

# EU-Russia Educational Cooperation as a Democracy Promotion Mechanism

Ekaterina Gorbunova

*Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon*

---

## Abstract

The idea of understanding and assessing the EU's role in promoting democratic values in the neighbourhood has acquired a central place in the EU's external relations discourse. At the same time, in the literature on democratisation, education is conventionally considered one of the key prerequisites of successful democratic transition and consolidation. Still, a rich body of democracy promotion literature and Europeanisation studies never discuss education as a possible mechanism of democratic socialisation. The article aims to fill this gap by bringing together these two different scholarly traditions and by looking at EU-Russia educational cooperation as a mechanism to promote democratic values. The following propositions are advanced on the basis of the analysis: (1) democracy promotion is both implicitly and explicitly present in the EU-Russia educational policy discourse; (2) the level of education is a valid predictor of more democratic attitudes in Russia and, hence, should be considered a strong factor of a country's democratisation.

## Keywords

EU-Russia relations; Democracy promotion; Education policy

---

THE IDEA OF UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)'S ROLE in promoting democratic values in the neighbourhood has recently received a rising amount of academic attention (Emerson *et al.* 2005; Youngs 2008, 2009; Saari 2009a), as it has acquired a central place in the EU's external relations discourse.<sup>1</sup> Scholars have identified different governance mechanisms used by the EU to promote democracy, including conditionality, such as external incentives, and socialisation, such as social learning models (Noutcheva 2010). An intensification of the EU-Russia cooperation in the sphere of education in the last two decades can be seen as a reflection of the EU's growing concern about the promotion of democratic culture, and using education as a priority socialisation mechanism. A large amount of resources is annually spent by the EU on education support programmes in Russia, with the explicit goal of fostering a European democratic system of values. According to the EU-Russia Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects, which was approved on 10 May 2005, one of the main objectives of EU-Russia cooperation in this field is 'to strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights'.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, in the

---

<sup>1</sup> See Council of the EU, "Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations", 2974th External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia\\_eu\\_four\\_common\\_spaces-%20roadmap\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20roadmap_en.pdf).

literature on democratisation, namely in its traditional structuralist perspective, education is conventionally considered one of the key prerequisites of successful democratic transition and consolidation (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Barro 1999; Glaeser *et al.* 2007). The general research hypothesis states that the higher the education level of a nation's population, the better the chances for democracy. Through education, citizens enrich their human capital and are socialised into civic attitudes and democratic values.

Still, the EU's efforts in using education as a 'soft power' instrument for exporting democratic ideas to Russia and constructing an EU-Russia partnership built on shared principles and values have not been discussed yet. The article fills this gap by raising this new research question and offering a multidisciplinary framework to answer it. Specifically, the article traces the development of EU-Russia educational cooperation from 1990 until 2010 and analyses it from a democracy promotion point of view. Then, it formulates and preliminarily tests a series of research hypotheses related to the democratisation function of education in Russia. The intention is to introduce the concept of the EU's educational policy as a democracy promotion mechanism and to analyse its validity in relation to the Russian context.

## Methodology

By integrating two different areas of academic research, namely scholarly work on Europeanisation and democracy promotion, as well as transition and democratisation studies, the article draws on rich bodies of literature to explore the democracy promotion function of EU-Russia educational cooperation. First, using IR social constructivism theories, the article analyses the dynamics of EU-Russia educational cooperation in the post-Soviet period with a view to reveal democracy promotion objectives and mechanisms. By proving the hypothesis that democracy promotion objectives are explicitly and/or implicitly present in EU-Russia educational policy discourse, it is shown that the proposal of regarding educational cooperation as a democracy promotion attempt is theoretically valid. Secondly, building on structuralist political science theories of democratisation and democratic transition, the article analyses the democratisation function of education in Russia by testing a set of research hypotheses of the correlation between the level of education of Russian citizens and their democratic values and attitudes. By proving them, the empirical validity of looking at education as a democracy promotion mechanism is demonstrated.

## Democracy promotion and democratisation theories

### *The EU as a democracy promoter*

The importance of EU-Russia relations based on a comprehensive bilateral strategy has already become an academic and political commonplace. The EU-Russia common interests lie in the spheres of economy, energy, common neighbourhood, environmental protection, justice and home affairs, security, as well as in the fields of research, education and culture.

The key liberal democratic principles, namely rule of law, political pluralism, protection of human rights and so on, are encoded in the EU's treaties<sup>3</sup> and constitute the normative basis for the EU internal and external policy. 'In its external action the Union thus wants to be seen as an essentially normative power [...] [and] rely on "softer" means for influence and persuasion' (Haukkala 2005: 2).

<sup>3</sup> See Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0042:0133:EN:PDF>.

In recent years, the comparative analysis of the EU promotion efforts has become subject of several book-length studies (Kelley 2004a; Pridham 2005; Emerson *et al.* 2005; Youngs 2008). From a conceptual point of view, the role of the EU as a promoter of democratic norms and principles has been addressed in the framework of the IR social constructivist (Finnemore 1993, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Rise, Popp and Sikkink 1999; Kelley 2004a, 2004b; Checkel 2005) and sociological institutionalist (McNeely 1995; Mundy 2008) traditions, as well as in the Europeanisation literature (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). Whilst admitting the existence of two main mechanisms through which the EU channels its influence – conditionality and socialisation – the first group of scholars has been mostly concentrated on exploring socialisation functions of international organisations, including the EU, while the Europeanisation strand, in turn, focuses mainly on political conditionality as a key mechanism of democracy promotion and democratisation.

In the framework of social constructivism, international relations are seen as ‘embedded in an institutional and cultural environment – an international community. In this context, international socialisation is an institutionalised policy, carried out by international organisations, to transmit the constitutive normative rules of the international community to individual states’ (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006: 17). The socialisation agency acts as a role model and persuades the target states (members or partners) to adopt the rules and norms using various socialisation strategies, such as reinforcement by reward, by punishment or by support (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). The target states, in turn, also pursue one of the strategies – strategic calculation, role playing or normative suasion – which lead to one of the socialisation outcomes: adoption of new roles or changes in values and interests (Checkel 2005).

A similar idea was developed in the framework of the sociological institutionalism arguing that national education policy and practices are influenced by overall world-level principles, ideas and imperatives usually defined and promoted by international organisations (Meyer *et al.* 1997; McNeely 1995; Mundy 2008; Pfister 2010).

In pursuing political conditionality, ‘the EU sets the adoption of democratic rules and practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfil in order to receive reward such as financial assistance, some kind of contractual association or – ultimately – membership’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 5). Usually, adopting liberal political norms means quite significant domestic costs. Hence, high external rewards are needed to balance these costs and effectively realize democracy promotion policy. The most general conditionality hypothesis assumes that ‘the level of democracy in the neighbouring countries of the EU increases with the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 6).

