research articles

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Bringing Instrumentality In: A Theoretical Case for the Role of Transnational Affiliations in Party-based Europeanisation

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Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to the study of party-based Europeanisation. More specifically, I explore, effectively in a theoretical manner, a new avenue of research in the study of the impact of European integration on national political parties, by focusing on the potential role of parties’ transnational affiliations. I do so in an attempt to eliminate or decrease existing theoretical ambiguities and deficiencies that can be thought to lead to a narrow conceptual and empirical focus, when it comes to research on this subject. This narrowness is owed to the omission, by the extant literature, of the potential instrumentality of transnational affiliations in changing, adjusting or reconfirming national political parties’ ideological profiles. By extending discussions of party-based Europeanisation, through incorporating the extant argument about instrumentality into the analysis of parties’ transnational affiliations, I illustrate that the spectrum of the impact of European integration on national political parties can be wider than conceded so far.

Keywords

Europeanisation; Political parties; Instrumentality; Transnational affiliations; Ideology; European integration; European Party Federations

THE ARGUMENT THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AN IMPACT ON NATIONAL political parties has been growing in attention and empirical testing, especially since Robert Ladrech’s (2002) initial formulations. Since then, this argument has been pursued further by various scholars, leading to the formation of what can now be called a strain of literature – with a core research question, albeit through different methodological avenues. Broadly defined, this strain of literature, itself keeping in line with many other top-down conceptualisations forwarded by scholars focusing on political systems, policies and governance (for the earlier ones see, Buller and Gamble 2002; Olsen 2002; Ladrech 1994), contends that European integration has a number of indirect effects on national political parties. European Union (EU) policies and/or the EU dimension of domestic political competition lead national political parties to incorporate Europe into their party functions, in a manner that enables them “to attain indispensible goals” (Ladrech 2002: 393). Initially, Ladrech suggested five areas of party activity, each embodying a relatively

This article further develops an argument that is expounded and utilised in an earlier publication (Charalambous 2011). The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for their critical and constructive comments on a previous draft. Great thanks also go to Zoe Lefkofridi for her remarks and criticisms.

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distinct function, for investigating the potential of top-down Europeanisation of national political parties: programmatic change, patterns of party competition, organisational change, party-government relations and affiliations beyond the national party system. In each, he argued, there is plenty of reason and indeed some preliminary evidence to suggest that parties are being indirectly Europeanised; that is, they change in response to EU-induced changes in their respective political systems.

The literature has by now incorporated in the study of party-based Europeanisation a careful examination of most of the above distinct areas (e.g. Pennings 2006; Kritzinger et al. 2004; Carter and Pogutnke 2010). The last area identified by Ladrech, of affiliations beyond the national party system, has arguably received very little attention (for an overview of the sub-field see Ladrech 2009a: section 2:2). Where Europeanisation scholars have touched it, focus has mostly been placed upon: a) the relation of national parties to their respective European party federations (EPFs), in terms of the salience placed on this relation and the organisational changes undertaken in order to strengthen it (Van Hecke 2009); b) the low grass-roots support and media coverage of EPFs and their activities (e.g. Ladrech 2007); c) the process of policy transfer and campaign guidance from the main EPFs on new Central East European (CEE) political parties, as part of the latter’s integration into the former, during the accession period (e.g. Spirova 2008; Sloam 2005; Buras 2005; Pridham 2001, although such studies have not always and analytically employed the Europeanisation perspective; see also later). In retrospect, the transnational affiliations of national political parties have been left under-theorised in the Europeanisation literature. Largely responsible for this has been the limited focus on the issue of the instrumentality of parties’ overall patterns of transnational affiliations; an instrumentality that, as I argue below, may condition the ideological profiles of national parties that in turn, may also serve various purposes instrumentally. When profiles’ instrumental nature is incorporated into the question of how European integration affects political parties, the testing grounds of research and analysis widen. In this manner the conscious and strategic reactions of parties - which are in pursuit of one or more context-driven goals - to Brussels (e.g. Lefkofridi 2010, 2008; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Sitter 2001), can be more thoroughly accounted for and explained.

Essentially, this study links the instrumentality of parties’ transnational affiliations, with the impact of European integration on parties’ ideological profiles, at the same time attempting to resolve the emerging, conceptual and methodological grey areas that present themselves, as well as give some preliminary examples in the direction of the main argument. By doing so, it illustrates that the spectrum of the impact of European integration on national political parties can be wider than conceded so far. As a note of caution, it should be added that parties’ affiliations beyond the national party system may indisputably be thought to lie at the crossroads of top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation. The effects of European integration on national political parties are assumed to leave traces of influence on the EU polity or at least the structure of the developing EU party system (Van Hecke 2009: introduction; for a fuller formulation, stretching beyond parties, see Mair 2004). Nevertheless, in this article, I concentrate on a top-down pathway as a distinctive political phenomenon whereby the effect is upon parties’ ideological profiles at the national level. In other words, a top-down pathway most of all means that the final resulting change regards the national level and not the EU one, although, as explained shortly, this process must not be conceptualized only as impact in the sense of something happening at the EU level.

In the next section I discuss further the limitations of relevant scholarly work on the subject so far, as well as add the concept of instrumentality, using it to conceptually reassess the Europeanisation of political parties by focusing on the role of transnational affiliations, and develop a new hypothesis. In section three I examine the logic of this new hypothesis.
Essentially, I firstly elaborate the link of parties’ ideological profiles to the EU level, by drawing on existing theorisations of the concept of Europeanisation, and secondly engage with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the instrumentality argument, in order to shine light on the potential role that parties’ transnational affiliations can play in party-based Europeanisation. In section four, I discuss methodological issues, initially by addressing possible units of analysis for instrumental change in transnational affiliations and then by assessing options for measuring the extent of Europeanisation. In section five, I provide a number of empirical pointers from the literature on both west and east European political parties, in an attempt to preliminary show the empirical relevance of the argument. In the conclusion I sum up.

What about party profiles? A conceptual reassessment

Research dealing with the party areas of patterns of party competition and programmatic change has concentrated on changes in what is being proposed and also in the extent to which EU-related preoccupations are projected. Yet, this duality of Europeanisation’s effect – change, adjustment, reconfirmation of projected preoccupations, as well as the organisational and other emphasis placed upon them1 – has been ignored in the study of parties’ transnational affiliations. According to Ladrech (2002: 399), Europeanisation can be discerned in parties’ transnational affiliations, when it results “in new perspectives on transnational cooperation with parties from other EU member states to the extent that new organisational and programmatic activities are promoted”. The core issue in the extant literature remains that of the organisational entrenchment of the European question and it is explored through the study of subsequent organisational restructurings, reorientations of international affiliations “operations” and departments and programmatic change. There are half-exceptions. Bomberg (2002), for example, has gone a long way articulating a more multi-faced mechanism of change in party-based Europeanisation, with a case study of the European Greens. In her analysis of ideological adjustments resulting from Europeanisation, she argued that “transnational co-operation and engagement has complimented trends simultaneously occurring at the domestic level: the privileging of certain issues over others; the softening of more radical Green views; the development of strategies favouring consensus and compromise; and an overall strategic grooming of the Greens for positions of government power” (Bomberg 2002: 40).

However, Bomberg’s perspective appears under-developed in analytical terms for two reasons. First, by focusing mostly on the ultimate result of the greens’ dominant patterns of transnational affiliations and spending little space on the mechanisms of change, Bomberg alludes to the unconscious or unintended nature of parties’ networking patterns. Essentially, she downplays the instrumentality of their reactions to European integration and as a result also their capacity to foresee or expect the broader changes that may arise out of changing transnational affiliations or spending less or more time and resources on certain groups, federations and projects. Secondly and by extension, another key issue is that of temporality. Broader ideological changes in green parties may stem from engagement with specific transnational projects but methodologically they are conflated with changes in other separate areas of party activity. From a perspective that employs the distinction between different areas of party activity and subsequently the polymorph of strategic action, the EU’s impact on parties’ identity component may manifest itself in one of three possible ways: 1) either through changes in transnational networking, only then followed by changes in the areas of programmatic rhetoric and patterns of domestic party competition; 2) or, through changes in programmatic rhetoric and patterns of domestic party competition first, only then followed by changes in transnational affiliations; 3) or, through simultaneous change in all areas.

1 What I have called elsewhere, ‘realignment’ and ‘entrenchment’ (Charalambous 2011).
In essence, the role of the ideological profiles of parties as a crucial component of the utility functions of parties in the dynamics of party conflict is largely missing in the study of transnational affiliations of parties. The logic of incorporating the role of transnational affiliations - as one which can be used to shape parties’ ideological profiles - in the study of party-based Europeanisation, is based on the concept of instrumentality that Ladrech’s original formulation hinted at, as we saw earlier, and which is prevalent in much of the party politics literature. Certain studies do employ and pursue further the concept of instrumentality, with respect either to the EU’s impact on parties or parties’ attitudes towards the EU. Building on the work of Muller and Strøm (1999) and Harmel and Janda (1994), Lefkofridi (2010: 3; see also 2008), for instance, begins with the observation that “in the real world, parties pursue multiple goals at the same time: votes, office, and policy”, facing trade-offs between them and identifying a “primary goal”. Her argument is that “the EU environment impacts the trade-offs party leaderships face in their simultaneous pursuit of votes, office, and policy”. The studies by Sitter (2001) and Steenbergen and Scott (2004) employ and pursue the concept of issue positioning and issue salience, in regard to European integration and EU-related issues, thus approaching parties as integral parts of their party systems and, stressing, in the first case at least, the constant dilemmas that parties tend to face. Similarly, Neumeyer (2008: 155) speaks of the “instrumentalization of EU issues [by CEE parties] to gain electoral support at the expense of competitors”.

In sum, if parties’ ideological profiles (either vis-à-vis the EU or more broadly) and any changes therein condition their capacity to secure votes, office, policy, cohesion, etc., then they must be instrumental in use, throughout the process of party-based Europeanisation. And if profiles are instrumental then why not examine also the possibility of a variety of party functions, including transnational affiliations, being instrumentally utilised to adjust, change or reconfirm these profiles? This syllogism leads us to the following hypothesis:

**H(1): European integration affects national political parties, since they use their patterns of transnational affiliations to change, adjust or reconfirm their ideological profile at the national level.**

This is not to suggest that the levels of organisational entrenchment and salience be dismissed, but simply that, as in other areas of activity, they are employed not in an ideological vacuum but partly in order to either downplay or emphasise the profile dimension and any changes in it (for matters of issue salience, see Tavits, 2008). In the following section, I turn to theoretically validating this hypothesis by addressing firstly, the link between the EU level and parties’ ideological profiles and secondly, the rationality of presupposing an intermediary role for parties’ transnational affiliations.

**Instrumentality, ideological signaling and European integration**

The first question that arises concerns the theoretical logic behind the link between the EU and parties’ ideological profiles. The domain of Europeanisation implies an inherent alertness towards causal effects, as these are ex vi termini the methodological trait differentiating the study of Europeanisation from other perspectives that concentrate on the relation between national, socio-political arenas and the EU. Yet, the issue of causality remains largely derivative of the overall research design employed by researchers (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2010: 20). Perhaps in a path-dependent manner, attempts to trace the causal effect of policy, ideational or politics-related change at the EU level on a party’s transnational affiliations will most probably require a more scholastic approach than attempts to trace the impact of the EU as an overarching reality. Strictness in tracing causality and consequently also the estimation of the phenomenon under question depend in large part, as in other areas of Europeanisation, on the precise parameters that delineate the term according to each author. A few words are, therefore, pertinent in an
attempt to avoid the pitfall of conceptual stretching (see Radaelli 2000), but also illuminate the possibility of a complex causal mechanism.

Europeanisation as the materialization of the chain effect sketched out in the previous section can be multi-faceted. In other words, European integration can be thought to have an ‘impact’ on parties’ ideological profiles, through their transnational affiliations, in an indirect way. For Ladrech, (2010: 2) and many others, the central question, usually is “how, once the EU policy-making process has produced an output – whether in the form of a directive, regulation, or more far-reaching initiative – this legislation, and more importantly its continuous transposition into member states, engenders some form of adaptational pressure”. However, in the case of parties, Europeanisation is indirect since no “direct legal inputs” into parties exist and therefore Europeanised parties will be those, which react to Europeanisation-led changes in their environment (see Ladrech 2009a: section 2.1; Mair 2000). In this vein, parties can be conceived to become Europeanised, when they incorporate the EU reality, into their modus operandi and thus respond to the EU’s impact on the domestic political systems, in which they operate.

Surely, in one sense indirectness may be thought to go without saying, in so far as parties will touch on issues, which are of relevance and effect foremost at the national level. Yet what is the most appropriate way of grasping any consistency or variation in the type of incentive a party can have, in order to react to and/or through the EU? Indirectness itself means two possible (indirect) channels which may or may not involve tangible changes at the EU level. The first channel is, using Ladrech’s terminology, that of an “EU-induced constraint” (2009b) or in more constructivist terms, a “perception of pressure” (2009a). When it involves changes at the EU level, these may include developments concerning EU institutional design. Alternatively, policy output can be held accountable for changes in parties’ transnational affiliations (which are in turn made instrumentally) through the actions of other parties or actors affected by the original change. To name one such scenario, the final decision of an EPF on a new Treaty, or intra-EP developments, may provide the ideological fuel for a party to leave, distance itself or come closer to the EPF in question. To name another, parties of new member states may feel intense pressure from approaching enlargement and/or from the (initial) demands from their EPFs. 2 Overall, this kind of ‘impact’ must not mean necessarily that instrumentality is not present, on behalf of national political parties. Because, it is one thing for change at the EU level to generate a self-perceived adaptational pressure (of various degrees) on parties and another how parties respond to such adaptational pressure, especially since the absence of “direct legal inputs”, makes such adaptational pressure non-binding. Furthermore, responses to changes in EU-level processes and policies are not necessary to happen immediately after these changes materialize, in order to be considered as the result of these changes. Therefore the independent variable must be conceived in a temporally wide manner, since a party may react to the formation, or development of a parliamentary group, or EPF, for example, years after this formation or development happens. On the other hand, a constraint indirectly induced by the EU needs not be even the result of a tangible change at the EU level. Evolving membership patterns, moves and changes by parties from the same national party system, or other domestic factors, influencing a party’s behavior, may lead a party to feel a pressure or a constraint from or at the EU level. Nevertheless, the very presence of the EU level is the main factor translating the domestic change into a ‘problem’ and therefore, the ‘real cause’.

The other channel is that of opportunity-seeking and includes a ‘move’ in transnational affiliations on one’s own incentive, simply in accordance with the (changing) goals of a party at the (Europeanized) national level, again independent of whether something has

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2 Indeed, this is the context in which Ladrech (2009b) uses the term ‘EU-induced constraints’ (see section five of this article for examples).
recently changed at the EU level, or not. Hix and Goetz (2000: e.g. 10) make clear that Europeanisation’s character may mean that the EU provides all kinds of domestic actors with opportunities to pursue their interests. Although Ladrech (2009a: section five; also 2010: 134) argues that “the view that the EU acts as an environmental political opportunity structure” has comparatively little application, “because of the lack of material benefit that can be achieved [by parties]”, this may be thought to change once we take under consideration the instrumental use of transnational affiliations for profile change, adjustment or reconfirmation, that will in turn contribute to domestic material change.

In both cases, the central guidepost, remains whether the presence and development of a new reality, that is built and molded into shape on the basis of policies and decision-making processes, affects the strategic considerations of parties aimed at “attaining indispensible goals”, by presenting them with either opportunities or constraints, within the context of their Europeanised (at least to a degree) political systems. Indeed, Ladrech acknowledges the usefulness of the opportunity/constraint approach. He argues that, “to the extent empirical changes in political parties can be traced to the influence of the EU, the causal mechanism is less a pressure to adapt than the exploitation of opportunities to advance interests and/or measures taken to resist the spillover of EU issues interfering and thus complicating party leadership goals and activities” (Ladrech 2010: 134). The message of the literature on party stances towards the EU is similar. A strong point in this literature is, as Conti (2007: 200-1) says, the argument that, “parties should change their positions [in regard to the EU in this case] only when they shift ideologically, or according to a process of gradual adaptation of a given ideology to the set of opportunities/constraints produced by the integration process over time”.

The hypothesis developed earlier ultimately rests on the assumption that a party’s EU affiliations and joint activity are used instrumentally to transmit at the domestic level instrumental signals of ideological change. (It is worth repeating, that) while transnational affiliations will change, or at the least, be utilised, in the sense of being used instrumentally\(^3\), the final outcome will be a party’s manoeuvre to shape its profile in accordance to its interests at the domestic level. In other words, transnational affiliations are a tool of adjustment, having a mediating effect between an EU cause or reality and a domestic result, and should ultimately be treated not as the object of Europeanisation but as its intermediary.

This brings us to the second question that needs to be answered: why would European integration, affect parties’ ideological profiles through their transnational affiliations? Let us briefly discuss the underpinnings of the instrumentality assumption, in order to establish the possibility of transnational affiliations being used for transmitting ideological signals. The instrumentality assumption is mostly a child of the rationalist logic which stresses the institutional impact on the strategies and exogenous preferences of political parties, as opposed to the social-constructivist logic, that is, the logic of choosing the appropriate institutional link to shape existing preferences (see Börzel 2010). Through this lens, the instrumentality of transnational affiliations as transmitters of ideological signals may have various objectives, within the context of either EU-induced or EU-related change and whether parties are under pressure from the EU level or simply exploit it. Ideological signals may be motivated by changes in ideological sympathies or even as a primary, testing or consolidating sign of broader ideological renewal. Alternatively, parties may simply attempt to exploit the structural opportunities offered by specific networking practices at the EU level in order to attain a successful domestic status overall, or to promote a policy outcome (Lefkofridi 2010: 4) and concurrently to project their policy contribution accordingly. In this respect, change in a party’s patterns of transnational

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\(^3\) And in this sense the argument fits into Ladrech’s general framework of Europeanisation affecting basic party functions.
affiliations can be expected to ensue, except when the advantages of continuing an existing relationship (tactical support, financial assistance, programmatic expertise, etc.) are perceived to outweigh those of leaving or pursuing another.

Given that the above advantages will not be seriously affected or that they can be easily restored in alternative networking settings, a third possibility is that it may be essential for these ideological signals to be transmitted, in order to appease moderate or radical supporters; perhaps, because of a new policy direction taken by the EU. Although, it has been generally thought that a party’s transnational affiliations (and more specifically EP group membership) are most of the time not of worry for national electorates (see Maurer et al. 2008: 249), ideological signals stemming from parties’ transnational affiliations can be thought to substantively affect leadership cohesion or the loyalty of parties’ core voters or members only, rather than their overall goal of vote-seeking. In those few cases where the electorate is more aware of developments and cooperation at the EU level, these ideological signals may feed directly into the vote-seeking or office-seeking goals of national parties, especially when party system realignment and newly emerging gaps make it opportune to change or adjust one’s profile. For instance, while Ladrech (2008: 145) argues that in Western Europe, voters are most of the time not even aware of EP groups and party federations, he also acknowledges that in Eastern Europe, the latter have played an important part in developing ideology and in advice on party campaigns (also see later). Especially office-seeking explains in the largest part, according to some scholars, national parties’ desires to pursue transnational cooperation (see Hanley 2008).

Yet, what is the rationale of arguing that a party’s affiliations and networking activities at the EU level, transmit an instrumental ideological message, which is potentially salient enough to have a bearing on the profile of a party in its domestic electoral arena, in terms of any particular strategic goal(s)? Evidence from the existing literature attests to the existence of a valid rational. Firstly, beyond the generally accepted claim that the visibility of European affairs in the mass media has increased (see Risse and Van de Steeg 2003), a substantial amount of resources and publicising is spent on transnational networking by national political parties themselves. National political parties have developed departments of European affairs and other mechanisms (websites, booklets, bulletins, newsletters, etc.) that contribute to the consistent projection of their linkages to and activities at the EU level. The fact that these mechanisms are mobilised mostly during (European) election time may indeed be taken to constitute proof that parties’ transnational affiliations are used as necessary strategic weapons for vote-seeking - when party competition and voters’ information collection around the EU issue are at their fullest.

In addition, the literature overall tells us that parliamentary groups and especially EPFs have grown “timidly” in terms of size, visibility, professionalisation and resources, exactly because the national components of Europarties “often seem to be concerned with justifying their actions at the national level” (Bardi 2004: 20). Hence, national parties seem to prioritise the implications of their transnational activity on their domestic requisites, rather than the advancement of the transnational project in which they engage. Indeed, the intra-party significance of transnational networking lies at the core of such behaviour. The issue of EPFs, particularly, has been a cause of “inflaming intra-party dissent”, internal divisions or debate, to the extent that it encloses and partly conditions the party’s – projected or substantive – ideological orientation (see Johansson 2004: 30-31)\(^4\).

\(^4\) Indicatively, for the European Left Party (ELP), see March and Dunphy (2010); Lightfoot (2010); for the European Green Party Federation, see Bomberg (2002); for the European People’s Party and the Party of European Socialists, see Hanley (2010: chapters 4 and 5); for the extreme right, see Mares (2006).
Lastly, the labels and ideological images distinguishing the EPFs and party groups at the EU level and hence also the labels and ideological images of individual parties that participate in different EPFs and party groups are antagonistic along competing policy agendas. Since the late 1970s, the European level political parties have been increasingly behaving in an organised, relatively cohesive (and objectively cohesive for the larger EP groups) and competitive fashion. Not so much along national loyalties but along European transnational interests and ideas and more specifically on a left-right axis (indicatively see Hix and Noury 2009; Hix 2002; Kreppel 2000). At the outset, each party group and/or party federation espouses one or more labels-values. For instance, the groups of the radical left champion opposition to neo-liberalism and project common positions on a number of other wide-ranging policy areas (Dunphy 2004: 169-73), while the ultimate “litmus test” for joining the European People’s Party (EPP) would be the acceptance of federalism (Hanley 2002: 469). Movement between party groups or federations would therefore clearly signal some form of ideological change or adjustment to those aware of the party political set-up at the EU level, not only in terms of the policy dimension but perhaps also in terms of the teleological one. In support of this argument, recent Eurobarometer data show that voters’ perceptions of the EP seem to increasingly reflect the latter’s competition-based, ideological demarcations (European Parliament 2010: 13).

In all, core issues are at stake within the microcosm of EU-level networking and these are dealt with through specific ideological choices that signify sensitivity to conditions on the ground. They are also transmitted to national arenas with effort and attention and deciding on them has often caused internal friction. The above points indicate a logic in the assumption of a link between the domestic party organisation’s overall strategy and that part of its strategy that materialises at the transnational level. To assume then that parties are ideologically instrumental in the affiliations they pursue at the supranational level is no more illogical than to assume they are ideologically instrumental in other areas of activity.

This of course does not imply that the party literature, which refers to the historical and ideological embedding of parties (e.g. Marks and Wilson 2000), should be ignored. Let us briefly consider the argument. Marks and Wilson (2000: 459) argue that political parties have significantly more in common with parties in the same party family than they do with other parties in the same country. The reason for this is that parties are shaped by their distinctive historical experiences, the most influential elements of which are the ideological propensities and constituency links that arise out of the basic cleavages that structure contention in a society. The thesis of this article is that if one wishes to know how a political party will respond to a new issue like European integration, one must pay close attention to these historically embedded predispositions.

Nevertheless, this is exactly the reason why changes in the ideological profiles of parties must be conceptualised separately from wholesale ideological redefinitions of certain parties that constitute movement across party families. Put simply, instrumental, ideological signalling is not the same as an overall re-evaluation of the integration process, in the sense that the former is centered on the framing of a party’s ideology and is instrumentally used to satisfy one or more out of a variety of domestic goals, while the latter has been found to be mainly cleavage-based and historically rooted, and thus be less susceptible to change (although not completely resistant). Retrospectively, this is also the reason, that changes in the EPF and parliamentary group affiliations of national political

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5 For a challenge to the above see Gabel and Carrubba (2004).
6 What remains more fluid is the specific party goal that changing one’s transnational affiliations aims at. What exactly different parties seek and manage to achieve through changing their transnational affiliations will highly likely depend on the contingencies of domestic and partisan contexts.
parties, mostly occur between ideologically neighbouring networks and rarely, if ever, involve travelling great distance across the EU-level ideological spectrum. Also, cleavage theory tends to fail in those cases [not only in CEE] where political competition is more fluid and party systems less stable (see Neumeyer 2008: 155).

**Conceptualising and measuring change**

Having discussed the instrumentality assumption that underpins our focus on transnational affiliations, let us now turn to the possible manifestations of changes in transnational affiliations, within the context of party-based Europeanisation. What are transnational affiliations? And what kind of transnational affiliations are likely to be affected in cases of party-based Europeanisation? The existing literature on EU politics has mainly referred to national parties’ transnational affiliations, as a progressive inter-connection between these parties and their respective EPF or parliamentary group. There is scarce if any mention of transnational or international networking in its broader, bi-lateral, as well as multi-lateral sense. This may partly have been the result of omitting the issue of profile change, since bi-lateral and other forms and signs of affiliation do not usually involve concrete organisational, educational and financial incentives. On the other hand, bilateral and other forms of affiliations may be consequential in assimilating or socialising some parties, especially new entrants, into western patterns and EPFs (Enyedi 2007: 70) and thus in projecting a specific profile. Beyond this, since in other areas of party activity, Europeanisation research is centered on uncovering indirect effects, there is no good reason to limit a priori the various manifestations of Europeanisation, through changes in transnational affiliations. European integration may condition much more than a party’s links to its respective EPF. The following possibilities are still unconsidered, for when the EU level is used towards shaping a different ideological profile for a party:

1) A party will rethink its overall affiliations within the EU and European sphere;
2) A party will alter the levels of its activity and mobilisation at the EU level, be it within the EP or outside, in so far as these are altered in pursuit of less or more identification with its existing partners;
3) A party will divert attention and resources from non-EU groups and parties towards EU-related groups and parties, or vice-versa;
4) A party will alter, emphasise or de-emphasise those of its bi-lateral affiliations which relate to the transnational level (possibly as a first step towards 1) and 3)).

Indirectness again seems to be a key consideration. While in terms of programmatic change, for instance, change resulting from Europeanisation is traced and measured by focusing on the policy proposals a party puts forward in national congresses and electoral manifestos, here what is of essence is the ideological message transmitted by alteration in patterns of transnational affiliations. This ideological message can in turn be traced and measured only indirectly and by approximation. Let us first deal with change in the choices parties make about partners and networks. The choice of affiliations that the party pursues at the transnational level, indicate among other things, the type of partners and joint activities it wishes to engage with. Given that other actors, be they national parties, federations of parties or groups, have average ideologies that are an aggregation of separate ideological fabrics and in so far as joint activities can be ascribed an ideological connotation then interaction at the transnational level can be assumed to get across an ideological signal that is derived from the aforementioned, average ideology or ideological connotation, of the objects of socialisation. Pitched at the summative level, activities, affiliations, parties, EP groups and EPFs have to be ascribed a position, for example, on the pro-European integration-anti-European integration axis or on the left-right axis, before moving on to trace the position of the actor that engages in or affiliates
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with them. Secondly, profile change can be inferred and measured only when considering
the potential de-socialisation object(s) as well. In order to do so, one must consider any
potential difference between the ideological profile of those activities and actors that are
left behind, substituted or downplayed and those that are given precedence or absolute
attention.

In its most basic form, the effect of European integration on the ideological profiles of
political parties, through change in these parties’ transnational affiliations can take one of
three directions, as in the areas of programmatic change and patterns of party
competition. Employing either a left-right or a pro-EU-anti-EU axis, these are:

1) Europeanised parties will engage in such activities, relate to such parties and
party groups, or give such emphasis to them in such a way that shows they have
become more moderate and accepting of a wider spectrum of opinions.

2) Through the same mechanisms, Europeanised parties can appear as more radical
or rejectionist than before.

3) Through the same mechanisms, Europeanised parties can appear to reconfirm
and establish further their existing ideological profile.

Concurrently, studies of specific party families or parties may be better posited in
considering the more historically specific intra-party family issues and axes of diachronic
disagreement, rather than aggregately employing given axes. For instance, stronger bi-
lateral affiliations or joint activity within the EP, with a market-liberal party on behalf of a
social-liberal one can be assumed to point directly towards change in the socio-economic
dimension of the liberal ideology. An opening up by a Marxist-Leninist party to the
northern European radical left, within or outside the EP, may likewise enclose more
attention to post-materialist values. A historical review that distills specific changing points
for parties is also a useful way whereby the link between the EU and parties’ ideological
profiles, as well as any resulting changes, can be specified with accuracy, since change in
one’s transnational affiliations, - let alone one that is important enough to reverberate
within and outside the party - is unlikely to occur frequently or even linearly.

Networking with other actors is, however, not epitomised only by choice of partners and
shifts between them (i.e. realignment), since each choice is pursued to a certain extent (i.e.
entrenchment). As noted throughout, it is also a matter of emphasis or the downplaying of
- that is, more or less passive behaviour regarding - specific transnational links. This caveat
is best exemplified by the question, how closely a member party identifies with its
respective party federation – e.g. as a participant or as an observer – party group or, other
affiliate parties? Or, why do different national parties choose to integrate themselves into
an EPF and other transnational groupings and activities at different times, speeds and
degrees, in spite of common accession trajectories and the common benefits (e.g.
information) that accrue from EPF membership? As contented earlier, the degree of
cooperation, in other words the degree of organisational entrenchment, as well as the
salience in party discourse placed on specific modes of transnational affiliations, may also
be used as indicators by themselves of the intensity of ideological identification with the
objects of cooperation.

