Research Article

On framing the EU: A plea for the relaunch of frame analysis in the study of elite and mass attitudes on European integration

Andrea Pareschi

Abstract

This article makes the case that attitudes towards the EU should be conceptualised as interpretative 'frames', to then be employed as analytical tools for comparison within and between European countries. As is argued, at present this move is all the more necessary, since multiple asymmetrical crises and the entrenchment of 'differentiated integration' have compounded the contested, open-ended nature of European integration. In parallel, EU studies have already increasingly acknowledged the context dependence, heterogeneity and ambivalence of such attitudes, moving beyond the presumption of stable support or opposition. This article leverages a variety of extant works and the empirical outcomes of a deductive-cum-inductive research endeavour to craft a comprehensive inventory of 16 interpretative frames. Then, it highlights a fundamental prospective application, discussing practices devised to enable the construction of a frame-based approach to mass-elite congruence on European integration. Further avenues for future research, which could be pursued on the back of a relaunch of frame analysis in EU studies, entail the study of Euroscepticism, national 'issue cultures' and 'issue fields', and mass-level attitudes towards the EU.

Keywords

Are the elites of Europe living in the same European worlds as their populations? Once defined as 'the most essential question since […] Maastricht' (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 188), this problem entirely retains its centrality in the wake of the recent predicaments of political Europe. This article makes the case for conceptualisation of attitudes towards European integration in terms of 'frames of interpretation' of the EU, to be pinpointed and then employed as analytical tools for the comparison of views espoused by ordinary citizens and political actors throughout the continent.

Over the last decade, EU member states have been asymmetrically plagued by a sequence of crises, including the sovereign debt crisis, the migration crisis, geopolitical instability at the borders of Europe and in the international system, the erratic Brexit saga, the unending challenge of 'illiberal democracy', the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing energy crisis, not to mention war in Ukraine (Riddervold, Trondal and Newsome 2021). Hard rifts have separated emerging coalitions of countries, and the equilibria between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism have been unbalanced, with Germany's role as a 'reluctant hegemon' (Bulmer and Paterson 2018) proving problematic in many respects. The EU itself has undergone a crisis of governance and legitimacy calling into question its very *raison d'être*, as reflected by the contentious ordoliberal consolidation of the Eurozone as much as by the equally controversial stalemate over the handling of migrant inflows.

Seeking to explain the radical divergence between the outcomes of the Eurozone crisis and the Schengen crisis, Börzel and Risse (2018) underscored the way each crisis was framed by various countries and political forces. According to their reconstruction, the theoretical apparatus elaborated by postfunctionalism – beginning with the 'constraining dissensus' exerted by national publics – came closer than other grand theories to providing a full-fledged explanation. In any case, the two authors concluded 'that the more existing approaches take insights from social constructivism with regard to identity politics and the *framing* of issues in politicized public spheres into account, the better they can deal with the subsequent European predicaments' (Börzel and Risse 2018: 102, author's emphasis). In fact, the proponents of postfunctionalism themselves had maintained that 'neither identity nor economic interest speak for themselves, but are cued and framed by political actors', so that, '[t]o understand variation in opinions on Europe, one must endeavour to explain how Europe is *constructed* in political debate' (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 125, emphasis in original).

This work substantiates the claim that, although awareness of the importance of framing processes has featured in EU studies as a subtle undercurrent, frame analysis has only rarely been deployed within the field and its analytical potential remains largely untapped. I establish my main contribution by recalling the 'usefulness of framing as a bridging concept between two levels of analysis – between cognition and culture' (Gamson 1985: 615). In other words, interpretative frames – as compared to more frequently considered alternatives such as recurring items in opinion surveys – are closer to the ways in which political actors depict the European issue and ordinary citizens make sense of it. Hence, I build on conceptual and empirical insights to articulate an inventory of 16 ideal-typical frames, which correspond to distinct viewpoints on the essence of the EU and may undergird positive, negative, ambivalent, or neutral views. This approach, striking a balance between interpretation-inspired *Verstehen* and comparability-oriented classification, notably allows to bridge elite-based and mass-based accounts of support and opposition towards European integration.

The article comprises seven sections. First, I recapitulate the shifting, unsettled nature of the European project. Second, I examine how attitudes towards European integration display context dependence, heterogeneity, and ambivalence. The third section presents the concept of frame and its operationalisation. The fourth ponders on existing studies with a view to constructing a list of interpretative frames, which is illustrated in the fifth section. The sixth section discusses practices for a frame-based approach to mass-elite congruence on European integration. In the conclusions, I summarise the crux of my arguments and their relevance for future research.

THE CONTESTED NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT

A necessary premise of this article is that the essence of European integration, as a project and a process, can hardly be taken for granted – now less than ever. In relation to different policy domains and to the main dimensions of political competition in EU member states, the European issue reveals an autonomous character, neither stable nor uniform across time and countries.

To begin with, insofar as external sovereignty is involved, European integration may be associated with foreign policy, as exemplified by Churchill's doctrine of the 'three circles' (see Gamble 2003). Yet, by virtue of the level and scope of its powers, the EU has outclassed any other international organisation. In historical perspective, European integration has been primarily connected with the economic sphere since the 'common market' embodied by the EEC, its revamping with the Single European Act, and the Treaty of Maastricht, which presided over completion of the EMU. Tellingly, writing in the mid-1990s, Hooghe and Marks (1997) had portrayed the EU polity as dominated by the struggle between two economic projects: the neoliberal project, supported by right-wing nationalists, and regulated capitalism, espoused by supranationalists mainly leaning to the left.

However, the same authors later developed their postfunctionalist theory (Hooghe and Marks 2009) by tying the increasing politicisation of the EU to a sociocultural antithesis – having emerged alongside the traditional socioeconomic dimension – between a green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) pole and a traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) pole. Another specification identified the European issue as part of a cultural dimension heralding an overall shift towards a cleavage between 'integration' and 'demarcation', between the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006). On whether Europe embodies a distinct third axis, rather than having been absorbed by the sociocultural one, the jury is still out. An empirical analysis of the politicisation of both Europe and immigration in six Western European countries drew the two issues apart, in that:

> European integration is a more complex, multi-faceted issue that is difficult to handle for most politicians as it is a moving target, attitudes to it are often ambivalent, and the framing of what European integration is actually about is highly contested. (Hoeglinger 2016: 49)

Certainly the Maastricht Treaty, beside coining the name 'European Union', 'marks the moment when divisions between European and domestic policy begin to become increasingly blurred in the areas of political, economic, social, legal, environmental and foreign affairs' (Usherwood and Startin 2013: 3). Broadly speaking, from the Common Fisheries Policy to the Working Time Directive, from the Prüm Decisions to Structural and Investment Funds, the European layer of governance is now involved – albeit with varying competences and pervasiveness – virtually in every policy area, which produces a multiplicity of possible vantage points. As perceptively argued by Flood, the 'hybrid, multi-level, unfinished' EU:

> is open to widely differing interpretations within as well as between different ideological currents. To what extent is it (becoming) democratic? To what extent is it (becoming) a bastion of economic neoliberalism? Is it destroying the identities and autonomy of its constituent nations or is it protecting them insofar as necessary adaptation to modern global conditions makes it healthy to do so? Is it a grandiose folly, condemned to fail by the laws of history and human nature? Or does it represent the possibility of a truly rational, postmodern order? (Flood 2002: 7)

Currently, the European construction looks as 'hybrid' as ever, while the hardening and spreading of opposition has seemingly caused its 'unfinished' character to become structural. The very *telos* of an 'ever closer union' took a symbolic blow when British Prime Minister David Cameron, upon renegotiating the terms of UK membership prior to the 2016 referendum, secured a specific exemption from the aspiration formally referenced three times in the EU

Treaties. Prolonged democratic backsliding in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland, and the laborious search for viable countermeasures, have raised a further existential conundrum. The concept of 'multi-speed Europe' is now frequently invoked no longer as a partial brake, but rather as an inexorable necessity to salvage the kernel of the process. Accordingly, scholars have theorised 'differentiated integration' (Leruth and Lord 2015; Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2013), but also 'disintegration' and 'differentiated disintegration' (Webber 2019; Schimmelfennig 2018).

The open-ended, contradictory nature of the European project, compounded by the current circumstances, inevitably affects the study of Euroscepticism, by highlighting unsteady assumptions made by the most renowned works in the field. The studies that kickstarted research on party-based Euroscepticism tied their categories to opposition to 'core' EU policies, as distinct from 'peripheral' ones (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003), and to 'the current form of integration in the EU' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 3). Another well-known article equated diffuse support for European integration with approval for 'institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element)' (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 301), although, as pointed out by Kný and Kratochvíl (2015), what Art. 3 TEU actually mentions is 'social market economy'.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, recent studies have worked around the categories of 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism, devising labels such as 'equivocal Euroscepticism' in their analyses of empirical cases (Heinisch, McDonnell and Werner 2021). More generally, examples of the ambiguities of established categories of Euroscepticism have been raised by several scholars, according to whom previous contributions had anchored Euroscepticism in the essentialised, ahistorical vision of a mainstream practice of integration that never existed as such (Kný and Kratochvíl 2015; Crespy and Verschueren 2009). Acting upon this concern, Crespy and Verschueren (2009) advocated a study of resistances to European integration capable of taking into account the 'model' of the EU being opposed. Their own plea for frame analysis, and their identification of a number of frames of interpretation of the EU, serve as a precious mainstay of the endeavour I undertake in this article.

HETEROGENEITY AND AMBIVALENCE IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU

The argument that 'there is no possible univocal interpretation of the essence of the European project' (Crespy and Verschueren 2009: 381) refers to political elites as well as national populations. For political parties, given its intricate governance and decision-making procedures, European integration amounts to a kaleidoscopic reality whose overall trajectory none of them can sway single-handedly. Different dynamics may separate 'mainstream' parties from 'challenger' ones, yet no party family displays a unitary approach to the EU, as extensively discussed in various chapters of the *Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism* (Leruth, Startin and Usherwood 2018). Thus, politicians of different sides 'face a thorny and often unresolvable dilemma as some of their ideological core concerns speak in favour of certain aspects of European integration, while others lead them to adopt a sceptical stance' (Hoeglinger 2016: 58-59). In the perceptive words of two distinguished scholars, which delve deeper into this aspect:

> the subjective lens through which they view the European project may well condition the positions that parties take on Europe. The European project as embodied in the EU can, in turn, be opposed (or, indeed, supported) on the grounds that it is […] a Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal or regionalist project. Similarly, it may well be that some parties […] view the European project as essentially a political project. In this case the EU is good in so far as it promotes internationalism, peace and security. Others may view the project as essentially economic. Seen through this lens, the EU is a way of either promoting prosperity, capitalism, socioeconomic cohesion or all of these things. (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003: 14)

Citizens of EU member states, by contrast, do not always share the levels of cognitive sophistication characterising political elites, nor do they ordinarily get in contact with the political facets of European integration. Studies of public opinion towards the EU have long argued mass attitudes to have become 'structured' (Marks and Steenbergen 2004), despite the apathy and the indecisiveness observed among national populations (Van Ingelgom 2012). Yet, through in-depth interviews and focus groups, works pertaining to a 'qualitative turn' have cast doubt on whether European citizens have substantially incorporated the EU in their cognitive frameworks (see Duchesne 2012). In fact, a prominent review authored by two leading scholars recently acknowledged that '[a]t this point, we lack solid evidence as to whether citizens hold consistent and stable predispositions on European integration that shape political behavior in a predictable manner' (Hobolt and De Vries 2016: 426).

National contexts play a relevant part in organising attitudes towards European integration. 'Public responses to Europe are refracted through national institutions and patterns of discourse that reflect distinct historical trajectories' (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 14) of EU membership, encapsulated in debates sifted through national media. A compulsory reference is Diez Medrano's (2003) *Framing Europe*, which, joining analyses of the press with in-depth interviews, reconstructed the distinct conceptualisations of European integration having sedimented within the national communities of Germany, Spain, and the UK. More generally, references to nationally salient arguments on the essence of European integration naturally surface in accounts of the patterns of support and opposition towards the EU in any individual member state.

The same is true of analyses having sought to disentangle, on a case-by-case basis, the reasons behind the outcome of European referendums, such as the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 or the Brexit vote of 2016. Considering the French campaign, Taggart noted that 'the opponents of the Constitutional Treaty are defending a particular European vision, and it is hard not to see that particular construction of the European debate as a national one' (Taggart 2006: 17). Hobolt and Brouard, exploring the multidimensionality of EU-related attitudes among French and Dutch citizens, argued that 'European attitudes have […] become intertwined with traditional domestic concerns' as drivers of the vote, concluding that 'the European issue is not firmly fixed within the existing policy space' (Hobolt and Brouard 2011: 319). Notably, the authors regarded their findings as 'challeng[ing] the conventional view of attitudes toward Europe as preferences that can be neatly ordered on a single scale from anti- to pro-European' (Hobolt and Brouard 2011: 319).