### ***Education as a social requisite for democracy***

When speaking about democratic transitions, at least two major perspectives can be identified: the structuralist and the actor perspective (Edvardsen 1997). The former tradition (which is of primary interest for the aims of this article) sees the establishment of democracy largely as a result of a series of favourable external and internal factors, while the latter emphasises autonomy of political actors and processes (see e.g. Linz 1973; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

In the framework of the structuralist approach, starting from the 1950s, a great variety of economic, political, social and cultural factors were identified as determinants of a series of waves of democratisation, including:

- socioeconomic development (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Diamond 1992; Przeworski *et al.* 2000; Fish and Choudhry 2007);
- political culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; Dahl 1971; Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993; Diamond 1993; Alexander 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2003);
- religious tradition (Huntington 1993, 1996; Inglehart and Norris 2004; Marsh 2005; Papkov 2007);
- social cleavages and fractionalisation (Lipset 1959, 1963 [1960]; Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1977; Przeworski *et al.* 2000; Alesina *et al.* 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006);
- international linkages and diffusion (Diamond 1992; Levitsky and Way 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007), and others.

As far as education is concerned, scholars have long attempted to identify and measure the relationship and interdependence between education and democracy. The view that educational systems perform an important socio-political role contributing to citizens' socialisation was proposed by John Dewey (1916) and later developed in the framework of the functionalist theory of education, originated from the works of Emile Durkheim (1956). In his article *Education, its Nature and Role* Durkheim asserts, that 'every society [...] has a system of education which is imposed on individuals', and sets itself a certain "human ideal" ('a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states'), which is the crux of education. Hence, 'education consists of a methodical socialisation of the young generation'. Through education, the individual is turned into a social and political actor.

At the same time, starting with classical works of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) the role of education – especially, higher education – as a requisite for democracy was emphasized: 'If we cannot say that a "high" level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world' (Lipset 1959).

Later, the theories linking education with support for democratic values and democratisation received a good deal of theoretical and empirical cross-country support (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959: 80; Kamens 1988; Dahl 1992; Barro 1999; Acemoglu *et al.* 2005; Glaeser *et al.* 2007; Spilimbergo 2009) proving that education is crucial for appearance of a democratic regime and its stability.

Several potential causal mechanisms could be identified. Education broadens the men's outlook, enabling them to understand the need for liberal norms and increasing their capacity to make rational electoral choices (Lipset 1959). Individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed and socialized into accepting officially promoted democratic values (Gibson *et al.* 1992). Moreover, education leads to higher participation in a whole range of social activities, including politics, as schooling involves learning about the virtues of civic participation. By socialisation and improving of interpersonal skills (i.e. human capital) education facilitates civic involvement and development of social capital (Glaeser *et al.* 2007). Finally, education may also inherently instil or reinforce liberal values already developed by the individual (Gibson *et al.* 1992). It should be stressed that in spite of addressing the issues of socialisation function of education, the majority of scholars were actually dealing with the 'quantity' of education (by measuring such indicators of education as level of educational attainment, average years of schooling, or number of students who studied abroad etc.), and not with the 'quality', the content of education (e.g. democratic values, political indoctrination or technical knowledge).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> One of rare exceptions is the work of Glaeser *et al.* (2006) where the authors make an attempt to construct (using tools of mathematical modelling) a theoretical model of regime stability based on the core assumption

## The development of EU-Russia educational cooperation and the aims of democracy promotion

One of the major features of Europeanisation is the fact that it produces externalities to neighbouring countries. It was impossible for Russia to remain indifferent to the European integration process as the eastern borders of Europe moved closer. At the same time, *Perestroika*, the end of the USSR, and the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation<sup>5</sup> marked a new era in the EU-Russia relations and boosted the EU-Russia cooperation. As a successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the already existing framework of the cooperation with the EU (mainly constituted by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in November 1990),<sup>6</sup> and through the 1990s Russia itself actively sought the membership of the Council of Europe and advocated for a close 'strategic partnership' with the European Union (Haukkala 2005).

The EU-Russia cooperation policy in the sphere of education and research was developed through the implementation of a series of bilateral arrangements and policy instruments and began with the adaption of the first EU-Russia Cooperation Programme and the opening of the EC Delegation in Moscow in 1991 (see Table 1).

---

that education raises the benefits of political participation: "in this model, the political success of a democracy hinges on having a large number of supporters whose benefits of political participation are sufficiently high that they fight for it despite the low personal incentives" (p. 5).

<sup>5</sup> "Declaration of the State sovereignty of the Russian Federation", 12 June 1990. <http://constitution.garant.ru/act/base/10200087>.

<sup>6</sup> "Charter of Paris for a New Europe", *CSCE 1990 Summit*, Paris, 19-21 November 1990. [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf).

**Table 1:** EU-Russia educational cooperation in 1990-2010

Year/date	Russia-EU milestones
1991	The Delegation of the European Commission to Russia was opened
1991	EU-Russia Cooperation Programme
15 July 1991	Regulation Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and Recovery in the USSR – the TACIS programme (the second phase followed on 19 July 1993)
29 April 1994	The first TEMPUS programme for 1990-1993 was launched in July 1990. Russia joined in the second phase on the 29 April 1994. The third phase followed on the 19 April 1999 and the fourth phase on January 2008.
24 June 1994	The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
4 June 1999	EU's Common Strategy on Russia
5 October 1999	Agreement on Cooperation on Science and Technology between the European Community and the Government of the Russian Federation
3 June 2000	Russia's Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000-2010)
9 February 2004	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia
27 April 2004	Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations
October 2004	Inauguration of the Tempus Programme Russian office in Moscow
10 May 2005	Road Maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces, including the Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects
24 October 2006	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Regulation
2007	EU Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the Russian Federation
2007	ENPI National Indicative Programme for Russian Federation (2007-2010)
2008	Agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union
26 May 2008	First meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Research in Ljubljana
June 2008	Start of the negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement
1 July 2010	New Partnership for Modernisation

*Source: author's own compilation on the basis of various sources.*

On 15 July 1991 the Council adopted the *Regulation Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and Recovery in the USSR*<sup>7</sup> (the second one followed on 19 July 1993<sup>8</sup>). The aim was ambitious: 'to promote, support and sustain the process of transformation to market economies and democratic societies in the New Independent States'<sup>9</sup> and to develop 'the local skills and know-how required for the acceleration of the economic reform process in the NIS [New Independent States] through the provision of advice, know-how and practical experience necessary for the effective functioning and management of a market-based economy and related democratic institutional structures'.<sup>10</sup>

Though the incentives were respectively high – the amount of Community funding for the implementation of the TACIS programme was €400 million for the financial year 1991 for

<sup>7</sup> "Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 2157/91 Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance to Economic Reform", 15 July 1991. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31991R2157:EN:HTML>.

<sup>8</sup> "Council Regulation (Euratom, EEC) No 2053/93 of 19 July 1993 concerning the provision of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia". <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993R2053:EN:HTML>.

<sup>9</sup> TACIS 1993. "Annual Report. Report from the Commission". COM (95) 57 final, 23.03.1995. <http://aei.pitt.edu/4782>.

<sup>10</sup> TACIS Annual Report from the Commission 1991 and 1992. "Technical Assistance Programme to the former republics of the Soviet Union". COM (93) 362 final, 28 July 1993. [http://aei.pitt.edu/5630/01/004043\\_1.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/5630/01/004043_1.pdf).



all former USSR countries, €450 million for 1992 and €510 million including humanitarian aid for 1993 (see Table 2) – the TACIS programme was built not only on clear principles of political conditionality, but there were already strong socialisation mechanisms implied. From the first year the programme was targeted not only at financial assistance to several sectors of economy identified as priority ones (e.g. energy, transport, financial services and food distribution in 1991), but also at human resources development aimed at fostering of competences and skills required in new economic and social conditions, as well as on purely training and educational programmes. In 1992, the human resources development constituted 21.4 per cent of the overall amount of financial assistance.