Other indicators of salience and organisational entrenchment, may include the activity of
parties and party leaders and personnel within and outside the EP - in terms of the EP’s
legislative and other instruments of intervention and in terms of the frequency of
meetings, joint declarations and common initiative building – ‘recruitment into appointive
and elective offices’ (Ladrech 2002: 399) and any signs and reports of internal
reorganisation aimed at supporting, enhancing or changing the above. Such institutional
activities may be thought to depict willingness or the need to emphasise and/or integrate
oneself into particular transnational networking patterns that arise, either due to changes in EU rules or policies, or because of the increasing importance ascribed by fellow actors to an already established transnational network, itself arising from EU rules at a previous time, or because of the EU-related opportunity to capitalise on the issue domestically.

**Empirical pointers from the literature**

Let us consider some practical examples from both sides of the ideological spectrum. For instance, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), whose MEPs joined the conservatives in 2009, is a case in point, where an ongoing attempt to project a more moderate and pro-federalist image (Huysseune 2002), within the newly emerging bi-polarity of the Italian party system, existed. As Huysseune (2002) argues, the party’s discourse “reflects widely voiced opinions on the necessity of reforming the Italian state, making it more democratic, and creating institutions that would be able to integrate the country in the European Union and its developing system of multi-level governance”. Surely, joining the conservatives cannot by itself explain AN’s change, especially since a pro-federalist conversion started much earlier than 2009 and therefore one should also look at the domestic scene to get a full picture of party behaviour. In the case of AN, such a look tells us that joining the EPP was the natural evolution of the party’s behaviour in the past decade, as well as that it reflects more its new voters-centered ideological profile and less its ‘inside’ or rank and file ideology. Describing this situation, Huysseuene (2002) writes that it is difficult to categorize AN straightforwardly. In its public discourse and official statements, it is very careful to avoid extremist and racist language, and its statements on national and European identity are difficult to distinguish from conservative or moderate mainstream opinions. Within the present centre-right government, it often tends to defend more moderate positions than the Lega or even Berlusconi. At the European level, it maintains its distance from extreme right parties, and prefers to cooperate with French Gaullists. At the local level and within its rank-and-file, however, more extremist tendencies and nostalgia for fascism are clearly still present.

Indeed, Italy, as a fluid electoral and partisan arena, provides examples of a number of parties that seem to confirm this article’s core argument. The former Italian Communist Party (PCI) is another case in point, for when ideological change is on the way. Its move from the group of the Unitary European Left to the Socialists group in the European Parliament was completed months before the official announcement of party leader Achille Ochietto’s ‘svolta’ into the social democratic left. Important may also be the party’s extensive socialisation (joint conventions, exchanges, congress invitations, bi-lateral relations) with social democratic and green parties, in France and Germany especially, years before its eventual transformation (see Dunphy 2004: 47-8).

In an analogous manner, there are already cases, which show that parties’ transnational affiliations may be partly responsive to the changing parameters of competition in their respective party systems. The case of the Portuguese Partido Social Democrata (PSD) is telling of this. Its affiliation to the Liberal International and the ELDR (European Liberal Democrats) until 1996 can be ascribed less to its true (inside) ideology and more to the occupation of the conservative ideological space in the Portuguese party system by the Centro Democrático e Social - Partido Popular (CDS-PP). The subsequent entrance of the PSD into the EPP followed shortly after the CDS-PP was expelled from the EPP (Freire 2006). Likewise, the Romanian Democratic Party (PD), took advantage of the political vacuum on the non-nationalist right of the political spectrum in the post-2000 period (Pop-Eleches 2008: 476) and (is one of those rare cases to have) transformed from a centre-left to a centre-right party. In so doing, it joined the EPP less than six months after the 2004
on other occasions, EU-level developments can provide stimulus for implementing previously contemplated change in transnational affiliations. The most prominent and discussed example of such a case is that of the British Conservative party's abandonment of the EPP. Ideological discomfort with the EPP's policies and character existed on the part of the Conservatives for some time. As Lynch and Whitaker (2007: 33) argue, "domestic concern at the EPP link grew as the Conservatives became a more Eurosceptic party both at Westminster and at grassroots level. Considerations of party unity and ideological consistency became more prominent for Conservative leaders when addressing the issue. During his leadership campaign of 2005, soon-to-be party leader David Cameron pledged to leave the EEP. Once sufficient alliances to form an alternative group were secured by the Conservatives, an exit from the EPP was completed in 2009 and a new group, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), emerged in the EP. Essentially enlargement had made more parties available, especially at the 2009 European elections and two parties left the Alliance for Nations group (UEN) and joined the ECR, making the materialisation of the Conservative's plan practically possible. The party rationalised its choice, not only on the basis of its many long-term disagreements with EPP policies, but also the culmination of these in the divergences on the Lisbon Treaty.

For the parties of new member states and their transnational affiliations, the Europeanisation effect is also a question of first choice. The other parties, the EPF, the parliamentary group and more broadly the networking patterns, which a new entrant initially approaches or is influenced by, can by definition be translated into an ideological move, resultant of European integration and more specifically EU enlargement. Therefore, although most of the examples from Western Europe given in this article appear to be mostly cases of opportunity-related Europeanisation, it may be that in the case of CEE parties, Europeanisation translates also, if not more tangibly, into a constraint; since these parties are presented with the 'perceived adaptational pressure' of having to project their belonging to Europe and having to choose quickly the most beneficial for them identity.

Europeanisation in the case of CEE parties also encompasses a certain degree of directness. Timus (2009) acknowledges the instrumentality implicit in domestic actors' interests, while also stressing the direct channel of change in the EU's impact on CEE parties. According to Timus (2009: 5), parties engage with EPFs voluntarily, in accordance to "perceived political legitimacy benefits" but once on the road to membership, face direct pressure, since they have to comply with EPF's requirements. How they respond to this direct pressure, whether for example they do all necessary to speed up their full identification with an EPF or simply suffice to an associate status and then hold back and not seriously project and entrench their EU level affiliation, is again a matter of strategic interests; hence, the case for instrumentality still being a strong theoretical possibility.

Scholars have also registered that the relations of CEE national parties with various EPFs (especially the two main ones) have been largely speeded up and taken shape by the latter's initiative to expand to new member states (see Holmes and Lightfoot 2011: 38; Delsoldato 2002; Pridham 2001). Therefore, phenomena of initiative on behalf of EU-level actors remind that, as Mendez et al. (2008: 294-95, cited in Ladrégh 2010: 41-42) suggest, any attempt at tracing a link between the EU and domestic level, would also have to take under consideration possible variation in the motivation of particular EU actors. Put differently, certain parties or party systems (even among CEE countries themselves) receive more pressure or more specific ideological gestures of welcome from above, than others. Pridham (2001, 1996), for example, evoked early on the crucial contribution of transnational parties to the development of CEE parties, in terms of policy programmes, campaigning and ideological profiles. Apparently, a different constellation of contextual
factors than in the case of west European parties, has led to a more profound impact on CEE parties’ ideologies. Where pressure from above, in combination with unclear or nuanced ideological profiles and unconsolidated organizational structures exist – choosing, socializing with and accepting assistance and influence from a parliamentary group or an EPF has also acted as a catalyst to ideological “crystallisation” or reorientation (Spirova 2008; see also Delsoldato 2002; Pridham 2001, 1996) and not simply profile adjustment. It remains to be seen whether affiliations of CEE parties that do not necessarily or directly involve an EPF, have led to similar outcomes or are underpinned by similar motives as EPF links.

Turning to levels of emphasis and more broadly entrenchment, existing empirical pointers may be more limited but they do exist. For instance, regarding the far left of the political spectrum, there is evidence to suggest that parties which project a deeply sceptical or rejectionist view of European integration in terms of the latter’s core values (such as the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the Dutch Socialist Party (SP)), systematically stress the rational of their refusal to join their party family’s newly formed federation and avert bilateral affiliations with actors that were among the main initiators of this EU-induced federation (see March and Dunphy 2010; Charalambous 2011). In contrast, parties such as Die Linke, Synaspismos and Rifondazione Communista, which have been sceptical of the EU but more open to the integration process and inter-ideological cooperation, have responded differently to the EU’s opportunities of organising with other like-minded parties at the transnational level and therefore have invested much rhetoric and resources in creating and projecting an EPF of those to the left of social democracy (the European Left Party – ELP) (see March and Dunphy 2010; Charalambous 2011).

Especially Rifondazione’s case bears solid signs of entrenchment/emphasis on the European dimension in terms of transnational affiliations. Rifondazione’s general secretary served twice as an MEP, thus increasing the liaison between national party and EP delegation, and was later also elected to the presidency of the ELP (Charalambous 2011). Rifondazione’s EP activity is much higher than both the Italian and the United European Left’s (GUE/NGL) average. And, the 6th Congress of the party passed the proposal to use as a symbol of the party that used in European elections (Sinistra Europea), in an attempt ‘to put in the forefront the strategic choice of the ELP’ (Charalambous 2011). These moves appear to be linked to the then party leadership’s strategy of opening up and consolidating its influence in the movements (Charalambous 2011).

As a last note, mainstream parties that project a public enthusiasm over their connection to their EPF and wish to exercise a dominant role, such as the Spanish Partido Popular (PP), have also undergone some solid organisational changes which were aimed at supporting or enhancing their transnational links and which echoed their leaders’ explicit identification with the party’s respective EPF (see Van Hecke 2009).

Conclusion
The literature has told us little about the relation between European integration and the function of political parties to network at the transnational level. Surely, what has been projected so far by the literature as a possible manifestation of party-based Europeanisation through changes in parties’ transnational affiliations is of undisputed value. Parties organise themselves at the transnational level and incorporate the European dimension of political competition and/or policy-making into their networking practices, by building links to other transnational actors and verbally supporting them. However, this approach leads to a narrow conceptual and empirical focus since it ignores the instrumentality of the role of transnational affiliations in changing a party’s ideological
profile, and therefore treats parties’ transnational affiliations only as objects and not as intermediaries of change.

This article has sought to extend previous discussions on party-based Europeanisation by incorporating the extant argument about instrumentality into the analysis of parties’ transnational affiliations. The central plunk of its perspective is based on the hypothesis that, in the presence of European integration’s opportunities and/or constraints, parties will seek to reconfirm or change their image, partly via, emphasising, downplaying, or changing their transnational affiliations. The link that runs between European integration to change in the ideological profiles of parties, through change or adjustment in parties’ transnational affiliations, seems to be theoretically validated and rationalised, as well as supported by a bulk of empirical pointers from the literature. Much remains to be done, however, at the empirical level. For example, questions oriented towards elaborate empirical testing could focus on: the empirical grounding of the phenomenon across time and space; any visible patterns with regard to party family, party system position, duration of membership, and so forth; the most common national level objective pursued by parties, which fit this theoretical argument.

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References


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National Parliaments as New Actors in the Decision-making Process at the European Level

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Abstract

National parliaments have two basic ways of influencing the outcomes of the European decision-making process. First, they influence national input legitimacy at the national level on European issues through influencing and controlling their respective national governments. Second, they influence national input legitimacy at the European level on European issues through directly entering into the European decision-making and interacting with the European institutions participating in it. To be able to make use of this second possibility, national parliaments have to devise instruments of cooperation and coordination and learn to use them effectively. The first steps have already been made: national parliaments exchange information on their scrutiny of European legislation and other activities through their permanent representatives in Brussels, the IPEX database and other channels. This article examines the cooperation, or, at least, information exchange among national parliaments on a number of legislative proposals - those chosen for coordinated tests of subsidiarity by national parliaments themselves, those most voted on in the Council of the European Union (EU) and those subjected to three readings in the co-decision procedure - discussed between May 2004 and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It shows that national parliaments face difficulties caused by the high costs of such cooperation, including the need for flexibility and speed of their own decision-making, as well as administrative costs, whilst they increasingly use the cooperation channels available to them.

Keywords
Democratic deficit; National parliaments; Subsidiarity check

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN decision-making process. It considers the ways in which national parliaments can influence the decision-making process at the European level and the possibilities for their cooperation and coordination. The calls for greater engagement of national parliaments have been related to the question of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU) and reflected in various practical institutional developments, as well as in academic works. As the national parliaments are state-based and not European institutions, and until recently, had officially not been directly involved in European decision-making at the European level, they have so far influenced European decision-making only at the national level through the control or the mandating of actions by their national governments in the process. The impact of European decision-making on national parliaments and the importance of the systems of national parliamentary scrutiny for alleviating the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ have been acknowledged in the literature on national parliaments (e.g. Pahre 1997; Raunio 1999; Raunio and Hix 2000; Benz 2004; Kiiver 2006). The systems of

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many of the Member States are also well known (Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Falkner 2000; Cygan 2001; Hansen and Scholl 2002; Hegeland and Neuhold 2002; Holzhacker 2002; Pollak and Slominski 2003; Maurer and Wessels 2001; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Tans, Zoehout and Peters 2007). However, the role of national parliaments at the European level has been evolving much more slowly. National parliaments were mentioned for the first time in a protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty and were given their first official rights and competences by the Lisbon Treaty. This resulted in some research on their European-level role, mostly focusing on legal aspects and the future prospects for the application of the early-warning subsidiarity control mechanism introduced by that treaty (for example, Raunio 2005; Fraga 2007; Cooper 2006; Louis 2008; Cooper 2010).

This article further develops this research. It focuses on the role of national parliaments at the European level by examining the coordinated tests of subsidiarity that the national parliaments organised in preparation for the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the European channels and tools of cooperation of national parliaments, as well as their use in cases other than subsidiarity control. It adopts a rational choice-based approach analysing the national parliaments as actors seeking to maintain or increase their power in the decision-making process.

The article is organised as follows. The first section describes recent developments in the roles of national parliaments in the EU. The second section conceptualises the role of national parliaments in the European decision-making process and presents the hypothesis. The third section presents the data. The fourth section is dedicated to empirical evidence regarding the activities and cooperation of national parliaments in the cases of coordinated subsidiarity checks. The fifth section presents the empirical evidence on other selected cases, followed by a final conclusion, summing up the findings.

Recent developments in the roles of national parliaments in European integration

The importance of the role of national parliaments in European integration stems from the way the parliaments have been affected by it. The decision-making capacity of national parliaments has decreased and there has been a transfer of decision-making authority from the parliamentary level to the Member States’ executives (Holzhacker 2002: 460; see also Katz and Wessels 1999: 11). At the same time, the importance of the role of national parliaments stems from the fact that they are directly elected and thus more strongly legitimised than most of the other organs and institutions (Kiiver 2006: 71). Kiiver (2006) goes on to explain this statement further from two key angles, namely the national constitutional and European perspectives. The first means that, as governments participate in the adoption of EU legislation that is binding upon national parliaments, parliaments do not participate in it in the same way as in the case of domestic legislation. There is therefore a lack of effective accountability of national governments to their national parliaments for their EU policies, effectively creating a ‘de-parliamentarisation’ at the Member State level. The second refers to the idea that “poor parliamentary oversight over the governments’ EU policy may essentially mean an interruption of the chain of democratic accountability that leads up to the decision-making in the Council” as the only way to legitimise the Council, neither directly elected nor accountable, via the individual accountability of ministers to their respective national parliaments (Kiiver 2006: 71-80). We could add a third point in developing the European perspective, namely that, if national parliaments do not have direct access to European decision-making, the whole process lacks sufficient legitimisation, as the powers of the EP cannot counterbalance the limitations that national parliaments face (O’Brennan and Raunio 2007: 3).

Thus, the role that parliaments may, want and will play in European integration is important to the question of European democracy. So far, national parliaments have been
able to take part in the European decision-making process mostly in their national arena, and their powers and influence there have depended almost solely on national rules. At the same time, the discussion on the democratic deficit and the need for institutional reform of the EU in the 1990s and 2000s have resulted in various incentives, and even legally binding rules, for the inclusion of national parliaments at the European level of the European decision-making process.

The Treaties first recognised the role of national parliaments in declarations attached to the Maastricht Treaty (Declaration on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, Declaration on the Conference of Parliaments, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992) and a protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty (Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, Official Journal C 340, 10 November 1997). The Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty merely stated that the involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the EU should be encouraged. The Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty notably stressed the need for national parliaments to be informed and to have enough time (i.e. six weeks) to study proposals in certain areas such as the third pillar of the EU. It also referred to the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), especially to its right to make contributions to the European institutions and to examine legislative proposals in the area of freedom, security and justice. In this way, the need for the involvement of national parliaments was officially declared in the European treaties without giving them any actual powers at the European level. The unsuccessful Treaty establishing the Constitution for the European Union (Official Journal C 310, 16 December 2004), as well as the Lisbon Treaty (Official Journal 306 C, 17 December 2007), contain a Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and a Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, introducing a tool allowing national parliaments to directly intervene in EU decision-making.

In their latter version (i.e. Lisbon Treaty), which are now in force, the Protocols contain an obligation for the Commission to forward all the proposed legislation directly to national parliaments and also strengthen the possibility to object to it. National parliaments have the right to object to a proposed legislative act due to its non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity within eight weeks (against six weeks in the Constitutional Treaty proposal) of the transmission of the proposal. If at least one third of the votes of national parliaments\(^1\) object on non-compliance grounds, the proposal must be reviewed (a so-called ‘yellow card’). If a simple majority of the votes of national parliaments objects to such non-compliance, the proposal must be reviewed, and a reasoned opinion of the Commission and the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity must be considered by the legislator (a so-called ‘orange card’). Pending the ratification of the treaty, President of the Commission Barroso introduced a mechanism for forwarding the documents to national parliaments, known as the ‘Barroso mechanism’, which has been applied since September 2006. Also, the COSAC has organised the first coordinated test of subsidiarity following the drawing up of the protocols annexed to the Constitutional Treaty to test how the system might work if ratified, and followed this practice ever since in expectation of such a system eventually becoming the everyday reality of European decision-making. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty also contains a new article regarding national parliaments (Article 12 of the Treaty on European Union) and various other provisions mostly requiring national parliaments to be informed on certain issues.

**Conceptualising the role of national parliaments in the EU**

In relation to the levels at which national parliaments may act, and the channels of legitimacy, we may define two basic perspectives for examining national parliaments:

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\(^1\) Every national parliament has two votes. If the parliament is bicameral, every chamber has one vote.
National parliaments influence national input legitimacy at the national level on European issues by influencing and controlling their respective national governments and the positions those uphold in the Council of the EU. This occurs according to national rules that differ in every country, whilst also sharing many similar features. The formal powers of national parliaments range from the simple scrutinising and adopting of non-binding resolutions to the possibility of mandating the government. At the same time, some parliaments with weaker formal powers may also be able to influence their government’s position rather effectively.

National parliaments influence national input legitimacy at the European level on European issues by directly entering into the European decision-making process and interacting with European institutions participating in this process, especially the European Commission and the European Parliament. The first attempt to include this role in the treaties has been made in the above mentioned Protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality attached to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties.

This article focuses primarily on the second perspective and the interconnection of the two levels.

National parliaments at the European level have been conceptualised as a “virtual third chamber” (Cooper 2010). This means that the national parliaments as a group have, under the provisions of the early-warning mechanism, many characteristics of a parliamentary chamber, such as the oversight of the executive, public deliberation and collective decision-making. However, this is virtual as its members do not meet together in the same physical space (Cooper 2010: 7). Cooper claims that national parliaments have more collective power under the early warning mechanism than other institutions that aspired to be the third chamber, such as the European Economic and Social Committee or the Committee of Regions, and more power than the European Parliament had at some stages of its development. Cooper thus concludes that, even though there are serious obstacles to the application of the system, the future potential influence of national parliaments over legislative developments should be taken seriously (Cooper 2010: 28).

Moreover, the interconnection of both levels may be conceptualised via multi-level governance approaches (see, for example, Bache and Flinders 2004). Multi-level governance is often conceived of as a governmental and institutional game (for detailed analysis of multi-level governance and its relation to the question of democracy, see Peters and Pierre 2004). Players in this game, the national parliaments in our case, can enter the game and align at different levels, namely both the national level/national political system and the European level/European political system. These levels are then inter-linked, in the sense that individual national parliaments can play an important role at both levels.

Crum and Fossum (2009) used the multi-level governance approach and the notion of ‘field’ (Bourdieu 1989) to create “a new heuristic tool”, namely the notion of a multi-level parliamentary field. This entails, first, the character and density of inter-parliamentary interaction, second, the character of parliaments as the constitutive units of the field and, finally, the mutual relation and interaction of these two dimensions.

This article reflects all these concepts in the sense that it acknowledges the multi-level nature of the European decision-making process and the involvement of national parliaments in it. While the focus is on their participation in the decision-making process at the European level, it also takes into account interactions with the national level. For example, the reasons for the cooperation of national parliaments may be at the European level (for example, some characteristics of the specific issue), the European and inter-
The hypothesis underpinning this article is based on the rational-choice approach. This choice was prompted by the fact that, while most of the literature on the national parliaments and European integration is normative (i.e. it examines national parliaments as legitimising factors), much of the recent literature on European decision-making is closely related to rational choice (for example, Hosli 1995; Tsebelis and Garret 2000; Thomson et al. 2006). If we then take normative reasoning as the starting point for being interested in the increasing role of national parliaments, we should investigate that role using approaches that analyse the role of other actors in the European decision-making process. The basic rational-choice assumption is that actors seek to maintain and increase their influence in the decision-making process. Therefore, national parliaments should seek influence in European decision-making. Its multi-level nature should prompt them to attempt this at multiple levels, including the European level.

The European level currently offers national parliaments one clearly defined legal tool, namely the early warning mechanism. However, this mechanism has two main limitations. First, officially, it allows national parliaments to control only the question of subsidiarity. At the same time, unofficially, it is well understood that multiple objections on the part of national parliaments would have to be taken into account by other institutions (two interviews with representatives of national parliaments to the EP, Brussels, May/June 2008; two interviews with staff of the Czech Parliament, January 2009). Therefore, even if there has not been any sufficient number of national parliaments criticising the compliance with the subsidiarity principle in any specific case yet, this mechanism can still work well as a channel to voice any kind of objections that national parliaments may have. Second, the early warning mechanism allows national parliaments to substantially influence the decision-making process only as a group, or a substantial part of a group. This leads to a need for mutual cooperation and coordination if national parliaments want to achieve results directly at the European level, which is already assumed here.

This need to act collectively (see also Olson 1965) has led national parliaments to take various steps to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation. These include:

- the establishment of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) in 1989, which serves as a forum for the exchange of information and as an organ of coordination (for example, also in the case of the coordinated test of subsidiarity (see below));

- the practice of having parliamentary representatives stationed in Brussels (currently only two national parliaments – those of Spain and of Malta – do not have a permanent representative in Brussels);

- the creation of the IPEX website in 2004 following a Danish initiative in order to facilitate the exchange of information of parliamentary opinions on proposed European legislation and other dossiers; IPEX contains dossiers on all proposed European legislation and allows national parliaments to upload information on their scrutiny process and subsidiarity checks, including any documents the parliament has drafted or adopted in the process.

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2 It is important to note that this article does not consider COSAC an actor per se, but merely a forum allowing national parliaments to try to act collectively at the European level.
However, it seems clear that the costs of cooperation of 27 national parliaments consisting of 40 parliamentary chambers, and, in the case of subsidiarity checks, of the need to achieve one third or a majority of votes may be very, if not too, high. Moreover, the number of actors also increases uncertainty – will all or a sufficient number participate and/or cooperate? At the same time, as some countries, such as Denmark, have been great supporters of inter-parliamentary cooperation, such as COSAC and IPEX, these high costs must have been apparent to them. Therefore, it is important to look for other reasons than immediate gain.

Lahno (2007: 444-446) introduces what he calls a coordination rule. Simply put, he says that there are some who follow coordination rules because they believe that it is right:

A person who adheres to the rule will still, and in spite of the disadvantage he faces, endorse that it is (and was) right to follow the rule; rather than regretting his action he will blame the others for acting wrongly. The rule follower will perceive the imperative of the rule as categorical, as prescribing the right way of conduct rather than as describing his personal means to achieving his ends. It is true that if nobody else follows the rule, then the rule follower will in the long run most probably adapt his way of action, and he may also revise his conviction about the authority of the rule (Lahno 2007: 445).

Regarding national parliaments, we may expect some national parliaments – namely, coordination rule followers or coordination supporters - to cooperate. Nevertheless, they will probably prefer some low-cost forms of cooperation. This may not immediately lead to significant results in terms of the power of national parliaments at the European level, but it may attract those parliaments which so far have not been very interested or active in European issues at either level, and may make them more aware of the possibilities to influence the European legislative process.

The resulting hypothesis can therefore be formulated as follows: national parliaments seek influence in European decision-making; therefore, they will increase their activities and pursue mutual coordination. The increase in these activities and cooperation may be hampered if the costs of such cooperation are too high, but the attempts at cooperation may continue even if there are no immediate gains.

This article tests this hypothesis on the behaviour of national parliaments by analysing the so-called coordinated tests of subsidiarity and other legislative proposals being discussed since the enlargement in 2004.

Data

The data used in this article to analyse the cooperation of national parliaments mostly reflects the use of IPEX and, in the case of the coordinated tests of subsidiarity, some other tools or channels of cooperation.

The coordinated tests of subsidiarity represent the first step, as they were important for developing channels of cooperation including IPEX. The national parliaments have organised them through COSAC following the drawing up of the protocols annexed to the Constitutional Treaty in order to test how the system might work if ratified, and they have followed this practice ever since in expectation of such a system eventually becoming the everyday reality of European decision-making - as it did, since the last such test was completed just after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. As these tests constitute a relatively easy (pre-prepared) opportunity to attempt to coordinate the efforts of national parliaments, it is the first obvious source of the empirical evidence.
Other cases used for the analysis were chosen on the basis of some aspects of the specific decision-making processes. Extensive databases on the EU decision-making were created and used for the project, and the following criteria were used to pre-select other cases:

- Proposals in which at least five Members of the Council cast a dissenting vote (i.e. voted against or abstained) in the period of five years after the enlargement. This criterion is based on the assumption that if a proposal that is problematic enough for some Member States to vote against it or abstain at least once, this should illicit more interest from national parliaments, as their deliberations are usually based on cooperation with their governments. Cases of confirmatory applications of public access to documents and anti-dumping related issues were excluded from the set (as they are not well suited for parliamentary scrutiny).

- Legislative proposals adopted by the Commission after the Enlargement in 2004 that underwent the process of three readings in the codecision procedure. This criterion was based on the assumption that such rare proposals were more problematic for the European Parliament and that there are some contacts between the EP and the national parliaments, ergo such cases could also illicit the interest of national parliaments.

The application of these criteria resulted in the set of 25 cases.

**Cooperation of national parliaments in the coordinated tests of subsidiarity**

As mentioned above, the coordinate subsidiarity checks run as if the appropriate protocols (to the Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty) were in place. The choice of a proposal to be submitted to a check was usually made beforehand based on the interest of national parliaments in an intended legislative initiative announced in the Commission working plan.

The first ‘pilot project’ of a subsidiarity check was agreed by the COSAC at its XXXII meeting in the Hague in October 2004, in order to assess how the early-warning mechanism established in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Constitutional Treaty might work in practice.

There have been eight completed coordinated subsidiarity checks, the last of which was running when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force:

1. **3rd Railway package** - test running between 1 March 2005 and 12 April 2005;
2. **Regulation on the applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters** – test running from 17 July until 27 September 2006;
3. **Proposal for the full accomplishment on the Internal Market for Postal Services** – test running from 31 October until 11 December 2006, (but translation into nine languages was finished only by 6 November);
4. **Proposal for the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism** – test running from 26 November 2007 until 21 January 2008, (the first test running for eight weeks according to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty);


Every national parliament runs the subsidiarity check according to its own national procedures. Usually, one parliamentary committee is responsible for the check, and it may ask other committees to give an opinion, and, sometimes, the plenary might be involved. The parliament must carry out the check quickly enough to comply with the six or eight week deadline, but at the same time it is in its interest to carry it out with as high a quality of expertise as possible. So, if the parliament finds a case of non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, its reasoned opinion will be harder to contradict. In theory, including other Committees than the European Affairs Committee into the process brings more expertise as it requires more time and may always help the effectiveness of the process.

In addition to subsidiarity checks questions (when the parliaments would attempt to influence the legislative process via the scrutiny systems by influencing the positions taken by their governments in the Council and coordinated their efforts to increase the chance of changing the proposal), the timing is also important as the chance to influence the substance of the legislative proposal is higher at the earlier stages of the decision-making process, when there is detailed negotiation on partial issues.

Two major challenges for national parliaments related to the subsidiarity checks can be identified, namely the compliance with the deadline and the further exchange of information and cooperation, apart from the fact that parliaments conduct a subsidiarity check on the same issue.

Complying with the deadline was the biggest problem that national parliaments faced when testing the early-warning mechanism on subsidiarity. During the first three tests, the deadline was set for six weeks. According to reports on these tests by COSAC and responses to questionnaires, the parliaments completed each test, but six weeks was considered too short a period to carry out the whole subsidiarity check process, including preparing reasoned opinions. This limited the capability of the parliaments and committees to make necessary consultations. In the case of the second coordinated test (relating to divorce matters), only eleven parliamentary chambers from nine Member States concluded the check in time. However, more parliamentary chambers finished the check by the time a report on the check was drafted by the COSAC secretariat in the second half of November. According to the report by COSAC, ten parliaments in total particularly noted that the time available for national parliaments was not sufficient for a proper consultation procedure. The problem was aggravated by the fact that the test was running mostly during the summer recess. In the case of the third test (concerning postal

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3 There might be exceptions based on the organisation of the committees in individual Member States, for example in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, the committee responsible for European Affairs has various sectoral sub-committees.
4 All the reports and questionnaires are available at [http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/](http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/)
services), only ten parliamentary chambers from nine Member States completed the check before the deadline. By the time the report by COSAC was drafted, at the end of January 2007 and some seven weeks later, 27 parliamentary chambers from 21 Member States had completed the check. Moreover, not all the language versions were available when the check started, thereby either shortening the deadline for some national parliaments or forcing the officials and members of parliament to work in a language other than their official one (especially in the new Member States).

