With the use of a liberal/rational framework as a baseline, this article examines whether economic asymmetric interdependence can yield political influence. More specifically, it examines exogenous gas supply to the EU and develops a theory that provides testable hypotheses aiming to answer whether the export of gas provides political advantages for the sender state. The outlined hypotheses, and more, are tested in a cross sectional time series dataset, where votes in the United Nations (UN) Assembly are used as the dependent variable, as a measurement for the policy preferences of states. The empirical findings support the prediction made in the theory section. Gas dependence has a conditional effect on policy behaviour. The sender government has to be a sizeable international power, whilst the recipient government should have low military capabilities and be dependent on foreign support.
Resource dependence, Natural gas, European Union, Russia
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.Material published in the JCER is done so under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence, with copyright remaining with the author.
- Articles published online in the JCER cannot be published in another journal without explicit approval of the JCER editor.
- Authors can 'self-archive' their articles in digital form on their personal homepages, funder repositories or their institutions' archives provided that they link back to the original source on the JCER website. Authors can archive pre-print, post-print or the publisher's version of their work.
- Authors agree that submitted articles to the JCER will be submitted to various abstracting, indexing and archiving services as selected by the JCER.