic overlaps between chapters or indeed the varying quality of the different chapters. One could also criticise and assess in how far the chapters form a coherent argument. Most of these criticisms would be quite common for edited volumes that originate from workshops or conferences. But, edited books, like this one on the Black Sea region, are very useful to assess a certain research area and to analyse possible gaps in the literature.

In fact the book reflects the quality as well as the focus of research regarding the Black Sea region rather accurately. The Black Sea research agenda is focused on security, energy and conflicts with some dashes of the problematic regional cooperation. At the same time, detailed policy case studies that go beyond the traditional IR/ foreign policy debate are hard to find. In particular, the 'sea' is often absent from research on the 'Black Sea' and topics connected to maritime issues such as the various environmental problems, transport infrastructure or fishing do not seem to capture the interest of many academics. Moreover, by looking exclusively at national governments the sub-national level is somewhat missing from the literature. Especially after the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, it would also be interesting to look at the impact of 'internal' EU policies that may have an impact on the Black Sea region. In that context, the possible 'europeanisation' of Romania and Bulgaria seems to be a topic that needs some attention by the academic community. The role of both countries in the formulation of EU policies, as well their role in the wider Black Sea region are topics for further research. Therefore, the edited volume shows that the Black Sea region offers an interesting research topic for scholars who are interested in EU foreign policy as well International relations and regional cooperation.
Book Review

Lašas, A. (2010)

*European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe*

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Cristian Nitoiu
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The idea of the historical right of belonging to Europe was a central argument for leaders from the former Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in their bid for NATO and EU membership. After the end of the Cold War the shelves of libraries in the new CEE democracies were filled with a variety of books and pamphlets vilifying the West for the way it had abandoned such countries either to the Nazis or to the Communists. Albeit very pervasive in CEE popular culture – including in the public and political spheres –, such claims have been marginalized in the scholarly literature, which has either ignored them or treated them as factors with little influence. In *European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe*, Ainius Lašas seeks to confirm that the choice for a ‘return to Europe’ discourses was, looking in retrospective, an effective strategy for the CEE states. Western countries like France, Germany, UK or the US were thus made to feel guilty about the historical injustices they were part of in first half of the 20th century. Not only did this sense of guilt drive forward the idea of enlargement but its degree also shaped the regional and temporal dimensions of the way NATO and the EU expanded. Although Lašas presents a thesis that can be considered highly controversial, he constructs a taught provocative and well-documented analysis, making the book an important read for all interested in European integration.

The book is structured into five chapters: the first sets out the theoretical framework, followed by a very detailed account of the way historical injustices were viewed during the Cold War in the second chapter and an empirical analysis of both NATO and EU enlargements in the next two chapters; while the last focuses on the limits of the concept of collective guilt and how might the conclusions of the book be applied to other areas of international relations. Contrary to rationalists which focus on cost benefit analyses of geopolitical and economic interests and constructivist approaches centred on the importance of institutional norms to the expansion of NATO and the EU, Lašas posits that a sense of responsibility or collective guilt legitimized the claims of the CEE states and instilled a sense of historical obligation into Western leaders. Collective guilt is seen here as associated ‘with a group that has perpetuated injustice to another group’ which leads to a self-assessment bent on making repairs and undoing malign actions from the past (p. 8). The book analyzes three such injustices grouped under the term ‘black trinity’: the Munich agreement, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the Yalta Agreement. Countries that have been affected by the ‘black trinity’ are considered to have a comparative advantage over other countries. However, not all CEE countries in questions have acceded to the EU or
Throughout the book, the subject of collective guilt shifts confusingly from Western states to their leaders. While the theoretical framework conceptualizes states as being sensible to feelings of guilt, Lašas’ empirical analysis presents a wide range of statements from public and political leaders from Western and CEE states supporting the idea that historical injustices played a role in the expansion of NATO and the EU. Little space is awarded to the mechanisms through which political discourse is transformed into practical decisions and incorporated in the national interests of the state. Norm socialization is briefly presented to explain how opposing ideas have been delegitimized and marginalized by mainstream arguments of collective guilt both within Western states and Europe as a whole. Two major discrepancies between the authors’ aims and his methods can be identified: firstly, while Lašas overtly differentiate his approach from constructivist ones, he relies on a norms based argument to account for the way discourse becomes translated into political decisions. Secondly, the historical narrative he constructs in order to present the evolution of idea of guilt in Western states doesn’t fully legitimize the idea that responsibility and reparation were the mainstream discourse that marginalized others, but merely that this rhetoric was existent and at times surfaced through various likeminded leaders. An overarching agreement towards the existence of a deep sense of guilt in the West is taken for granted, with few opposing discourses being analyzed. In instances when dissenting views from Western decision makers are analyzed, they are easily discarded as containing logical inconsistencies determined by various domestic or international constraints.