The fourth check (on combating terrorism) was the first to run according to the Lisbon Treaty provisions, which prolonged the test to eight weeks. Also, the timetable for the check was, for the first time, set only when all the language versions were already available - as stated in the Lisbon version of the Protocol -, and not beforehand as it had been done in the previous cases (with the already mentioned result that those checks had started before those version were available). Thus, in this case, 25 parliamentary chambers from 20 parliaments concluded the check by the deadline. At the end of January when the COSAC report was drafted, 29 parliamentary chambers from 23 Member States had concluded the check. Nevertheless, some national parliaments still reported that the period was too short.

The number of ‘successful’ parliaments dropped again during the fifth check (on antidiscrimination) due to the fact that the check was again carried out during the summer recess. Only 17 parliamentary chambers from 13 Member States concluded the check by the deadline. Another 15 parliamentary chambers from 13 Member States started the check, but could not complete it in time because of summer recess. Some of them proposed to disregard the four weeks of August, but such an initiative would have required the support of the European institutions engaged in the legislative process.

The sixth check (concerning transplantation) faced the problem of the Christmas recess. However, by the deadline, 27 parliamentary chambers from 20 Member States had completed the check, whilst four others had started, but had not managed to finish in time. The seventh check was again carried out during the summer period. In this case, 21 parliamentary chambers from 17 Member States were able to complete the check within the deadline, and ten other chambers from nine Member States started the check, but did not finish it in time. Once again, the summer parliamentary recess was identified by many parliaments as the cause for delay in the check. The eighth check was the most successful in this respect. The check was completed by almost all of the parliaments, with 36 parliamentary chambers from 25 Member States participating in the process.

It is clear from the above cited data that parliaments encountered two main external obstacles that prevented them from completing the checks in time. First, it was the late availability of the legislative proposal in question, including the respective language version. This obstacle has been removed by new rules applied since the fourth check. Second, it was the short deadline, a problem often aggravated by the timing of subsidiarity checks during parliamentary recesses, as shown by a comparison between the fourth and fifth checks. On the other hand, the number of parliaments or parliamentary chambers capable of finishing the procedure in time seems to be rising despite such timings (see the last check), suggesting that parliaments are able to learn from previous cases and speed up their internal procedures. Improvements in timing of the individual scrutiny procedures in each parliament should allow parliaments to tackle the important issues of timing and effectiveness of mutual cooperation.

In theory, every parliament could carry out the check on its own without any interest in the proceedings of the others. However, parliaments have a better chance of achieving the required majority if they mutually communicate their opinions before the checks are over. The COSAC reports on the coordinated subsidiarity checks contain, since the fourth check,
data on cooperation, specifically the use of IPEX, but also other channels such as exchanging information via national parliaments’ representatives in Brussels or through other bilateral contacts. Table 1 summarises the degree of parliaments’ cooperation with other parliaments. During the fourth, fifth and sixth checks, nine, 18 and 17 parliaments or parliamentary chambers respectively reported some cooperation with other parliaments. Only 14 parliamentary chambers reported such contacts during the seventh subsidiarity check, but 18 chambers cooperated in the last subsidiarity check.

**Table 1: Cooperation of national parliaments in the coordinated subsidiarity checks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National parliament</th>
<th>Any attempt at cooperation with other parliaments (NA for 1-3)</th>
<th>Cooperation through permanent representatives</th>
<th>IPEX used to search for info. on scrutiny in other nat. parliaments</th>
<th>Cooperation with individual parliaments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria Bundesrat</td>
<td>4,5,6,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,5,6,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium Chamber of Representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium Senate</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4,5,6,7,8</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>4,5,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5,7,8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,7,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic Chamber of Deputies</td>
<td>5,6,8</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic Senate</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France - Assemblee nationale</td>
<td>4,6,7,8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,6,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France - Senate</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany Bundestag</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany Bundesrat</td>
<td>4,5,6,7,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,5,6,7,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4,5,6,8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,5,6,8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4,7,8</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy - Chamber of deputies</td>
<td>5,6,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,6,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy Senate</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td>6,7,8</td>
<td>5,6,7,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4,5,6,7,8</td>
<td>6,7,8</td>
<td>5,7,8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All types of cooperation mentioned are limited to only the exchange of information. Moreover, the use of the IPEX database usually does not prove useful. Member States often do not post any detailed information, or they post it too late for the others to consider. There are also linguistic challenges. Many national parliaments post documents only in their respective national language(s), which also hampers possibilities for cooperation. For example, in the case of the sixth subsidiarity check, there were 23 parliamentary chambers that posted documents. In 10 cases, the document was available in English (and in the national language if different), whilst there were 13 documents in national languages (in four cases, this was French and in two cases, German). In the case of the seventh subsidiarity check (concerning the issues of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings), two weeks before the deadline for the check, the webpage did not contain any document. It contained 19 documents three weeks after the deadline, most of which had been posted after the deadline. Whilst participation improved in the eighth check, the availability of the documents via IPEX did not. Seventeen chambers did not upload the information before the end of the check. Also, information was often available only in the original language. Simply put, many parliaments repeatedly report difficulties in accessing the results in other national parliaments. For example, in the case of the second subsidiarity check, the Dutch Parliament complained that only a few documents regarding scrutiny in other parliaments were available through IPEX, and none of them were in French, English or German. Similar reservations were also raised in other checks by different parliaments. The French National Assembly, on the occasion of the third test questionnaire, emphasised this problem in relation to the short period available for the check.

Another interesting point concerns the approach to cooperation. According to the questionnaires and reports, multiple countries are often interested in proceedings in specific countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark or France. At the same time,
these countries, especially Denmark and the United Kingdom, do not actively seek cooperation themselves. The countries whose proceedings are interesting to others are mainly those with strong parliamentary scrutiny (such as Denmark, see for example Raunio 2006) or with formally weaker, but still influential systems (for instance, for their expertise – such as in the case of the United Kingdom – see for example, Neuhold and de Ruiter 2010). The parliaments that seek information are often those with weaker scrutiny systems or those from the new Member States, which are also weaker in practice (such as those of Portugal, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania (see for example, Maurer and Wessels 2001; O’Bernnan and Raunion 2007)).

Use of the IPEX database in other selected cases

The exchange of information among national parliaments on other selected issues was analysed on the basis of the data on the use of IPEX, specifically how many parliaments or parliamentary chambers post information, and how usable this information is to others. Table 2 shows a slight, but noticeable, increase in posting information on IPEX. More parliaments post at least some kind of information; for example, they use status icons or post links on the documents in their language. Similarly, more parliaments post detailed information, such as opinions and minutes, in English, French or German, which are the working languages of the EU institutions. At the same time, it is obvious that most of the parliaments posting most information in languages easily usable by others are also mostly the parliaments that have no need to translate them, as these are their official languages. The only exceptions were the Czech Senate in three cases, the Italian Senate in two cases and the Polish Sejm, also in two cases. They all used English translations of their documents. This again points to the high costs of efficient cooperation and information exchange, namely the time and cost of the translations. Among parliaments that tend to post any information are those with stronger powers (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany) or the parliaments of new Member States (especially Poland and the Czech Republic), with the exception of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Some information, even if it is in a language that is not commonly used, may also be helpful, as it sometimes encourages those interested to contact the person responsible in the respective parliament to ask for further information as suggested in some reports on the coordinated tests of subsidiarity and interviewees (two interviews with national parliaments’ representatives to the EP, Brussels, May/June 2008).

The data on the use of IPEX also suggests the different importance of the criteria used for the selection of cases. The number of parliaments posting information on cases that were selected because they underwent three readings under the codecision procedure (distinguished by ‘3rdg’ in the first column of the table below) was much smaller than in the other cases; in addition, no increase was recorded. This would suggest that incentives from the national level prompt more cooperation than incentives from the European level. However, the number of these cases was small (i.e. eight) and most of them were part of a package on maritime safety (COD 2005/237 to 241).
Table 2: Use of IPEX by individual parliaments or parliamentary chambers in other selected cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussed in years</th>
<th>Dossier</th>
<th>Number of parl. posting any info.</th>
<th>Parliaments posting any info.</th>
<th>Number of parl. posting detailed opinions in EN, FR or DE</th>
<th>Parliaments posting detailed opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>COD/2003/175 (04/05)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DK Folketingsrett, FR Senat, UK House of Commons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FR Senat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-06 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2004/175</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DK Folketingsrett, IT Camera dei Deputati, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-06 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2004/218</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IT Camera dei Deputati, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DE Bundesrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-09</td>
<td>COD/2004/209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>COD/2005/41 (05/06)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IT Camera dei Deputati, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>COD/2005/43 (05/06)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IT Camera dei Deputati, PL Sejm, PT Assembleia da Republica, SE Riksdagen, UK House of Commons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DE Bundesrat, IR Oireachtas, IT Senato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>CNS/2005/44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DK Folketingsrett, PL Sejm, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IR Oireachtas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2005/191</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IT Camera dei Deputati, ML Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati, PL Sejm, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-09 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2005/237</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-09 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2005/238</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-09 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2005/239</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-09 3rdg</td>
<td>COD/2005/240</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Chambers</td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
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<td>--------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>CNS/2006/173</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>DK Folketingent, DE Bundestag, ML Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati, PL Sejm, SE Riksdagen, UK House of Commons</td>
<td>2  DE Bundesrat, FR Senat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>COD/2005/260</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>DK Folketingent, DE Bundestag, IT Camera dei Deputati, HU Országgyűlés, PL Sejm, PL Senat, SL Drzavni Zbor, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>4  CZ Senat, IR Oireachtas, UK House of Commons, UK House of Lords</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>CNS/2006/162</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>DK Folketingent, DE Bundestag, ES Senado, IT Camera dei Deputati, LU Chambre des Deputes, PL Sejm, SE Riksdagen</td>
<td>3  DE Bundesrat, IR Oireachtas, UK House of Commons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The empirical results show that national parliaments do use the opportunity presented by the coordinated subsidiarity check and learn to use this process and coordinate their efforts, but with limited success, due to time constraints and costs of cooperation. Several specific conclusions may be drawn from the presented empirical evidence.

First, national parliaments do have problems complying with the deadline set for the subsidiarity checks, but prolonging the period from six to eight weeks did improve their capability to finish the process in time. However, while the time is now sufficient to complete the check itself, it is not enough to improve their ability to cooperate or coordinate with other national parliaments. Second, the timing of the subsidiarity check in the course of the parliamentary year has a substantial impact on that ability, and another actor, the Commission, has the ability to influence that timing by choosing the date for adopting the legislative proposal.
Third, the coordinated checks of subsidiarity prompted the national parliaments to introduce various channels of cooperation (COSAC, the IPEX website and IPEX correspondents, representatives of national parliaments, direct bilateral contacts), and these led to some increase of such cooperation, but many national parliaments often report it to be ineffective and not up-to-date. The cooperation is limited to the exchange of information. The costs of more effective cooperation would probably be too high. Information shared in time to serve as an input for other national parliaments would require speeding up the process in the parliament sharing the information, thereby creating the need for investing more resources in scrutiny – greater workload in a short time, a need for speedy translation services, meetings convened at unusual times, and so on. Fourth, despite the points made above, the coordinated test of the checks of subsidiarity served as a learning mechanism for the national parliaments. The experiences from the first few subsidiarity checks helped to improve the procedure as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty version, prolonging the period for the subsidiarity checks and establishing its beginning as the date when versions in all official languages are available.

Fifth, the use of IPEX in the other selected cases also suggests that the parliaments increasingly use the IPEX - the channel they created specifically for the exchange of information on their scrutiny of EU decision-making. At the same time, it is used mostly by the same parliaments or parliamentary chambers, and the information posted is usually not easily usable by others. Also, the number of parliaments or parliamentary chambers posting information on IPEX remains rather low. However, these parliaments persist in such cooperation, which can be interpreted as adherence to the coordination rule (Lahno 2007). Sixth, the parliaments that offer information are often those with strong powers in European affairs. On the other hand, the parliaments who seek information are almost exclusively those that are weaker and / or less experienced. While the second fact is a logical result of their need for more information, the actions of stronger parliaments can be attributed only to the support for future cooperation and adherence to the coordination rule. Seventh, there is also some limited evidence that incentives from the national level lead the national parliaments to attempt cooperation more often than incentives from the European level.

To sum up, some progress in cooperation among national parliaments can be seen. However, many improvements would be needed if national parliaments wanted their collective voice to make a substantial difference in European decision-making. Thus the high costs of cooperation seem to prevail over the national parliaments’ desire to increase their influence.

Moreover, although such a scenario is rather unlikely, if national parliaments were able to effectively coordinate their efforts on national stages, they could be able to change or stop a legislative initiative in the Council via a sufficient number of their national governments.

***

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Measuring the Impact of EU Support for Cross-border Regional Cooperation

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Toni Mora  
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Montserrat Millet  
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**Abstract**

The European Community has provided financial support for cross-border territorial cooperation since 1990. The justification of the European Union (EU)'s current territorial cooperation policy for cross-border contiguous regions lies in its capacity to promote functional economic links between them. This capacity is based on two assumptions, namely that there is a relation between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the financial support provided by the EU, and that there is a relationship between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links. This article attempts to measure both the impact of Community support on territorial institutional cooperation intensity and the impact of institutional cooperation intensity on economic functional links. This is done using primary data for EU-15 regions for the period between 1992 and 2007.

**Keywords**

European Union; Regional policy; European cohesion policy; Territorial cohesion; Territorial cooperation; Cross-border cooperation

The European Community has provided financial support for cross-border territorial cooperation since 1990. This began as a community initiative entitled INTERREG. However, since 2007, it has been one of the three priority objectives of the European regional policy, together with Convergence and Regional Competitiveness and Employment. Furthermore, the importance of regional cooperation has increased since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in December 2009, as it has become the main instrument of the European Union (EU)'s new objective of territorial cohesion. Territorial cohesion has been added to, and complements, the well-established European objectives.

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments.

of economic and social cohesion. It represents the EU’s new commitment to breaking the predominant core-periphery model of economic development that is characteristic of Europe, to achieve a more balanced approach. Nevertheless, territorial cohesion is a wide concept that has led to different interpretations. To this day, there only seems to be consensus on the belief that territorial cooperation is conducive to territorial cohesion. These concepts can be linked as follows: the more regional cooperation is achieved, the greater territorial cohesion is in the EU.

Efforts have been made to research the territorial impact of various EU sector policies (ESPON 2006). Nevertheless, as Hague (2006) and Dühr et al. (2010) point out, each project has adopted its own methodological approach. There is no common methodology to assess the territorial impact of a policy. Moreover, the impact or added value of territorial cooperation in terms of concrete outputs is difficult to measure for two main reasons: first, the small scale of the financial resources involved, and second, the shortcomings in monitoring systems and data collection (Dühr et al. 2010; Milwaldt et al. 2009; Taylor et al. 2004).

Both the European Commission and researchers have tried to evaluate the impact INTERREG has had on the territorial cohesion of the regions involved through qualitative analysis. Research includes qualitative studies that assess one or more cases of cooperation in depth (Mirwaldt et al. 2009; Matthiessen 2005; Knippenberg 2004; Kramsch and Hooper 2004; Perkmann and Sum 2002; Koschatzky 2000; Krätke 1999; Stryjakiewicz 1998; Brunn and Schmitt-Egner 1997) as well as formal evaluation reports (INTERACT 2007; Taylor et al. 2004). All of these studies indicate that territorial cooperation contributes to making citizens from different nationalities overcome cross-cultural communication problems.

According to Mirwaldt et al. (2009: 31), five general consequences of INTERREG have been identified in the literature. First, cooperation programmes promote the EU goal of territorial cohesion by supporting enhanced cooperation between member states. Second, they enable specific territorial problems to be tackled. Third, they provide for learning and exchange of experience. Fourth, they can bring together different types of organization which do not regularly work together. And finally, they can result in a significant increase in the number, intensity and dynamics of cross-border contacts at national, regional and local levels.

The article aims to contribute to this effort in order to measure the impact of EU’s support for territorial cooperation on territorial cohesion. Specifically, it offers an attempt to measure, on the basis of quantitative methods, the impact of Community support on the development of functional economic links between the cross-border contiguous regions of EU-15.¹ The research presented here is based on the argument that the impact of EU’s support for cross-border regional cooperation on territorial cohesion depends upon the existence or intensity of two relations. First, its impact depends upon the existence of a relationship between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the financial support provided by the EU, and second, on the existence of a relation between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links.

This article is divided into six sections. The first two sections analyse the aim of EU support for territorial cooperation in general, and of geographically contiguous border regions in particular. The third section explains the methodology that has been followed to measure the impact of cross-border territorial cooperation on the development of economic

¹ EU-15 refers to pre-2004 EU Member States.
functional links between the regions involved. The fourth and fifth sections present the results, and the final section offers some conclusions, as well as limitations to the study.

The aim of the EU support for territorial cooperation

A policy is generally considered effective when its objectives are met (Molle 2007). Therefore, the first step in an impact analysis is to determine the objective of a measure or policy. Regional cooperation is currently one of the three priority objectives of European Regional Policy (ERP). Consequently, its final objective is that stated in Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion.

In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.

To date, the EU has been characterised by a core-periphery territorial development model.2 The European pentagon is delimited by London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg. It covers less than a fifth of the current surface area of the EU (14 per cent), but contains a third of its population (32 per cent) and makes up almost half of its GDP (47 per cent). This economic driving force of Europe, which is also known as the 'Blue Banana',3 is the only EU zone that can compete on a global scale. There is evidence of a gradual process of convergence between different groups of regions in the EU-15 (Molle 2007). However, according to the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON 2004, 2006), current territorial trends still indicate that many of the global scale functions are clustered in the pentagon.

The new general objective of the EU, as stated in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, is to attain territorial cohesion. This will lead to a new strategy to break the core-periphery model that has characterised Europe to date. It should complement and add to the ERP’s well-established objectives of social and economic cohesion to achieve more balanced economic development. In the words of Dühr, Colomb and Nadin (2010: 60),

[c]oncerns about the socio-economic disadvantages that a spatial structure with a strong core and weak periphery implies for economic and social cohesion lies at the heart of EU policy-making, and is the rationale for the considerable support given under the EU Cohesion Policy to regions that are ‘lagging behind’.

Debates on territorial cohesion are not new.4 The European Spatial Development Perspective was agreed at Potsdam in 1999 by the ministers responsible for spatial planning after a ten-year process of deliberation; the European Commission introduced territorial cohesion in its Cohesion Reports as early as 2001, and in 2007 an informal Territorial Agenda specifying six territorial priorities for the EU was agreed.5 However,

2 For a classification of regions between the core and the periphery, see Molle (2007: 88-89).
3 For more on the core-periphery conceptualisations of Europe, see Dühr et al. (2010), Chapter 5.
4 As Dühr et al. (2010: 191) remind us, the story began with the Council of Europe, which “provided the main arena for international debate on spatial development and planning in Europe” until the late 1980s.
5 For a detailed account of the European debate on territorial development from the 1950s until now, see Dühr et al. (2010).
there is still no consensus among member states and researchers on the significance of this new common objective.\(^6\)

According to Mirwaldt, McMaster and Bachtler (2009), there are at least four different definitions of territorial cohesion among member states and researchers, depending on whether they are based upon polycentrism, balanced development, accessibility or networking. In the words of these authors, territorial cohesion can be seen first, as polycentric and endogenous development, aiming to cultivate several clusters of competitiveness and innovation across Europe. Second, it can be seen as a balanced development model with the primary aim of reducing socio-economic disparities and avoiding imbalances. Third, territorial cohesion is sometimes formulated in terms of accessibility, i.e. the ambition for citizens to have equal access to facilities, services and knowledge, regardless of where they live. And finally, it could be seen as a form of networking, giving emphasis to the physical and interactive connections that exist between different communication centres and that also link them with their surrounding areas (Mirwaldt et al. 2009: v).

According to Doucet (2006), all those interested in territorial cohesion consider that it should lead to some sort of spatial justice while promoting the horizontal coordination of all those policies that have a spatial impact, such as agriculture or transport policy. The greatest divergence of opinion relates to what exactly territorial cohesion entails in practice. This article identifies two general approaches to this quest for the "European Holy Grail": that of “protector knights” and that of “mystical knights”. For the former, territorial cohesion means a range of positive discrimination steps in favour of various penalised areas outside the EU pentagon, for which resources should be concentrated in regions of a specific category at the expense of others. The latter are “the heirs of the post-war urban and regional planning tradition” (Doucet 2006: 1478), since they believe in the need for integrated territorial planning strategies.\(^7\)

In any case, both Doucet’s “protector knights” and “mystical knights” consider that Community efforts in favour of territorial cooperation between sub-national units, channelled through both the current European regional policy third objective and its forerunner INTERREG, are an instrument at the service of territorial cohesion. As Mirwaldt et al. (2009: 2) express it: “disagreements about the meaning of territorial cohesion may abound, but there is near-universal acceptance that territorial cooperation is conducive to territorial cohesion”.

In turn, this belief is based on the assumption that territorial cooperation is conducive to the reduction of the border effect between different member states (Dühr et al. 2010; Mirwaldt et al. 2009; Faludi 2009; Barca Report 2009; Fernández Tabales et al. 2009; European Commission 2008; Molle 2007). Cross-border regions face linguistic, regulatory, administrative, cultural and even physical (mountains, rivers, seas) barriers, which reduce spillovers from neighbouring regions. To quote van Gorp (2009: 359), “[b]ecause borders can obstruct movements (of people, business, capital, goods and services) they can not only obstruct spillovers but also the play of centripetal and centrifugal forces”.

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\(^6\) Along these lines, Begg (2010) argues that there is also a lack of consensus on the definition of economic and social cohesion. Molle (2007: 12) argues that “cohesion is an elusive concept. It has been made operational by selecting and defining indicators of disparity. Less disparity means more cohesion; more disparity means less cohesion”.

\(^7\) Faludi (2009, 2007) could be considered one of the main representatives of the “mystical knights”. In his opinion, territorial cohesion implies the definition of a European spatial model and, alongside it, a European social model. In the same line, Dühr et al. (2010: 189) have recently explained how the “ongoing debate around the concept of territorial cohesion is helping to distinguish the characteristics of the European spatial planning model from other domestic national models”.
This review of the literature on territorial cohesion led to the following conclusion. Behind the efforts to promote regional cooperation in the EU is the idea that the more cooperation we attain, the smaller the border effect will be and the easier it shall be to break the core-periphery model of territorial development that has characterised Europe to date. However, there are many ways to define and foster regional cooperation.

The aim of EU support for cross-border regional cooperation

The EU currently distinguishes between three forms of territorial cooperation and allocates different resources to each one. Regional cooperation in the INTERREG I (1990-1993) Community Initiative only took into account cross-border or transfrontier cooperation, that is, cooperation between geographically contiguous border regions, including maritime borders (CEC 1990). In INTERREG II (1994-1999), the area of regional cooperation was extended to large multi-national spaces, which is known as territorial transnational cooperation (CEC 1994, 1996). Finally, INTERREG III (2000-2006) included interregional cooperation, to create European cooperation and exchange networks among non-contiguous regions (CEC 2000). The objective of current territorial cooperation covers all three of these forms of cooperation, as stated in Council Regulation 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the ERP (EC 2006).

The impact of the ERP on regional cooperation may vary according to the type of cooperation that is being addressed (Dühr et al. 2010). This research focused on cross-border cooperation between contiguous regions, for example, the cooperation found between regions on both sides of member states’ sea or land borders within the EU. There are two reasons for our choice of focus. First, this is the only type of cooperation that has been supported by the European Community since 1990. Second, it is the type of cooperation that has received the largest financial support in the EU. As shown in Table 1, it has always been allocated more than 50 per cent of the regional cooperation budget.

Table 1: EU financial support for cross-border cooperation since 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community support</th>
<th>Cross-border cooperation</th>
<th>Territorial Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERREG (1990-93)</td>
<td>ECU 800 million</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERREG II (1994-99)</td>
<td>ECU 2.400 million</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERREG III (2000-06)</td>
<td>EUR 2.437-3.900 million</td>
<td>50%-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIRD OBJECTIVE ERP</td>
<td>EUR 5.576 million</td>
<td>73, 86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This does not amount to much money, if we take into account that over 30 per cent of the European Community budget is allocated to ERP (i.e. 308 billion euros for 2007-2013).

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8 For an account on the evolution of the support on the European Community on transboundary territorial cooperation programme and projects see Dühr et al. (2010).
9 In the case of Interreg III, the Commission Communication 2000/C143/08 establishes in the second paragraph of section 48 that “Member States will ensure that (on an indicative basis) between 50% and 80% of their total allocation for Interreg III is allocated to cross-border cooperation under strand A”. Dühr et al. (2010) estimate that 67 per cent of the total budget was devoted to this strand.
However, from 1990 to the present, the EU has increased the resources available for regional cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular. Hence, it is giving increasing importance to this area.10

One important question is what the EU hopes to obtain with its support for cross-border cooperation. A comparative analysis of the regulations and other documents relating to cross-border cooperation shows that from 1990 to the present day Community efforts in this area have been mainly characterised by continuity (Garcia-Duran et al. 2009). As far as the objective is concerned, cross-border territorial cooperation has always sought to reduce the costs of the border effect by promoting permanent cooperation strategies both in the public and private environments and in the economic, social, administrative and judicial environments.

Nevertheless, there has been a change in the definition of these costs. Thus, where previously support was sought for underdeveloped regions facing a range of economic problems deriving from the elimination of border controls, today support is required to stimulate the benefits of border effect reduction (i.e. to reduce the costs still arising from border effects). In INTERREGS I (1990-1993) and II (1994-1999), the primary goals were to promote the economic development of regions suffering the effects of their peripheral border location and to provide them with compensation for the loss of income resulting from the elimination of internal customs within the European Community. From INTERREG III (2000-2006) onwards, the objective is to reduce border effects because they hinder economic and social integration. In other words, we have gone from compensating the costs of the border effect reduction caused by the internal market to seeking the benefits of border effect reduction, such as developing functional economic links.

To sum up, the EU has shown a continuous commitment to the promotion of stable cooperation between border regions. With its support, the EU hopes to increase the level of cooperation between border regions and thus ensure the development of functional economic links. Two analyses are needed to measure the effectiveness of this policy. First, we should establish whether there is a relation between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the financial support provided by the EU. Second, we should assess whether there is a relation between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links.

**Measuring the impact of EU support**

The definition of the EU’s objective in supporting regional cooperation between contiguous regions has restricted the scope of this article to a study of the EU-15. Consequently, cross-border cooperation between the first 15 members of the EU has been analysed, as more data are available on these members and the period of analysis is longer (1992-2007).

The database used here is therefore that of the EU-15 regions; the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) for 1999 is also used.11 On the basis of these data and information on the cross-border associations that have formed along the internal EU borders of these countries, which was provided by Perkmann (2003) and INTERACT (2007), a sub-database of the NUTS-3 regions was created that belong to some of the 24 cross-border regions (CBRs) that were identified. A list of the 24 CBRs can be found in Table 2, as

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10 However, the increase in 2007-2013 was largely due to the entry of 12 new Member States into the EU (Garcia-Duran et al. 2009).

11 NUTS was established by the EU statistical office to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units. As Dühr et al. (2010: 34) put it: “It is a five-level hierarchical classification that subdivides each member state into NUTS 1 regions, each of which is in turn subdivided into NUTS 2 regions and so on”. 
well of an account of the NUTS-3 regions that form each of them.

Table 2: The 24 CBRs selected for this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euroregions or Work Communities</th>
<th>Member states</th>
<th>NUTS 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Ems Dollart Region</td>
<td>Germany/Netherlands</td>
<td>8 Oost-Groningen, Delfzijl en omgeving, Overig Groningen, Zuidoost-Drenthe, Emde Kreisfreie Stadt, Aurich, Emsland, Leer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sonderjyllands-Schleswig</td>
<td>Denmark/Germany</td>
<td>4 Sønderjyllands Amt, Nordfriesland, Schleswig-Flensburg, Kreisfreie Stadt Flensburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Skargarden</td>
<td>Finland/Sweden</td>
<td>6 Åland (coast lines), Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi, Stokholms Län (coast lines), Uppsala Län, Södermanlands Län.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Europaregion Tirol</td>
<td>Italy/Austria</td>
<td>10 Tiroler Oberland, Innsbruck, Tiroler Unterland, Ossirot, Pinzgau-Pongau, Oberkärnten, Klagenfurt-Villach, Udine, Belluno, Bolzano-Bozen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Isole</td>
<td>Italy/France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ireland-North Ireland</td>
<td>Ireland/Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ireland-Wales</td>
<td>Ireland/Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fyn-KERN</td>
<td>Denmark/Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Storstroms Amt/Ostholstein Interreg</td>
<td>Denmark/Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Germany/Luxembourg/Luxembourg</td>
<td>Germany/Luxembourg/Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>France/Germany</td>
<td>France/Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>SaarlorluxRhein/Walloonia-Lorraine-Luxembourg</td>
<td>Belgium/France/Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Transmanche region/Rives Manche</td>
<td>France/Great Britain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 24 present CBRs of EU-15 are not homogeneous. As shown in Table 2, most of the CBRs (i.e. ten of them) are composed of between six and ten NUTS-3 regions. Six CBRs are formed by between 11 and 15 regions, six by less than six regions and just two by more than 16 regions. This is because Cooperation projects based on proximity at European level include the so-called Euroregions, as well as the Work Communities. The former have been widely developed among contiguous territories of the Rhine basin, but typically include few regions. The latter, which include the Western Alps and Galicia-Northern Portugal, typically group together more than four regions. Nevertheless, this article considers the degree of institutional cooperation in the CBRs, rather than their size. To classify these CBRs according to the degree of institutional cooperation achieved, data from a detailed article by Perkmann published in 2003 was used. In this article, Perkmann established a typology of cross-border associations for regional cooperation. Specifically, he enabled us to classify cross-border associations as high intensity or low-intensity, depending on the degree of institutional cooperation. According to his data, at the beginning of this century, only eight of the 24 EU-15 CBRs maintained a permanent secretariat and had drawn up both development plans and comprehensive cooperation schemes. As Figure 1 shows, most high-intensity CBRs are found in the European pentagon and the Scandinavian countries.