For its own part, the 'qualitative turn' has compellingly stressed – by analysing citizens' ways of discussing Europe in relation to concrete political problems (White 2010) or aspects of their lifestyles (Weber, Brand, Niemann and Koch 2020), or by asking for discursive answers to questions habitually included in the Eurobarometer surveys in closed-ended form – that ordinary people exhibit vastly different ways of talking about Europe, not all of which are properly 'political'. Through hundreds of semi-structured interviews in five European countries, the transnational project Concorde (2006-2009) drew remarkable conclusions:

> Europe is not perceived by all citizens in the same way and the EU is not clearly identified in all segments of the public. Insofar as 'European' attitudes exist, they are not always clearly oriented. Not everyone is 'for' or 'against' Europe; some do not know whether they support or oppose it. Many reactions cannot be classified, or are contradictory or composite. On the other hand, some attitudes are stable, but despite what is frequently assumed, they are not all structured by preoccupations related to the political issues of European construction as they are framed and debated by politicians, journalists or commentators. (Gaxie 2011b: 239-240)

Concorde researchers identified 'a limited set of supporting practical elements which contribute to structuring attitudes, and on which almost everyone has something to say: the Euro, peace or free movement in Europe' (Dakowska and Hubé 2011: 90) as the baseline of people's thinking on European integration. They also contended that:

> [t]here are very disparate visions of Europe: for politicised citizens, the representation of the EU is a political and institutional one. For others, Europe is above all about the Euro, opening the borders, and bringing people and cultures together. For those who are more distanced from European debates, things such as bird flu or the presence of two lines (for EU nationals and non-EU nationals) in airports for immigration checks are "evidence" of a European reality. (Dakowska and Hubé 2011: 91)

While the 'qualitative turn' represents a minority tradition, the mainstream of EU studies has autonomously moved to contemplate many of the above observations, considering multidimensionality, ambivalence, and context dependence. For instance, the cornerstone of the 'benchmark theory' proposed by De Vries is that '*people's evaluations of and experiences with the European project are fundamentally framed by the national circumstances in which they find themselves*' (De Vries 2018: ix, emphasis in original). Furthermore, moving beyond previous understandings of 'public support as a single latent variable of fixed attitudes toward European integration', recent works have suggested such opinions to be 'inherently variable, reflecting differential degrees of certainty and ambivalence' (Hobolt and De Vries 2016: 415). Attitudes have been reinterpreted as distributions of considerations, sometimes aligned and sometimes counterposed. Ambivalence may arise from contrasting evaluations of different aspects – the community, the political process, the various policies (De Vries 2018) – although inherent ambivalence towards the EU as a whole should also be envisaged. Stoeckel (2013), in particular, equated 'ambivalence' with the compresence of favourable and unfavourable thoughts about the EU in an individual's mind, resolutely separating it from 'indifference'.

In sum, the arguments hitherto mustered buttress the notion that European integration is a complex political object, amenable to contrasting interpretations to political elites and, a fortiori, to ordinary citizens, whose viewpoints are influenced by national cultures and characterised by varying levels of stability, consistency, depth, and connection with the objective operations of the EU.

THE CONCEPT OF 'FRAME' AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

Against this background, interpretative frames constitute a particularly promising instrument, insofar as the versatile concept of 'frame' adapts to all levels of generality. The act of framing may be described as 'the process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue' (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997: 222). According to a thicker operational definition, '[t]o frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*' (Entman 1993: 52, emphasis in original).

As anticipated, Crespy and Verschueren (2009: 386) were pioneers in advocating frame analysis in relation to EU matters. And according to the rationale provided by a rare study of party frames, '[t]o understand Euroscepticism and Europeanism, we need to show not only what positions political actors take, but to understand how they present European integration to the populace, and which arguments they put forward to support or oppose it' (Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest 2010: 516). I double down on such suggestions by underscoring that frames play a paramount role as the vehicle of communication between the strategic framing contests at the heart of politics and citizens' inner processes of sense-making. Indeed, frames:

> lead a double life: they are internal structures of the mind that help individuals to order and give meaning to the dizzying parade of events they witness as political history unfolds; they are also devices embedded in political discourse, invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye on advancing their own interests or ideologies. (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74)

In this respect, the opinions gauged by the most common survey questions on European integration – for example, evaluations of EU membership as a good thing, a bad thing, or neither – should be more volatile than the underlying considerations that frame the EU as a common market, as the promise of 'social Europe', as a world power, or as something else entirely. Moreover, similar survey items are equipped neither to unveil ambivalence, nor to separate it from indifference. To comprehend whether different actors live in the same European worlds (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999), and to compare their attitudes between and within European countries, it is imperative to ascertain to what degree they view the EU through same lenses. This is predicated on the development of an array of frames, meaningfully representing the interpretations of European integration held by the elected legislator as well as the man in the street – or even an interest group's spokesperson or a journalist.

To construct such an array of frames, given the cognitive differences that exist between elites and masses and amongst the latter, plus the differences between national discourses on Europe, a 'thin' operational definition must be preferred to a 'thick' one. Pronounced agreement arguably obtains between two sources who concur on the nature of the European 'problem' and related motives, and it would be unrealistic to expect any frame to convey agreement on more than the sheer substance of the European issue. Thus, a frame of interpretation of the EU is defined by *a viewpoint on what the EU is or does*, common to a fair number of voices and broadly recognisable in terms of internal consistency. By virtue of their nature as composite packages of facts, devices and arguments, interpretive frames – especially when they are endowed with high levels of generality – are composed of multiple building blocks, or 'idea elements' (Meyer and Höllerer 2010).

With respect to inspection of textual evidence, the elaboration of frames may proceed deductively, by delineating all of them in advance with precision and exhaustiveness, or conversely entail inductive examination of aptly selected textual corpora, possibly originated from multiple sources in different EU member states. Direct precedents do not abound. In fact, a few studies have dwelled on how the media frame European politics and the process of integration (Barth and Bijsmans 2018; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). Yet, the endeavour to systematically reconceptualise views of the EU in terms of frames remains novel, as is the aim to consider 'mass frames' and 'elite frames' simultaneously. Accordingly, the exploratory findings presented here were gathered as part of a doctoral project (Pareschi 2019) that resorted to a deductive-cum-inductive approach, poring over extant literature to identify initial working categories, which were then refined in parallel with analysis of both elite-level and mass-level textual evidence drawn from France and the UK.

HOW TO FRAME THE EU? AN OVERVIEW

This section begins by discussing a handful of works that have explicitly referred to 'frames' about European integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018; Barth and Bijsmans 2018; Wonka 2016; Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest 2010; Crespy and Verschueren 2009). Then, it seeks further footholds in extant typologies of motivations of Euroscepticism (Skinner 2013; Ruiz Jiménez and Egea de Haro 2011; Leconte 2010; Sørensen 2008; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Sørensen 2004; Taggart 1998). By taking stock of these analytical proposals in its final portion, it paves the way for the eventual reconstruction of a dedicated inventory of frames.

First among the former group is Crespy and Verschueren's (non-exhaustive) list of ideal-typical models:

> i) a supranational "super-state" versus a "Europe of the nations"; ii) a Christian Europe […] or even a "fortress Europe" versus a "cosmopolitan Europe"; iii) the model of a "social Europe" versus a "(neo)liberal Europe"; iv) a "military power Europe" versus a "pacifist Europe". (Crespy and Verschueren 2009: 384-385).

Studying how the parties of six Western European countries framed European integration in 2004-2006, Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010) developed a categorisation identifying: i)

under a 'cultural' heading, 'nationalistic' frames, focusing on threats to national independence and identity, but also 'multicultural-inclusive' frames, upholding cultural openness, and 'moral-universalistic' ones, revolving around rights; ii) under an 'economic' heading, 'labour and social security' frames, composed of arguments about the job market and the welfare state, and 'economic prosperity' frames, which embrace growth, competitiveness and economic policies; iii) 'other utilitarian frames', namely 'political efficiency and efficacy', referring to the workings and action capacity of the state or the EU, and 'security and ecology', grouping topics regarded as scarcely salient.