The TACIS programme, which acted as a main financial framework for implementation of the EU-Russia Cooperation Programme in 1994 to 2006, expired at the end of 2006. From 1 January 2007 it has been replaced by a new regulation for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI Regulation – No. 1638/2006, 24 October 2006), but a large number of TACIS projects will still be ongoing until 2013.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2:** Allocation of TACIS funds for Russia, 1991-2006 (Euro, million)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005-2006	Total
<b>TACIS-Russia</b>	212,0	111,0	160,8	150,0	161,2	133,0	132,9	139,7	101,0	92,0	90,0	90,0	95,0	94,0	298,0	<b>2.060,6</b>
<b>Regional programmes</b>	106,0	88,6	172,0	131,5	124,5	152,0	135,0	155,8	129,4	122,4	118,0	128,5	129,5	~235,6	~471,4	<b>2.400,2</b>
<b>For all countries</b>	396,6	418,9	472,2	469,7	511,2	536,0	481,8	507,2	427,7	453,6	428,2	456,5	396,5	530,6	1.079,4	<b>7.567,8</b>

Source: [http://tacis.uz/docs/Tacis\\_tables\\_EN.pdf](http://tacis.uz/docs/Tacis_tables_EN.pdf).

Meanwhile, the *EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* (PCA), valid for ten years, was signed on 24 June 1994 and entered into force in December 1997 (which replaced the 1996 *Interim Agreement*). The PCA provided the institutional framework for the EU-Russia relations in supporting the reform process in Russia, strengthening political and economic freedoms and starting a regular dialogue on political issues, based on the assumption of shared values. Again, the main objectives were clearly demonstrating the EU's will to promote mutually recognizable principles of liberal democracy in Russia, namely 'to strengthen political and economic freedoms, to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy, to provide a basis for economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation founded on the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support', and so on, with an ultimate goal of 'gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe [...] [and] establishment of a free trade area between the Community and Russia'.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting that the results of the EU's audit of the projects, supported in Russia, sometimes are far from being positive. According to the Special Report No 2/2006 of the Court of Auditors concerning the performance of projects financed under TACIS in the Russian Federation – Council Conclusions, "the efficiency of the use of TACIS funds in the Russian Federation has been low... the objectives were not met in a number of the audited projects and... projects were deemed sustainable in only a few cases... Given the size and duration of the programme, the audit results can only be seen as disappointing."

In turn, the conclusions of TEMPUS impact studies are generally positive: see, e.g. Mid-Term Evaluation of Tempus in Russia – Assessing the contribution of Tempus to the Bologna process in Russia, Final report, February 2008: [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating\\_countries/eval/russia\\_en.pdf](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/eval/russia_en.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> "Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part". 24 June 1994. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128\(01\):EN:NOT](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN:NOT).

On the incentives level, though, the implementation of PCA was assured through continuous support in the framework of the TACIS programme, where from 1999 the amount of financial support significantly decreased. According to the Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) classification of the EU political conditionality incentives, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements represent political conditionality with minor economic and financial incentives, on the one hand, and with low credibility of threats to withhold them in case of political non-compliance, on the other.

Article 63 of the PCA was specifically focused on the cooperation in education and training with the aim of raising the level of general education and professional qualifications through a number of instruments, including updating higher education and training systems in Russia; the training of public and private sector executives and senior civil servants in priority areas to be determined; cooperation between universities, cooperation between universities and firms; mobility for teachers, graduates, young scientists and researchers, administrators and young people; promoting teaching in the field of European Studies within the appropriate institutions; training of journalists, etc.

According to the PCA, it was advisable that such cooperation was institutionalised through Russia's participation in a new Community's TEMPUS programme. The first round of the new Community TEMPUS programme (*Trans European cooperation scheme for higher education*) for 1990-1993,<sup>13</sup> financed through TACIS mechanism, was launched to respond to the modernization needs of the higher education sector in Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The second phase followed in 1994: TEMPUS II was adopted by the European Council for a period of four years and broadened the list of partner countries to include Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus with an overall objective to contribute to the creation of a higher education area between the European Union and the Neighbourhood.<sup>14</sup> The decision on the TEMPUS III and TEMPUS IV was taken in 1999 and in 2008, respectively (the fourth phase being financed through the ENPI mechanism) giving the opportunity to Russia to enjoy so far the total amount of support of nearly €170 million (see Table 3).

**Table 3:** Allocation of TEMPUS funds for Russia, 1991-2006 (Euro, million)

	1994-1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Specific allocation for Russia	69,5	10,0	10,0	10,0	10,0	10,0	10,0	9,7	10,0	8,9	1,9	167,8
ENPI regional funds		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2,4	1,4	4,0	

*Sources: Brief summary of TEMPUS impact study in Russian Federation. [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/participating\\_countries/impact/russia.pdf](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/participating_countries/impact/russia.pdf); EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Reports 2007-2009; Information obtained from consultation with the EACEA – Tempus & Bilateral Cooperation with Industrialised Countries.*

On the whole, the launch of the TEMPUS programme had a crucial significance not only for the EU-Russia education cooperation, but for the development of the EU educational policy at large. Though not stressing directly the goal of democracy promotion, the

<sup>13</sup> History of the TEMPUS programme, main milestones. [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/programme/history\\_TEMPUS\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/programme/history_TEMPUS_en.php).

<sup>14</sup> About TEMPUS IV (2007-2013). [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/programme/about\\_TEMPUS\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/TEMPUS/programme/about_TEMPUS_en.php).



programme could be seen as one of the major socialisation mechanisms aimed at 'reciprocal development of human resources', 'mutual understanding between peoples and cultures of the EU and the Partner Countries', and hence, fostering European, namely democratic, norms and values.

The turn of the 21st century brought new challenges and possibilities for the development for the EU-Russia cooperation and resulted in a series of bilateral agreements. Since 2000 EU-Russia summits start to be held twice a year on a regular basis. The high point was the Saint-Petersburg summit of May 2003, when the EU (then with 15 members) recognised that Russia, while not eligible for membership, had a European dimension and granted it the status of a market economy, a vital step to membership of the World Trade Organisation. An EU-Russia permanent partnership council was set up, giving Moscow a say in European affairs where its interests were concerned.

At the same time education and training became central to the new EU economic, social and environment strategy 2010, defined at the European summit in Lisbon in March 2000<sup>15</sup> in preparation for the EU enlargement, and thus marked a new era of major changes in Community cooperation in education and training, both in terms of policy and grassroots programmes (Pepin 2006).

EU enlargement brought the European Union and Russia closer together and further strengthened the rationale for a close and effective strategic partnership, based on shared values and common interests, and giving a new shift to educational cooperation. This fundamental policy was confirmed in the *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia* (9 February 2004) and the *Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations* (27 April 2004), and followed by the adoption of a single package of Road Maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces at the Moscow Summit in May 2005: Common Economic Space; Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; Common Space of External Security; and Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects.