Figure 1: High-intensity cross-border regions

Sources: Perkmann (2003) and NUTS (1999)

Two highly intuitive indicators to assess whether there is a relationship between the level of cooperation and the financial support provided by INTERREG were used in this study. The first indicator depends on the date of creation of the CBRs and how they are financed. The more associations were formed after the implementation of INTERREG in 1990 and the more INTERREG-funded projects they carry out, the greater the impact of EU support is. The second indicator is related to the classification of CBRs by the intensity of their cooperation. This article analysed whether the high-intensity CBRs received more or less
INTERREG funding than the others. As stated by Molle (2007: 227), “[w]hat needs to be measured is the difference between the ‘without intervention’ and ‘with intervention’ situations”.

Finally, an indirect indicator to establish whether there is a relationship between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links was used. To obtain data on changes in functional links between regions, the article measured the impact of CBRs on the extent of economic specialisation. The higher the level of cooperation is in the CBR, the greater their impact should be on the levels of economic specialisation of regions.

The spatial distribution of regional economic activity in the EU has been the focus of growing research interest (Cutrini 2010; Mora and Moreno 2010; Mora et al. 2006; Escurra et al. 2006; Hallet 2002; Molle 1996). Research in this field provides contradictory conclusions on the role of CBRs. On the one hand, these empirical contributions have proved the relevance of regional contiguity in explaining EU regional sectorial specialisation, and therefore CBRs may have an important role to play in the European regional specialisation pattern. However, due to the existence of the border effect, one would also expect the specialisation levels of CBR economies to be less prone to the influence of foreign contiguous neighbours than they are to that of their national counterparts alone (van Gorp 2009; Grasland 2006).

To identify the effects coming from cross-border neighbours, this article has used spatial econometrics techniques to compare the specialisation pattern of regions involved in cross-border cooperation, both high and low intensity, with that of all the adjoining regions of the EU-15 – whether cross-border or not – for the period 1992-2007. The article assessed whether the border effect is lower in high-intensity CBRs than in low-intensity CBRs, by measuring the impact of cross-border associations on the economic specialisation pattern of regions.

A spatial error model was built, as Equation (1) shows, that explains specialisation in region \( i \) in time \( t \), i.e. \( Y_{i,t} \). The period analysed is \( t = 1992,\ldots, 2007 \) and \( i \) represents each EU-15 region. The NUTS 2 level was chosen as the spatial unit for performing our analysis, given that this is the highest level of disaggregation for which statistical information is available.\(^{12}\)

\[
y_{i,t} = X_{i,t} \beta + \alpha_i + \eta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
z_{i,t} = \rho W z_{i,t} + v_{i,t}
\]

The vector \( X_{i,t} \) collects the regional macroeconomic variables that are useful for proxying the determinants of specialisation (in our case, annual employment levels from a panel of European regional data from the Cambridge Economics database). \( \alpha_i \) represents regional fixed effects and \( \eta_t \) identifies time-fixed effects. \( Z_{i,t} \) represents the error term.

To achieve a more homogeneous database with respect of the geographical size of the European regions, our sample comprises regions from the NUTS 0, 1 and 2 classifications. The result is a division of EU-15 into 130 sub-national units (which we refer to simply as regions). NUTS-2 regions are used for Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and NUTS-1 regions for Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We consider Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg as single regions (NUTS-0).
This article compares the results obtained when considering connectivity on three different bases: membership of CBR associations, membership of a high-intensity CBR and contiguity in space. Therefore, three spatial weight matrices have been constructed: the ‘contiguity matrix’ accounted for all neighbouring regions - whether cross-border or not - and represented an upper limit for our estimates using CBR information, while the ‘CBR matrix’ accounted solely for cross-border regions and the ‘CBR High-intensity matrix’ accounted only for regions involved in high-intensity cooperation associations.\(^\text{13}\)

To ensure the robustness of the results, the coefficient \(W_{ij}\), \(i.e., \rho\), was calculated in three different ways. Thus, in order to measure economic specialisation, three specialisation indices were used: the Mutual Information Index, the Dissimilarity Specialisation Index and the Krugman Specialisation Index. These three indices have the same aim: to measure the degree of concentration or dispersion of a region’s economy in terms of the distribution of activities in different sectors. This enabled the results to be triangulated, as it was found that neighbouring impact presented little sensitivity to the choice of specialisation index.\(^\text{14}\)

The degree of cross-border regional cooperation achieved in the EU-15 and the financial support provided by the EU

Table 3 presents for each of the 24 cases of cross-border cooperation analysed the following information: whether the CBR was created before or after 1990, whether it has received financial support from INTERREG II and/or III, and whether it is a high or low intensity CBR according to Perkmann’s classification.

**Table 3: The nature of cross-border cooperation in the EU-15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euroregions or Work Communities in internal frontiers of EU-15</th>
<th>Member states</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Pre - 1990</th>
<th>INTERREG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Euroregio Salzburg-Berchtesgadner Land -Traunstein (Interreg Bayaut)</td>
<td>Austria/Germany</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ems Dollart Region</td>
<td>Germany/Netherlands</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EUREGIO/Euregio Rhine-Waal/Euregio Rhine-Meuse-North</td>
<td>Germany/Netherlands</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sonderjylland-Schleswigg</td>
<td>Denmark/Germany</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Euregio Meuse-Rhine</td>
<td>Belgium/Netherlands/Germany</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Grensregio Vlaanderen-Nederland (Euregio Benelux Middengebied/Euregio Schedelmond (Flanders-NL))</td>
<td>Belgium/Netherlands</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Oresund Region</td>
<td>Sweden/Denmark</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Skargarden</td>
<td>Finland/Sweden</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) Although analysing the impact of neighbouring regions was our main goal, we also needed to control for other variables. We have therefore also analysed the following control variables: human capital and the existence of a specialised regional labour pool, the presence of agglomeration economies, regional investments and innovation activities.

\(^{14}\) For more details on the spatial error model, see Garcia-Duran *et al.* (2009) and Mora *et al.* (2011).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Euroregion/Tirol</th>
<th>Italy/Austria</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Alcotra</td>
<td>Italy/France</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Isole</td>
<td>Italy/France</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ireland-North Ireland</td>
<td>Ireland/Great Britain</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ireland-Wales</td>
<td>Ireland/Great Britain</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pamina</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
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<td>Greece/Italy</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HIGH** - high intensity cooperation

**pre 1990** - cross-border association created before 1990

**INTERREG** - financial support from INTERREG II and/or III.

The table shows that most associations appeared after the birth of INTERREG. Only the border regions of the pentagon and the Nordic countries had developed links before INTERREG was established. Moreover, almost all Euroregions and Working Communities post-1990 have received money from INTERREG II and/or INTERREG III. According to INTERACT (2005) and Lrdp Kantor Ltd (2003), 19 of the 24 instances of cross-border cooperation in the EU-15 received money from INTERREG between 1994 and 2006. Only two of the 14 post-1990 CBR associations did not receive money during this period. These data indicate that the EU’s support may have had an impact on the formation of cross-border associations. There are now cross-border cooperation associations along all the internal borders of the EU-15. This was not the case prior to INTERREG. However, to
assess the extent of this impact, we should take into account the information on the level of cooperation attained by these associations.

There is no automatic relationship between the level of intensity of the cooperation and its duration. Most of the high-intensity CBRs, namely seven of them, were set up before 1990, but three of the CBRs that were set up before 1990 continue to be low-intensity. There does not appear to be a relation between the degree of intensity of cooperation and the participation of the association in INTERREG. Curiously enough, of the eight high-intensity CBRs, three have not received any funding from INTERREG II or III, whereas 14 of the low-intensity CBRs have.

To conclude, this analysis of the nature of CBRs in the EU-15 therefore seems to indicate that there is no relationship between the degree of cooperation achieved and the funding received from the EU, at least until 2006. What the analysis seems to suggest instead is that community funding helps create cross-border cooperation that would not otherwise have existed, so that it cannot be ruled out that they become high-intensity CBRs later on.

The degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links

As Table 4 shows, the results from the spatial error model are similar for each of the three specialisation indices. These results confirm neighbouring effects on regional economic specialisation. They indicate that European regional specialisation is driven by contiguous economic regions. However, the estimated spatial impact is found to be lower when using cross-borders. In other words, the impact exerted by associated regions (in general, that is, both high and low intensity) on each other in terms of European regional relative specialisation is lower than that exerted by neighbouring national regions. Autocorrelation coefficients after taking into account CBR associations range from 0.36 to 0.41, whereas the use of a contiguity matrix shows a greater impact (ranking from 0.70 to 0.74).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual Information Index</th>
<th>Dissimilarity Index</th>
<th>Krugman Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>CBR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>CBR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors' own calculations.

These first results are as expected: what is known as the border effect continues to exist along the internal borders of the EU-15. As far as the subject under discussion is concerned, nevertheless, these results also indicate that it cannot be ruled out that cooperation between cross-border regions has an impact on regional specialisation.

To observe whether the intensity of cooperation affects the impact of CBRs on the economic specialisation pattern of regions, the results in Table four with those in Table five need to be compared. The latter shows the correlation coefficients obtained through the three specialisation indexes when using the ‘CBR high-intensity matrix’ instead of the ‘CBR matrix’.

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15 They may have received funding from their national administrations (Perkmann 2003).
Table 5: Disentangling CBR associations based on intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual Information Index</th>
<th>Dissimilarity Index</th>
<th>Krugman Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: authors’ own calculations.*

As the coefficients are impacts that are calculated using the residues of each equation, which change for each specification, we must be cautious about the comparisons that are drawn. For example, the fact that the high-intensity results are very similar to those of the contiguity matrix does not mean that the impact of high-intensity CBRs is the same as that of national contiguous regions. However, we can conclude that the higher the coefficient is, the greater the impact of some regions on others is.

We can see that the autocorrelation coefficients for high-intensity cross-border associations are higher than those obtained for all CBRs for each of the specialisation indexes. This means that regions participating in a high intensity cross-border association (eight out of 24) have a greater influence on each other than border regions with a low-intensity institutional link, at least in terms of the degree of economic specialisation in the regions.

In other words, this quantitative analysis leads us to believe that there may be a relation between the degree of cooperation achieved by CBRs and the degree of economic interdependence between them. However, there is no information as to the direction of the causal relationship between these two variables. Thus, one possibility is that cooperation between CBRs with a high degree of economic interdependence is more effective, which leads them to become high-intensity CBRs. Another possibility is that, when cooperation works, the border effect is reduced sufficiently to render the impact of neighbourhood on the degree of regional specialisation similar to that of neighbouring national regions.

Conclusion

The EU has provided financial support for cross-border regional cooperation since 1990. This support has been confirmed in each programming period to become in the last period a priority objective of the ERP. Moreover, it is considered to be one of the main EU instruments for achieving territorial cohesion and therefore promoting growth and employment.

The article began by referring to the qualitative studies that explain how cross-border cooperation can help create new links between regions on both sides of EU internal borders. Many of these studies also show how INTERREG has promoted cross-border cooperation. The research presented here does not dispute their findings. Rather, it aims to measure the effectiveness of the policy from a quantitative point of view.

The comparative analysis of regulations and other documents relating to cross-border cooperation shows that this policy is currently based on the hypothesis that financial support enhances cooperation among cross-border regions and that the higher the degree of cooperation between border regions is, the lesser the border effect is and therefore the greater the impact on growth and employment is. For this hypothesis to be valid, we should find evidence that the following relations between the variables involved exist: a relation between the degree of cooperation achieved and the financial support...
provided by the EU, and a relation between the degree of cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links.

If INTERREG helps maximise the level of cooperation, and this in turn promotes the development of functional economic links between border regions, then the third objective in the current economic and social cohesion policy makes sense and has a role to play in territorial cohesion. If not – i.e. if previous economic interdependence determines good cross-border cooperation –, then Community efforts to promote cross-border cooperation may make less sense.

The analysis of the nature of the 24 cases of cross-border cooperation in the EU-15 shows that the relationship between the degree of cooperation achieved and INTERREG financial support is not clear. Of the 24 CBRs, eight are high-intensity, seven of these eight instances of high-intensity cooperation already existed before INTERREG came into being, and three have received no funding from either INTERREG II or INTERREG III. Nevertheless, since the European Community began to provide financial assistance, the number of CBRs has increased. Therefore, we should consider that the intensity of cooperation may increase in the future.

As to the relationship between the degree of cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links, this study on the specialisation pattern of regions involved in cross-border cooperation shows that this relation does exist. However, there is a lack of information as to which variable affects which. Therefore, it is not known whether higher-intensity cooperation promotes more functional economic links or whether such cooperation became high-intensity because there were already more functional economic links between the regions.

To sum up, this impact analysis indicates that the EU’s policy of cross-border regional cooperation could be effective. The promotion of cross-border cooperation may help to form functional economic links between cross-border regions and thus improve the territorial cohesion of the EU.

However, this study has several technical limitations. First, a classification of the level of cooperation that only has two categories was used. Hence, the analysis of how the level of intensity of cooperation could affect the results cannot be refined. Second, it should be noted that CBRs are made up of NUTS-3 regions. This means that, since the database takes into account different NUTS classifications for partially solving the modifiable administrative unit problem, associations were assigned to its upper category. Last but not least, the omitted variable problem might be present. Although non-contemporaneous data was used for the covariates considered, unobserved shocks might be correlated with accounted explanatory variables throughout the empirical analysis or with regional effects.

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CEC (1996) *Communication to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community Interreg initiative concerning trans-European cooperation on spatial planning (INTERREG II C)*, 96/C 200/07, OJ C 200, 10/7/1996.


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The Christian Churches as Special Participants in European Integration

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University of Salford

Abstract

This article argues that Christian Churches should be regarded as special participants in European integration. The Churches embrace features of non-state actors and identity formers, and they take a unique stance as contributors to the initial stages of the integration process. In addition, Churches perform their functions within Church-State regimes - a phenomenon unknown to other actors in European integration. Overall, Christian Churches have established themselves as unique and influential participants in European integration and EU politics.

Keywords

Christianity; Churches; European Union; European integration

THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EU POLITICS HAS now become an important focus for research. A growing number of scholars are trying to decide how Churches should be seen, perceived and studied in the context of European unification (see Minkenberg 2009; Leustean 2009; Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). This is certainly no easy task, not least due to the complex nature of the process of European integration, and the diversity of Christian Churches in Europe. An additional difficulty comes from the fact that Christian Churches are usually researched within a national context (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, Minkenberg and Vliegenthart 2009). Also, they are often perceived as regular non-state actors, embracing a specific feature or several specific features (say, as the interest-groups, lobbyists, organisations of civil society, etc.). One cannot, of course, deny that Churches are also studied as transnational actors, but this is often related to foreign policy and security analysis (see Fox 2001), where the main transnational actor taken into consideration, is Islam not Christianity (since Islam appears more politicised and more active on international arena). Therefore we need to find a more precise way of how Churches are incorporated in the process of European integration, and what we should expect from their involvement in EU politics.

The key argument, pursued in this article, is that Churches are special participants of European integration. In our view, it is not sufficient to study their role exclusively through the prism of NGOs, interest groups, lobby structures, etc. Churches stand out separately, embracing both regular and unique features, which make them distinct from other participants. This fact was noticed by Minkenberg (2009), but it is in need of further development.

This objective specifies the structure of the article. First, it is necessary to reflect on the main approaches towards the study of the role of Christian Churches. Secondly, we shall analyse how Churches perform their role as non-state actors and identity formers. Finally, we shall add other important features: their role at the initial stages of integration (historic role) and their existence within the specific Church-State regimes.
Churches in European integration: a contemporary approach

Although the number of publications on the role of Churches in European integration is growing, the pattern of agreement among scholars in this field is hardly identifiable. We can just encounter some contradictory approaches, forming the poles of perspectives. They reflect both the limited and increasing roles assigned to Churches, and the legalistic approach.

The limited role of Churches

Christian Churches (or religion in general) are at times assigned a rather limited role, with the emphasis that the impact of religion in Europe “[d]oes not change the usual rules of the game” (Foret 2009: 38). Even if the increase of the Churches’ level of influence is noticed, this mainly happens, it is argued, due to the EU initiatives. The Union just looks for new methods and ways for legitimisation, which include the attempts to put citizens in the centre of the decision-making process and to improve the dialogue with civil society, including Churches. Francois Foret assumes that “[t]he European Commission proposes a strictly consultative role for churches” (For et 2009: 39), which allegedly does not equip them with a realistic chance to influence decision-making. Consequently, a “major impact from churches on European policies and politics” is scarcely confirmed, in spite of the fact that “religious bodies have increased their presence in the supranational arena”, mainly due to “interest representation” and “political mobilisation” in the European Parliament (Foret 2009: 39, 41).

Foret’s perspective is partly echoed by Martin Steven, who insists that the EU is “[a]n inherently secular body with no mention of Christianity in any of its treaties or directives” (Steven 2009: 181). Still the integration process does not pass by Churches; it makes them more vulnerable to supranational institutions (via the increase of the latter’s possibilities to interfere in the Churches’ activities at the national level). European legislation often concerns Churches, and even if it refers to Churches indirectly (or accidentally), its influence is not necessarily marginal. Unlike Foret, Steven in his theorising does not substantially develop the idea that the role of Churches is constrained in the EU. He admits that they act, first, within some dimensions of the Church-State relations, exercising their influence on the voting behaviour and European values, and, secondly, as “[p]olitical interest groups, lobbying decision-makers on aspects of social policymaking which concern them” (Steven 2009: 183). While pointing out that no meaningful comparison can be drawn between religious lobbies in Europe and the USA, Steven does not argue that Churches “[a]re any less politically influential as a result of EU integration” (Steven 2009: 184). The problem lies in the assessment criteria, since it is very difficult, if not impossible to evaluate properly the effectiveness of interest-groups.

A legalistic perspective

Benoit Challand approaches the Churches-EU theme with more legalistic criteria, trying to identify the presence of religion in the EU legislation. The analysis of nine fundamental treaties of the European Communities and the European Union, leads him to conclusion that “[t]he question of religion is not a central topic at all in legal terms for Europe itself”. In these documents the theme of religion appears only 15 times (in 755 pages). In almost all cases (14) it refers to the text of the European Constitution, including the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which mentions religious freedom and non-discrimination on the basis of religion (Challand 2009: 69). This allows Challand to argue that “[t]he collocation of Europe and religion is only a very recent construction” (Challand 2009: 66), and the increasing interest of the EU towards religion can be ascribed to pragmatic
reasons, where the desire to separate itself from Islamic neighbours (i.e. Turkey) plays a prominent role. The opinion of Valery Giscard d’Estaing (that Europe will lose its soul if it accepts a Muslim country) is a testimony to that (Challand 2009: 70).

However, the presence of religion in EU legislation does not need to always come in obvious and explicit forms. Keith Jenkins specifies that EU secondary legislation “[d]irectly refers to and impacts on religion in many areas of law, including non-discrimination, labour law, data protection, culture, media law, animal welfare, cooperation, finances, customs, and economic law” (Jenkins 2005: 77-78). For example, issues relating to the economic competence of the Union acquire a religious dimension when they refer to the export of cultural goods, the statistics on income and living conditions in different institutions, including monasteries, etc. (Doe 2009: 149). Norman Doe even develops the concept of a “European ‘common law’ on religion”, which includes eight fundamental principles (value of religion, subsidiarity in matters of religion, the principle of cooperation (dialogue with religion), religious freedom, the autonomy of religious associations, religious equality (non-discrimination), the principle of special protection of religion, and the principle of religious privilege) (Doe 2009). The religious organisations are also exempt from some regulations of non-discrimination directive, since they are allowed to introduce requirements for religion or beliefs of prospective employees (Doe 2009: 152-153). Doe (2009: 157) concludes that:

[a]n examination of its laws and other regulatory instruments reveals the posture of the EU in terms of its own church-Union relations. The details of its laws indicate that the Union shares characteristics most in common with the so-called cooperationist model of church-state relations, though the language of separation is also employed; however, the Union is not a state-church system.

An increasing role

Contrary to the negative approaches, Lucian Leustean observes the increase of the level of importance of religious issues in the EU, even though the “[c]ontacts between European institutions and religious communities have officially been made relatively late in the life of the European Community” (Leustean 2009: 167). The turning point appeared at the Treaty of Maastricht, with the prominent role of the Jacques Delors initiative on the cooperation between Churches and the EU, known as the “Soul for Europe project” (see Silvestri 2009 for more detail). At present, according to Leustean, the Commission is open for dialogue with the religious communities, with the likelihood that the benefits from this dialogue will be mutual. He observes that

[o]n the one hand, religious communities are gaining legitimacy and are becoming more assertive in influencing the agenda of European institutions, particularly on transnational issues. On the other hand, religious communities encourage the European Union to become a world player, rather than to remain a regional one (Leustean 2009: 174).

Thus, there are three main sets of ideas, emanating from various approaches of scholars who analyse the role of Churches in European integration. First, the presence of religion is confirmed by EU legislation. Secondly, Churches exercise their influence in different formats, including the ones of the interest groups and lobbyists. Finally, the role of Churches becomes more visible and important after the Treaty of Maastricht, and the cooperation between Churches and EU institutions is beneficial to both sides. These ideas, reflecting certain aspects of the Churches’ activities, do not provide a comprehensive vision of the Churches’ involvement in European integration. In our view, they also do not fully reflect the Churches’ character. Therefore we need to identify their unique, special and multifold role in the process of European integration, which mirrors the nature and
specific features of Christian Churches. This brings the issue of Churches as non-state actors on the first point in our agenda.

**Churches as non-state actors**

There is adequate literature, where Churches are studied as non-state actors in different formats—interest groups, lobby groups, pressure groups, NGOs, etc. (see Djupe 2009; Warhurst 2008). Noting that in different cases various features of Churches are revealed, we need to see how these specific features are uncovered in the course of European integration. This poses a key question: to what extent religion is relevant to European society. Indeed, if its role has largely diminished (as suggested by some scholars—see Voas 2009), than the role of Churches will be reduced to the minimum. On the other hand, the greater role of religion presupposes the higher importance of Churches.

**Religion in politics and society**

We need to sketch first how religion can in principle be incorporated in politics and society. In our context we mean European society, and, speaking about religion, we denote Christianity, since Christians are in the overwhelming majority in the EU. Normally, we encounter the two opposite approaches, with religion being deliberately ignored (suppressed) or adequately recognised (promoted).

Indeed, in liberal secular circles the need for the strict separation of religion and politics is normally postulated. The “privatization of religion” is viewed as the “central functional conditions for liberal democracy” (Minkenberg 2007: 890). Hilarion Alfeyev even writes about the desire of the “modern humanism” to put religion in a ghetto, to exclude it from society and to minimise its influence on the people, especially on youth (Alfeyev 2006). Thorleif Pettersson (2007: 233) points out that a “privatised religion” is excluded from public and political issues:

> [s]ome assume that the differentiation between religious and secular institutions have led to a privatized religion which has remained relevant to personal and private matters. Religion is assumed to have been transformed and to have become increasingly assigned to the home—family life, love, and intimacy—and to have become a matter of individual and private taste (see e.g. Turner 1991, 2000). Such a privatized religion does not concern itself with public and political matters.

On the other hand, the privatisation of religion is viewed as a negative phenomenon, which is not compatible with the principles of democratic state. Michael Minkenberg argues that “[t]he democratic state must guarantee the free exercise of religion in the private realm and the opportunities for religious communities to promote their values in public (Stepan 2000: 39). From this follows that all religious communities must have the right to form political parties [...] It also follows that this principle is compatible with all kinds of institutional Church-State relationship” (Minkenberg 2007: 891). We could, in principle, expect the dominance of the first approach in highly secularised societies, where Churches are indeed put under pressure to leave the political/public space. This is applicable to some EU member states, but cannot be extended to the whole EU. We assume that the secularisation trend in the Union is not as great as to allow the dominance of anti-religious ideologies and the pushing of Churches to the private area.
It is not uncommon to hear that Europe is going through a process of rapid secularisation. As Loek Halman and Veerle Draulans (2006: 263) state, “[t]he sharply declining levels of church attendance in Europe are often regarded as evidence that this part of the world is being secularized”. Franz Hollinger, Max Haller and Adriana Valle-Hollinger (2007: 133) argue that “[i]n Europe religious institutions have lost much of their former influence and religious practice and belief have both declined in the course of the twentieth century”. David Voas claims that religion in Europe is in decline, with the appearing of the phenomenon of “fuzzy fidelity”, when people can keep loyalty to tradition, without being regular church-goers (Voas 2009: 161,167).

Interestingly, the “death of religion” was a sort of “conventional wisdom” of social sciences in most of the 20th century (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 3). Hans Knippenberg (2006: 261) writes about “a dramatic decline of religiosity” in all aspects, including the belief, Church membership and Church attendance, with the traditional Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches as the main victims. Europe has been regarded as a model of the secularisation process, which implies that the presence of religion diminishes in everyday life and the sacred “[e]ventually becomes socially and politically marginal” (Haynes 2010: 3). Although the secularisation hypothesis remains popular, we do not see substantial evidence that Europe (or the EU) is turning into a kind of atheistic superstate. In fact, the diversity of the EU member states and the complexity of the process of secularisation do not allow to indicate any trend applicable to the EU at large. Halman and Draulans (2006: 264) agree that “Secularization may well be a European phenomenon, but this does not imply that Europe is homogeneously secular”. Indeed, the countries of Western Europe diverge considerably in religious matters, with religious participation higher in the Southern Catholic parts and lower in Northern Protestant (Pettersson 2006: 232). Jonathan Fox mentions two different concepts of secularisation (when people become less religious, and when the influence of religion declines, due to the moving of religion from the public to the private domain), but he admits that there is no agreement that this process is happening (Fox 2001: 56). We can hardly find a European society where Christianity has become a purely private matter and Churches are completely deprived of any voice or have totally lost the ability to exert an influence. Even in France, traditionally regarded as one of the most secularised countries in the EU, political leaders have begun to speak openly about the increasing importance of religion. In spite of some secularisation developments, we cannot claim that religion has been banished from the political sphere (Knippenberg 2006: 254). Moreover, even if religion moves to the private sphere, “[i]t continues to influence policy because many modern ideologies that influence policymaking have religious origins […] Such influence is often indirect but nonetheless important” (Fox 2001: 65). Fox reminds us that religion influences people’s views, “their perception of events and their actions” (Fox 2001: 59), including, of course, the views of the policy-makers.

Rodney Stark assumes that the secularisation doctrine is not applicable to the EU as a whole, especially if it refers to the level of religiosity. According to him, “[t]here has been no demonstrable long-term decline in European religious participation” (Stark 1999: 254, emphasis in the original). Participation has changed from time to time, but it was low in western and northern parts of Europe many centuries before the 21st century (Stark 1999: 254). With the undermining of the secularisation doctrine, there is no reason to expect that Churches will be hidden in a ghetto or locked into a “private space”. Even in more secularised societies Churches can find their way to exert an influence and the chance not to be fully excluded from the public space. Jürgen Habermas (2008: 20) offers the following explanation:
I am thinking here of the fact that churches and religious organisations are increasingly assuming the role of “communities of interpretation” in the public arena of secular societies. They can attain influence on public opinion and will formation by making relevant contributions to key issues, irrespective of whether their arguments are convincing or objectionable. … Be it the dispute over the legalization of abortion or voluntary euthanasia, on the bioethical issues of reproductive medicine, questions of animal protection or climate change—on these and similar questions the divisive premises are so opaque that it is by no means settled from the outset which party can draw on the more convincing moral intuitions.

Therefore nothing prevents us from discussing in more detail how Churches are incorporated in EU politics as non-state actors. This is especially meaningful, because religious actors are sometimes regarded, together with transnational NGOs and business corporations, as “[o]ne of the most important players (Badie, Smouts 1999; Josselin, Wallace 2001)” (Centre for European Studies 2009: 25).

The role of Churches as non-state actors

First, we need to mention that all three confessions (Catholic and Orthodox more, Protestant less) are well represented at the EU level (see Leustean 2009). The Christian organisations in Brussels play a twofold role: they inform their leaders about the main developments in the EU, and try to influence the decision-making process (Jansen 2000). In the latter case, they seem to be operating like other organisations of civil society, but this similarity is not as great as one might suppose. One of the differences, highlighted by Thomas Jansen, is related to the scope of the areas of work. On the one hand, the organisations, which represent economic, social and cultural sectors, are more worried about specific EU policies, within the competence of one of the Directorate-Generals. On the other hand, the concerns of Churches and religious communities “[a]re more general and based on the ethical and moral aspects of European unification and European policy”, therefore their dialogue with the European Commission is aimed more at the meaning, spiritual direction and ethical dimension of European integration and related policies (Jansen 2000: 104). Consequently, the European Commission values Churches as, in the first instance, those partners which may assist “[w]hen it comes to weighing up the ethical dimension of the process of European unification and giving it meaning and identity” (Jansen 2000: 104).