Wonka (2016) examined patterns of politicisation of the Eurozone crisis within the German Bundestag. His content analysis captured three 'generic frames': i) an 'economic' frame, centred on the 'issue sub-categories' of economic growth, employment, fiscal stability, and redistribution among member states; ii) a 'cultural' frame, revolving around German and European identity, migration and multiculturalism, sovereignty, and solidarity, too; iii) an 'institutional' frame, comprising functional aspects of (de)centralisation and effectiveness, but also democratic control and accountability. Each frame could be wielded with a positive, neutral, or negative orientation. Like Helbling and his colleagues, Wonka found the frames used by the various political forces not to be simply reducible to the respective party families.

Barth and Bijsmans (2018) pinpointed five frames employed by British and German quality newspapers in the 1990s, again in positive, neutral, or negative versions. The list included: i) national 'sovereignty', the European impact on it, and the role attributed to other member states; ii) 'economic consequences', entailing cost-benefit assessments, together with the structural traits ascribed to the European economic bloc; iii) 'security and peace', i.e. the successes and failures experienced by the European project in delivering such goals; iv) 'efficiency' upon tackling pressing issues; v) 'democratic quality', accountability, and legitimacy evaluated at the European level.

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) used expert surveys to explore the link between recent EU crises and the further entrenchment of party-based Euroscepticism. Notably, they also captured how Euroscepticism was articulated by 2015 in each member state. By and large, four frames were identified: i) economic factors, including criticism of austerity and bailouts, aversion to the euro, and wider opposition to a union alternatively dubbed as either too 'liberal' or too 'protectionist'; ii) immigration; iii) critiques based on the EU democratic deficit or the loss of national sovereignty, with the two arguments being often fused in practice; iv) *sui generis* national factors, such as concerns about Turkey. Alongside 'Economy', 'Immigration', 'Democracy' and 'Sovereignty', an extended country-by-country list featured entries like 'Values', 'Environmentalism', 'Militarism', 'Women's issues'.

The second group of studies mentioned above was inaugurated by Taggart (1998). His tripartition recognised, beside opposition to the very idea of European integration, two positions respectively opposing the EU because of its inclusiveness, squeezing together realities too diverse to be compatible, possibly in regard to sovereignty or immigration; and because of its exclusiveness, undermining social justice within the EU and vis-à-vis third countries. Instead, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) separated a 'political' form of Euroscepticism, linked to the preferred decision-making level, from an 'instrumental', utilitarian form, in an article that mapped their diffusion and interrelation across Europe.

More sophisticated lines were drawn by Sørensen (2004), whose explorative comparison of British and Danish Euroscepticism distinguished six types of attitudes. Together with outright 'principled opposition', these types revolved around:

> the integrity of the nation-state (*national sovereignty*); the values of the EU (*ideology*); the transfer of new competencies to the EU in order to enhance efficiency (*political performance*); the economic rationale of integration (*economic utility*); and the (lack of) emotional attachment to the European level (*affective pull*). (Sørensen 2004: 3, emphasis in original)

In a later contribution, Sørensen (2008) revised her inventory, streamlining the content of its categories so as to encompass: i) a 'utilitarian' type, informed by all considerations about costs and benefits; ii) a 'sovereignty-based' type, concerning national sovereignty, supranationalism or the preferred level of policy-making; iii) a 'democratic' type, questioning the institutional makeup and democratic credentials of the EU; iv) a 'social' type, rooted in left-wing wariness of its economically liberal character.

Leconte's (2010) fourfold classification of Euroscepticism comprised: i) a 'utilitarian' variety, either individual or sociotropic, built around concerns such as unequal treatment, fair returns, national interest, or the redistributive consequences of EU policies; ii) a 'political' variety, grouping anxieties about democratic deficit, pooling of sovereignty or a European identity; iii) a 'value-based' variety, hostile to EU interference in moral, religious or normative matters, possibly extending to immigration; iv) 'cultural anti-Europeanism', fearing a degeneration of identity, mistrusting other European countries, or espousing veritable ethnocentrism. Referring to Euroscepticism in Spain, Ruiz Jiménez and Egea de Haro (2011) covered a 'utility' heading, a 'principle' heading, comprising both democracy-based leanings and views rooted in traditional left and right, and a 'sovereignty' type, grouping power transfers but also national and cultural identity and centre-periphery dynamics.

Lastly, Skinner's (2013) account of Euroscepticism in Western European non-member states included: i) a 'utilitarian' (or 'economic') motivation; ii) a 'political' (or 'political culture') motivation, revolving around sovereignty, democracy and satisfaction with its functioning; iii) a somewhat narrow 'cultural' motivation, linked to national traditions such as international neutrality; iv) a 'post-materialist value-based' motivation, channelling social liberalism, international solidarity, pacifism or environmentalism in opposition to 'Fortress Europe' or market hegemony; v) a weakly specified 'right-wing value-based' motivation; vi) miscellaneous 'rural society' concerns, comprising fisheries, urbanisation, depopulation and the environment.

It is also worth noting that Stoeckel's (2013) cited analysis exploited an item that has been included in each Standard Eurobarometer since 2009: 'What does the European Union mean to you personally?' A variety of prisms underpin the available response categories, positively or negatively oriented: 'peace', 'cultural diversity', 'waste of money', 'economic prosperity', 'stronger say in the world', 'loss of cultural identity', 'democracy', 'Euro', 'more crime', 'social protection', 'unemployment', 'not enough control of external borders', 'freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU', 'bureaucracy'.

Upon settling accounts, this overview reveals at once consistency and inconsistencies among the reviewed works. *Prima facie*, a 'family resemblance' characterises their classifications: the EU is amenable to being portrayed through prisms broadly linked to high politics, rights, society and culture, the economy, efficiency, and the international arena. Nevertheless, significant variation demarcates the content and boundaries of akin categories proposed by different scholars, as the precise connotation of certain 'idea elements' remains ambiguous. To give just one instance, does the embrace of European identity belong to a cultural sphere, in opposition to exclusive national identity, or to a political sphere, since it expresses support for a European polity, flag and anthem? Depending on how such a building block is articulated in context, it may as well evoke one or the other frame, or even multiple frames at once (in line with Huang 1995).

Before moving on, however, one cross-cutting consideration should be incorporated. Four ideal types of 'perceptions of Europe' were isolated by the Concorde project, corresponding to as many observation points: i) 'synoptic involvement', globally evaluating the EU through a register close to political debate; ii) 'restricted general involvement', conveying more ambiguous discourse through arguments often drawn from common sense; iii) 'limited involvement', reflecting intensive but bounded experience of European integration; iv) 'remote evaluation', entailing uncertain attribution of everyday problems to the European level (Gaxie

2011a). The general upshot, for the purposes of this article, is that viewpoints whose perspective is respectively *individual*, *situated* or *holistic* amount in effect to incommensurable frames. Any reconstruction of frames of interpretation of European integration should factor in this distinction where appropriate, e.g. by differentiating between the EU as an *economic benefit factor* and the EU as an *economic model*.