The *EU-Russia Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects* (10 May 2005) represented a significantly new phase in the EU-Russia educational dialogue. The Road Map was clearly combining explicit goals of intensifying cooperation in the sphere of research, education and culture – to 'intensify links and exchanges in the fields of education, youth and culture and promote the identification and adoption of best practices' – with explicit and implicit political goals of promoting democratic values – to 'capitalize on the strong EU and Russian intellectual heritage and knowledge capital to promote economic growth involving civil society of the EU and Russia and strengthening of competitiveness of economies in the EU and Russia'.<sup>16</sup>

Specifically, this should be reached by implication of a series of instruments and activities, including provision of the Russian participation in the European Community education programmes like TEMPUS, Erasmus Mundus, and Youth; promoting youth exchanges between the EU and Russia; promoting cooperation between youth organisations and youth leaders from the EU and Russia; exchange of information, expertise, and best practices through joint seminars and workshops between the EU and the Russian Federation; investigating means of promoting studies and training in Russia in the field of European Union law, EU economy, EU general and interdisciplinary studies, etc.

<sup>15</sup> See "Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Summit". 23-24 March 2000. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm).


<sup>16</sup> Roadmaps of four EU-Russia Common Spaces. [http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia\\_eu\\_four\\_common\\_spaces-%20roadmap\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20roadmap_en.pdf).

The culture section of the document more openly appealed for desired democratisation of Russia stating as the key objective 'to strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity as a basis of vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines'.

A deeper analysis of the TEMPUS and the Education Road Map programme documents helps to identify at least two crucial democracy promotion / socialisation instruments. The first one concerns academic exchanges. Indeed, on the one hand, democracy promotion is predominantly societal and bottom-up, but on the other – international (Levitsky and Way 2005). Here, the potential of education for contributing to transnational exchange plays a crucial role. The effects of these interactions are diverse, but undoubtedly cultural and academic exchanges increase the level of education as a social requisite of democracy or constitute a channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favour democratisation '[...] the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with (other) democratic countries in its international environment' (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007: 9).

Although there is no available data on the amount of mobility carried out within EU-supported projects in Russia, the positive dynamics of the overall outgoing mobility of Russian students (especially, for European destinations) is a good indicator of increasing transnational linkages of Russian students with their European colleagues, assuming that Community programmes provide by far the largest and longest-living support for cooperation between Russian and European universities.

**Figure 1:** Outgoing international mobility of Russian students, 2000-2008



*Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, various years, author's own compilation.*

Another instrument is promotion of the EU Studies in Russia. It was with the launch of TEMPUS programme when ES started to enter Russian universities. The first major project was the creation of a postgraduate ES department at Saint-Petersburg State University, the first of its kind in Russia, in 1994. The number of ES departments continued to grow under the framework of TEMPUS I and II, and by the time the TEMPUS III programme was implemented, ES had become a priority area in higher education reforms. The numbers speak for themselves: since 1994 twenty EU-Russia educational projects devoted directly to studying Europe were put in place.

In the framework of the Road Map, the European Studies Institute (Eurocollege) in Moscow was opened in 2006 a result of a joint EU-Russia initiative and was supported by Russia and the EC through a €12 million grant, paid on a parity basis from 2006 to 2013. Moreover, under the recently launched pilot project call of the Erasmus Mundus programme, the European Parliament made available 960,000 EUR to provide scholarships for university graduates from European Neighbourhood countries and Russia to follow courses in the European Union leading to a Master Degree in European Studies. Additionally, a series of EU Information Centres have been set up by the European Commission at Russian universities with the aim to promote research and teaching on European integration and to provide general information about EU policies.<sup>17</sup>

Table 4 presents a summary of the amount of financial support and intensity of the EU-Russia academic exchanges for all key EU educational programmes with Russian participation (except for the TACIS and TEMPUS programmes discussed earlier).

---

<sup>17</sup> See the list of the centres and the contact information here: [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/more\\_info/eu\\_information\\_centres/eu\\_info\\_centres\\_russia/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/more_info/eu_information_centres/eu_info_centres_russia/index_en.htm).

**Table 4:** EU education support to Russia, and intensity of academic exchanges, 2004-2010, various programmes

EU Education Programmes		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Erasmus Mundus</b>								
<b>External Cooperation Window (Action 2)</b>	<i>Financial support, € thousand</i>	--	--	--	5000	12000	7930	--
	<i>Projects supported</i>	--	--	--	1 consortium, 12 unis, 310 mobility flows	3 consortia, 34 unis, 730 mobility flows	2 consortia, 17 unis, 486 mobility flows	--
<b>Action 1, Masters Courses and Joint Doctorates</b>	<i>Projects supported</i>	--	--	--	--	2 EMMCs <sup>18</sup> , 1 EMJD <sup>19</sup> , 3 universities	2 EMMCs, 1 EMJD, 3 universities	--
<b>Action 1, Individual scholarships</b>	<i>Mobility flows</i>	9 students, 3 academics	31 students, 9 academics	36 students, 13 academics	50 students, 16 academics	81 students, 19 academics	65 students, 22 academics	--
<b>Action 4, Enhancing attractiveness projects</b>	<i>Projects supported</i>	1 project, 6 universities	1 project, 2 universities	1 project, 2 universities	1 project, 4 universities	4 universities, 4 projects	--	--
<b>Jean Monnet</b>								
<i>Financial support, € thousand</i>		12,00	28,28	18,00	13,87	65,35	75,00	19,80
<i>Projects supported</i>		1	2	1	1	2	1	1
<b>Youth in Action</b>								
<i>Projects supported</i>		--	--	--	1,600 participants, 320 projects	1,000 participants, 220 projects	600 participants, 100 projects	--

Source: author's compilation on the basis of various sources, mostly from the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) web-site [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/index\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/index_en.php).<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, in the period of 2007-2008 several key EU-Russia documents were adopted, including the *EU Country Strategy Paper on Russia (2007-2013)*, the *ENPI National Indicative Programme for Russian Federation (2007-2010)*, and a so desired by the Russian part *Agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union* playing an important role in the EU's democracy promotion efforts by facilitating international movement and exchange of persons participating in scientific, cultural and artistic activities, pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers, journalists, etc.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Erasmus Mundus Masters Courses.

<sup>19</sup> Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorates.

<sup>20</sup> The author would like to especially thank Ms. Claire Morel, the Deputy Head of the Unit C4 – International cooperation, Directorate C – Lifelong Learning: Higher Education and International Affairs, European Commission - Directorate General for Education and Culture, Ms. Sarah Moffat from the EACEA - Tempus & Bilateral Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, and Mr. Nicola Scaramuzza from the EU-Russia Cooperation Section of the Delegation of the European Union to Russia for their cooperation and the information provided.

<sup>21</sup> "Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation", 17 May 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:129:0027:0034:EN:PDF>.

In June 2008, as a result of the 21<sup>st</sup> EU-Russia Summit in Khanty-Mansiisk, the negotiations on a *New EU-Russia Agreement* started, and on 1 July 2010 the EU and Russia launched a new *Partnership for Modernisation*.

At the same time, structural and curricula reforms in Russian universities were marked by a clear strategy of European integration, including joining the *Bologna Declaration* on the European space for higher education on September 19, 2003 and the adoption of a series of legal and strategic measures to assist those changes, such as the approval of the National modernization project 'Education' (which started in 2005); the implementation of Russia's transition process to the two-level Bachelor-Master system (25 October 2007); and the elaboration of the next generation of Federal state standards of higher professional education (started in 2007), allowing more academic autonomy to universities, introducing course curricula based on compulsory and elective modules and a credit system as a measure of workload substituting academic hours, and so on.