Having said that, we do not need to assume that the role of Churches is limited to some broad and ethically-based issues. At times Churches need to be more specific and even to defend their interests or the interests, originating from their moral and social doctrines (especially if the EU elaborates legislation related to these doctrines). According to Jenkins, this requires Churches “[t]o behave much more like the traditional industrial lobby groups which surround the European Institutions, becoming closely involved with the detail of the legislation rather than acting as advocates for broad general principles” (Jenkins 2005: 81). Therefore Churches need to establish contacts with the MEPs and relevant divisions of the European Commission, and to organise lobbying of their governments. They need sometimes to persuade other actors that the decisions, supported by Churches, reflect some general concerns, but not the Churches’ interests only.

The methods of Churches

The methods that may be in use by Churches are similar to the regular methods of non-state actors. First, this can be direct or indirect lobbying, used with the help of different organizations or individuals. The second method includes political mobilization, especially among parishioners, and more active influence on the formation of public opinion. Robyn
Driskell, Elizabeth Embry and Larry Lyon indicate that “Clergy and religious leaders can send messages politically mobilizing church members (Guth et al. 2003) and organizational skills learned in the church can extend to subsequent political participation” (Driskell et al. 2008: 296). David Martin outlines three ways of how Churches become actors in the public sphere: mobilising political parties, acting as pressure groups and using their resources in order to contribute to the solving of social problems (Summary 2003).

Mobilisation is a particularly strong method in countries where the trust in the Church is significant, and where either the masses can be mobilised easily, or influential political groups are willing to act in accordance with the Church recommendations or requests. The mobilisation of the masses is useful to form strong public opinion, with which the government, claiming to be democratic, cannot deal formally. Surely, the public opinion is a changeable thing, as especially demonstrated in the referenda on important EU issues, but even these changeable instruments can be efficient in forcing governments to make decisions which are not possible otherwise. As Zsolt Enyedi (2003: 228) sums up,

[in spite of the high risks involved, churches often engage in political and partisan struggles. One likely explanation, often overlooked by rational choice approaches, is that churches have other goals than that of preserving their ‘market position’ or increasing their ‘market share’. Often these other goals are strictly political. Clergymen are also political beings, with secular political preferences. In the democratic era, the ability of churches to put pressure on the state depends to a large extent on how skilled they are in mobilising public opinion.

Christof Mandry explains that the Churches (or, better to say, the governing bodies of the Churches) possess adequate resources to operate and to shape public political debate. “The decisive question, however, is how far they succeed in activating allies and influencing neutral third persons”, which, in its turn, brings to the surface the mobilising potential of the religious theme itself, i.e. the reflection on the relationship between (political) identity and religion (Mandry 2009: 279). One can point out that “organised Christianity” has indeed established itself as “[a]n important, publicly recognized, legitimate interlocutor in the institutional space of the EU” (Schlesinger and Foret 2006: 60), but this establishment is not necessarily a guarantee of success. Rather, the real level of success is dependent on the mobilising potential of the theme, chosen and advocated by the Churches themselves and those acting on their behalf, and which often involves identity-related issues. The correlation of Christian Churches and identity underlines their additional distinct feature.

**Churches and identity**

The role of Churches as non-state actors reflects one of the aspects of the Churches’ participation in European integration. Although not defining their unique character, it paves the way for the consideration of additional aspects. These aspects are related to the historical role of Churches and the issue of Churches and identity.

The relevance of identity to European integration is broadly accepted and is normally learnt through the national and European identities (see Caporaso and Kim 2009; Carey 2002; Cram 2009; Mayer and Palmowski 2004; McLaren 2004; Risse 2003). Therefore in order to reveal an additional feature of the role of Churches in European integration, we need to look at their possible contribution to the formation of both national and European identities. Arguably, the question of “[w]hether Europe can be at least partly defined as a community of values and identity by virtue of its Christian past is a matter of long-standing
debate” (Schlesinger and Foret 2006: 59). But we are more inclined (in agreement with Enyedi) towards the viewpoint that defines the European continent in this way:

\[\text{national identity, particularly on the peripheries of Europe, is often built around religious values and is linked to church-state regimes as well. Churches provide rituals, unity, and identity for community builders even in the modern world (Enyedi 2003: 223).} \]

Since religion is regarded as a part of identity (see Korostelina 2003), Churches are able to contribute directly to the process of identity formation. This is especially true for the areas where religion is an important part of everyday life. Certainly, this contribution is determined by European history, by its distinct features, which demonstrate the meaningful role of Christianity. Indeed, Europe was not created from nothing, nor did it appear as a result of random coincidences. Rather, we can suggest that Europe achieved the status of a continent because it was marked by Christian values and Christian faith.

**Christian identity and the EU**

One may argue (see Schlesinger and Foret 2006) that the proposition of Christian identity for the EU is not an easy thing. This is normally explained by the denominational diversity of Christianity (e.g. no unity) as well as by the fact that “[E]uropean history can hardly be written without acknowledging the centuries-long interplay between Christianity, Judaism and Islam” (Schlesinger and Foret 2006: 60). But the opposite approaches look more plausible. For example, Casanova describes Christianity as a “central component of the personal identity of many Europeans” (Casanova 2006: 82). According to Daniel Nexon, “[s]ignificant aspects of European identity are tied to a long history involving the consolidation of Latin Christendom as a political-religious community” (Nexon 2006: 256). Nexon describes in detail the various events of European history, in which Christianity was a meaningful contributor and participant. Augustin Jose Menendez (2005: 186) explaining the views of Joseph Weiler on that matter, emphasizes that:

\[\text{not only is Christianity the religion which has marked most deeply the identity of Europe and Europeans, but it is also the faith at present shared by the largest number of Europeans... [O]ther believers should acknowledge that their identity as Europeans is profoundly marked by Christianity nonetheless.} \]

While acknowledging the difficulties surrounding the idea of Christian identity for the EU, we do not see any profound reasons for rejecting this idea altogether. Christianity should be given the leading role for the following reasons. First, in spite of the presence of other religions in Europe, Christianity has always maintained the status of the most powerful and influential faith. Christianity either gave birth to or made an outstanding contribution to the formation of European culture, literature and science. Monasteries were the centres of scientific research and important educational establishments. Christian architecture, embodied in magnificent Cathedrals and public buildings, became a constituent part of European cities. Many emperors, especially after the fourth century AD, were devout Christians for whom the Gospel values played a very important role. The mood of that time could be discovered through the words of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, who wrote to one of the emperors: “You rule with Christ, and you command with Christ. So you should imitate God’s love of man. This is the most divine feature of man, namely to do good” (Christodoulos 2003). As it is also emphasised in one of the statements of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece: “Europe cannot, and should not forget that its spiritual foundations lie in the Gospel of Christ” (Church of Greece 2003). The foundation of Europe on the basis of the Gospel formed some of the distinct features of Europeans. The fact was admitted by Paul Valéry:
Apart from this direct contribution, one should bear in mind the existence of the indirect contribution to the process of identity formation. This is connected with values as a parameter of identity. Indeed, values are related (at least partly) to religion, and there is a well grounded viewpoint that “[t]he identity of individual Europeans, and of Europe as a Union, continues to be heavily influenced by Christian values” (Weiler in Menendez 2005: 185).

**Values in Europe**

In the Europe of today one can observe the existence of two sets of values: secular and religious. They are in conflict with each other; this clash of values is the reflection of the desire to construct a certain type of European identity, based on either religious or non-religious dimension. Speaking about Christian values in their application to Europe, we need to emphasise that they are, by and large, conservative ones, not eroded by the modernist trends found within some Christian factions. These values contain a clear moral and ethical message, where, *inter alia*, the family is seen as the union between man and woman, human life exists and should be protected from the moment of conception to the moment of natural death; honesty, chastity and mutual help should be promoted, rather than criticised or even mocked. However, these conservative values are contested by European secularism (Alfeyev 2006).

A clash of values becomes the everyday reality of the contemporary EU. In this clash most Churches take a clear stance: as the defenders of conservative Christian values. In fact, this ongoing clash of values in the EU often leaves no other option than to encourage the active participation of Churches on one of the sides of the conflict. For Churches, it is very important to ensure that those values that will be laid at the foundation of European identity will not promote a secular vision of the EU. Logically, Churches see themselves as the defenders and promoters of certain values and lifestyle not only because of their theological doctrines and inclinations of moral theology, but also out of a desire to contribute to identity formation. The type of values defended by Churches correlates with their respective theological doctrines. Thus, Churches made their way into the process of European integration, becoming the identity formers and influencing the debates on both European and national identities. This adds an important feature to their special participation.

**Christian Churches at the beginning of integration**

One more issue, which must be considered in relation to the unique character of the Churches’ presence in European integration, is the role of Christianity/Churches at the initial stages of the integration process. This issue remains disputable, since a degree of involvement of Churches and the level of their influence at the creation of the European Community is a matter for discussion. For example, Leustean (2009: 165) admits the influence of religion (through Christian Democratic parties) on the establishment of the European Community, but claims that “[w]ithout the political support of other parties, the ratification of the treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) would not have been possible”.

Speaking about Churches (in the plural), one should realise that the main role is normally given to the Roman Catholic Church (or the institutions which reflected the values and...
ideas existing in the Roman Catholic Church). Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah state that “[t]he Catholic Church actively inspired, promoted, and shaped European integration”, while other Churches “[p]layed a relatively weak and sporadic role in promoting and shaping European integration” (Philpott and Shah 2006: 51). The contribution of Churches is usually discussed via the role of Christian Democratic parties at the initial stages of the integration process (see Madeley 2010) and the Christian convictions of the “founding fathers” of the European Community. These are the two main points, which are worthy of further attention.

Integration as a Christian Democratic project

In principle, many scholars agree on the substantial contribution of the Roman Catholic Church at the initial stages of European integration, which was even “sanctioned by the Vatican” (Casanova 2006: 66). The Vatican (and the Catholic Church more broadly) were closely connected with the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Bryan Hehir (2006: 103) underlines:

> [t]he EU is built on the EC and the EC was powerfully influenced by Christian Democracy, a political movement but one directly rooted in Catholic social thought and close collaboration with the Holy See’s role in postwar Europe.

Timothy Byrnes (2006: 292) states that the EU was “powerfully shaped by Catholic social teaching”. From those founding fathers of the EC, who were devout Catholics, one can name French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Italian Foreign Minister Alcide de Gasperi. Schuman believed that the project of European unification “cannot do without the inspiration of its Christian sources”. As he also emphasised, “Europe is the implementation of a universal democracy, in the Christian sense of the word” (Schuman in Vanheeswijck 1997: 50). Rocco Buttiglione states that “faith in Jesus Christ [was] at the centre of the life of Alcide De Gasperi” (Buttiglione 2006 in Venneri and Ferrara 2009: 121). According to Stefano Trinchese, the tendency of de Gasperi to make “constant reference to the holy texts as an element of salvation constituted the main features of his actions, especially in moments of pain and uncertainty” (Trinchese 2006 in Venneri and Ferrara 2009: 122). Linda Risso notes that the Christian Democratic parties of post-war Europe “[b]ased their political programme on the radical view that western civilisation was embedded in Christian values and that it needed to be protected both from the seduction of modern lifestyles and from the even greater dangers of communism” (Risso 2009: 100).

Pope Pius XII, who was head of the Catholic Church from 1939 to 1958, as early as 1948 “[d]eveloped the theme of a possible European Union” (O’Mahony 2009: 182). Peter Pavlovic indicates that the main aim of integration was to prevent a new war in Europe and to reconcile two old enemies—France and Germany (Pavlovic 2007). Economic cooperation was just one of the methods of reaching the objective mentioned, but not the main objective itself. James Barnett insists that “The origins of the European Union in the Coal and Steel Community were related to the ideal of reconciliation. The implications have always been both economic and political” (Barnett 2005: 28). This fact, which was quite obvious in the early 1950s, is rarely remembered nowadays, although it allows to understand better and to see the presence of Christian (mainly Catholic) aspects at the birth of the united Europe after World War II. Indeed, it is not accidental that in the early 1950s Protestants and Social Democrats often viewed European integration “[a]s a Catholic conspiracy of conservatives, an ideologically tainted attempt to revive clerical politics as a hand-maiden of big business, orchestrated by the Vatican” (Katzenstein 2006: 17), while Catholics were supportive of the project (see, for example, Boomgaard and Freire 2009). Whatever the truthfulness of this “conspiracy” claim, it underlines nonetheless
that it is impossible to put Christianity aside and to ignore the meaning and contribution of Churches at the initial stages of the process of European integration.

**Church-State regimes as an additional factor**

We have now identified the main features of the unique stance of Christian Churches in European integration. First, their role is seen at the initial stages of the process. Second, they embrace the features of non-state actors, using some similar methods to achieve their aims. Third, Christian Churches make their contribution to the formation of both European and national identities. There is one more feature which adds to the uniqueness of Churches and, at the same time, allows us to assess their possible degree of involvement in European integration and EU politics. This is the existence of such phenomena as Church-State regimes. Indeed, no other actor of European integration embraces this unique and distinct feature, peculiar to Christian Churches only.

**Church-State relations in the EU**

We need to mention that there is no EU-wide model of Church-State relations. Cooperation between state and Churches remains a sole competence of the EU member states. Therefore the diversity of relations between Church and State in the EU led to what Grace Davie has called a “bewildering variety” (Davie 2000). Some scholars (Leustean 2008) argue that “Church-state relations form the basis of contact between religious and political actors at both national and supranational level. They are at the very core of overcoming social differences and influencing the architectural evolution of the European Union” (Leustean 2008: 248). As Leustean (2008: 247) also explains, “[t]hese relations have deep historical roots and are moulded on the national differences of religious and political realms”.

Enyedi (2003: 226) maintains that peculiarities of Church-State relations “affect three types of interests: the interests of states, churches, and of non-believers”. However, no substantial claim is made that Church-State relations is the key to the defining Churches’ role in European integration. Accepting this viewpoint, we shall further analyse how Church-State relations can form “the basis” of the contacts between religious and political actors at both national and supranational levels. Our first step will be the analysis of European Church-State relations per se.

**Church-State relations: the main patterns**

There is a substantial degree of agreement among scholars on the typology of Church-State relations in the EU. Leustean (2008: 247) mentions three models (or systems): the state Church, the cooperationist (or hybrid) and the secular (or separation). If a religious confession is predominant and is regarded as a “national” or “established” Church, this will be the state Church model. In the case of the formal separation between Church and state, normally with the existence of agreements with the states (regulating the status of churches), one can speak about the cooperationist model. Finally, in the case of the secular model, there is no religion which is favoured by the state and no established Church exists (Leustean 2008: 247-248).

Christopher Soper and Joel Fetzer explain the notion of laïcité which is the opposite of an established Church, and provide some insights on the intermediate system. They spell out two main categories of laïcité: strict and soft. The first version implies that “[c]itizens may, in their private life, believe what they will about religion. In public, however, religious individuals face more restrictions”. According to the second version, “[t]he state should
respect all religious beliefs but also foster the free exercise of religion by, for example, funding private religious schools” (Soper and Fetzer 2007: 937). The third (intermediate) system is located between these two polar cases. In the third model, there is no established Church by law, but national legislation guarantees the patterns of cooperation between Church and State. As Soper and Fetzer (2007: 938) say, “The German Basic Law establishes a formal separation between Church and State, but at the same time the constitution secures cooperation between the two institutions in such areas as education and social welfare provision”.

Gerhard Robbers (2005: 578-579) mentions three “basic types of civil ecclesiastical law systems”: State Church or predominant religion, strict separation, and basic separation, when the existence of common tasks for both sides is recognised. John Francis (1992: 800) offers a broader explanation, describing five main models of Church-State relations:

- The Erastian model, in which the state has assumed responsibility for the direction of the church; the liberal model, in which the state is secular and neutral in its relationships with the church(es) found in its society; the theocratic model, in which the church has achieved supremacy in religious and secular affairs; the spheres model, in which the church prevails in some spheres and the state in other spheres of society; and the anti-church model, in which the state stands in opposition to the church and seeks to curtail or eliminate religion.

Of course, the aforementioned approaches can be inserted into the three main regimes: state Church, strict separation and cooperationist model. The first two are the exception in the EU. Indeed, the system of state Church exists in Denmark, England, Finland, Malta and Greece. Strict separation is probably peculiar to France and (as stated sometimes) to the Netherlands. In all other cases, we encounter the model of cooperation between Church and State, although it is true that the depth and intensity of cooperation varies a great deal. Therefore it seems plausible, in agreement with Russell Sandberg, to speak of the abandonment of the so-called tripartite system (Sandberg 2008: 336). Sandberg correctly argues that the position of the Church under the same type of system may vary a great deal. For instance, in Denmark, within the state church system, there is a high degree of state control over the Lutheran Church, while in Greece the Orthodox Church is a self-governing structure (Sandberg 2008: 331).

**Historical and confessional trajectories**

It is worth noting that the formation of Church-State systems has been a long and complicated process, not without its own conflicts and disputes. The modern models of the Church-State relations were mostly developed in the 20th century, since in the centuries before “[c]hurch and state institutions were closely intertwined” (Riedel 2008: 252). Indeed, in most countries of what is now the EU, the monarchs normally dominated the Church, even assuming the right to appoint bishops and, further, to interfere in doctrinal issues (Riedel 2008: 253-255). The relations between Church and State were largely unequal; and this inequality took a disadvantageous form for the Churches (Riedel 2008: 252).

Historical peculiarities, of course, matter, as well as the confessional tradition. Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd argue that the religious inheritance “[r]emains part of Europe’s fabric today, still a palpable presence in its state and political traditions, educational institutions” (Ruane and Todd 2009: 2). There is indeed a perspective that the confessional distribution left its impact on Church-State relations. Knippenberg, for example, maintains that Church-State relations differ substantially between Western and Eastern Christianity, “[a]nd this divide can be expected to have direct implications and consequences not only
for political conflicts in the European states, but also for the religious landscapes involved” (Knippenberg 2006: 255). His viewpoint is similar to John Madeley’s, who argues that:

[t]he pattern of church-state relations in society X can, in part at least, be explained by the fact that it is a mono-confessional Orthodox or Catholic or Lutheran society; alternatively, in the case of society Y, that it is a multi-confessional society with a particular range and balance of confessions represented. To make sense of these patterns, two factors must be examined in each case: the character of the different confessional traditions, particularly as this relates to church-state relations, and how strongly they are represented relative to other traditions (Madeley 2003: 34).

In terms of confessional distribution, one can observe the following picture in the EU (bearing in mind some difficulties in counting the number of adherents of different confessions). If we accept Madeley’s concept of monoconfessional blocs and multiconfessional belts, than the picture will be as follows:

- Austria, Belgium, Poland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, Slovenia and Italy belong to the Catholic bloc;
- Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus belong to the Orthodox bloc;
- Denmark, Sweden and Finland belong to the Lutheran bloc.

All other EU countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Hungary, Latvia, and Estonia) cannot be regarded as monoconfessional states, although in some of them religious minorities are few in number.

What can we expect from these models? Does a State Church, for example, presuppose greater influence for the Church? This is not necessarily the case, although Soper and Fetzer are in favour of this perspective, claiming that “[C]hristian leaders in Britain and Germany are already well positioned politically. That fewer people are attending religious services might not reduce the political influence of church leaders or lead inevitably to a secular public policy” (Soper and Fetzer 2007: 941). However, this perspective is contested. Fink argues the opposite: “[t]he very fact that Churches are closely tied to the state may jeopardise their power and ability to influence” (Fink 2009: 84). In some cases, it is the state which tends to dominate the Church, not vice versa. Overall, we can, in line with Minkenberg, regard the Church-State relations more as an opportunity structure for religious interests in politics since “[t]hey determine to some extent whether churches, as political actors, operate as public institutions or as interest groups” (Minkenberg 2003: 196). Church-State relations do matter for policy outputs, but mainly if taken in connection with other variables (Minkenberg 2003: 196). For us, they are important as a factor, confirming the unique stance of Christian Churches in European integration, although their impact on the level of influence of Churches and the combination with other variables will require further research. However, the latter is not of the concern of this article.

Concluding remarks

The active participation of Christian Churches in European integration is not an alien concept. As we have identified in this article, Churches are logically incorporated in the EU politics; they form a constituent part of EU life and have been visible since the earliest stages of European integration. The role of Churches is not limited to the private space. Instead, Christian Churches act in different formats, bringing their unique contribution to the process of European integration. They are similar, in some features, to other actors, but they are at the same time different, due to the fact of being religious, spiritual organisations. Christian Churches embrace the familiar features of regular non-state actors,
but they also act as identity formers. As identity formers, Churches are willing to contribute
to the formation of their own vision of European identity, where Christian values and
norms constitute a substantial or, at least, important part. The unique stance of Churches,
combined with some other factors, allows us to make more concrete conclusions.

First, we suggest that Christian Churches have increased their level of influence in the EU
in the last 20 years. The process of secularisation, occurring in some areas of the Union, is
not applicable to the EU at large. Secondly, Churches are active only on selected EU issues,
which they regard as the most important. These are largely value-based issues, involving
concepts of identity, morality, and the rights of vulnerable and oppressed groups (i.e.
illegal immigrants). Churches mainly act out of common interests, rather than their own
egotistical aims. Third, one can expect that the degree of influence and involvement of
Churches goes according to confessional lines. We can expect a higher degree of influence
and involvement of the Roman Catholic Church on the supranational level, while on the
national level this depends on the circumstances of a given country. The variations can be
tremendous even between countries with a similar confessional distribution and they also
involve the peculiarities of Church-State regimes. Finally, we assume that the level of
influence and success for Churches may depend on what issues are at stake. On the issues
attracting a high degree of attention from the public and governments, one can expect
better mobilising potential of Churches, outweighing the mobilising potential of their
opponents. Arguably, on some issues Churches may ally with secular organisations. This
will make their potential even stronger.

Overall, Christian Churches are now the inalienable participants of the integration process
and the EU politics. It is impossible to ignore them, even if the EU aims to position itself as
a secular organisation, with no direct competence in faith issues. Nowadays Christian
Churches have firmly accepted their role as the unique and special participants of
European integration—a role which cannot be assigned to anyone else.

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EU Aid Conditionality in ACP Countries: Explaining Inconsistency in EU Sanctions Practice

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Abstract

The EU is often criticised for using negative conditionality only in poor, strategically less important countries in the ACP region. However, whether and why there is inconsistency within the group of ACP countries has not been properly investigated. Therefore, this article investigates the reasons for the EU’s non-application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in five countries that can be considered typical cases where negative conditionality is generally imposed, namely countries that experienced flawed elections over the last ten years: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya and Chad. On the one hand, the study confirms previous findings that security interests tend to trump the EU’s efforts to promote democratisation. On the other hand, the article adds that democratisation might not only conflict with the EU’s interests, but also with its objective to promote development and poverty reduction.

Keywords
Development cooperation; Political conditionality; Sanctions

Since 1995, the European Union (EU) has had the possibility to suspend aid towards developing countries that violate human rights or experience democratic breakdown. This was made legally possible by defining human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles as “essential elements” of the Lomé Agreement between the European Community (EC) and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. In 2000, this political conditionality was broadened to some extent by making good governance a fundamental element, making it possible for the EU to suspend aid in cases of severe corruption and bribery (Hadfield 2007: 43-44). Article 96/97, which can be invoked when one of the essential or fundamental elements is violated, provides that the EU might impose sanctions after consultations with the violating country in which the EU and the partner country try to remedy the situation.

While the emergence and legal status of this conditionality clause has been described and analysed elaborately (Arts 2000; Fierro 2003; Hilpold 2002; Holland 2002), only few studies have focused on its application. From the studies that have investigated the application of

1 Throughout the article, the term “European Union” (EU) will be used as a general rule, whereas “European Community” (EC) is only used when referring specifically to the legal (first pillar) dimensions.

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Article 96/97, it is clear that political conditionality is usually invoked only in a limited number of cases, mostly in countries that experienced flawed elections or a coup d'état (Laakso et al. 2007: 48-50; Portela 2007: 41-42). In the case of a coup d'état, the EU has been consistent: each clear-cut coup d'état in the ACP region has been followed by EU sanctions (Laakso et al. 2007: 50). The table in the Appendix gives an overview of Article 96 cases and the situation that led to the invocation of the human rights clause. Different reasons can explain this limited application. For the EU, sanctions are seen as an ultimate tool and agreement in the Council is not easily found. Therefore, sanctions are only imposed when the situation leaves little room for interpretation, such as in cases of democratic breakdown, while for human rights violations, a “cut-off” point is more difficult to agree upon (Laakso et al. 2007: 34; Smith 2001: 200; Portela 2007: 42).

We thus know that the EU consistently invokes Article 96 in the case of a coup d'état and also often in cases of flawed elections, while human rights violations or more gradual deteriorations of the democratic process are less likely to lead to sanctions. The EU practice thus confirms studies on political conditionality, which have suggested that donors tend to focus on a minimalist, electoral conception of democracy (Diamond 1999: 56; Tomasevski 1997: 157). However, we do not know whether the EU is consistent in its striving for free and fair elections around the world. The reason for this hiatus is that studies focusing on the application of development aid suspensions have not or hardly considered those cases where the EU does not apply Article 96. This article therefore seeks to advance possible explanations for the non-application of Article 96 in ACP countries where flawed elections have taken place in the last ten years (the so-called “non-cases”).

Previous studies on EU democracy promotion have mainly advanced EU and Member State interests to explain inconsistent policies. The main argument is that, when democratisation conflicts with the EU’s interests in a country, the EU will most likely prioritise its interests. On the one hand, this article will investigate whether this assumption is also valid for the EU’s policies in the group of ACP countries, which consists primarily of Sub-Saharan African countries that are mostly poor and little important strategically. A distinction is made between security interests, political-historic interests and economic interests. On the other, the article adds an additional factor that might complicate EU democratisation policies in developing countries. The EU might close an eye towards certain countries that tend to make progress in eradicating poverty while stagnating or worsening politically. In other words, the EU’s proclaimed overarching goal in the developing world, namely poverty reduction, might conflict with its desire to promote democratisation. Five Sub-Saharan African countries that experienced dubious elections in the last ten years are investigated in this article: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya, and Chad. In the selection of the cases, efforts were made to have maximum variance with regard to the independent variables. Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria are strategically important allies of the EU, while Chad and Rwanda have a rather negative impact on security in their surrounding regions. All five countries have a very different colonial history, with Ethiopia not having been colonised, and the other four countries colonised by three different EU Member States: Belgium (Rwanda), France (Chad) and the United Kingdom (Kenya and Nigeria). The countries also vary regarding their economic importance, including important (Nigeria) and less important (Chad) oil producers and relatively large (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia) and small (Rwanda, Chad) economies. Lastly, the countries also vary substantially in their economic and social development: some countries have high growth but only limited progress in the social sphere (Kenya, Nigeria), others achieve high growth rates and make great progress towards the achievement of

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2 While in principle, the opening of consultations and the partial suspension of aid may be decided with a qualified majority of the votes, it has been noted that in practice, these decisions are taken by consensus in the Council (Laakso et al. 2007: 16).
the Millennium Development Goals (Ethiopia, Rwanda) and Chad scores poorly on both economic and social development.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, the literature on EU democracy promotion is reviewed in order to generate concrete expectations for EU democracy promotion in the ACP region. The second section presents the five country cases studies and gives a brief introduction of the electoral records of these countries. The third section then applies the hypotheses on the five cases. Conclusions are presented in the last section.

When EU interests trump democracy promotion: a review of the literature

Previous research has suggested that the interference of security or economic interests with the promotion of democracy is the main explanatory factor for EU inconsistency in democracy promotion and especially negative conditionality. Sanctions are only imposed on weaker countries where the EU has no important security or economic interests and which have limited capacity to reciprocate, such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Brummer 2009; Smith 2001). The importance of security interests has been further specified by studies on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. It has been argued that the EU is more interested in stabilising than in democratising the Mediterranean region. Although the current regimes in the Southern Mediterranean do not conform to the liberal democratic model, ousting them would endanger energy supplies, cause massive migration to the EU or provoke terrorist attacks, as current leaders are key partners in the war on terrorism (Jünemann 2004: 7; Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Balfour 2006: 126). A similar view is reflected in research on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia, which concludes that economic and security interests, namely energy interests and the fight against terrorism impede the EU in fulfilling its democracy promotion agenda (Crawford 2008; Hoffmann 2010; Warkotsch 2006). Studies on EU democracy promotion in South-East Asia focus more clearly on the trade-off between commercial interests and democracy promotion, e.g. in China (Algieri 2007).

However, whether these factors also account for a less consistent democracy promotion agenda in the poorer and strategically less important ACP region has not been properly investigated. Olsen (2000: 163) seems to suggest a similar conflict between security interests and democracy promotion in Africa. In a study of EU democracy promotion in three African countries (Kenya, Niger, Algeria), he concludes that “whenever there is a conflict between security and democracy, the Europeans tend to give priority to security”. Crawford (2007: 84) confirms this finding in a study on EU democracy promotion in Ghana. According to his article, EU democracy promotion is limited in Ghana because the EU has few direct security interests in the country. In this context, one should also note the recent evolution of a “securitisation” of EU development policies, whereby security and development policies increasingly tend to merge. The Cotonou Agreement includes a whole article on peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution (Article 11), while revisions added articles on the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Articles 11a and 11b). Most authors describing this evolution seem to suggest that the EU, when confronted with security and development objectives, will most likely prioritise security to development (Hadfield 2007; Youngs 2007).