DISTILLING AN INVENTORY OF INTERPRETIVE FRAMES

The insights reviewed above were employed as the foundations of the deductive-cum-inductive procedure carried out in the aforementioned doctoral research project (Pareschi 2019; for similar approaches, see Meyer and Höllerer 2010; Huang 1995). The deductive stage closely inspected the framing categories identified within each proposed classification. Their respective 'idea elements', methodically written down on pieces of notepaper, were then arranged and rearranged in clusters on a broad board, until a preliminary but exhaustive list of working frames was outlined. As already mentioned, the inductive stage then applied the inventory to the elite-level and mass-level textual corpora; as the actors' statements were deconstructed into idea elements, the ones that proved 'new' were also noted on paper and added to the clusters on the board, contributing to a redefinition of the frames through back-and-forth iteration.

The overall tally of identified frames increased and the content of each frame became at once more precise and broader, as the statements of elites and citizens – expressed through different linguistic registers – were distilled in cyclical steps into a catalogue of 16 interpretations of the EU. The outcomes are synthesised in Table 1. Admittedly, certain frames parallel attitudes already probed in some fashion by traditional surveys. Yet, they can properly 'be considered as explaining reactions towards European integration only if people justify their perceptions of European integration with reasons likely to be interpreted as indicators of such attitudes' (Gaxie 2011a: 11). In principle, even a frame apparently characterised by an ingrained slant may happen to be wielded in any direction: each empirical instance may therefore be coded as 'positive', 'negative', 'ambivalent' or 'neutral'. Hence, a frame can prove less or more 'contested', depending on whether its actual usage is consistently linked to a specific orientation or fragmented into different orientations.

Table 1: Frames of interpretation of the EU and European integration

Frames of interpretation of the EU	
• Sovereignty, supranationalism, rules	• Utilitarian (economy/single market)
• National and European democracy	• Utilitarian (immigration/society)
• Rights	• Model (economy/single market)
• Europe as modernity	• Model (free movement/immigration)
• Identity and tradition	• Peaceful relations and cooperation
• Social Europe	• International stage
• Economically liberal Europe	• Value for money and waste
• Utilitarian (individual)	• Political effectiveness

Sovereignty, supranationalism and rules encompasses matters of self-determination and loss thereof, acceptance of political Europe and pooling of sovereignty, but also emphasis on EU 'rules' or the influence exerted by foreign powers through the EU. *National and European democracy* provides a distinct focal point, substantiated by attributing an 'undemocratic' nature to the EU, by stressing domestic democratic improvements brought by EU membership, by comparing national and European democracy, or by highlighting the European Parliament's activities. Another frame links the EU to the promotion or the preservation of *Rights* – such as human rights, consumer rights, workers' rights – or to their imperilment, or even to their alleged abuse allegedly encouraged by the European courts.

Europe as modernity and *Identity and tradition* are sociocultural frames, largely capturing interpretations of European integration in line with the GAL/TAN divide. The former groups perceptions anchored in environmentalism, humanitarian values and cultural openness – for instance stressing health, safety and environment regulation – or espousal of a European identity. Instead, the latter chiefly reflects concerns and appeals linked to national identity and strong in-group feelings, or cultural animosity towards immigration. Cleavage-based views of the EU are also conveyed through *Social Europe* and *Economically liberal Europe*. The former frame corresponds to references – of varying ideological thickness – to labour, jobs, workers and working conditions, as well as transnational economic solidarity. The latter reveals a source's adhesion to *laissez faire*, deregulation and other tenets of neoliberalism, or their emphasis on strengthened ordoliberal governance especially within the Eurozone.

Utilitarianism is voiced in three separate versions. *Utilitarian (individual)* revolves around the impact of European integration on a person's life, family and immediate milieu. *Utilitarian (economy/single market)* evaluates the EU through elements such as consequences for national companies, the cost of membership, agriculture and fisheries, the internal market, and so on and so forth, weighing costs and benefits for the country or, possibly, a more restricted territorial community or a sectoral grouping. *Utilitarian (immigration/society)* displays the same reasoning and situated perspective, but stresses how the free movement of foreigners affects employment, social services, crime or the society in general.

Conversely, *Model (economy/single market)* and *Model (free movement/immigration)* consider the EU in its entirety, not as a factor influencing a lower-level polity or group. The former frame gathers scarcely ideological interpretations of the EU that address its economic agency or its trade policy, for example by lamenting the absence of a veritable level playing field or by asserting that too diverse economies will never be made to work together. Systemic viewpoints related to freedom of movement or to migration fall under the latter frame.

As for the international side, *Peaceful relations and cooperation* incorporates views of European integration related to the role of the EU in fostering unprecedented peace, but also emphasis on *détente* and cooperation (or lack thereof) within Europe. *International stage* encompasses the manifold relationship between Europe and the global arena: from wariness of its possible 'militarisation' to distrust of its double standards vis-à-vis foreign powers, from European countries' say in the world to development aid.

Finally, two frames arise from instrumentality. *Value for money and waste* frames the EU as a factor delivering efficiency or, on the contrary, as an overly bureaucratic and wasteful entity. *Political effectiveness* encapsulates perceptions about its relative effectiveness in solving problems, especially as regards the most pressing and salient political issues, and about the (un)wieldy character of its configuration.

A FRAME-BASED APPROACH TO 'EU ISSUE CONGRUENCE'
The frame-based approach proposed in this article promptly finds a primary application. According to postfunctionalist theory (Hooghe and Marks 2009), 'constraining dissensus' plays a crucial part in the deeply troubled stage currently experienced by the process of integration, as the attitudes shown by more divided and tepid national public opinions restrain their political elites. Moreover, '*the unprecedented development in supranational governance in recent years has led to greater public contestation, yet at the same time the Union is more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before*' (De Vries 2018: 5, emphasis in original). Unsurprisingly, within studies of 'issue congruence' between the represented and their representatives, analyses specifically targeting 'EU issue congruence' – through established mass and elite surveys like the European Election Studies – have burgeoned (Pareschi, Giglioli and Baldini 2022). However, beside the fact that 'there is no natural metric with which to measure the gap and no certainty about what kind of divergence between elites and the masses will result in trouble', lingering conceptual and methodological pitfalls have engendered a 'peaceful coexistence of research results and conclusions' (Müller,

Jenny and Ecker 2012: 168-169; see also Real-Dato 2017). Besides, works aiming to explain such opinion gaps have mostly reported negative findings (e.g. Dolný and Baboš 2015).

Given these difficulties, carrying out frame-based evaluations of 'EU issue congruence' – by reconceptualising attitudes towards European integration as frames – may prove especially fruitful. The connection between such kind of attitudes and substantive representation remains watertight. In fact, issue framing has been argued to constitute 'a central aspect of the "conversation" between elites and citizens in a democracy' (Nelson and Kinder 1996: 1074); and according to another account, 'to find politicians framing, cueing, and priming, and to find citizens forming preferences in response to that activity, is merely to find both exercising the practice of representation, understood in the iterative sense' (Disch 2011: 109). Like conventional assessments, a frame-based analysis can compare attitudes at country level, between whole political classes and their national populations, or at party level, between political parties and their supporters.