All these inputs contributed to the fact that throughout the 2000s, EU-Russia cooperation in the field of education and research flourished reaching its peak in 2008. The year of 2008 was expected to bring the positive momentum into the relations between Russia and the European Union by starting negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement. However, the reality turned out to be different from expectations, and by 2009 the situation started to deteriorate. According to Haukkala, 'none of the Union's strategic objectives have been met: Russia has not become democratic and the basis of its current stability is debatable... What is more, Russia is increasingly belligerent towards the Union's normative agenda in the so-called "Common Neighbourhood" – and it is beginning to challenge the applicability of EU principles as the cornerstones of a wider international order' (2009: 1757). This EU disaffection resulted in significant cuts of financial education and research assistance to Russia, not to speak the deterioration of EU-Russia relations in general (see Table 5).<sup>22</sup>

**Table 5:** Tempus projects with participation of Russian partners

Year	Phase	Number of projects in Russia
1990 – 1993	TEMPUS I	---
1994 – 1999	TEMPUS II	97
2000 – 2006	TEMPUS III	199
2007 – 2010 (2013)	TEMPUS IV	42
	... 1 <sup>st</sup> call	20
	... 2 <sup>nd</sup> call	14
	... 3 <sup>rd</sup> call	8

*Source: author's own compilation on the basis of various sources, mostly from the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) website ([http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/index\\_en.php](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/index_en.php)).*

<sup>22</sup> Moreover, when analyzing the development of the EU-Russia educational cooperation, it is important to take into consideration that for Russia (in contrast to Ukraine, for instance) the EU is only one relevant player in a multipolar world system. This is reflected in an intensification of political dialogue within other international and regional organizations, (e.g. G8/G20, CIS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRIC etc.) and is translated into an increasing number of cooperation initiatives in education and research with respective regions.

## Education as a factor of democratisation

The previous section presented an analysis of the development of the EU-Russian education cooperation between 1990 and 2010 using theoretical and methodological framework of the IR social constructivist and institutionalist approaches, and the Europeanisation literature. Though the amount of financial incentives provided by the EU to Russia has been reduced, Russia enjoys quite favourable conditions of benefiting from the EU resources and programmes in the sphere of education, mainly through implementation of the *Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects*, and participating in several of the Community's largest educational programmes like TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundus. Still, most scholars agree on the apparent failure on the part of the European Union in promoting democracy in Russia (Saari 2009b; Haukkala 2009).

This section will turn to domestic conditions of democratisation in Russia by briefly describing the current state of democracy in the country and then testing a series of research hypotheses related to the democratisation function of education, like the relationship between education and the level of democratic attitudes, for example.

### *The state of democracy in Russia*

Analysis of the current situation shows that democratisation objectives in Russia have not still been met: the country ranks low on all the major democracy scales and, two decades on from transition, is some way from being a truly democratic society (Gerrits 2010; Haukkala 2009). When discussing the process in Russia, the scholars now are moving from the category of 'hybrid regimes' (Diamond 2002) to using the notions of 'new' / 'semi-authoritarianism' (Gerrits 2010), and 'autocracy' (Hassner 2008; Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010). There is common agreement about the authoritarian tendencies in Russia's polity, which are combined with some democratic elements (like free elections, or political pluralism) serving not the establishment of a democratic regime, but performing a declaratory or, in other words, a 'facade', 'virtual', 'imitation' role (Hassner 2008), or a legitimizing function (Gerrits 2010) – Levitsky and Way (2002) called this type a 'competitive authoritarian regime'.

The *Freedom in the World* survey, conducted by the Freedom House, provides an annual evaluation of the progress and decline of freedom in 194 countries and 14 select related and disputed territories. The survey measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Countries and territories are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Then each country and territory is assigned a broad category status of 'Free' (for countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5), 'Partly Free' (3.0 to 5.0), or 'Not Free' (5.5 to 7.0). Freedom House also assigns upward or downward 'trend arrows' to certain countries and territories which saw general significant positive or negative trends (Puddington 2010).

Russia ranks low on the Freedom in the World 2010 democracy scale: '6' for Political Rights score, and '5' for Civil Liberties score and is considered as being 'Not Free'. According to the report, 'Russia received a downward trend arrow due to electoral abuses, declining religious freedom, greater state controls over the presentation of history, and the repeated use of political terror against victims including human rights activists and journalists' (Freedom in the World 2010). Moreover, in 2009 only 24 per cent (47) of all countries, and 28 per cent (8 countries) of the Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union region – all representing the former Soviet Union republics – were considered 'Not Free'.



The situation appears to be even more worrying if we consider the 2002 results for Russia, when it was considered 'Partly Free' and received rights '5' score both for Political Rights and Civil Liberties indicators. This means that instead of continuing its democratisation process started in the 1990s, the country is characterized by a democratic degradation.

The *Economist Index of Democracy* 2008 corroborates the Freedom House findings, concluding that the 'authoritarian trends in Russia have continued [...] Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today's Russia has been called a "managed" (or "state managed") democracy' (Kekic 2008: 2, 10). In 2008 Russia was placed into the 'Hybrid regimes' group and ranked 107th (of 167 countries). Moreover, between 2006 and 2008 Russia recorded the third biggest democracy decline worldwide (Kekic 2008).

Just to compare, Table 6 also presents results for the most democratic European countries – namely, Sweden, Iceland and the Netherlands (the latter two have the highest level of political culture) – and the least democratic EU members – Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the scores for the most authoritarian regime of North Korea. Russia seems to be as far even from the less democratic European countries as it is close to the world's most authoritarian one.

**Table 6:** Economist Index of Democracy 2008

Country	Rank	Overall score	I	II	III	IV	V
			Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Sweden	1	9,88	10,00	10,00	10,00	9,38	10,00
Iceland	3	9,65	10,00	9,64	8,89	10,00	9,71
Netherlands	4	9,53	9,58	8,93	9,44	10,00	9,71
Romania	50	7,06	9,58	6,07	6,11	5,00	8,53
Bulgaria	52	7,02	9,17	5,36	6,11	5,63	8,82
Russia	107	4,48	5,25	2,86	5,56	3,75	5,00
North Korea	167	0,86	0,00	2,50	0,56	1,25	0,00

*Source: Kekic 2008.*

The *2010 Bertelsmann Political Transformation Index* measures a country's progress towards democracy through two main indexes: the Status Index and the Management Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). The Status Index for Russia is considered as 'limited' (5,7 out of 10, rank 65 of 128) and includes score for Democracy and Market Economy; the Management Index is 3,14 out of 100 (rank 107 of 128), which is considered to be 'weak'.

Moreover, the 2003-2010 dynamics of the Bertelsmann index for Russia clearly demonstrates the deceleration of institutional transformations in the 2000s.