Another factor important for EU democracy promotion in the ACP region are political-historical relations related to colonial history. The relations between the European Community (EC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries originate in European colonialism. Grilli (1993) speaks of EC associationism between the Member States and their former colonies, by which the former colonizers hoped to preserve their influence. According to this view, former colonial links were the main driving force of associationism.
Consequently, France - as the Member State that maintained the widest and longest colonial presence in Africa - was most influential. This French domination has been confirmed in other studies (Holland 2002: 25-26; Claeys 2004: 118-119; Dimier 2006: 266), although it is also widely recognised that the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) and the inclusion of Anglophone colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific have greatly diminished French influence in EC development policies. A statistical analysis of EU sanctions came to the counterintuitive conclusion that former colonies of EU Member States were sanctioned more severely than non-former colonies. However, this might be related to the fact that former colonies were generally less democratic than non-former colonies (Hazelzet 2005: 12). Jünemann and Knodt (2007: 354-355) note that historical (in the sense of ex-colonial) interests have prevented the EU from using negative instruments towards certain countries, such as France in the case of Algeria.

While these factors all relate to a potential conflict between democratisation and the EU’s interests, the case study analysis will demonstrate that a conflict between the objectives of EU development policy is equally possible. The EU’s objectives in the ACP region are stated in the Cotonou Agreement. Article 1 states that “The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the world economy”. The Lisbon Treaty clearly states that the primary objective of EC development cooperation is “the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” (Article 208 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Policy documents reflect the general consensus that economic development is not possible without democratisation. This idea was first mentioned publicly in the 1991 Council Resolution on human rights, democracy and development and is also repeated in Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, which names democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance “an integral part of sustainable development”. It is still reflected in the EU Consensus on Development (2006) which states that both the eradication of poverty and the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights form the objectives of EU development policy. This means that the EU is confronted with a dilemma in those countries that make progress in poverty reduction, but have rather poor democratic records. The article further explores this dilemma by examining the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda.

An overview of non-cases

In order to investigate whether there is inconsistency in the EU’s promotion of electoral democracy through conditionality, this section of the article presents a number of ACP countries that have not been sanctioned, despite the fact that they are not electoral democracies. Of course, the question whether a country is an electoral democracy is already quite controversial. Therefore, this study is limited to those cases in which an EU election observation mission itself concluded that the elections were problematic (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya) or where the EU expressed clear criticism about the electoral process despite the fact that there was no EU election observation (Chad).

The 2005 parliamentary elections in Ethiopia were monitored by a large observation mission deployed by the EU and led by the socialist Member of European Parliament (MEP) Ana-Maria Gomes. The overall report was without doubt the most critical of all international observer missions, concluding that “the elections fell short of international principles for genuine democratic elections” (EU Election Observation Mission 2005: 1). Although the elections were more or less peaceful and the campaigning had been more open to the opposition than in preceding elections, violence arose in the counting and aggregation process. The results were heavily contested and the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) – which was accused by the opposition of being in favour of the ruling
party - fell short in investigating claims of fraud. This led to mass protests in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, to which the government reacted by imposing a ban on demonstrations and on the freedom of assembly. Over two hundred people were killed and tens of thousands arrested (mostly members of the main opposition party) in protests in June and November 2005. Opposition leaders were arrested by the government on the suspicion of staging a coup (Harbeson 2006; Abbink 2006). In 2008, local elections were held, which were perceived to be uncompetitive due to strong pressure by the ruling party to vote for or join the ruling party. International observers were not allowed during these elections and the international community remained silent about the conduct and results of the poll (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 117-118). Although the 2010 parliamentary elections did not bring about the same kind of violence than in 2005, the EU concluded that the electoral process “fell short of international commitments for elections, notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of level playing field for all contesting parties”. It was noted that state resources were used in some cases to fund ruling party campaigns and that public administration at the local level was highly influenced by the ruling party. Opposition concerns about the impartiality of the NEBE had not been met (EU Election Observation Mission 2010: 1). The lack of political openness and the curtailing of political and civil rights in the aftermath of the 2005 elections (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009) can explain the minuscule gains of the opposition: whereas the independent opposition had managed to secure 109 (CUD) and 9 (UEDF) seats in 2005, the ruling party EPRDF won 544 of 547 seats in 2010 (EU Election Observation Mission 2010). Despite the fact that all three of these elections were flawed, the EU did not invoke Article 96. Nevertheless, the EU demonstrated its lack of trust in the government by suspending budget support jointly with other donors in December 2005, as a reaction to the post-electoral violence. However, budget support was resumed under the Protection of Basic Services programme only a year later, and continued ever since, despite the severe deterioration in Ethiopia’s democratic record in recent years.

The EU election observation mission to the 2003 parliamentary and presidential elections in Rwanda noted several irregularities, including the stuffing of ballot boxes and the illegal manipulation of the lists of voters. In addition, the mission found that competition was unequal and without real opposition, as the campaign period was marked by arrests, intimidations and interrogations by the ruling party (Meyer-Resende 2006: 16). However, despite these severe accusations, Chief Observer MEP Colette Flesch concluded that the elections were an important step in the democratic process (BBC News online, 27 August 2003). The report from the Observer Mission of the 2008 legislative elections was more severe in tone. It noted that there were a number of shortcomings in the elections regarding international and regional standards for democratic elections. The main concerns were the lack of transparency in the consolidation of the votes and the publication of results at the polling stations and the lack of political debate amongst contestants, due to intimidation and arrest of the opposition and limitations to the freedom of press and information (EU Election Observation mission 2008a). The 2010 presidential elections, which again took place in a climate of violence and intimidation, including killings of the opposition, were not observed by the EU, advancing that there were already many elections in Africa in 2010 and Rwanda was not amongst the priority countries (EU Business, 5 August 2010). Although the Netherlands have given a clear signal by not planning any budget support to Rwanda because of its poor democratic record, the EU and other Member States stand firm in maintaining substantial support, including budget support, to the country (Kanyesigye 2010).

In 2003, the EU deployed an observation mission to the presidential, gubernatorial and assembly elections in Nigeria. The mission concluded that the national assembly elections were marked by serious shortcomings. Similarly, the presidential elections and a number of gubernatorial elections were marred by serious irregularities and fraud in a number of
states, such as ballot stuffing and the changing of results, according to the EU mission (EU Election Observation Mission 2003). However, in a statement by the Presidency, the EU called the elections “an important step in the democratic process in Nigeria” (Council of the European Union 2003). The conclusions drawn from the 2007 presidential, national, gubernatorial and assembly elections were much more critical. The overall judgment was that the elections fell short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections, due to very poor organisation, the lack of essential transparency, procedural irregularities, fraud and widespread voter disenfranchisement. The fraud and lack of transparency was so serious according to the observers, that there could be no confidence in the results (EU Election Observation Mission 2007: 1). Chief Observer Max Van den Berg concluded that the poll was one of the worst that the EU had ever observed (Enabulele and Ewere 2010: 185). Despite these strong accusations, Nigeria’s electoral process has not affected close relations between Nigeria and the EU. The Ministerial Troika held one year after the elections in May 2008, hardly dealt with issues of human rights and democratisation (Council of the European Union 2008a).

In the beginning of the 21st century, Kenya was known as one of the success stories of democratic transition in Africa. After years of dictatorship, President Moi announced in 2002 that he would not stand for another term in the 2002 presidential elections. These elections, monitored by the EU were praised as an “important step in the process of democratic development in Kenya” and “an example for other countries in the region”, according to the EU election observation team (EU Election Observation Mission 2002). In addition, the rejection of the proposed constitution by the Kenyan people in a 2005 referendum was regarded as a sign of further democratic progress in the country. For this reason, the presidential election in December 2007 and its violent aftermath came as a surprise to the international community. Whereas voting itself was relatively free and fair, problems emerged in the counting process. The electoral commission declared Kibaki to be the winner, but the margin was very small and many constituencies were still disputed. In addition, the parliamentary elections had resulted in an overwhelming majority for opposition candidate Odinga (Abuya 2009: 135-136; Throup 2009: 296). The EU observer mission concluded that “the 2007 General Elections fell short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections”. According to the mission, the lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of the results undermined the confidence in the accuracy of the final result. In addition, the mission concluded that there were some important shortcomings and deficiencies in the legal framework of the elections, which lacked basic transparency safeguards relating to the tallying and publication of the results (EU Election Observation Mission 2008b). Instead of imposing sanctions, the EU actively supported African attempts of mediation by John Kufuor and Kofi Annan, which eventually led to a power-sharing deal in February 2008 (Council of the European Union 2008b).

It is widely recognised that Chad is not an electoral democracy, although the EU has never sent an observer mission to Chadian elections. The International Crisis Group (2006: 2) noted that the 2001 presidential and 2002 legislative elections took place in “controversial circumstances” and according to Freedom House (2002), the elections were marred by “serious irregularities and indications of outright fraud”. After the 2002 legislative elections, the electoral process further deteriorated. The opposition decided that it would stop participating in the elections, as participating would only legitimise the elections (International Crisis Group 2008a: 9). In June 2005, President Déby organised a constitutional referendum that would allow him to stand for a third term, despite earlier promises that he would step down (International Crisis Group 2006: 2). The presidential elections in May 2006 were held despite a call by the international community and the opposition to postpone the elections because of the turmoil caused by a coup attempt in February 2006. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for President Déby, which came
to no one’s surprise as the main opposition boycotted the elections and Déby’s adversaries were mainly unknown to the public (International Crisis Group 2006: 2). Legislative elections have been postponed several times since 2007. In August 2007, a political agreement was reached between the government and the unarmed opposition to cope with some of the problems in the electoral process. In the meantime, a new electoral commission has been set up and an electoral census has been undertaken. Legislative, presidential and local elections are foreseen for 2011 (United States Institute for Peace 2010). Although the EU did not send observer missions to none of these elections in Chad, it is clear that the EU questioned the credibility of the elections. A Council Presidency statement on the 2001 presidential elections regretted “the many shortcomings in the organisation of the poll and the resultant irregularities” (Council of the European Union 2001). Reacting to the 2006 presidential elections in Chad, Commissioner Michel expressed concern about the climate in which the elections took place and the lack of dialogue between government and opposition (Michel 2006). There was no official reaction to the 2002 legislative election nor to the 2005 constitutional referendum. The EU seems to prefer a constructive approach towards Chad instead of sanctions, for example by facilitating the political deal reached in August 2007.

Explaining inconsistency

Security interests

Ethiopia and Kenya are located in the strategically important region of the Horn of Africa. The importance of this region to the EU is illustrated by the Strategic Partnership the EU adopted in 2006, which is the only Strategic Partnership that the EU has adopted with an African sub-region. The EU fears that a destabilisation of the Horn of Africa would undermine the EU’s security: “cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking of arms, drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions that spread throughout the Horn of Africa, and could even reach the EU” (European Commission 2006: 5). It is also noted that the Horn of Africa is sensitive to extremist influence from neighbouring sub-regions as a result of the fragility of most countries, weak governments and economies, poor governance and many internal and cross-country conflicts (European Commission 2006: 5; Rotberg 2005: 1-22). In addition, some of Africa’s most threatening conflicts are located in the region, including the civil wars in Sudan and in Somalia, but also several border conflicts, including between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Eritrea and Djibouti. In December 2008, the EU deployed a naval mission along the coasts of Somalia to discourage the operations of pirates. Ethiopia and Kenya are key allies of both the EU and US in the securitisation of the region. Ethiopia is the main backer of the transition regime in Somalia and Ethiopian troops even fought the Islamic Courts in 2006 in the town of Baidoa, after which Ethiopian troops remained in the country for some years to support the transition authorities (International Crisis Group 2008Bb). Although Kenya’s role in Somalia is less pronounced, it also supports the transition regime and has hosted several peace talks on Somalia (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11). Moreover, Kenya cooperates closely with the EU in the fight against piracy along the coast of Somalia. An agreement was signed in 2009 on the prosecution of suspected Somali pirates in Kenya (Agence France Presse 26 April 2009). Kenya and Ethiopia are also crucial partners of the United States (US) in the war on terrorism. Both countries participate in several US programmes, such as the East-Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative and the Terrorist Interdiction Programme (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007; Whitaker 2008: 256-257).

Even more so than Ethiopia and Kenya, Nigeria tries to present itself as the peacemaker on the continent, and especially in West Africa. Nigeria is the main driving force behind ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) and contributed most of the
troops of the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Obi 2008: 190). Despite the weaknesses of its own democratic record, Nigeria has also tried to act as a force for democratisation in West Africa, for example by supporting the democratic process in Togo, Sao Tome and Principe and Liberia (International Crisis Group 2007: 12).

While Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia could be seen as stabilising forces in their regions, this cannot be said about Rwanda and Chad. Relations between Sudan and Chad are difficult, as Chad is accused of supporting the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan, while Chad suspects that Sudan is involved in rebellions in the country (International Crisis Group 2006: 22). Similarly, Rwanda is at odds with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), because of the occupation by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi of the North-eastern part of the country during the second Congolese war. More recently, Kagame was accused of supporting Nkunda’s Congrès National Pour La Défense du Peuple (International Crisis Group 2009). Nevertheless, despite Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC, it has been noted by some authors that the mere fact that Rwanda is internally stable is crucial for donors. Donors might not be pushing too hard for democratic reforms, as democracy might also have destabilising consequences in a post-conflict and ethnically divided society such as Rwanda (Uvin 2001: 180; Silva-Leander 2008). This ‘democratisation-stability dilemma’ does not exist in the case of Chad, which is also internally unstable because of the many armed opposition groups threatening the ruling regime.

**Political-historical Interests**

The five non-cases that are being scrutinised in this article all have different colonial histories. Ethiopia was never colonised, despite a brief annexation by Italy between 1936 and 1941. Kenya and Nigeria are both former colonies of the United Kingdom. Colonial history has resulted in strong cultural and economic links with the UK that continue to exist as a consequence of large immigration into the UK. Kenyan and Nigerian communities count around 150,000 Kenyan and Nigerian-born residents in the UK, which places them at the bottom of the top 10 of foreign residents in the country (Office for National Statistics 2009). These figures are most likely an underestimation, as the total number of Nigerians living in Britain on a more-or-less settled basis is estimated at one million (Whiteman 2008: 275). The colonial history between both former colonies and the UK has however not impeded several frictions in the relations with their former coloniser. Indeed, it could be argued that strong cultural ties could even result in more pressure for democratisation. For example, when General Abacha annulled the results of presidential elections in the 1990s, civil society in both the UK and Nigeria strongly advocated a tough stance towards the regime. Although they were only minor (not affecting trade in oil for example), sanctions were nevertheless imposed. The fact that UK-Nigerian relations are good, despite the 2007 elections, is more likely to be related to the fact that the UK is happy with the economic reforms and diplomatic strategies that have been undertaken in recent years, rather than to colonial history (Whiteman 2008: 269-271). Similarly, despite colonial history, the rampant corruption in Kenya has led to several diplomatic rifts between the UK and the Kibaki regime (Agence France Presse 21 January 2003; 17 May 2006; 9 December 2007).

After having been colonised by Germany in the 19th century, Rwanda was granted to Belgium as a mandate territory in 1919. It gained independence in 1962. Despite strong cultural, political, social and economic ties in the first decades of independence, relations between Belgium and Rwanda were affected by Belgium’s role in the Rwandan genocide. Belgium is seen as having contributed to a large degree to the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi, by introducing identity cards and privileging Tutsi under colonial rule. In addition, Belgium has done nothing to prevent the genocide, withdrawing troops after the murder of ten Belgian soldiers and even advocating for a withdrawal of the United Nations
peacekeeping mission. It is often argued that this historic responsibility might have created a sense of guilt amongst Belgians and other European Member States alike, creating a "genocide credit" for President Kagame. Relations between Rwanda and its former coloniser have significantly improved since the public apology for Belgium’s role in the genocide in 1999. The improvement of diplomatic relations has led to political and economic reengagement: aid has increased significantly since 2000 and Belgium also praised the 2003 elections in Rwanda, despite the critical EU report (Hayman 2010: 343-345; *Agence France Presse* 9 October 2003).

Nowhere in the above-mentioned cases have colonial relations played such an important role than in Chad. It is widely acknowledged that French support to the Déby regime is crucial to its survival. France is concerned to maintain its military base ‘Epervier’ in Chad, which is the second largest after Djibouti. Former military interventions and the presence of the military in the country have created close relations between certain high-ranking officers and Déby. Political relations between Déby and France have also been close because of Déby’s role in protecting French interests in Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (International Crisis Group 2006: 17). These close ties are reflected in France’s stance towards the political crisis in Chad. France openly supported the constitutional amendment allowing Déby to run for a third term and the subsequent presidential elections in 2006 (International Crisis Group 2008; Marchal 2006: 474-475). France also intervened militarily through its military base to protect President Déby against rebel attacks in April and November 2006. Moreover, France was the main architect of the European military mission EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic that is mandated to protect civilians, ensure humanitarian aid and the safety of UN personnel in the regions of eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic that are affected by the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (International Crisis Group 2008).

**Economic interests**

The ACP region is only of marginal economic importance to the EU. In 2009, the ACP group (excluding South Africa) represented only 4.5 per cent of the EU’s total imports and 5.2 per cent of its export. The only ACP countries (again excluding South Africa) in the list of the EU’s 50 main trade partners are Nigeria (the EU’s 26th trade partner) and Angola (the EU’s 37th trade partner) (European Commission DG Trade 2009a). Going back to our five “non-cases”, only Nigeria is economically important to the EU. Nigeria is Africa’s second largest economy, after South-Africa. The EU mainly imports oil from Nigeria: in 2005, 91 per cent of EU imports from Nigeria were oil products, representing 3.3 per cent of the EU’s total oil imports (European Commission DG Trade 2009b). Nigeria is the 8th largest oil importer for the EU (European Commission DG Energy 2010). Despite the fact that Kenya and Ethiopia are also amongst the largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (with respective GDPs numbering over $30.2 billion in the case of Kenya and 28.5 billion in the case of Ethiopia in 2009), their economies are only of minor importance when compared to the Nigerian giant ($169 billion). Moreover, their main exports consist of agricultural products such as coffee, tea and flowers. The economies of Chad ($6.7 billion) and Rwanda ($5.1 billion) are even smaller (World Bank World Development Indicators). Despite the fact that Chad is also an oil exporting country and 85.2 per cent of Chadian exports to the EU are mineral fuels, the relative importance of Chadian oil to the EU, with €100 million imported in 2009, is negligible (zero per cent) (European Commission DG Trade 2009c).

In conclusion, after scrutinising our five non-cases with regard to their importance for the EU’s security, political-historic and economic interests, we can conclude that strategic interests are definitely more important than political-historic or economic interests. Strategic importance plays a role in three of the five mentioned non-cases: Ethiopia, Kenya...
and Nigeria, which are important stabilising actors in the region. To a lesser degree, security interests might be of importance in Rwanda, to the extent that this country is not democratic but stable. Political-historic relations related to the colonial past only play a very clear role in Chad, where France is widely known to be keen on maintaining President Déby in power and EU policies are clearly dominated by France. To a lesser degree, colonial history might also play a role in Rwanda, where the ‘genocide credit’ makes Belgium reluctant to criticise Rwanda’s democratic record. In other cases, such as Kenya and Nigeria, colonial history has not impeded public outcry for democratisation by the former coloniser. Lastly, economic interests can only be considered to be directly important in the case of Nigeria, which is a significant oil exporter to the EU.

**Democracy versus development**

Rwanda and Ethiopia have had impressive growth rates in the last years. GDP growth in Ethiopia has been above 10 per cent since 2004. Economic growth has been less impressive in Rwanda, but still substantial at over seven per cent on average between 2000 and present (World Development Indicators). In addition to solid economic growth, both countries have made significant progress regarding the Millennium Development Goals. The MDG monitor notes that Rwanda and Ethiopia are on track for most of the MDGs. As such, the EU’s silence about the lack of democratisation in Ethiopia and Rwanda might actually be beneficial to some extent to the population in these countries. This relates to the so-called “humanitarian dilemma”. Human Rights Watch notes that donors choose to continue programmes in Ethiopia, because the suspension of their programmes would have even worse consequences for the population, given the fact that a large part of the Ethiopian population is dependent on food aid (Human Rights Watch 2010: 81).

Moreover, donors might be more inclined to continue development assistance in these countries because programmes are well managed. Marysse et al. (2007) point out that donors prefer countries that are ‘well governed’ in the technocratic sense of the word, even if they do not fulfil donor objectives with regard to democratisation. Technocratic good governance involves low corruption, low regulatory burden, strong government effectiveness and an adequate legal environment for the private sector. This is especially the case for Rwanda, which scores above the Sub-Saharan African average for all indicators of technocratic governance identified by the World Bank: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and the rule of law. For control of corruption, Rwanda even scores above world average, ranking in the 61st percentile. Ethiopia has less impressive scores, which are around the Sub-Saharan African average, except for government effectiveness, for which Ethiopia ranks in the 40th percentile and thus scores above average.

Does this democratisation-development dilemma also occur for the other three cases identified in this study: Chad, Kenya and Nigeria? Both Kenya and Nigeria have had relatively high growth rates in the last few years: Kenya’s GDP grew by five to seven per cent between 2004 and 2007 and Nigeria even had over 10 per cent GDP growth in 2003 and 2004, followed by six per cent on average in 2005-2008. However, despite economic

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3 The MDGs are (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) Achieve universal primary education, (3) Promote gender equality and empower women, (4) Reduce child mortality, (5) Improve maternal health, (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (7) Ensure environmental sustainability and (8) Develop a global partnership for development. On the basis of national Government reporting, Rwanda will most likely achieve MDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, while information for MDGs 2 and 8 is insufficient. Ethiopia will most likely meet MDGs 2-7, and could also meet MDGs 1 and 8 if changes are made.

4 World Bank Governance Indicators, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

5 These figures fell markedly in 2009 as a consequence of the economic crisis (Worldbank World Development Indicators).
growth, this did not always trickle down to the population. Both countries are off track regarding the eradication of extreme poverty by 2015. The picture is a little less bleak for Kenya, which could meet most other MDGs if policy changes are made, but Nigeria is off track for most of the other MDGs. Only MDG 2 on universal primary education will probably be met in these countries. A second problem concerns the rampant corruption in both countries. They score below the Sub-Saharan African average in the World Bank Governance Indicators on the control of corruption.

Figures on Chad show that its economic is very poor condition. Chad experienced enormous injections of capital in 2003 because of the start of oil production, resulting in astronomical GDP growth rates, but this has not led to sustained economic growth. Recent figures show that the economy has been hardly growing since 2006 (and even shrinking in 2008). Chad is off track for the MDGs, except for MDG 2 regarding universal primary education.

Conclusion

EU negative conditionality is often criticised for its lack of consistency. This article has investigated whether this inconsistency could also be identified in the case of the EU’s relations with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Since the EU uses negative conditionality mainly to punish countries for negative evolutions in the electoral process, the article looked into five countries with questionable electoral records: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya and Chad. Although the EU seems to agree that the elections that took place in the period between 2001-2010 in these countries did not meet international standards, it preferred to use political dialogue instead of punitive conditionality. The main part of the article was concerned with explaining this inconsistent application of conditionality. It first explored factors relating to the EU’s interests, which are mostly advanced when talking about inconsistency of EU democratisation policies. More specifically, the article looked whether security, political-historic and economic interests could explain why the five non-cases have not been sanctioned. Security interests seemed to be most important in the economically little important Sub-Saharan African region. More specifically, countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya are key partners of the West in the fight against terrorism and in maintaining peace in their respective regions by means of diplomacy and peacekeeping troops. In Rwanda, the democratisation-stability dilemma might play a role, meaning that the EU chooses not to meddle in a country’s internal affairs as long as it remains stable. Political-historic interests related to the colonial history of one of the EU Member States play a very large role in Chad and, to a much lesser degree, in Rwanda, but are less important in Kenya and Nigeria, where colonial relations have not impeded diplomatic rifts resulting from discussions about democratisation. Economic interests are a minor explanatory factor in the economically little important Sub-Saharan African region, but do play a role in Nigeria, which is an important oil producer. Apart from traditional explanations relating to the EU’s interests, the article also argued that in developing countries, the EU might face a dilemma in countries that might not be democratic, but are nevertheless developing economically and socially. This thesis is illustrated with the case studies Ethiopia and Rwanda, where high economic growth, substantial progress regarding the Millennium Development Goals and relatively good technocratic governance stand in sharp contrast with negative evolutions in the democratic sphere.

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References


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### Appendix: Overview of Article 96 cases

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>4/08/2000</td>
<td>Coup d'état</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>22/05/2003</td>
<td>Coup d'état</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>19/12/2003</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>29/11/2005</td>
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<td>Fiji</td>
<td>27/02/2007</td>
<td>Coup d'état</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>16/03/2009</td>
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<td>4-5/06/2009</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2/08/2000</td>
<td>Flawed elections</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Referendum for third mandate of President in view of Presidential elections</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23/07/2001</td>
<td>Involvement with human rights violations by the RUF, lack of freedom of the press and of expression, corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>29/10/2001</td>
<td>Growing violence and insecurity, lack of freedom of expression, violence in the pre-electoral period, illegal occupation of land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Laakso et al. 2007a; Portela 2007; Official EU documents*
Bridging the Gap between Environmental Policy Integration and the EU’s Energy Policy: Mapping out the ‘Green Europeanisation’ of Energy Governance

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Abstract
The Europeanisation of energy policy has occupied a remote place in the European integration literature to date. However, current developments such as the Energy Policy for Europe launched in 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty Title XXI on Energy have given greater prominence to this policy area within the integration process. Hence, there are several indications that the Europeanisation of energy policy is already taking place, even though the understanding of this process is still weak. And indeed, European studies are just beginning to shed light on this policy area. Against this backdrop, this article examines the EU environmental performance, supported by the Environmental Policy Integration (EPI), as a driver for energy governance during the process of Europeanisation. Its main argument is that EPI is not only a variable for explaining the governance changes at the EU level concerning energy – defined here as ‘green Europeanisation’–, but also a useful instrument for pursuing coherence within the emergent EU energy policy.

Keywords
Europeanisation; Energy policy; Climate change; Renewable energy

THE EUROPEANISATION OF ENERGY POLICY HAS OCCUPIED A REMOTE PLACE IN THE European integration literature to date. Paradoxically, even though energy policy provided an early impetus for European integration, this policy has largely remained state-centered, and the integration process has not been capable of laying down the foundations for a fully fledged and coherent Common Energy Policy (CEP). In fact, energy has been considered one of the weakest areas of integration and has been neglected by EU analysts, perhaps with the exception of deregulation policy. However, current developments, such as the Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) launched in 2007 or the Lisbon Treaty Title XXI on Energy, have given more prominence to this policy within the integration process. Energy Commissioner Günter H. Oettinger recently stated that, nowadays, “there is a chance to achieve what the Founding Fathers had envisaged some 60 years ago […] with the European Coal and Steel Community and shortly afterwards the Euratom Treaty” (Oettinger 2010a). Overall, there are several indications that the Europeanisation of energy policy is already taking place (Oettinger 2010a, 2010b), even though the understanding of this process is still weak. And indeed, European studies are just beginning to shed light on this policy area (Buchan 2009; Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010; Morata and Solorio forthcoming). Against this background, it is fundamental to acknowledge that energy
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policy has been invariably considered a particularly unusual case of policy-making at the European level, especially due to the pronounced conflicts between the development of common policies, on the one hand, and divergent national policies, on the other hand (Andersen 2000). This was the main reason behind the ban imposed on the EU in this area before the Lisbon Treaty broke down the barriers that hindered action by Brussels. Nevertheless, despite having only recently been recognised as a formal EU policy area, it has been under the influence of Brussels for several years, particularly since the 1990s, when the Commission forged links between energy issues and its formal areas of competence, such as the external relations, the environment and the internal market (Matláry 1997). This dynamic has led to a *de facto* construction of a very limited and sector-based energy policy at the European level (Zapater 2009).

In the past years, the emergence of pressing issues, such as climate change and energy security, at the top of the EU political agenda has made the development of a comprehensive EU energy policy even more indispensable (European Commission 2006, 2007). In fact, the EU has a significant record of trying to respond to these challenges by moving towards a sustainable, secure, and competitive energy future (Damro et al. 2008; Piebalgs 2009; Buchan, 2009; Oberthür and Pallenaerts 2010). Thus, the new EPE is based on the objective of achieving a so-called ‘EU energy trinity’, firstly by increasing security of supply; secondly, by ensuring the competitiveness of European economies and the availability of affordable energy; and finally, by promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change (European Commission 2007; European Council 2007). Perhaps more significant is the fact that the energy chapter of the Lisbon Treaty emerged with the task of coordinating overall EU action in this field; that is, to give the new EPE a truly transversal character, instead of a sector-based one. Nevertheless, at the moment, there are hardly any indications of the mode of action to reach this paramount goal. Generally, there is a lack of a systematic understanding of the EPE and the wider Europeanisation of energy policy.

This article examines the EU environmental performance, supported by the Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) as a driver for energy governance during the process of Europeanisation. This article intends to answer the following questions regarding this process:

- How has the EU environmental performance, supported by EPI, influenced the EU energy policy and what is the relative importance of the *green driver* against the other elements of the energy trinity?

- What are the emergent governance patterns in this process and its perspectives for further development?

The article begins by contextualising the debate on the EPE in the Europeanisation framework. Subsequently, the article develops a categorisation of EPI of energy, arguing that there are identifiable EPI phases that have influenced the EPE as it is known nowadays. Next, it analyses the overall green contribution to the energy governance of Europeanisation against the other EPE components and reviews the nature of this process. Later, it studies the perspectives of change for energy policy. Finally, the conclusion summarises the debates about the energy governance of Europeanisation, the development of the EPE, and further challenges to be confronted in this policy field. The main argument of the article is that EPI is not only a variable capable of explaining the governance changes concerning energy – defined here as ‘green Europeanisation’–, but also a useful instrument for pursuing coherence within the emergent EU energy policy.
Energy Europeanisation: state-of-the-art

The Europeanisation agenda has received considerable attention in European studies, driven mainly by the greater dynamics of the integration process triggered by the Single European Act in 1986 and reinforced by successive Treaty revisions (Bulmer 2007). Thus, the studies on the effects of European integration gained prominence in a period where the EU competences increased notably (Haverland 2007), gradually spanning a wide range of policy areas. Not surprisingly though, energy has played a very paradoxical role in this process. In fact, even if the last decade has seen a growing interest in energy issues in EU policy-making (Natorski and Herranz 2008; Braun 2009; Buchan 2009; Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010; Morata and Solorio forthcoming), this area of public policy has been excluded from the Europeanisation research agenda.