Notwithstanding these conceptual and empirical inconsistencies, the collective guilt model proposed in the book successfully tests seven hypotheses. In his well-documented analysis, Lašas skilfully shows that guilt related discourse was present in Western and CEE countries in both cases - EU and NATO (H1); that the discourse of collective guilt gradually transformed into one of obligation, and moral and economic restitution (H2); early Western commitments to enlarge were made in both cases by Western leaders (H3) which led to a regionalization (H4) and cyclicality (H5) of the expansion processes based only a certain group of victim states from Central and Eastern Europe. Institutional norms (H6) proved to be more powerful in the case of the EU – through its effective use of conditionality - than that of NATO, in determining short term differentiation between candidate countries. Opposite to this, national interest (H7) was constrained in a larger degree within the expansion of NATO, as France was convinced to relinquish its support for Romania’s accession at the Madrid summit. According to Lašas, these hypotheses lead to the conclusion that collective guilt is to be considered the most important factor in shaping the decision to enlarge NATO and the EU, while institutional norms and national interests acted only as constraints. Consequently, the book insightfully challenges both rationalist and constructivist views of NATO and EU enlargements towards Central and Eastern Europe.
Book Review
Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, eds (2011)
*The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood*
London: Routledge

Nelli Babayan
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While the European Union (EU) seems constantly to be searching for its identity and foreign policy strategy, Russia has resolved its Yeltsin-era identity crisis since Putin’s inauguration. Moreover, it has reiterated its great power claims and has spared no effort to reinstate its dominance over its traditional “sphere of influence”. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that sphere of influence has turned into a “shared neighbourhood” of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and become a battlefield between the EU and Russia (p. 1). This volume edited by Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins provides a collection of well-constructed and original insights into a battle that has increasingly been characterised by “zero-sum calculations and geopolitical competition” (p. 2).

Going beyond the conventional format of edited volume with a uniform, though often restricted, analytical framework, this book provides its target readership of graduate students and scholars with seven substantive chapters on the political, economic, and social relations between the EU and Russia that may inter alia influence their shared neighbourhood. Without imposing a single theoretical framework, the contributors familiarize readers with different analytical tools that may account for the divergence of EU-Russia interests and their outcomes.

The opening contribution by Derek Averre questions “the assumption that Brussels and Moscow offer radically different approaches to the shared neighbourhood” (p. 24). Averre argues that describing Russia as a malign nineteenth century power and the EU as a “good thing” (p. 24) is “misguided” (p. 25) and threatens to “overemphasize conflicting approaches and overshadow positive elements” (p. 24). Examining the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an attempt to “integrate third countries of the immediate vicinity into ‘policy-taking’” (p. 32), Stefan Gänzle argues that the ENP “will only have an impact on domestic contexts that are favourable to it” (p. 46). Broadening the inquiry into the ENP, Martin Dangerfield analyses the rhetorical position and the actual contribution of the Visegrad Group to the EU’s Eastern policy. Dangerfield argues that the Visegrad Group role has been “to endorse and advocate” (p. 68) initiatives of larger EU members.

Adopting a framework of power, Hiski Haukkala explains why the EU “has failed to reach practically any of its original objectives with Russia”. He argues that the main reason for this failure “resides in the nature of interaction between the EU and Russia” (p. 87), which is
based on the amorphousness of the EU’s actorness and “Russia’s new assertiveness” (p. 87) due to the increase of crude oil prices. Provoked by the championing of democracy by post-communist countries, Rick Fawn asks to what extent human rights and democracy have been used for “political expediency” (p. 94) to negatively depict Russia. He warns that an increased advocacy of human rights and democracy by post-communist countries in Russia may result in an increased tension. Tuomas Frosberg and Antti Seppo focus on expectations-capabilities gap in the EU’s Russia policy. They argue that even if the EU is stronger than Russia “by almost all conventional indicators of power” (p. 135), it has not been successful in solving trade disputes due to reasons including weak strategies and exaggerated expectations about success. Adopting the framework of diversionary tension, Mikhail Filippov investigates the uneasy relations between Russia and Georgia, which culminated in the 2008 armed conflict. He argues that with its immediate neighbours Russia pursues “the traditional geo-political goals, as well as the domestic diversionary goals” (p. 160), because the promotion of a “virtual conflict” with the West helps to keep domestic politics and the domestic public under control.

Throughout the volume, there is a feeling that some of the chapters, focusing extensively on the intricate interplay of the EU and Russia’s interests, either overlook the influence of that interplay on the shared neighbourhood or let the readers contemplate it on their own. On the other hand, the volume demonstrates a genuine striving for objectivity, without falling into the trap of merely depicting the EU as a benign power and Russia as a megalomaniac one. The analyses of various issues and the engaging writing of the contributors, suggesting a number of important and innovative perspectives, make this volume a thought-provoking analysis for readers interested not only in EU-Russia relations, but also in those factors that separately shape EU and Russian politics.

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