**Table 7:** Bertelsmann Political Transformation Index for Russia, 2003-2010

<b>2003</b>		
<b>Status Index</b>		<b>Management Index</b>
(0-10 scale)		(0-10 scale)
<b>6,0 (rank 41)</b>		<b>5,5 (rank 31)</b>
Democracy	Market Economy	
(0-5 scale)	(0-5 scale)	
3,0	3,0	
<b>2010</b>		
<b>Status Index</b>		<b>Management Index</b>
(0-10 scale)		(0-10 scale)
<b>5,7 (rank 65)</b>		<b>3,14 (rank 107)</b>
Democracy	Market Economy	
(0-10 scale)	(0-10 scale)	
5,25	6,14	


*Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003, 2009.*

According to the 2010 Russia's country report, '[i]n terms of the country's democratic transformation, no material progress was achieved during the period under study. To consolidate its power, the political elite that surrounds Putin routinely employs measures that conflict with democratic standards [...] It is clear that the political leadership that surrounds Putin and Medvedev does not consider a qualitative enhancement of the process of democratic transformation one of the government's key tasks', (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 2-3).

### ***Education as human capital***

Though expert and scientific assessments of the state of democracy in Russia could be extremely negative, it is necessary to have a closer look at its citizens, shared democratic values and attitudes towards democracy, as democracy is not just a top-down political action, but is 'built from within societies' (Beetham *et al.* 2002). Starting with the starting with the classical modernisation theory of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), the level of education of country's citizens is widely considered as a determinant of the level of human capital and, hence, a prerequisite for the country's successful democratic transition. According to our hypothesis, education is one of the key mechanisms of democratic socialisation and nurturing of democratic values and civic competences in the citizens.

**Figure 2:** Level of education in Russia – the highest level attained, 1995-2006



Source: *World Values Survey for Russia, 1995 (2<sup>nd</sup> wave) and 2006 (5<sup>th</sup> wave)*, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.


Even though the level of primary and secondary education enrolment in Russia has been declining since 1995, the *higher education* enrolment rate, as well as the percentage of citizens with *higher education*, has risen (see Figure 2 and Table 8).

**Table 8:** Level of educational enrolment in Russia, 2000-2008

	Enrolment in primary education		Enrolment in secondary education		Enrolment in tertiary education	
	2000	2008	2000	2008	2000	2008
Enrolment (people)	6 138 300	4 968 710	14 138 847	8 415 648	6 331 324	9 446 408
Per cent of the whole population	4,2%	3,5%	9,6%	5,9%	4,3%	6,7%

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>.

By level of education Russia falls into one cluster with such countries as Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and Japan (Kosova 2009). Although the average number of years spent by Russian students in educational institutions is somewhat lower than in the most developed countries, however, by the share of graduates who received a higher education certificate, Russia is among five leading countries (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3:** The level of education in Russia and in the world

Source: Kosova 2009.

This is a crucial (though, preliminary) conclusion showing that the 'Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis' of direct positive correlation between the level of education in the country and the state of democracy in it could also work for Russia<sup>23</sup> and proving the validity of our main research question concerning the role of external educational policy in country's democratisation.

The context is amplified by a significant decrease in prestige of Russian education in comparison with the best examples in the world. Though one-third of the Russian population thinks that the quality of Russian higher education today corresponds to the world standards (28 per cent), 41 per cent are convinced that it is lower than world standards (though in 2001 this indicator equalled to 35 per cent, see Table 9). People with higher education are those who are more critical towards the quality of Russian education and those whose opinion changed most dramatically: if in 2001 29 per cent of this category thought that the quality Russian education was below the world standard, in 2007 they already constituted half of the group (50 per cent).

<sup>23</sup> For example, John Dewey in 1916 in *Democracy and Education* suggested caution in making optimistic prospects of democratic developments in Russia based on the great expansion of education.

**Table 9:** In your opinion, Russian education, in general, is higher or lower the world level?

Answer options	Aug.01	May.05	Jan.07
Higher than the world level	15%	10%	7%
Corresponds to the world level	24%	23%	28%
Lower than the world level	35%	37%	41%
Don't know	26%	30%	23%

*Source: "Quality of the higher education in Russia", "Public opinion" Foundation, 21 January 2007.*

We can further suppose that it is not only the 'quantity', for example the level of education enrolment or education attainment, that effects successful democratic transitions, but also the 'quality' of education, such as the norms and values nurtured in students, that matters. To investigate this, the article will analyse the democratic public attitudes in Russia and try to identify whether the more educated part of population is more democratically oriented.

### *Education and democratic attitudes*

Following Almond and Verba, most scholars agree that 'the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process-upon the political culture' (Almond and Verba 1963, 498). In the case of Russia, the population's approval of democracy *per se* as voiced in representative polls is moderate to high, depending on the wording of the question. According to the 'Levada Analytical Center' data of December 2009, half of the population (57 per cent) thinks that Russia needs democracy (see Table 10),<sup>24</sup> but just 39 per cent recognize that democratic development is Russia's reality nowadays, and 13 per cent believe that the country is approaching dictatorship (see Table 11).

**Table 10:** Do you think that Russia needs democracy?

Answer options	Jun.05	Dec.06	Dec.07	Jun.08	Dec.09
Yes	66%	56%	67%	62%	57%
No	21%	27%	17%	20%	23%
Don't know	13%	18%	17%	18%	20%

*Source: "What is Democracy and does Russia Need it?", Levada Analytical Center, 21 January 2010.*

<sup>24</sup> It is not a surprising fact since it is confirmed by other Russian and international empirical studies (see e.g. *New Russia Barometer* – Rose et al., 2006). Though, according to Gerrits (2010: 40-41), "the research findings are not all consistent. While the New Russia Barometer concludes that throughout the 1990s and 2000s two-thirds of the respondents rejected dictatorship, and only one-third supported it; Diamond concludes on the basis of other polls that in most of the European republics of the former Soviet Union, Russia included, only minorities say no to 'all authoritarian options'" ( See Diamond and Plattner 2008).

**Table 11:** In which direction, in your opinion, is developing political life nowadays in Russia?

Answer options	Oct.05	Oct.06	Oct.10
Development of democracy	32%	33%	39%
Establishment of previous Soviet order	7%	6%	10%
Establishment of dictatorship, authoritarian regime	12%	14%	13%
Rise of disorder, anarchy	30%	22%	16%
Don't know	18%	24%	22%

Source: "Democratic freedoms and Russian politics", Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

Though 23 per cent of the Russian population think that Russia needs a European or American style of democracy, 30 per cent of the respondents consider Western democracy and Western culture 'not applicable' for Russia, and 12 per cent perceive them as a 'dangerous and destroying' (see Table 12).

**Table 12:** What kind of democracy needs Russia?

Answer options	Jun.05	Dec.06	Dec.07	Jun.08	Dec.09
Like in development countries in Europe, America	24%	18%	22%	20%	23%
Like it was in the Soviet Union	16%	13%	10%	13%	14%
Absolutely specific, corresponding to national traditions and specificity of Russia	45%	48%	47%	45%	43%
Russia does not need democracy	6%	10%	7%	8%	7%
Don't know	10%	11%	14%	15%	13%

Source: "Democratic freedoms and Russian politics", Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

The vast majority of the Russian population has no strong opinion on the idea of democracy. This implies a sort of silent consent to democratic norms, but represents no principal opposition to undemocratic norms (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). 43 per cent of the Russian population believe that Russia needs an absolutely specific kind of democracy, corresponding to national traditions and specificity of Russia (43 per cent), which they associate primarily with economic development (39 per cent), various freedoms, for example, freedom of speech, media, religion (38 per cent), as well as stability and order in



the country (37 per cent), and not with such crucial democratic principles as democratic elections or human rights.<sup>25</sup>

Gibson *et al.* (1992: 333-334) argued that 'perhaps the key cultural enemy of democracy in the Soviet union is the desire for order'. It seems that two decades so far the situation has not changed significantly. For 42 per cent of Russian citizens democracy cannot exist without order, and 59 per cent of the population would prefer maintaining order in Russia even at the cost of violations of some democratic principles and limitations of personal freedoms (see Table 13).