It can be acknowledged that numerous elements of energy policy have been examined during these years of expansion of the Europeanisation research agenda. However, they have frequently been limited to a sector-based perspective, and have by no means covered the broader picture of energy policy. In other words, if this sector-based perspective is required given the nature of energy in European integration, these studies have yet to succeed in expanding the Europeanisation approach to overall energy policy due to their research foci. In this context, the research focused on the Europeanisation of the internal energy market has attracted most attention (McGowan 2008). It is possible to find earlier examples, such as the study by Andersen (1999) on natural gas liberalisation, the work of Eising and Jabko (2001) on the changing objectives of the French energy policy as a result of the market liberalisation negotiations, the well-known publication by Levi-Faur (2002) on the Europeanisation of the electric and telecommunications regime, and the research by Humphreys and Padgett (2006) on globalisation, EU and domestic governance, as well as other relevant works (Jordana et al. 2005; Barttle, 1999, 2002).

At the same time, the agenda that focuses on the EU’s external activities has also been further developed by Escribano’s study (2006), which analysed the European Neighborhood Policy and its impact on the Mediterranean. Studies such as those by Escribano (2010) and Herranz and Zapater (2010) have analysed how the EU promotes its energy interests beyond its frontiers, a perspective that is gradually growing. Similarly, Natorski and Herranz (2008) have investigated the way in which the securitisation of energy policy has failed to mobilise support for a CEP. Oddly though, despite major political attention being dedicated to climate change in the EU (Damro et al. 2008), it is hard to find studies linking the environmental performance of the EU to the Europeanisation of energy policy (Solorio 2009). It is therefore an emerging research agenda, which requires conceptual clarification in order to grasp this process under the Europeanisation framework. The next section aims to develop a comprehensive analytical framework in order to systematically map out the ‘green Europeanisation’ of energy policy.

‘Green Europeanisation’: the transformation of energy governance

The construction of a framework rooted in the Europeanisation literature is imperative in order to trace the impact of environmental performance on energy governance. However, this task involves considerable risks inherent to the application of the Europeanisation framework. One of the main challenges is that this concept has been “contested as to its usefulness for the study of European politics” (Vink and Graziano 2007: 3). Thus, perhaps the most useful approach to defining this concept is to draw the line with related concepts. A basic assumption for our research is the separation between the concepts of Europeanisation and political integration. Basically, the difference is that, while the latter involves “the understanding of a process in which countries pool sovereignty”, the former is concerned with “what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their
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effects” (Radaelli 2000: 6). However, the boundary between both can become blurred due to the fact that Europeanisation has a dual function “as an independent variable in domestic politics” and “as the processes by which domestic structures adapt to European integration” (Caporaso 2007: 27). In this article, we are interested in the first function, and it is therefore imperative to keep in mind the aforementioned differentiation.

Once the initial difficulties related to the application of the Europeanisation framework have been overcome, the following step is to clearly identify the domain of interest. In this sense, it is crucial to recall that the Europeanisation research scope is not restricted to changing policy domains, but also includes the wider policy and politics dimensions (Börzel and Risse 2000). However, each of these domains again includes a vast universe of sub-units that can easily vary upon reference in the literature (e.g. Radaelli 2000). Since this research focuses on the Europeanisation of energy policy governance, we are actually approaching the policy domain in order to understand its governance changes. In fact, Europeanisation is a process that involves the gradual erosion of national sovereignty, modifying the governance practices of the Member States (Risse et al. 2001: 2). In this context, the article adopts the definition of Risse et al. (2001: 2) on Europeanisation, which describes it as the “emergence and the development at the European level of different structures of governance”. In other words, our task is to analyse how the EU governance system has centralised many policy-making activities regarding energy in Brussels, whilst relying on national administrative actors for implementation (Knill and Lenschow 2005). Therefore, we identify political institutionalisation – as a process that involves the development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms, and practices governing politics at the EU level (Risse et al. 2001: 2) – as the parameter guiding our research on the Europeanisation of energy governance.

As already mentioned, the research topic distinguishes itself from other policy fields since the Europeanisation of energy governance has been mainly driven by related areas of competences. For that reason, the empirical core of this analysis involves how much the incorporation of the environmental variable into energy has facilitated the shift of energy governance towards the European arena, particularly regarding the implemented EPE. Hence, a three-step model of ‘green Europeanisation’ for energy policy is proposed as a tool for explaining the Europeanisation of energy governance, the main driver of which is the EPI. The model attempts to illustrate how energy governance was Europeanised before the formal competence was granted by means of environmental performance (Solorio 2009). It is argued here that, firstly, the EU’s institutional flexibility paved the way for Brussels to exert greater influence in energy governance. As a second step, the growing awareness of the environmental impact of the energy chain, particularly related to climate change, facilitated the integration of both policies. And finally, this process guided by EPI was a main catalyst for the Europeanisation of energy governance.

Before introducing the EU environmental performance impelled by EPI as the independent variable, it is crucial for the objective of this research to underpin the analytical framework in order to appreciate the emergent patterns of governance. In consequence, this research relies on Knill and Lenschow’s (2003) categorisation of the modes of regulation in EU governance to supplement our understanding of the impact of ‘green Europeanisation’ in energy governance. It enables a two-level of analysis that adequately captures the range of EU patterns of governance. In general terms, the type of regulation level considers the distribution of responsibilities across regulatory centres (such as the EU, national executives or non-state actors) and the level of discretion they grant to decentralised actors in the implementation process, while the steering mechanism level implies the different mechanisms of policy adaptation at the national level (Knill and Lenschow 2003: 2-3).

In view of this framework, the type of regulation level distinguishes between four patterns
of action. First, “the substantive and procedural regulatory standards fit the image of the EU regulatory state”; second, “the new instruments are a mixed bag of regulatory tools [and] what they have in common is a more indirect approach towards achieving behavioral change”; third, “the self-regulatory model is based on private actors devising concrete regulatory standards in the shadow of the state”; and finally, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) refers to cases where “certain policy benchmarks are set for the Union, national responses are formulated independently without the threat of formal sanctions and the EU merely provides a context for enabling cooperation and learning among national policy makers” (Knill and Lenschow 2003: 3). In addition, the steering mechanisms level distinguishes between three general mechanisms through which regulators might seek to affect the behavior of the regulated. first, “they may be coerced to comply with the regulation”; second, “they may be ‘tempted’ to change their behavior due to incentive effects of the regulation”; and finally “they may learn, i.e. redefine their interests on the basis of new knowledge gathered due to the regulatory context and subsequently adapt their behavior” (Knill and Lenschow 2003: 4).

The application of this double-level analysis can be helpful in order to map out the predominant mechanisms in practice within energy policy regarding ‘green Europeanisation’. Thus, it is a required step in order to recognise the “potential for national institutional change and cross-national convergence” (Knill and Lenschow 2005). The task in the subsequent sections will be to test the effectiveness of this analytical toolkit against the empirical developments in this policy field.

**Energy and the environment: towards a mutually supportive relationship?**

It is undeniable that it is necessary to take into consideration the environmental impact of energy policy-making in order to limit its ecological impact. Together with the liberalisation of the internal energy market (MacGowan 2008), this premise has been the most prominent path for the EU to influence energy policy (Damro et al. 2008; Solorio 2009). But how has the relationship between energy and the environment developed? It is worth recognising that a considerable part of this process has been well-documented by Ute Collier in her publications on EPI within energy (e.g. Collier 1994, 1997, 2002). However, perhaps because of the obviousness of the energy-environment relationship, there is a ‘black hole’ in the Europeanisation literature with regard to understanding how the increasing proximity between both policies has contributed to the Europeanisation of energy policy. This article undertakes the task of bridging the gap between EPI development and the Europeanisation of energy policy governance.

Against this backdrop, we adopt the definition put forward by Collier (1994), which regards EPI as a concept aiming at “achieving sustainable development and preventing environmental damage; removing contradictions between policies as well as within policies; and realizing mutual benefits and the goal of making policies mutually supportive” (Collier 1994: 36). Certainly, this definition has been criticised by other EPI authors (Persson 2004: 13-14) because of its lack of normative character. However, a positive aspect of this definition is its flexible nature that permits its application to the long-term relationship between the environment and policies. Thus, from the perspective advocated in this article, the ideal-case scenario is to reach policy coherence as a manner in which both policies “go together”, gradually sharing “a set of ideas or aims” (Mickwitz et al. 2009: 19). Therefore, the goal is to enable a process where ‘win-win’ situations can be determined. The hypothesis guiding the analysis of our independent variable is that there is a direct relationship between the development of the environmental policy impelled by EPI and the Europeanisation of energy governance. The following section will present an EPI categorisation showing that there are identifiable phases in the relationship with energy that have influenced the EPE as it is known nowadays. This section intends to
unveil as exhaustively as possible the EPE’s environmental component, while at the same time addressing the development of the EPI.

**Phase 1: Environmental awakening**

From the beginning, European integration has demonstrated a propensity to react to emergent problems (Jordan *et al.* 1999). Thus, with the growing concern for environmental issues in the 1970s, the Community did not hesitate to focus on the ecological impact of the energy chain (Damro *et al.* 2008: 183). The Commission’s reflections, as well as the Council’s resolutions, reflected the reality of increasing environmental awareness (e.g. Commission of the European Communities 1972, 1974; European Council 1974, 1975). Therefore, institutional flexibility enabled environmental issues to become one of the earliest and most remarkable targets for the free movement of goods policy (Pollack 1994: 124). However, the oil crisis of the 1970s contributed to making energy security one of Europe’s paramount policy goals (Natorski and Herranz 2008). Nevertheless, this scenario increased the necessity to formulate and to develop policies together in order to tackle energy problems. Specifically, regarding the environment, the Council (1975) provided the following statement:

> [i]t is the duty of the Communities and the Member States to: (a) take environmental protection requirements into account in all energy policy strategy by taking effective measures […] (Council of the European Communities 1975).

The recognition of EPI as a policy objective was translated into a considerable number of environment-related measures and recommendations. On the energy efficiency side, there were numerous acts, such as the action programme on the rational utilisation of energy, the recommendation on the energy consumption of road vehicles, as well as on the rational use for electrical household appliances. Moreover, resolutions were adopted on the setting of a short-term target for the reduction of oil consumption and for energy savings. On the other hand, the development of renewable energy was delayed given the immediate need to solve the supply problems (Twidell and Brice 1992). Thus, Community activities were limited to the granting of financial support for projects to exploit alternative energy sources.

This first phase of the EPI was characterised by an increasing awareness of environmental issues within Europe and the initial reactions in this regard. Against this backdrop, EPI began to be recognised as a policy objective in energy policy-making, and the Community adopted a considerable body of legislation consisting of EPI-related instruments years before the Single European Act (SEA). In this context, the main success for the Commission was to bring back energy issues onto the European agenda, and to trace a path that, in the following years, appeared to be a useful driver for the evolution of energy governance: the environmental policy.

**Phase 2: Environmental formal competence**

1986 was a meaningful year for European integration, as well as for EPI issues. The main shift with the SEA arrival came through the internal market performance (McGowan 2008), but also by means of the institutionalisation of other significant areas, such as environmental policy. Thus, the new environmental policy emerged with the task of protecting the environment “through the prudent and rational utilization of natural resources”, such as oil products, natural gas and solid fuels (article 191 with the Lisbon Treaty revision). Against this background, the Community environmental policy was supported from the beginning by two particular features: first, its success in terms of expansion and second, its efforts for integration in other policies, mainly in the energy
Regarding its expansion, this can be measured given the number of legislatives acts adopted as well as the successive governance modifications in the following Treaty revisions. With regard to integration, it is worth remarking that the new competence emerged almost in parallel with the fourth Action Programme (1987-92), which declared that the “integration of the environmental dimension in other major policies will be a central part of the Commission’s efforts” (Owens and Hope 1989: 97). Paradoxically, the initial years of environment competence were characterised by a lack of remarkable results in energy policy, perhaps with the exception of the large combustion plant directive. However, climate change emerged as a hot topic on the international level, which proved beneficial for the relationship between energy and environment (Damro et al. 2008). Thus, since the first EU target for stabilising carbon dioxide emissions was adopted by the Joint Council of Energy and the Environment in October 1990 (Skjaerseth 1994), the European climate policy has become increasingly intertwined with energy policy. In short, this second phase of EPI led to the institutionalisation of environmental policy as a path to intervene in the energy field. The results of this became more evident in the following years.

**Phase 3: Formal integration**

EPI was legally codified the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and incorporated into Article 6 TEC (article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty), which contains the integration principle as a core EU objective (Lenschow 2002). It recognised that the “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. In parallel with these governance changes, climate change placed more pressure on the integration process of both policies. While this issue has moved into the mainstream of the international political agenda, Europe has also accelerated efforts to reduce global warming, thus improving its energy consumption practices (Henningsen 2008; Solorio 2009). Hence, with the intention of presenting the European Community negotiators with strong arguments for the Rio Conference in 1992, the Commission proposed for the first time a ‘Climate Package’ that included a directive proposal on renewable electricity, regulatory measures in the field of efficiency and energy savings, as well as a tax on energy-using products (Skjaerseth 1994). However, this package was diluted by the Council, which ultimately adopted pilot programs such as ALTENER and SAVE and excluded the possibility of taxation on energy use and a regulatory framework for renewable electricity (Collier 1997). Nevertheless, this involved the development of the first Community strategy to fight climate change in the early 1990s, the emergence of the climate policy at the core of the EU agenda and the creation of a new stage for EPI issues (Andersen 2000).

Given the growing awareness of climate change, it is understandable that limiting carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy efficiency was a significant step forward. Consequently, the SAVE Directive – closely related to the homonymous programme – emerged with the intention of drawing up and implementing programmes related to energy efficiency. Regarding renewable sources of energy, the Commission decided to boost their development with the Green Paper of 1996 on renewable sources of energy, a document that provided the basis for the White Paper in this area.

The initiation of the so-called ‘Cardiff Process’ in 1998 represented a step forward for the practical application of EPI, calling to Council formations to prepare strategies and programs focused on integrating the environmental considerations in its own policies. Regarding energy, the Commission argued that “given the important impact on the
environment, environmental integration cannot be achieved without adapting energy policy” (Commission 1998: 3). In this way, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources came to form the cornerstone of a sustainable energy system (Collier 2002). Soon, new environmental measures were adopted at the EU level such as the renewable electricity directive, and the biofuels directive. Moreover, once the Kyoto Protocol was ratified in 2002, the adoption of concrete measures to combat climate change was accelerated. Soon after, the directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community was adopted and a consensus was even reached to adopt measure restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. Overall, the EPI’s third phase was characterised by a double impetus to its integration within energy. On the one hand, the consolidation of environmental governance facilitated its influence on energy. On the other hand, climate change as a remarkable issue in international and in European politics sped up this process (Damro et al. 2008).

Phase 4: EPE emergence

In 2005, the EU began a new stage in its climate change programme to prepare a mid- and long-term strategy to confront this challenge (European Commission 2005). In this context, the European Council perceived “the need to demonstrate that the EU’s commitment to meet Kyoto […] is practical and not just a paper one” (Piebalgs 2009: 2). In response, the Commission began pushing forward the energy debate with the paramount goal of laying down the foundations of a new EPE of global character as an indispensable step towards effectively tackling climate change (European Commission 2006, 2007). The first step was the Green Paper on ‘A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy’, in which the Commission put forward concrete proposals for implementing a European energy policy (European Commission 2006). In 2006, the Commission launched a strategic review of the current energy challenges as a guide to Europe’s energy policy, in which the threefold twenty - renewable energy, energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions reductions - were specified as a necessary target to limit climate change. In this document, the Commission argued that “[m]eeting the EU’s commitment to act now on greenhouse gases should be at the centre of the new European Energy Policy” (European Commission 2007).

As a turning point, the 2007 spring European Council enhanced the Action Plan (2007-2009) Energy Policy for Europe “as a milestone in the creation of an Energy Policy for Europe and as a springboard for further action” (Council of the European Union 2007: 13). Overall, an imperative goal was set to achieve integration between climate and energy policies (Council of the European Union 2007: 11). Along the same lines, the European Council recognised the importance of EPI by stating that “a substantive development of energy efficiency and of renewable energies will enhance energy security, curb the projected rise in energy prices and reduce greenhouse gases emissions” (Council of the European Union 2007: 20).

Responding to the Council’s move, the Commission launched the Communication ‘20 20 by 2020: Europe’s climate change opportunity’ in January 2008. In this context, the Commission proposed a set of measures “designed in a way so that they are mutually supportive”, in order to translate “political direction into action” (European Commission 2008). The economic crisis was certainly an added obstacle during the legislative process. However, after the hard inter-governmental negotiations, the ‘Climate and Energy Package’ became law in early 2009. The package comprises four main measures: first, a revision of the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS); second, an ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ governing emissions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS, such as transport, housing, agriculture and waste; third, binding national targets for renewable energy; and finally a
legal framework to promote the development and safe use of carbon capture and storage. With all the above-mentioned measures, it represents the most concrete expression of EPE and the most convincing proof that the ‘win-win’ solutions between energy and environment are more than possible.

The last phase of EPI not only involved the EPE official emergence, but also was the key to understanding two basic characteristics of the evolution EPI. First, there is a clear continuity in the environmental component of the EPE as a result of sector-specific actions within energy, encouraged mainly in the framework of the European fight against climate change. Additionally, the wider concept of EPI has been, at least within energy policy, centered on the environmental sub-sector of climate policy. All in all, after this historical review it remains clearer the link between the environmental policy development impelled by EPI and the Europeanisation of energy governance.

**From EPI re-evolution to energy Europeanisation**

With all the above-mentioned developments in mind, the former Commissioner on Energy Andris Pielbargs seems to have been correct in defining the EU’s shift in energy policy as the “third industrial revolution” (Pielbargs 2009: 5). However, when bridging EPI development with the Europeanisation of energy governance, several questions arise from this process. First of all, it would be enlightening to bear in mind the wider energy policy picture as a useful exercise in determining the relative contribution of each of the drivers of the political institutionalisation of EU energy policy. Moreover, even if we were able to capture the significance of the energy governance as ‘green Europeanisation’, it is still uncertain what the main patterns of governance of this process are. The following section will deal with these issues in order to better reflect on the ‘green Europeanisation’ energy governance.

**Europeanisation of energy governance: how green is it really?**

Following the adopted definition of Europeanisation, the main undertaking of this article is to measure the political institutionalisation of energy policy by means of the related competences. In this sense, and given the unusual nature of Europeanisation in this policy area, the EU has now a considerable legislative body to draw upon when executing the EPE. Nonetheless, analysing the EU legislative record in energy policy can be a very deceitful exercise. For example, a simple research in EUR-Lex for the current legislation in force in this policy area reveals a surprising figure of 471 acts (last accessed 18 on November 2010), which is far beyond the image of energy as a weak policy at the European level. However, looking at these acts in more detail, one might be disappointed that almost 50 percent of this figure corresponds to nuclear energy acts (214), which are under the Euratom umbrella.

Undoubtedly, in-depth research in the EUR-Lex database could reveal more energy-related legislation. However, this practice involves the risk of inflating the data of legislative acts which are actually important for the EPE in practice. Therefore, it is indispensable to define a systematised procedure for coping with the Europeanisation of energy policy governance. For that reason, since we are actually interested in the development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms, and practices that nowadays govern the EU energy policy, this study will be based on the ‘Summaries of EU legislation’ as the database to be explored in order to map out the political institutionalisation, while the ‘Climate and Energy Package’ measures will also be added. The use of the selected database has two advantages. First of all, it presents up-to-date coverage of current EU legislation on a range of themes; secondly, it excludes legal decisions of only temporary interest, such as decisions on grants. Thus, even if it does not present the entire picture of energy policy
institutionalisation, this database is useful for gaining an overall picture of the EU instruments currently in practice in the EPE. Table 1 presents a systematised vision of our findings without taking into consideration the Euratom \(^1\)-related legislative acts.

**Table 1: Energy policy institutionalisation**

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<th>Europeanisation driver</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
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<td>General objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green dimension</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Energy Market</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Supply and external dimension</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Policy institutionalisation</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own elaboration, data from ‘Summaries of EU legislation’, last accessed on 18 November 2010.*

At first glance, there is a clear predominance of the green dimension as a driver of the institutionalisation of energy policy. This is in line with the previous analysis of the EPI development and its persistent rapprochement with energy policy. Nevertheless, it is also important to observe the role of the internal energy market dimension, which has been a noticeable key driver for the Europeanisation of energy governance as well. This is even more the case when we consider the interplay between both drivers – reinforced with the EPI process – and the fact that the internal energy market is ultimately the context in which the green dimension mainly takes place.

In this scenario, another factor is the poor performance of the security of supply and external dimension driver. This finding, besides agreeing with Natorski and Herranz’s (2008) analysis, also shows that there is a considerable distance between its contribution to the political institutionalisation of EPE in comparison with the formerly analysed drivers. Thus, the green dimension and the internal energy markets are certainly consolidated as the mains drivers for the Europeanisation of energy governance. However, it still blurs the significance of ‘green Europeanisation’ for the internal energy market. Hence, it becomes necessary to clarify this exercise with a more qualitative analysis. Figure 2 presents an analysis of the institutionalisation of energy policy, taking into consideration the distinction between preparatory legislative acts, such as Commission’s Communications, and the legislation in force, for example, decisions, directives, and regulations.

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\(^1\) Hence, the existence of Euratom has led to a different process of Europeanisation in this policy area. For work on the role of the Euratom as an instrument for the EU energy policy, see Barnes (2008).
Accordingly, the picture is considerably different. This variation occurs because there are many preparatory legislative acts or ‘soft law’ instruments on the green dimension of energy policy, something that inflates the data with regard to its political institutionalisation. This responds to the fact that “the Commission is increasingly using non-legislative or ‘soft law’ such as Green Papers and Communications as tools of policy-making” (Braun 2008: 430). Table 2 reflects this reality within the green dimension of energy policy. Thus, when analysing the data regarding the legislation actually in force, there is only a slight variation between both (16 acts regarding the internal energy market vs. 23 acts regarding the green dimension of energy policy).

Table 2: Green dimension institutionalisation: key measures

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<th>Formal Legislative acts</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Commission Decision 2001/546/EC of 11 July 2001, setting up a consultative committee to be known as the “European Energy and Transport Forum”</td>
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* Soft-Law or Non legislative Acts

1. Communication from the Commission of 14 October 1998: Strengthening environmental integration within Community energy policy

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commission Green Paper, 22 June 2005, &quot;Energy Efficiency - or Doing More With Less&quot;</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission of 7 December 2005 – Biomass Action Plan</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Commission Communication of 13 December 2005 on the review of the Sustainable Development Strategy – A platform for action</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Commission Communication of 8 February 2006 entitled &quot;An EU Strategy for Biofuels&quot;</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission, of 10 January 2007, entitled: “Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond”</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Commission Communication of 10 January 2007 “Sustainable power generation from fossil fuels: aiming for near-zero emissions from coal after 2020”</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission of 13 November 2008 - Energy efficiency: delivering the 20% target</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Commission Green Paper of 28 March 2007 on market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 23 January 2008 entitled: &quot;Supporting early demonstration of sustainable power generation from fossil fuels&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 12 March 2009 on mobilising Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to facilitate the transition to an energy-efficient, low-carbon economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee of 28 April 2010 - A European strategy on clean and energy efficient vehicles</td>
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</table>

Source: EUR-Lex and Summaries of Legislation, last accessed 18 November 2010.

Overall, it can be concluded that a basic characteristic of ‘green Europeanisation’ has been its capacity to activate the debate at the EU level on the need to have a coherent EU energy policy, and its ability to facilitate the consensus between the Member States and the EU institutions around energy issues. Hence, in a complex terrain such as energy policy and with a limited capacity to exert hierarchical authority, the Commission has reconciled itself to “the position of a strategic node in EU network governance” in order to facilitate
agreements (Braun 2009: 431). The next section will focus on the emergent patterns of governance within this process.

‘Green Europeanisation’: the emergent patterns of governance

Now that we have focused on the relative contribution of the ‘green Europeanisation’ of energy policy, the next step consists in analysing its emergent patterns of governance. Hence, its importance relies on an understanding of the deployed EU regulatory force at the moment of promoting the so-called ‘third industrial revolution’. Before presenting our findings, it is worth noting that this outline corresponds to the analytical objective of clarifying the energy governance of ‘green Europeanisation’. However, the empirical reality is even more complex. Table 3 merely represents an exercise of simplification of the modes of governance of ‘green Europeanisation’.

Table 3: Steering mechanisms and types of regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory Standards</th>
<th>New Instruments</th>
<th>Self-regulation</th>
<th>OMC</th>
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<td>Coercion</td>
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<td>Legally binding</td>
<td>Framework and</td>
<td>Shadow of</td>
<td>Reporting and</td>
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<td>standards</td>
<td>procedural rules</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incentive structures</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>Changes of</td>
<td>Private actors</td>
<td>Peer pressure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>procedural and/or material opportunities</td>
<td>influence</td>
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<td>Regulatory</td>
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<td>Learning</td>
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<td>Communication in</td>
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<td>private networks</td>
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<td>Hierarchy model:</td>
<td>Public delegation</td>
<td>Private delegation</td>
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<td>power of coercion</td>
<td>power of</td>
<td>model: traditional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>delegation</td>
<td>subsidiarity</td>
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<td>model: traditional</td>
<td>subsidiarity</td>
<td>learning approach</td>
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<td>public model:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>learning</td>
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*The number inside each box corresponds to the legislative acts that can be situated within the predominant patterns of EU governance in our analysis.

Source: Author’s own classification, based on Knill and Lenschow 2003

As noted, there is a wide range of governance patterns involved in the ‘green Europeanisation’ of national energy policies. However, unsurprisingly, the new environmental instruments are the predominant type of regulation. Thus, as a mode to overcome the Member States’ reluctance on the EU regulatory performance in energy policy, flexible instruments with a mixed bag of regulatory tools have emerged in order to promote national change. This result exposes the delicate distribution of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States in the green dimension of energy policy. In this sense, it seems the EU will continue using these new modes of governance to become more involved in emerging policy areas such as energy policy (Braun 2009). With regard to the steering mechanisms, this table also shows the variety of Europeanisation mechanisms
used for the green dimension of energy policy. Moreover, it calls the attention to the fact that in a more in-depth analysis most of the instruments are characterised by a mixture of Europeanisation mechanisms as a way to counterbalance the EU regulatory limits on energy policy. Thus, in order to promote national change, the EU has been increasingly committed to develop a wide range of instruments looking for institutional adaptation, transforming domestic opportunity structures, as well as for altering beliefs and expectations of domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002).

Certainly, it is possible to extract much more information from Table 3. However, with our limited goal of mapping out the ‘green Europeanisation’ of energy policy, it is worth mentioning the two main limitations of this process when promoting change at the domestic level. First, it requires, in most cases, a consistent national commitment. Hence, the attainment of the energy trinity, even though it is an area that is increasingly regulated at the EU level, relies fundamentally on the Member States. Secondly, the nature of this process is problematic for the convergence between the adaptation forms at the national level. Although it establishes common goals, it does not necessarily facilitate the homogenisation of national energy policies. Such a result could have direct implications for the purpose of laying down the basis for the establishment of a CEP with global character. To sum up, if this is an experimental exercise in mapping out the emerging patterns of governance in the ‘green Europeanisation’ of energy governance, we must bear in mind the highlighted scope and limits of this process.

Winds of change for energy

The above analysis is a simplified, but useful, picture of the ‘green Europeanisation’ of energy policy, which shows the backdrop from which the EPE has evolved and is currently emerging. However, there are two particular features that forecast winds of change for energy policy in the near future: the revision of the Energy Action Plan and the Lisbon Energy Chapter.

First of all, it is worth remarking that a very particular characteristic of the EPE is its flexibility. In fact, “the Energy Action Plan will be kept under regular review within the context of an annual examination by the European Council” (European Council 2007: 14). In parallel, the Council called on the Commission to implement the elements contained in the Action Plan and to put forward an updated Strategic Review to serve as basis for the new Action Plan (European Council 2007). In its Second Strategic Review the Commission remarked that the “EU’s new energy and environment policy agreed by the European Council in March 2007 establishes a forward-looking political agenda to achieve the Community’s core energy objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply” (European Commission 2008, emphasis added). Overall, the Action Plan will be revised soon against the background of the economic crisis and is expected to place a greater focus on security and competitiveness objectives (see European Commission 2010).

In addition, the Lisbon Treaty brought significant novelty for energy policy, namely its inclusion in the formal competences of the EU. Thus, energy governance was strengthened with the establishment of a catalogue of exclusive and shared competences between the EU and its Member States, whereas the TFEUrecognises energy within the last category, together with other related areas such as the internal market, environment or transport policy (TFEU, Article 4). In this way, this novel chapter closes the circle in the relationship between Europeanisation and political integration, as this case exposes the manner in which Member States have pooled a certain level of sovereignty in energy policy only after the EU institutions had begun influencing this policy area by means of institutional flexibility - a phenomenon that clearly needs further investigation. In fact, the
inclusion of the energy chapter simply implied the recognition of the work that the EU has been undertaking through all these years by means of other policies (e.g. environment, internal market and external relations). However, the Lisbon Treaty is expected to bring some changes to this scenario because the EU ultimately has an explicit energy competence. It is worth stating, thus, that the Lisbon Treaty offers a new clear legal basis for pursuing EU ambitions regarding the energy trinity.