To that end, the inventory of frames presented above shall serve as a unified structure of coding, to be applied to textual data collected at both mass and elite level in order to detect such frames' respective diffusion. Very few similar studies exist, and none relates to European integration. The closest predecessor in thematic terms might be Larsen's (1999) comparison of the approaches of British and Danish elites and citizens towards the European level during the 1990s. However, Larsen selectively relied on in-depth contextual knowledge in the shape of available opinion polls, official documents and declarations. A reference point in methodological terms is Huang's (1995) rare effort to compare 'media frames' with 'audience frames' on the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas controversy which took place in the US in 1991. After collecting newspaper and TV stories and submitting two open-ended questions to adult citizens via telephone, Huang iteratively developed common coding categories and interpretative frames through multiple readings. Of course, a frame-based evaluation of EU issue congruence differs in that Europe is an abstract, long-lasting bone of contention, not a singular event.

As regards mass-level data collection, targeting representative samples of national adult populations in line with current research practices remains key to sound statistical inference. Thus, the central prescription vis-à-vis traditional surveys concerns the nature of the necessary items to be included. As a minimum, a question like the one exploited by Stoeckel (2013) should routinely probe the meaning(s) attributed to the EU, offering an exhaustive range of response categories. Another route, gently tilting the balance towards further induction, encourages the usage of open-ended items, advocated by constructivist researchers together with yet more 'qualitative' instruments such as semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Gamson 1988). Reliance on open-ended questions, incidentally, has steadily featured in experimental studies of framing (e.g. Valkenburg, Semetko and De Vreese 1999).

As for elite-level data collection, parallel inclusion of the mentioned Eurobarometer item into the most renowned elite surveys would be welcome. Indeed, the combination of independent surveys of citizens and legislators exploiting identically worded items would be highly convenient, although the eventuality of 'differential item functioning' (Golder and Stramski 2010) cannot be discounted. Otherwise, at least six sources could provide textual data suitable for coding and extraction of frames: i) newspaper articles or TV newscasts; ii) press agencies' news reports; iii) political parties' official statements; iv) party leaders' speeches; v) parliamentary debates; vi) political actors' social media pages. As each alternative displays strengths and weaknesses, triangulation would be preferable. Some options yield evidence to be channelled into either country-level or party-level assessments, whereas others only allow for the latter option.

In this regard, social scientists have long treated the mass media as 'a window through which to gain insight into the positions of political parties, interest groups and citizens and as a data source for studying how well these different positions are reflected in national public debates' (De Wilde, Teney and Lacewell 2018: 51-52). Specifically, the press has frequently supplied the default option in studies of 'frames in communication' (Matthes 2009; Chong and

Druckman 2007). Selecting a set of quality newspapers – based on criteria like diffusion and ideological diversity, in addition to relative objectivity – guarantees reliability in representation of the public discourse, continuous availability through preservation in electronic databases, and homogeneous applicability across national contexts (for a discussion and an applied example, see Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest 2010). Moreover, a textual corpus composed of politicians' statements reported by newspapers over a certain period consists by design of a weighted average of sorts (Pareschi 2019). For instance, it gathers the voices of numerous political exponents, within a country or a party, while reflecting their different levels of prominence; in addition to this, occasions in which political actors deliberately evoke EU matters are blended with circumstances in which declarations are reactively prompted by external events.

At a lower level, two interlocked research decisions entailed by textual data analysis concern the unit of observation. Should it be a single proposition, or a whole text? And should it be associated with one frame only, or potentially harbour multiple frames? In principle, the lengthier the unit of observation, the higher the probability that multiple frames will emerge from it. Furthermore, inasmuch as ambivalence characterises a source's views – *inter alia* in terms of the joint presence of diverse frames – researchers should prize its detection. Thus, the aforementioned doctoral research (Pareschi 2019) chose as its unit of observation at mass level each interviewee's whole answer to an open-ended question on the meaning(s) of the EU; at elite level, it relied on the totality of propositions attributable to each political exponent within each selected newspaper article. Concerning the second decision, the study deemed it plausible to find a single proposition framing the EU in distinct ways or, on the contrary, a single frame articulated through multiple propositions, some of which could in fact be understandable only in context. Thus, for example, reference to the rights of workers within a unit of observation could be coded at both frames *Rights* and *Social Europe*.

Finally, according to established consensus 'checks for intercoder reliability are imperative when manual coding is used' (Chong and Druckman 2007: 108; see the review in Matthes 2009). Huang (1995), Valkenburg, Semetko and De Vreese (1999) and Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest (2010), among others, reported on the procedures employed to ensure inter-coder reliability. Such procedures often involve the parallel coding of a subsample of the textual corpora by multiple coders, resulting in a percentage of agreement or an akin indicator.

CONCLUSIONS

Do the ruling classes and the ordinary citizens of EU member states live in the same European worlds, as Thomassen and Schmitt (1999) would put it? Frequent opinion polls gauge the attitudes of national populations towards European integration, and those of their political representatives are also surveyed on occasion. Yet, no systematic endeavour has ever examined whether and to what extent the EU is actually interpreted in similar ways at the two levels. This is astounding, both because the diverse outcomes of recent European crises have strongly problematised the *framing* of the EU (Börzel and Risse 2018), and because related considerations arise in real-world debates at each and every critical juncture. In the run-up to the Brexit referendum, for instance, the *Guardian* had asked for contributions from its foreign readership:

> to explore how the EU is viewed throughout the union, and what it means in other European countries. What do people talk about in your country when the subject of the EU is raised: democracy, migration, bureaucracy, free movement, security, strategic alliances? (Marsh 2016)

This article has contended that revamped reliance on 'frames of interpretation' would precisely provide the instruments enabling such a systematic research effort across European countries. Consequently, it has issued a plea for the relaunch of frame analysis in the study of attitudes towards European integration, with special reference to assessments of mass-elite correspondence and discrepancy.

Firstly, I have dwelled on the open-ended and multifaceted nature of European integration, in historical terms and in its relationship with the main dimensions of political competition in EU member states. Secondly, I have considered how different national experiences with the EU and ambivalent thinking about it have at once enabled and complicated appropriation of the European issue across the continent. As Stoeckel concluded, 'future theorizing on the opinions of Europeans should recognize that [the constraining] dissensus on European integration exists in many citizens' minds' (Stoeckel 2013: 41). In fact, even the mainstream of contemporary EU studies – notwithstanding the paucity of analyses directly focusing on frames – has expressed awareness of the relevance of framing processes (Hooghe and Marks 2007).