**Table 13:** What, in your opinion, is more important for Russia: order or democracy?

Answer options	Sep.96	Apr.00	Dec.05	Dec.09
Order, even at the cost of violations of some democratic principles and limitations of personal freedoms	78%	81%	69%	59%
Democracy, even if following democratic principles can give freedom to destroying and criminal groups	9%	9%	18%	18%
Don't know	14%	10%	13%	22%

*Source: "Democratic freedoms and Russian politics", Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.*

As it was supposed, the population in Russia nowadays is also characterized by a very low level of political interest and participation: 64 per cent of citizens are not interested in politics and 64 per cent do not think of participating in political life, even at their city's level.<sup>26</sup> This attitude is closely connected with the situation of factual absence of alternative decisions in all spheres of life, which results in absence of trust towards government and public authorities, and a very specific perception of 'freedom'. The majority of the Russian citizens (84 per cent) are aware of their inability to influence any political decisions and processes (see Table 14). More than half of the population (52 per cent) think that the majority of social movements and initiatives in the Russian society nowadays appear as a result of the initiative of the government authorities or other political parties, who are in the opposition to the current power.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> "Democratic freedoms and Russian politics", Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

<sup>26</sup> *Idem.*


<sup>27</sup> *Idem.*

**Table 14:** In your opinion, are you able to influence political processes in Russia?

Answer options	Jun.08	Jun.10
Definitely, yes	1%	3%
Most probably, yes	7%	7%
Most probably, not	36%	30%
Definitely, not	51%	54%
Don't know	5%	6%

Source: *"Democratic freedoms and Russian politics"*, Levada Analytical Center, 12 November 2010.

But does this negative picture change if we analyse the most highly educated part of Russian society? Preliminary analysis of the correlation between several democratic attitudes, namely interest in politics, political participation, assessment of the importance of democracy and satisfaction with democracy, confirms that the level of education is a positive indicator of democratic perceptions and attitudes.<sup>28</sup> According to Inglehart and Welzel (2003), political participation and self-expression are among the core values constituting a specific democratic type of a political culture, such as "more deeply rooted orientations of tolerance, trust and participation which can guarantee the presence of effective democracy present at the societal level" (Inglehart and Welzel 2003: 69). Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, the higher the education level of a citizen is, the higher is his interest in politics. Or, in other words, people with higher education are more often interested in politics than citizens with education below tertiary level.


**Figure 4:** Correlation between interest in politics and educational level

Source: *World Values Survey, 5<sup>th</sup> wave, 2006*.

<sup>28</sup> The level of educational attainment was grouped into two categories: (1) below tertiary level, and (2) university and upper-level tertiary education. The first reason is that the vast majority of EU-Russia educational cooperation programmes are targeted at higher education. Secondly, the difference in democratic values of people with non-university and university education is statistically higher than between people of other educational levels (primary and secondary, or secondary and university).

Similarly, people with university education will more probably show a higher level of political participation and, for example, join political organisations than people with lower levels of education (see Figure 5).


**Figure 5:** Correlation between political participation (joining political organisations) and educational level



Source: "General political activity", Foundation "Public Opinion" (FOM), 13 April 2006.

Although one can argue that support for democracy *per se* cannot be considered to be a valid predictor of democracy as at this point of history a favourable opinion of democracy is extremely widespread, this is not actually the case of Russia. But though the overall level of public assessment of the importance of democracy is not as high as in developed democratic countries (61 per cent), the level of citizens' education is positively associated with their opinion about the importance of democracy. For more educated Russian citizens democratic regime is more significant, than for less educated individuals (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6:** Correlation between the assessment of the importance of democracy and the educational level



Source: *"Democracy in Russia", "Public Opinion" Foundation, 31 March 2005.*

The image of democracy also depends upon individual's level of education. If we compare positive and negative associations that Russian citizens have with the notion of democracy, the tendency of people with higher education to perceive democracy in a positive way is significantly higher than that of those who were not socialized in the university (see Tables 15 and 16).

**Table 15:** Associations with the notion of democracy

Positive associations	%	Negative associations	%
Just system of governance with participation of all citizens on equal basis	27%	Idle talk, demagoguery	19%
Guarantees of respect by the government of civil rights and liberties	27%	This is a state regime for "normal countries", not for us	12%
Possibility to criticize authorities of all levels	13%	Chaos, disorder, anarchy	11%
Division of power and public accountability of authorities	9%	System of governance that proved its inefficiency in Russia	10%
Free competition of political parties for electorate	9%	Absence of a "firm hand" in governance, dispersed responsibility	8%

Source: *"Russian's Image of Democracy", Levada Analytical Center, 15 October 2009.*


**Table 16:** Relation of positive to negative associations with the notion of democracy

In general	1,5
Education	
Higher	1,6
Secondary, college	1,3
Below secondary	1,0

*Source: "Russian's Image of Democracy", Levada Analytical Center, 15 October 2009.*

Finally, the most educated part of Russian population is also the most realistic with regard to the country's democratisation successes and drawbacks. People with higher education are more likely to assess the current situation as a 'lack of democracy' than citizens with lower educational levels (see Figure 7).

**Figure 7:** Correlation between satisfaction with democracy and educational level



*Source: "Democracy in Russia", "Public Opinion" Foundation, 31 March 2005.*

These facts demonstrating that the higher level of education (and its content) is positively associated with civic participation and democratic attitudes provide additional support for the hypothesis concerning the role of education (especially, higher education) as a prerequisite for democracy in Russia. Education can directly increase these attitudes by developing necessary democratic competences and values and providing relevant information and experience, as well as implicitly reinforce them, since those with higher levels of education are more likely to have higher human and social capital and, hence,

demonstrate higher levels of social trust and satisfaction with life (other crucial cultural prerequisites of democracy).

### Concluding remarks

By bringing together two different scholarly traditions, namely the literature on democracy promotion and that on democratisation, the article has developed a new perspective for understanding the EU democratic promotion activities and the role of education (and educational policy) in the democratisation of Russia. It has also contributed to the understanding of the EU's educational policy as a democracy promotion mechanism. Democratic norms and values constitute the core of the EU's politics and the fabric of a modern society. By tracing the history of EU-Russia educational cooperation, the primacy of values on the EU's normative agenda is stressed, and education is shown as one of the EU's key socialisation mechanisms for promoting and fostering democracy in Russia. At the same time, the article has demonstrated that, in the current ambiguous socio-political situation in Russia, the level of education is a valid predictor of more democratic public attitudes, and hence, should be considered a strong factor in the democratisation of a country. Given the current status of the EU-Russia relations, the widening of the so-called 'values gap' (Haukkala 2005) and the necessity of a real strategic partnership based on common interests and shared values (Larionova 2007), it is exactly in the educational domain that the EU could exercise its 'soft' normative power<sup>29</sup> and influence the development of Russia through the democratic socialisation of its citizens.