Regarding its decision-making process, the new energy article has been accompanied by the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 194 TFEU, Paragraph 2). Therefore, after years of having to revert to related competences or to the flexibility clause in order to develop energy legislation, the mere existence of this procedure as the ordinary decision-making system for energy is positive for the development of EPE (Zapater 2009). Nevertheless, the renewed legal framework was accompanied by a relevant counterbalance for the EU’s regulatory capacity. Accordingly, an exception in Article 194 stipulates that the adopted measures “shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” (Article 194 TFEU, Paragraph 2). Certainly, the reservations of the Member States place limitations on the EU’s energy activities and limit the degree of pooled sovereignty pooled. However, it is worth remarking that the current institutional set-up permits, more than ever, improvements in the coordination of national energy policies and among the different EU policies concerning energy.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted the fundamental role of the green contribution to the Europeanisation of energy governance, where the environmental path relieved for years the competence limit of the Community/EU in the energy field. In this context, our ‘green Europeanisation’ model has proved to be a useful tool in order to explain changes in the governance of EU policy-making regarding energy. Moreover, the EPI trajectory has demonstrated that climate change has been a major driver for setting the framework of the new EPE and for breaking down the barriers that have traditionally hindered the activities of Brussels in the energy field. Hence, there is clearly a direct relationship between the development of the environmental policy impelled by EPI and the Europeanisation of energy governance as our hypothesis suggested. Secondly, this article has exposed the way in which the formulation of the EPE was directly related to the incorporation of the environmental/climate variable. Thus, it is clear that coherence is a significant challenge to the further development of the EPE. In general, the formal energy competence certainly facilitates increased policy coherence, necessary to reduce the trade-offs between the related policies. It is therefore a path towards reaching an ideal-case scenario in which ‘win-win’ solutions are developed within the emergent EPE. Against this background, the policy integration approach could again be the most suitable pathway for developing energy policies in a ‘mutually supportive’ way. Overall, this article has demonstrated that EPI is not only a variable capable of explaining the governance changes in EU energy policy – ‘green Europeanisation’ –, but also a useful instrument for pursuing coherence for the realisation of the energy trinity.

As an early attempt to map out this process, there are clearly further challenges for future research on the EU energy policy, which this article has only partially examined. First of all, the green driver has clearly not been the only key to push forward the energy-related activities of Brussels. The influence of energy security and competitiveness must also be taken into consideration. Particularly, it is necessary to shed more light on the interplay between the internal market and the green driver as a facilitator of the Europeanisation of energy governance. Secondly, the above-presented simplification of the emergent patterns of governance has a lot more of ‘squeezable’ information regarding the emergent
EU energy policy. Therefore, it is a question that significantly requires more attention. And thirdly, this article has clearly traced a relationship between the Europeanisation of energy policy and political integration. It is therefore a phenomenon that needs further study based on neofunctionalist theory in order to better understand it.

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References


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The increasing role of the European Union (EU) in governing European societies has attracted widespread attention from scholars interested in explaining policy-making at the supranational level. After the enlargement of the EU and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional architecture and policy processes of the EU have become more complicated than ever, so improving our understanding of the key drivers of this process is needed more than ever.

One such driver is the European Commission. The Commission’s unique role in the EU political system has long been a subject of scrutiny, not least because of the central position it plays as a promoter and motivator of supranational policies. While many previous studies have been conducted on the Commission’s ‘formal’ powers, its ‘informal’ powers are still relatively unknown. Moreover, even fewer studies have attempted to combine these two. The book *Framing Europe: The Policy Shaping Strategies of the European Commission* by Mark Rhinard attempts to fill this gap by setting out a framework of analysis for explaining how the Commission relies on a mixture of both formal resources and informal strategies to “strategically frame” policy choices.

The author argues that the Commission constructs frames to help member state governments “make sense” of policy questions, but it does so in a way that tends to privilege Commission preferences. The construction of a frame is rhetorical, but also material, in the sense that networks of supporters and policy instruments that reflect a preferred frame are put in place by the Commission as part of its “strategic framing” process. This process is led by policy entrepreneurs who then mobilise their preferred frames within their respective policy domains by manipulating ideas, institutions and interests in ways that bias outcomes. Thus, Rhinard’s strategic framing argument combines both social constructivist and rational approaches to understanding the EU policy process, bringing together actor-based, institution-based and ideas-based literature.

The book contains an easily accessible chapter describing the analytical framework in a way that should be useful for both postgraduate students and established scholars. The chapter first defines the policy frame concept, discussing the actors involved in the framing process, and then turns to the means these actors can exploit in this regard (e.g. networks, institutional rules, and policy). The case study chapters cover two periods of biotechnology policymaking and two periods of agricultural reform. The former represents
an “easy case” and the latter a “hard case”, hence making a compelling claim that strategic framing is indeed common throughout the entire EU policy system.

At the same time, it would have been useful if the book had also included a more intergovernmental policy, such as CFSP or JHA before the Amsterdam Treaty. Greater attention to the effects of enlargement on this strategy and the effects of the Lisbon Treaty would also have been interesting; although maybe this is too much to ask considering the fact that the case studies were completed in 2009. The strategic framing concept has its limitations, too. As the author acknowledges, it is just one of several possible explanations for EU policy change, and it offers no guarantee for success for Commission frame entrepreneurs. On the contrary, strategic framing might just as well end up hurting the Commission if different Directorate Generals (and units within these DGs) employ different frames for the same policy domain.

Despite these shortcomings, one clear advantage with the book is that regardless of the policy area one is interested in, the analytical framework should be helpful in understanding EU level change more generally. In fact, one open question that the author only briefly addresses is whether the framework could even be applicable to other prominent supranational bodies, such as the UN Secretariat. Students of EU policymaking can build on the findings made by this book in two major ways. First of all, the explanatory potential of strategic framing as a concept for explaining the EU policy-making process could be strengthened through further case studies, especially by expanding the scope to also include cases from the formerly second and third pillar policy domains. Furthermore, future studies should do a better job at incorporating the strategic framing concept into the EU agenda setting literature so as to further uncover the entire policy-making chain in the EU.

In summary, the book *Framing Europe* makes an important contribution to the field of EU policy-making. It speaks directly to the debate between intergovernmentalists and those scholars who have a more favourable view of supranational policy-making by demonstrating a strategy used by the European Commission to directly influence policy outcomes. This strategy – labelled “strategic framing” – possesses much potential and deserves to be further assessed by future studies.

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Book Review

Jacques Gerstle (2008)

*La communication politique, 2nd ed.*

Paris: Armand Colin

Jack Hayward  
*University of Hull*

As one would expect from the leading French investigator of political communication, this welcome new edition provides a comprehensive and clear summary of the immense volume and range of publications on this subject. While recognising that most of the research and commentary has been American, Gerstle’s treatment has the advantage of detachment, coming from a non-Anglo-American author. However, much of the empirical data relates to France. Drawing upon and synthesising his extensive earlier work, this book provides a succinct analytical guide to a vast literature: theoretical, technical-electronic, practical and experimental.

Gerstle emphasises the priority that high speed media accord to the ephemeral short term over the enduring long term and to excessive stress on negative news, attributing blame, over positive news that is deemed to be of less public interest. Politicians and journalists are in competition over the crucial issue of defining political situations, with the ability to do so shifting in favour of the journalists. Having to counteract the increasing distrust and derision to which they are subjected, politicians have responded by resorting to propagandist persuasion, so that official communication has been polluted in the service of top-down governmental domination of public information for electoral advantage. However, experience has shown that being a successful communicator is not an accurate indicator of being an effective decision-maker. There is some discussion of the bottom-up, public participation attempt to influence the political agenda through deliberative democracy procedures to secure better informed discussion prior to policy decisions, assisted by the new electronic technology, particularly in local decision-making matters. However, Gerstle mentions the resource inequality of access to the media, so that the majority of the people - deemed to be ignorant, incompetent, indifferent and alienated - are largely at the mercy of elite-controlled communication processes. A discussion of the domineering role of media magnates who monopolise much of the newspaper and TV channels of communication, with governments in liberal democracies inclined to subservience to them, would have been welcome.

The general assessment that emerges from this wide-ranging analysis is that public perception as conveyed by the media has been significantly substituted for the realities of actual political activity. Democratic accountability suffers from this manipulation and biased information that is an insult to better educated electorates. Feeling condemned to critical impotence, many people lose faith in the potentially elite-challenging electoral process, reflected in declining voter turnout and episodic recourse to direct action as a way of communicating their protest to those that purport to exercise power in their name.
Book Review

Simon Reich (2010)

Global Norms, American Sponsorship and the Emerging Patterns of World Politics

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Paulo Vila Maior
University Fernando Pessoa

Unites States (US) foreign policy is examined outside conventional parameters relying on standard ‘isms’ – imperialism, unilaterlalism, multilateralism. Reich conveys an alternative approach to leadership in international relations. Instead of focusing on a traditional, military dominance (labelled as “hard power”), which faces increasing erosion by enemies’ non-conventional attacks on US interests all over the world, the author emphasises how sponsorship enables leadership outstripped from the nuisances of military and often unilateral action. One of the advantages of sponsorship, Reich argues, is the veil of legitimacy that follows. This in turn breaks up with recurrent criticisms towards US foreign policy when imperialism or unilaterlalism is the option.

Reich starts by conceptualising sponsorship. The outcome is the enactment of global norms at the international level with the support of the US government. Nevertheless, agenda-setting falls outside the initiative of US authorities. Agenda-setting is promoted by different coalitions of non-governmental actors (mainly NGOs). The author points at the legitimacy background of this alternative dimension of foreign policy, since the process of recognition of global norms follows a bottom-up procedure. This comes in line with the awareness that state actors lost influence as world politics stakeholders, which in turn opened a window of opportunity for NGOs. Advocacy coalitions, in which non-governmental actors are prominent, bring global norms to the fore and attract the support of the US administration in office. Reich warns that only norms supported by the US are likely to be accepted. To this extent, he also acknowledges the normative dimension embedded in global norms, notably the emergence of moral imperatives and a social and economic model emphasising the benefits of transparent governance and capitalism. They are instrumental to values or interests that match the US foreign policy agenda.

In contrast with traditional, military leadership provided by the US, sponsorship relies on “soft power”. For this purpose, Reich recalls the unsuccessful ventures of US military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. He then stresses the following paradox: of how a “hyper power” (resorting to hard power) has been unable to meet the prescribed goals; and how, in contrast, examples of global norms sponsored by US administrations (soft policy) have resonated with success. The paradox emphasises the negative correlation between resources available and outcomes. While hard power requires a considerable amount of military force and human resources, thus increasing overall costs, soft power entails modest resources. Since the enforcement of global norms asks for a hegemonic power,
this paves the way for the US to play an influential, but discrete, role in international relations. The new paradigm of foreign policy allows the US to perform a hegemonic power that, nevertheless, meets the requirements of efficiency and legitimacy.

The changing pattern of US foreign policy is to be understood within the context of the increasingly transnational nature of foreign policy (“the dark side of globalisation”, p. 34). The outcomes are the erosion of the problem-solving capacity of influential countries and the vulnerability of powerfully military countries (even the US). Therefore, foreign policy undergoes adaptation. This explains why and how the locus changes from hard to soft power. In the face of stable scepticism on surveys concerning US foreign policy, sponsorship is the appropriate way to change the perception about the role of the US in the world. Interestingly, as noted by the author, the largely dominant bad image of US foreign policy is unchanged despite the “Obamania” around the world, thus revealing that the problem is one of credibility regardless of the US President’s charisma. The bottom-up procedure of bringing global norms encompasses a threefold process. It starts with “aggressive moral entrepreneurs” setting the agenda of a global norm. Second, at the intermediate level, global norms must be codified and monitored by international organisations. This contributes to boost the legitimacy of US foreign policy when the US promotes sponsorship of the global norm. Third, the process is completed when the US government commits to the global norm supplying resources for policy implementation.

In the empirical part of the book, Reich examines three case studies of US foreign policy that do not match sponsorship. The first focuses on the influence exercised by successive US administrations on the World Bank (a case of imperialism). The US sought to pursue an agenda of its own (which changed between the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations), imposing the goals of the World Bank. According to the author’s threefold conceptualisation of sponsorship, only the third condition (US commitment and resources for enforcement) was present. The second case study is the worldwide respect for preemptive and preventive intervention (a case of unilateralism). In this case, both the second and third conditions of sponsorship were met (formal codification of global norms by international organisations, and US commitment and resources for implementation), but aggressive moral entrepreneurs were absent. The third case study is the coordinated effort to fight against cyber-crime (a case of multilateralism). This chapter (written by Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos) shows how the combination of aggressive moral entrepreneurs with the US commitment to enforce a global norm at the international level was not enough to meet agreement, as other countries showed divergent approaches to the regulation of cyber-crime. As a consequence, the codification of such global norms within the international organisations involved in the negotiation process was not possible, which explains the failure of sponsorship. Conversely, the chapter on anti-trafficking global norms is the best example of how a bottom-up process ended up in the codification of such rules by international organisations with the enforcement of US authorities. For Reich, this is the paradigm of sponsorship whereby US foreign policy is able to attract support at the international level.

Reich concludes by suggesting an alternative theorisation of US foreign policy that falls outside the conventional ‘isms’ debate (imperialism, unilateralism, multilateralism). He focuses instead on a “third dimension of power” (p. 224) according to which others formulate the relevant agendas and the US promotes the effective enforcement of those that receive their own approval. The outcome is a different kind of leadership - one in which the US plays a less aggressive and more legitimate role, making US foreign policy more effective. Furthermore, Reich warns, this is coherent with the ongoing economic crisis that asks for budget cuts and a less aggressive role in the international arena and involves huge savings in the defence budget.

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Book Review

Lacroix, J. and Nicolaidis, K., eds (2010)

*European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*

Oxford: Oxford University Press

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Dorothy Horsfield

*Australian National University*

One of the ironical commonplaces about the European Union is that in essential matters, such as its constitutional legitimacy or cultural mindsets, the only way forward appears to be to fudge the issues and keep one’s patience. Or, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt’s anti-liberalism sneer, when faced with unresolvable difficulties, adjourn the meeting and appoint a committee of inquiry. Such an acerbic view is certainly not shared by Lacroix and Nicolaidis, the editors of this very fine collection, *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*. Rather, they claim that any notion of a shared, uncontested European story is a ‘non-starter’. “Behold our Europes!” proclaims the final chapter, pointing out that in myriad, complex ways, both within and between countries, the idea of being European is imagined, revered, debated and debunked in a polyphony of voices. Implicit in their optimistic, celebratory approach is the view that the European Union is at best a work-in-progress. The success of its commitment to a historic drawing together of very different nations and peoples means renouncing “thick consensus” in favour of the kind of thorough-going pluralism that recognises and accepts “deep diversity”.

The book contains fifteen essays on countries ranging across the founders, joiners, returners or outliers of the European Union. Though each country’s preoccupations, issues, apprehensions and hopes vary widely, the editors identify four common themes: national identity; the promise or failure of European modernity; integration and liberal democracy; and how to define the nature and ends of a European polity. Given the monumental challenges of reconciling such large baskets of contentious ideas, Varouxakis writes that what may yet prove invaluable is a British mindset used to “inconclusiveness, messiness, ambivalence, willingness to combine and compromise, and flexibility” (p. 166). Varouxakis’s essay surveying almost fifty years of intellectual debate about Britain’s membership of the European Union is one of the most entertaining. With a sharp wit and an eye for the telling quote, he focuses on the work of prominent academics of the Right and Left, with Eurosceptics and Europhiles on both sides. Behind much of the debate is the suggestion that the British are the watchers at the gate of true liberalism against the onslaught from communitarian continentals. As well, there is the tacit concern that Eurocentrism and imperialism might have severely undermined the credibility of Britain’s civilised liberal ideals – a view readily dismissed by Conservative Roger Scruton for whom such ‘England-bashing’ by its own is best described as “Oikophobia” (the antonym of “Xenophobia”).
Despite the editors warning about glib generalisations, it is often the sense of a national overview that is most interesting and challenging in these essays. Germany’s intelligentsia, for example, is singled out as exceptional because it is without ambivalence or scepticism towards European integration. The German discussions, Mueller writes, have been largely legalistic, preoccupied with the constitutional norms and practicalities of a Europe-wide polity. Domestically, until the last decade or so, there has been a pervasive wariness of resurgent nationalism, so that even the debates on the concepts of statehood and the rule of law developed by the Schmitt School have been seen as matters of internal institutions and values, tangential to the European project.

To call these essays “stories” is perhaps an overstatement, if by that is meant structured narratives anchored in times and places. Rather, as the editors acknowledge, what they often evoke is a tangle of shifting national and transnational perspectives, which may be nostalgic, imbued with myth and memory, as well as fractured, even contradictory. For example, Barbu’s analysis starkly contrasts how for many Romanians the European Union simply represents “a giant supermarket” with the esoteric mysticism that has prevailed amongst the country’s foremost thinkers even “in the dark times of Communism”. Inspired by the country’s most famous public intellectual, right-wing extremist and anti-semitic theologian Mircea Eliade, Romania’s “collective thirst for holiness” is here claimed to place a minor, peripheral nation in the vanguard of “a struggle for the European soul”. Characterised as predominantly messianic, anti-democratic and anti-modernist, Romania’s intelligentsia emerges from Barbu’s analysis as “a deviant case”. But his essay also gives focus to one of the central issues of the book: how we are to understand the concept of the ‘intellectual’. According to Lacroix and Nicolaidis, the definition must be necessarily broad and cautiously “objective”; in short he/she is simply someone culturally authoritative with a significant public profile.

The problem here is that one of history’s lessons is that both good and bad judgment, as well as passionate political commitment, may be integral elements of any intellectual debate. Whether ingenuously or deliberately, influential intellectuals have also been seriously mistaken. And even the most so-called high-minded, level-headed rationalist would be naïve to assume that his/her opinions cannot be co-opted into the political arena, and for the worst possible reasons. Insofar as these scholarly essays are discussed publicly, there are no guarantees that their influence will be a benign contribution to Europe’s narrative choruses. Consider, for example, Gora and Mach’s “story” of the Polish intelligentsia emerging unsteadily from a geopolitical mindset steeped in memories of past glories and humiliations; or Barbu’s evocation of a ‘deviant’ Romanian intelligentsia. Both analyses present the kind of themes that can serve to confirm other nations’ prejudices, rather than exemplifying the progress of enlightened understanding. As always, the question then remains of what to do when Europe’s laudable polyphony becomes deeply discordant, when its national voices become darker, harsher, more divisive and belligerent - in other words, in what circumstances the bonds of a European democracy might not be sufficiently strong or enduring.
Book Review

Ullrich Kockel (2010)

Re-visioning Europe: Frontiers, Place Identities and Journeys in Debatable Lands

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Timofey Agarin
European Centre for Minority Issues

“Once upon a time, not all that long ago, there was a place called ‘Europe’, which some of us may still remember” (p. 1). This poetic prose opens Re-visioning Europe by Ulrich Kockel, Professor of Ethnology in Ulster and so it continues for 200 odd pages, offering a “synthesis dealing with migration within and into Europe; frontiers and boundaries; heritage and tradition; socio-economic structures, processes and change; and, finally, the role of ethnology in education and cultural practice” (p. ix). Given the fact that the book is “framed by personal reflections on changing visions of Europe”, it is unsurprising that it attempts explaining too much, while at the same time offering too little gist of what it actually purports.

To start from, the book lacks a theoretical framework, making it hard to identify where the reflections of the author on travels around and travails about Europe sit conceptually. Indeed, reading an ethnographic research monographs is frequently a challenging experience for political scientists who fancy coherent methodological frameworks to depart from, a contribution to theoretical and case-study debates and ultimately, clear statements on basic assumptions and anticipated outcomes of research. Neither is it clear what the author factually adds to European studies in general: throughout the book a plethora of issues are observed and commented upon, neither of them is de-constructed to an end. At times, it seems that Kockel does not wish to engage in re-constructing narratives either. However, the readers of JCER will appreciate this book as a source of insights into and a personal reflection upon cultural, social and political realities, rather than an eye opener on processes and issues with which European studies deal.

Regardless, there are several issues that make the book a worthy read. First, is the role that political, and increasingly economic, processes play in preventing deeper integration of European societies. Kockel’s main point of reference here is his observation of scaling down the state affecting individual choices in several domains: in chapter 2 it is the diminishing role of the state and regional frontiers, in chapter 3 – the constraints going together with the geographic mobility of citizenry, and in chapter 4 – individual options to handle the dominance of economic constraints in everyday life. Despite the centrality granted to structural constraints on individuals and groups throughout the book, however, Kockel only conceives of these as important in terms of their negative impact on individual choices. The book can also be read as lamenting the increase of opportunities which are explained by reference to diminishing social cohesion in Europe. The idea of
lacking cohesion as a potential impediment for deeper European integration is interesting. Yet without clearly identifying the structures he sees as important tools of social cohesion, Kockel falls into the trap of hand-picking observations as they suit him: his case-studies are ranked good or bad, depending on the side he is taking. It is always a majority on some political scale that he aligns with, making it impossible to conclude anything but his preference for the strong role of coordinating structures to guide social change.

Does this suggest that individual (and at times, group) actors are secondary to the analysis in the book? This is unclear, largely because the second point reiterated throughout Re-visioning Europe is these very agents of change. Kockel’s narrative strongly emphasises the important role that social actors play in the process of social, political, economic and cultural transformation in an increasingly borderless Europe. Starting from a participant observation through the eyes of the travelling European, the volume is abundant with an unperturbed observation of the gains and losses of this continent’s heritage that span the entire 20th century. Kockel is sceptical about the role of individuals in the process: Who set European integration processes into motion? Why did economic liberalisation and labour force mobility become of importance? What happens to traditional forms of identity and belonging in the age of voluntary migration? And ultimately, who benefits from all of the above? This allows Kockel to query nearly all social and political developments in contemporary Europe, writing off any rationality of the actors re-visioning Europe’s past and present throughout chapters 5 and 6. This is an extremely important point to consider for students of European studies who tend to engage with structural overlap across various European regions and states, yet rarely perceive of European integration as a process that is caused by, and in turn affects, European citizens.

Finally, and with both his fancy for power-structures and actors disengaged from an active role in social change, there is only one possible background agenda Kockel is pushing throughout the book. It is worth closing up on it: Kockel seems to distrust the bounded rationality of actors involved in envisioning the common European future. Actors appear throughout as being rational in making their choices, especially when it comes to their identities and strategies to mark others’ difference. However, Kockel remains uncertain whether identifying oneself as part of the group does not inherently lead to excluding non-members from the European project. Here again, rattling down a multi-scale comparison from European, state to community levels, he makes it extremely difficult to nail the argument down. But the description of structural pressures exercised upon individuals and groups by rigid political structures allows for a conclusion: Kockel is not romanticising the importance of social ties or a permanent, even though imaginary, place of belonging and reference he calls Heimat. Kockel is all about “experience”, what sociologists would call “socialisation”, and political science jargon would term “institutional constraints” for envisioning Europe and Europeans to come.

The conclusion of this book is unambiguous about the issues that the author has with European integration and change, making individual perceptions of place, belonging and choices people make a valid point of reference for the entire volume. Most often, individual and group choices confirm, but also contest and thus change, social institutions, political structures and choices of other agents, thus facilitating dialogue and exchange of options. As the book indeed makes clear, all of these have played an essential role in linking generations, transmitting social norms and ensuring political stability across Europe since the 1945. The lack of similar social constraints at the European level is already driving geographically, socially and culturally disparate segments of the European society apart. Migration, faltering state borders, economic integration and issues about the history of nations-in-conflict all have their stakes in questioning the sustainability of European integration.
Your reviewer found it at times challenging to buy into Kockel’s argument, which hints at debates in social sciences, yet rarely references any; plunges into thick descriptions on a case-by-case basis, yet does not shy away from broad generalisations; discards opinions (and scholarship) that does not sit well with his view, yet fails to prove his own point; and on top of it all, is insightful, yet too often emotional. Thus, reading Re-visioning Europe I could not stop asking myself whether one really needs to use clichés, instead of causal explorations of contemporary changes in Europe? Kockel’s observations from his field work and research over the past twenty years are hard to read as an academic piece of work because they lack perspective; too many useful observations are made in passing and are never returned to. Re-visioning Europe is an interesting pass-time read for a social scientist, but one should be equipped with plenty of time to translate the ethnographic prose into categories of social sciences. If one makes an effort to do this, the book rewards one with a different perspective on issues forming the background to social (and political) science debates on European integration.

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Book Review

Dellecker, A. and Gomart, T., eds (2011)

*Russian Energy Security and Foreign Policy*
London: Routledge

Paolo Sorbello
*Portal on Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans (PECOB)*

A fine attempt at tackling the issue of the relationship between energy security and foreign policy, the volume edited by Dellecker and Gomart is easily one among the most important pieces of literature on the matter. In recent years, Stulberg (2007), Baev (2008), Perovic, Orttung, et al. (2009), Overland and Orttung (2011), and Sorbello (2011), have all attempted to address this link in a scientific manner. Currently, various dissertations are being written on the topic, regarding case studies chiefly of Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The approach taken by the editors is innovative. Their near-exhaustive consideration of the relevant variables and their success in gathering leading experts of the geographic area and subject matter should be noted. The diversity among the contributors is most welcomed as well: European, American, and Russian academics and businessmen were involved in the project, which culminated in this book after a series of conferences and roundtables. The subdivision of the book into three main parts helps fulfill the promise of approaching the theme from all perspectives.

The first part serves as the backbone of the analysis. Umbach considers the diverging interests in the area; Tompson addresses the interplay between economics, law, and politics in the hydrocarbon markets; Guillet stresses the distorted method that political actors follow when envisioning the construction of a pipeline; Crandall reverses the lenses and focuses on the export options for Central Asian gas.

The second part aims to explain the dynamics in each bilateral relationship between Russia and those among its southern neighbours that are net exporters of energy. Milov puts the Russo-Turkmen relation into perspective, emphasising the double-edged dependency of each country on the other’s transportation system. The other two Central Asian energy exporters, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are analysed by Brill Olcott and Monaghan, granting the reader an in-depth account of their relations with Russia. Baev considers Azerbaijan, a key state in the Caucasus both for energy relations with Europe and the Middle East, and for the security implications of its role south of the Caucasian range.

The third part considers a broad scope of issues that can be summarised as the implications of Russia’s behavior in the Central Asia and Caucasus Region (CACR). Grigoriev highlights the role of Gazprom in the formation of Russian foreign energy policy and the possible divergence between the two; Roberts takes into account the Russo-
Georgian war in 2008 as a game-changer for the political and business dialogue on the pipelines to be built along the Southern Corridor; Garbe, Hett, and Lindner focus on the weight of Belarus as an energy-thirsty neighbour and transit country in Russia’s relation with its Western markets.

This publication provides a deep analysis of the most important issues that have shaped the relations between Russia and the CACR. Additionally, the approach used offers a fresh set of insights for students and scholars that are interested in the subject. Including Guillet’s business mindset and Roberts’ ‘concreteness’ is surely beneficial, as it serves to bring in the voice of the private sector.

The environment to which earlier works have contributed was one filled with political and economic analyses not rooted in solid ‘real world’ grounds. This bias has accompanied many well-researched academic efforts that ultimately have resorted to one or another theory of International Relations to answer a research question for which not all relevant variables were considered (Myers Jaffe et al. 2002; Hadfield 2007; Schaffer 2009). The lack of a multidisciplinary approach to understand “the link between Russia’s foreign and energy policies” (p. 1) is addressed by Tompson and Grigoriev. Their chapters are preceded by a well-rounded introductory chapter by Umbach, who defines the expression “energy security” and set forth the principle of the bi-directional dependency: Russia is regarded as a threat by importing countries, but regards itself threatened by possible cut-offs in their market request. Supply and demand are tightly connected, as is their security.

A few drawbacks may leave the reader unsettled, perhaps indicating the need for perfecting the research method and compilation effort. First, the editors and some of the authors put a marked emphasis on energy prices as the engine for the aforementioned connection between energy and foreign policy. It is possible that the role of prices is more influential on the “security” side, however one should take into account that Russia is not a price-setter and that energy prices have fluctuated since 2000 more than they have in the previous 50 years, as opposed to Russian foreign policy. Second, timing is problematic. The editors’ preface serves as an early warning (roundtables were held in late 2006 and 2007) of the possible obsolescence of data used to justify pieces of the analyses. Although it is clear that the effort by Dellecker and Gomart has entailed two rounds of processing for the chapters, it ultimately comes down to the publisher to send the book to print in a timely fashion. Lacking deep and solid academic grounds, chapters with old data become less appealing to readers, who are always in search for the latest take on the issue. Third, as in many collective volumes, the disadvantage of reiterating the same concepts throughout the chapters is present; however, the editors avoided the pitfall of a lack of coherence by accurately organising the parts of the volume.

It is remarkable that the editors avoided addressing European energy security, Russo-Ukranian crises, and the Russo-Georgian war directly with a chapter of their own. Instead these well-documented and contingency-related issues were used as the background for the explanation of a few prominent energy/foreign policy actions. Moreover, many among the contributors attribute deserved relevance to the role of China. Nevertheless, such auspicious premises did not eventually lead to a step forward in the construction of the research question: it is possible that energy is not just a foreign policy ‘weapon’ (which is one of the two main conclusions of the book). Perhaps a slightly more academic approach to the matter would describe energy policy as a trigger, channeling foreign policy formation in a direction that favours its implementation. Interestingly, the incorporation of the time factor helps the contextualising effort and allows Dellecker and Gomart to foresee energy (particularly its military dimension) as “the bonding agent that maintains the notion of the FSU for years to come” (p. 208).
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