Highlighting the versatile nature of frames as analytical tools, the article has defined them as distinct viewpoints on what the EU is or does. On this basis, I have reviewed a number of studies serving as a baseline for the construction of a comprehensive list of interpretive frames. The inventory, resulting from a deductive-cum-inductive procedure developed in iterative steps, includes 16 ideal-typical frames: from *Sovereignty, supranationalism, rules* to *Europe as modernity*, from *Utilitarian (immigration/society)* to *Model (economy/single market)*, from *International stage* to *Political effectiveness*. Finally, I have debated research practices to be implemented by future, frame-based analyses of mass-elite congruence on EU matters.

Three additional avenues for further research stand out. First, recent works on Euroscepticism have called attention to its diffusion beyond party systems and public opinions, in loci such as the media, interest groups and social movements (Usherwood and Startin 2013; Vasilopoulou 2013; Leconte 2010). However, the catch-all notion of Euroscepticism remains problematic, as '[n]umerous authors unsatisfied with [it] forge neologisms which seem more appropriate to particular aspects of their object or of the context under study' (Crespy and Verschueren 2009: 382). Conversely, an inclusive catalogue of frames appears well-suited to 'travelling' across European countries, matching and describing through its balanced flexibility the wide gamut of views of the EU displayed by different kinds of political actors.

Second, frame-based research is equipped to assess which interpretations prevail within the 'issue field' of each EU member state (Meyer and Höllerer 2010), where the totality of relevant actors – not only the ones that pertain to the political realm – engage in framing contests over the meanings to be conferred upon European integration. Subject to appropriate data collection, it shall be possible to reconstruct for each country – through homogeneous categories that enable cross-national comparison – the specific balance in the mixture of employed frames that constitutes the 'issue culture'. Moreover, techniques such as Multiple Correspondence Analysis could map types of actors, frames and orientations simultaneously, to catch sight of the dynamics lying behind the generation of meanings (for a similar design, see Meyer and Höllerer 2010).

Third, prospective developments relate to mass-level attitudes. Certainly, the detection of frames in citizens' minds calls for explanation of their cognitive, demographic, social and behavioural antecedents, in a way that parallels extant literature (Hobolt and De Vries 2016). In this vein, Huang (1995) singled out through statistical techniques the main individual-level drivers behind reliance on each identified 'audience frame'. Furthermore, Vasilopoulou called for '[e]xperimental settings that would examine the relationship between […] citizen exposure to stimuli related to different aspects of European integration and […] political attitudes and behaviour at the domestic level' (Vasilopoulou 2018: 32). Indeed, numerous experimental analyses have inspected the relationship between properties of interpretative frames – 'accessibility', 'applicability' and 'strength' – and their respective leverage on the public (Chong and Druckman 2007). However, although research on the European issue has recently resorted to experimental designs, it is largely found wanting in regard to frames themselves, even though a Brexit-related exception probed the impact exerted on Leave/Remain preferences by positive and negative versions of a 'cultural', an 'economic' and a 'political' frame (Goodwin, Hix and Pickup 2020). Enhanced awareness of the variety of plausible frames of interpretation of the EU should spur such experimental research, while endowing it with theoretically stable foundations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

AUTHOR DETAILS

Andrea Pareschi, Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca' Foscari University of Venice. [andrea.pareschi@unive.it].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barth, Christiane and Patrick Bijsmans (2018). 'The Maastricht Treaty and public debates about European integration: the emergence of a European public sphere?' Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(2): 215–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1427558

Börzel, Tania A. and Thomas Risse (2018). 'From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics'. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1): 83–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310281

Bulmer, Simon and William Paterson (2018). Germany and the European Union: Europe's Reluctant Hegemon? London: Red Globe Press.

Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman (2007). 'Framing Theory'. Annual Review of Political Science, 10: 103–126. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

Crespy, Amandine and Nicolas Verschueren (2009). 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective'. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10(3): 377–393. https://doi.org/10.1080/15705850903105793

Dakowska, Dorota and Nicolas Hubé (2011). 'For or Against the EU? Ambivalent Attitudes and Varied Arguments Towards Europe'. In: Daniel Gaxie, Nicolas Hubé and Jay Rowell (eds), Perceptions of Europe: A comparative sociology of European attitudes. Colchester: ECPR Press: 85–100.

De Vries, Catherine (2018). Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De Wilde, Pieter, Céline Teney and Onawa Promise Lacewell (2018). 'Euroscepticism: stand-alone phenomenon or embedded within a broader cleavage?' In: Benjamin Leruth, Nicholas Startin and Simon Usherwood (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism. Abingdon and New York: Routledge: 48–60.

Diez Medrano, Juan (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Disch, Lisa (2011). 'Towards a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation'. American Political Science Review, 105(1): 100–114. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000602

Dolný, Branislav and Pavol Baboš (2015). 'Voter–Representative Congruence in Europe: A Loss of Institutional Influence?' West European Politics, 38(6): 1274–1304. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1053180

Duchesne, Sophie (2012). 'Le tournant qualitatif des travaux sur les attitudes à l'égard de l'intégration européenne: un virage consommé'. Revue Française de Science Politique, 62(1): 109–114. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.621.0109

Entman, Robert M. (1993). 'Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm'. Journal of Communication, 43(4): 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Flood, Chris (2002). 'Euroscepticism: A problematic concept'. Paper presented at the UACES 32nd annual conference, 2–4 September, Belfast.

Gamble, Andrew (2003). Between Europe and America. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gamson, William A. (1988). 'The 1987 Distinguished Lecture: A Constructionist Approach to Mass Media and Public Opinion'. Symbolic Interaction, 11(2): 161–174. https://doi.org/10.1525/si.1988.11.2.161

Gamson, William A. (1985). 'Goffman's Legacy to Political Sociology'. Theory and Society, 14(5): 605–622. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00160018

Gaxie, Daniel (2011a). 'What we know and do not know about citizens' attitudes towards Europe'. In: Daniel Gaxie, Nicolas Hubé and Jay Rowell (eds), Perceptions of Europe: A comparative sociology of European attitudes. Colchester: ECPR Press: 1–16.

Gaxie, Daniel (2011b). 'Conclusion'. In: Daniel Gaxie, Nicolas Hubé and Jay Rowell (eds), Perceptions of Europe: A comparative sociology of European attitudes. Colchester: ECPR Press: 239–242.