\*\*\*

### References

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A. and Yared, P. (2005) "From Education to Democracy", *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 95, pp. 44-49.
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. (2003) "Fractionalization", *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2): 155-194.
- Alexander, J. (2002). *Political Culture in Post-communist Russia: Formlessness and Recreation in a Traumatic Transition*. New York: Palgrave.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963) *The Civic Culture*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1980) *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Barro, R. J. (1999). "The Determinants of Democracy", *Journal of Political Economy*, 107 (6), pp. 158-83.
- Beetham, D. et al. (2002) *International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003) *BTI 2003*. Available at: [http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BERT\\_Tabelle\\_ENGL.pdf](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BERT_Tabelle_ENGL.pdf).
- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2009) *BTI 2010 – Russia Country Report*. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- Burnell, P. and Schlumberger, O. (2010) "Promoting Democracy – Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes", *Contemporary Politics* 16 (1), pp. 1-15.
- Checkel, J. T. (2005) "International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework", *International Organisations*, 59 (4), pp. 553-588.

<sup>29</sup> See Ian Manners' conceptualisation of the EU as a "Normative Power Europe" (Manners 2002).



- Dahl, R.A. (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R.A. (1992) "Democracy and Human Rights under Different Conditions of Development", In A. Eide and B. Hagtvet (eds) *Human Rights in Perspective: A Global Assessment*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 235-251.
- Dewey, J. (1916) *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Macmillan.
- Diamond, L. (1992) "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered". In *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset*, edited by G. Marks and L. Diamond. Newbury Park, California: Sage, 93-139
- Diamond, L. (ed.) (1993) *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. L. Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
- Diamond, L. (2002) "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes", *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2), pp. 21-35.
- Durkheim, E. (1956) *Education and Sociology*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Edvassen, U. (1997) "A Cultural Approach to Understanding Modes of Transition to Democracy", *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9 (1), pp. 211-234.
- Emerson, M., Aydin, S., Noutcheva, G., Tocci, N., Vahl, M. and Youngs, R. (2005) "The Reluctant Debutante, The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood". *Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document*, 223.
- Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (eds.) (2003) *The Politics of Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Finnemore, M. (1993) "International Organisations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation and Science Policy", *International Organisation*, 47 (4), pp. 565-597.
- Finnemore, M. (1996) "Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism", *International Organisation*, 50 (2), pp. 325-347.
- Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organisation*, 52 (4), pp. 887-917.
- Fish, M.S. and Choudhry, O. (2007) "Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist World", *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 254-282.
- Freedom in the World (2010) "Country Report for Russia", *Freedom House*. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010>.
- Gerrits, A. W. M. (2010) "Exploring Democracy in the Russian Federation: Political Regime, Public Opinion and International Assistance", *Contemporary Politics*, 16 (1), pp. 33-48.
- Gibson, J. L., Duch, R. M. and Tedin, K. L. (1992) "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union", *The Journal of Politics*, 54 (2), pp. 329-371.
- Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G. and Shleifer, A. (2007) "Why Does Democracy Need Education?", *Journal of Economic Growth* 12 (2): pp. 77-99.
- Grabbe, H. (2006) *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanisation through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hassner, P. (2008) "Russia's Transition to Autocracy", *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (21), pp. 5-15.
- Haukkala, H. (2005) "The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU's Russia Policy", Paper presented at the *VII ICCESS World Congress*, Berlin, 26 July.
- Haukkala, H. (2009) "Lost in Translation? Why the EU has Failed to influence Russia's Development", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61 (10), pp. 1757-1775.
- Huntington, S. (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3, 22-49.
- Huntington, S. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Inglehart, R. (1990) *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2004) *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2003) "Political Culture: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages", *Comparative Politics*, 36 (1), pp. 61-79.
- Kamens, D. (1988) "Education and Democracy: A Comparative Institutional Analysis", *Sociology of Education*, 61, pp. 114-127.
- Kekic, L. (2008) "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008", *The Economist*, 22 October.
- Kelley, J. G. (2004a) *Ethnic Politics in Europe. The Power of Norms and Size*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kelley, J. G. (2004b) "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialisation by International Institutions", *International Organisations*, 58 (3), pp. 425-457.
- Kosova, L. (2009) *Socio-cultural Potential for Modernisation: Russia in International Comparative Context*, Paper presented at the 10<sup>th</sup> International Scientific Conference of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 07-09 April 2009, Moscow.
- Larionova, M. (ed.) (2007) *Russia and EU Creating the Common Higher Education Area: Scenarios for the Future*. Moscow: Higher School of Economics.
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2002) "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2), pp. 51-65.
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2005) "International Linkage and Democratisation", *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (3), pp. 20-34.
- Lijphart, A. (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, J. (1973) "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or an Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime", in A. Stepan (ed.) *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 233-254.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959) "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Economic Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review*, 53 (1), pp. 69-105.
- Lipset, S.M. (1963 [1960]) *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. NY: Anchor Books.
- Lipset, S. M. (1994) "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address", *American Sociological Review*, 59, pp. 1-22.
- Manners, I. (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (2), pp. 235-258.
- Marsh, C. (2005) "Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy", *Democratizatsiya*, 13:3, 449-462.
- McNeely, C. (1995) "Prescribing National Education Policies: The Role of International Organisations", *Comparative Education Review*, 39 (4), pp. 483-507.
- Meyer, J., Boli, J., Thomas, G. and Ramirez, F. (1997) "World Society and the Nation-State", *American Journal of Sociology*, 103 (1), pp. 144-181.
- Mundy, K. (2008) "Global Governance, Educational Change", *Comparative Education*, 3 (3), pp. 339-357.
- Noutcheva, G. (2010) "The European Union and Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood", Paper presented at the "European Studies' State-of-the-Art" conference, Lisbon, 23 June.
- O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Papkov, I. (2007) *Orthodoxy and Democracy in Russia: New Interpretations*, PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University.
- Pepin, L. (2006) *The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training*. Luxembourg: European Commission.

- Pfister, T. (2010) "European Studies as Agents of European Integration", Paper presented at the *ISA 51st Annual Convention*, New Orleans, 17-20 February.
- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000) *Democracy and Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pridham, J. (2005) *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Puddington, A. (2010) "Freedom in the World 2010: Erosion of freedom intensifies", *Freedom House*. Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW\\_2010\\_Overview\\_Essay.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Overview_Essay.pdf).
- Putnam, R. D. (1993) "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life", *American Prospect*, 13, pp. 35-42.
- Pye, L. and Verba, S. (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rise, T., Popp, S. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saari, S. (2009a) *Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Saari, S. (2009b) "European Democracy Promotion in Russia before and after the 'Colour' Revolutions", *Democratization*, 16 (4), pp. 732-755.
- Schimmelfenning, F. (2005) "Strategic Calculation and International Socialisation: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe", *International Organisation*, 59 (4), pp. 827-860.
- Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) (2005) *The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2006) *International Socialisation in Europe: European Organisations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schimmelfenning, F. and Scholtz, H. (2007) "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development, and Transnational Exchange", *National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR), Working Paper*, 9.
- Spilimbergo, A. (2009) "Democracy and Foreign Education", *American Economic Review*, 99 (1), pp. 528-543.
- Youngs, R. (ed.) (2008) *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood?* Madrid: FRIDE.
- Youngs, R. (2009) "Democracy Promotion as External Governance?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16 (6), pp. 895-915.

\*\*\*