Golder, Matt and Jacek Stramski (2010). 'Ideological congruence and electoral institutions'. American Journal of Political Science, 54(1): 90-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00420.x

Goodwin, Matthew, Simon Hix and Mark Pickup (2020). 'For and Against Brexit: A Survey Experiment of the Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership'. British Journal of Political Science, 50(2): 481–495. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000667

Heinisch, Reinhard, Duncan McDonnell and Annika Werner (2021). 'Equivocal Euroscepticism: How Populist Radical Right Parties Can Have Their EU Cake and Eat It'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 59(2): 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13055

Helbling, Marc, Dominic Hoeglinger and Bruno Wüest (2010). 'How political parties frame European integration'. European Journal of Political Research, 49(4): 496-521. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01908.x

Hobolt, Sara B. and Sylvain Brouard (2011). 'Contesting the European Union? Why the Dutch and the French Rejected the European Constitution'. Political Research Quarterly, 64(2): 309–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909355713

Hobolt, Sara B. and Catherine De Vries (2016). 'Public Support for European Integration'. Annual Review of Political Science, 19: 413–432. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044157

Hoeglinger, Dominic (2016). 'The politicisation of European integration in domestic election campaigns'. West European Politics, 39(1): 44–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081509

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2009). 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus'. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2007). 'Sources of Euroscepticism'. Acta Politica, 42(2): 119–127. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (1997). 'The Making of a Polity: The struggle over European integration'. European Integration Online Papers, 1(4): 1–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302663

Huang, Kuang-yu (1995). A comparison between media frames and audience frames: the case of the Hill-Thomas controversy. PhD dissertation: University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders (1990). 'Mimicking Political Debate with Survey Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks'. Social Cognition, 8(1): 73–103. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1990.8.1.73

Kný, Daniel and Petr Kratochvíl (2015). 'Caught in the Deviation Trap. On the Fallacies of the Study of Party-Based Euroscepticism'. Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science, 22 (3): 200–215. https://doi.org/10.5817/PC2015-3-200

Kopecký, Petr and Cas Mudde (2002). 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe'. European Union Politics, 3(3): 297–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003003002

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal et al. (2006). 'Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared'. European Journal of Political Research, 45(6): 921–956. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x

Larsen, Henrik (1999). 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach'. European Journal of International Relations, 5(4): 451–483. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005004003

Leconte, Cécile (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leruth, Benjamin and Christopher Lord (2015). 'Differentiated Integration in the European Union: A Concept, a Process, a System or a Theory?' Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6): 754–763. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1021196

Leruth, Benjamin, Nicholas Startin and Simon Usherwood (eds.)(2018). The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig (2013). Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lubbers, Marcel and Peer Scheepers (2005). 'Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism: Mapping Scepticism in European Countries and Regions'. European Union Politics, 6(2): 223–242. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116505051984

Marks, Gary and Marco R. Steenbergen (eds.)(2004). European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marsh, Sarah (2016). 'What does the European Union mean in your country?' The Guardian, May 13. Online: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/13/what-does-the-european-union-mean-in-your-country [Accessed 03 April 2021].

Matthes, Jörg (2009). 'What's in a Frame? A Content Analysis of Media Framing Studies in the World's Leading Communication Journals, 1990-2005'. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(2): 349–367. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900908600206

Meyer, Renate E. and Markus A. Höllerer (2010). 'Meaning Structures in a Contested Issue Field: A Topographic Map of Shareholder Value in Austria'. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6): 1241–1262. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.57317829

Müller, Wolfgang C., Marcelo Jenny and Alejandro Ecker (2012). 'The elite-masses gap in European integration'. In: Heinrich Best, György Lengyel and Luca Verzichelli (eds), The Europe of Elites. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 167–191.

Nelson, Thomas E. and Donald R. Kinder (1996). 'Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion'. Journal of Politics, 58(4): 1055–1078. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960149

Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley (1997). 'Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects'. Political Behavior, 19(3): 221–246. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024834831093

Pareschi, Andrea (2019). Two approaches to the assessment of opinion congruence: Elite-mass gaps on the EU issue in France and in the United Kingdom. PhD dissertation: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, University of Siena, University of Pisa, University of Florence.

Pareschi, Andrea, M.F.N. Giglioli and Gianfranco Baldini (2022). 'Caught between sovereignty and solidarity? A multidimensional revisitation of EU mass–elite congruence'. Italian Political Science Review – Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, published online. https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2022.10

Real-Dato, José (2017). 'Party-voters Congruence Concerning the European Union: An Analysis of Its Evolution During the Eurozone Crisis Using Elite and Mass Surveys'. Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 8(3): 85–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.14267/cjssp.2017.3S.05

Riddervold, Marianne, Jarle Trondal and Akasemi Newsome (eds.)(2021). The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia M. and Alfonso Egea de Haro (2011). 'Spain: Euroscepticism in a Pro-European Country?' South European Society and Politics, 16(1): 105–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608741003594379

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2018). 'Brexit: Differentiated Disintegration in the European Union'. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(8): 1154–1173. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467954

Semetko, Holli A. and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000). 'Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news'. Journal of Communication, 50(2): 93–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.x

Skinner, Marianne Sundlisæter (2013). 'Different Varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-Member States'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1): 122–139. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02305.x

Sørensen, Catharina (2008). 'Love me, love me not… A typology of public Euroscepticism'. SEI Working Paper 101, EPERN Working Paper 19. Online: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-101.pdf&site=266 [Accessed 17 March 2021].

Sørensen, Catharina (2004). 'Danish and British popular Euroscepticism compared: A sceptical assessment of the concept'. DIIS Working Paper 2004/25. Online: https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/107191/wp_2004_25_final.pdf [Accessed 17 March 2021].

Stoeckel, Florian (2013). 'Ambivalent or Indifferent? Reconsidering the Structure of EU Public Opinion'. European Union Politics, 14(1): 23–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116512460736

Taggart, Paul (2006). 'Keynote Article: Questions of Europe - The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums ad their Challenge for the Study of European Integration'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1): 7–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00641.x

Taggart, Paul (1998). 'A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems'. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3): 363–388. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006853204101

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2018). 'Putting Brexit into perspective: the effect of the Eurozone and migration crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European states'. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(8): 1194–1214. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467955

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2004). 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe'. European Journal of Political Research, 43(1): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00143.x

Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak (2003). 'Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality'. SEI Working Paper 69, EPERN Working Paper 12. Online: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-69.pdf&site=266 [Accessed 22 December 2021].

Thomassen, Jacques and Hermann Schmitt (1999). 'Issue congruence'. In: Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (eds), Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 186–208.

Usherwood, Simon and Nick Startin (2013). 'Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02297.x

Valkenburg, Patti M., Holli A. Semetko and Claes H. De Vreese (1999). 'The Effects of News Frames on Readers' Thoughts and Recall'. Communication Research, 26(5): 550–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/009365099026005002

Van Ingelgom, Virginie (2012). 'Mésurer l'indifférence: Intégration européenne et attitudes des citoyens'. Sociologie, 3(1): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.3917/socio.031.0001

Vasilopoulou, Sofia (2018). 'Theory, concepts and research design in the study of Euroscepticism'. In: Benjamin Leruth, Nicholas Startin and Simon Usherwood (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism. Abingdon and New York: Routledge: 23–35.

Vasilopoulou, Sofia (2013). 'Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?' Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1): 153–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02306.x

Webber, Douglas (2019). 'Trends in European political (dis)integration: An analysis of postfunctionalist and other explanations'. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8): 1134–1152. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1576760

Weber, Regina, Alexander Brand, Arne Niemann and Florian Koch (2020). 'Non-elite conceptions of Europe: Europe as a reference frame in English football fan discussions'. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 16(3): 293–319. https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v16i3.1089

White, Jonathan (2010). 'Europe in the Political Imagination'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(4): 1015–1038. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02084.x

Wonka, Arndt (2016). 'The party politics of the Euro crisis in the German Bundestag: Frames, positions and salience'. West European Politics, 39(1): 125–144. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081512